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Event Notification Report for April 14, 2003








                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

                              Operations Center



                              Event Reports For

                           04/11/2003 - 04/14/2003



                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **



39749  39750  39751  39752  39753  39754  



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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39749       |

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| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/11/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:23[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        04/11/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:45[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAT RYAN                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/11/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MICHAEL PARKER       R3      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     M/R        Y       30       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

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| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO VIBRATIONS ON THE MAIN TURBINE                    |

|                                                                              |

| "A manual scram was initiated at 0145 on April 11, 2003, due to vibrations   |

| on the Main Turbine trending up to the trip setpoint.  A scheduled plant     |

| shutdown was in progress for a maintenance outage [of the 'B' recirculation  |

| flow control valve sensor].  All plant systems operated normally on the      |

| scram.  The plant is shutdown at 0% power in Mode 3.  The turbine vibrations |

| returned to normal values after the turbine tripped."                        |

|                                                                              |

| All rods inserted normally.  All safety and electrical systems operated as   |

| designed during and after the reactor trip.  The plant is stable and using   |

| normal feedwater.  There was nothing unusual or not understood.              |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39750       |

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| FACILITY: DAVIS BESSE              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/11/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  OH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:17[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-R-LP                         |EVENT DATE:        04/11/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:00[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LARRY MYERS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/11/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE RIPLEY                  +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MICHAEL PARKER       R3      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |GENE IMBRO           NRR     |

|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

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| UNANALYZED CONDITION COULD CAUSE HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION PUMP DAMAGE         |

|                                                                              |

| "As a result of an in-depth design and performance capability review, a      |

| non-conforming condition was identified whereby, utilizing only safety grade |

| equipment, long term cyclic repressurizations of the reactor coolant system  |

| (RCS) may occur following a subset of postulated very small Loss of Coolant  |

| Accidents (LOCAs) with effective break sizes in a range between 0.0021 ft2   |

| to 0.0045 ft2.  The repressurization cycles were not previously analyzed,    |

| but are predicted by a new application of the license basis 10 CFR 50.46     |

| Evaluation Model.  Although non-safety grade equipment would be available to |

| prevent repressurizatons, if only safety grade LOCA mitigating equipment is  |

| credited, these repressurizazion cycles could be postulated to damage both   |

| High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps.  This could occur due to pump           |

| deadheading after HPI recirculation flow back to the borated water storage   |

| tank is procedurally isolated upon tank low level and pump suction has been  |

| manually transferred to the containment emergency sump at minimum of         |

| approximately 20 hours into the postulated event.  Minimum recirculation     |

| flow back to the borated water storage tank initially provided protection    |

| against deadheading the pump and previously assumed reactor coolant system   |

| pressures would have allowed continued HPI pump flow.  During part of the    |

| newly predicted repressurization cycle, RCS pressure would exceed the        |

| shutoff head of the HPI pumps.  Without minimum flow, the pumps would be     |

| damaged.                                                                     |

|                                                                              |

| "This issue is currently evaluated by Condition Report 02-06702.             |

| Davis-Besse has determined this condition is reportable under               |

| 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in ..'The nuclear    |

| power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades     |

| plant safety.'  Although the plant is currently in cold shutdown and the HPI |

| pumps are not required to be operable per the Technical Specifications, this |

| issue represents a historical condition that existed within the last three   |

| years."                                                                      |

|                                                                              |

| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                        |

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   39751       |

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| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2003|

|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:02[EDT]|

| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        04/11/2003|

|           COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL                  |EVENT TIME:        18:30[EDT]|

|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2003|

|    CITY:  COLUMBIA                 REGION:  2  +-----------------------------+

|  COUNTY:  RICHLAND                  STATE:  SC |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|LICENSE#:  SNM-1107              AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |

|  DOCKET:  07001151                             |JANET SCHLUETER      NMSS    |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CARL SNYDER                  |                             |

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |

+------------------------------------------------+                             |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

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| LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY PROTECTION                                        |

|                                                                              |

| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                      |

|                                                                              |

| Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility,         |

| Columbia SC, low enriched (less than or equal to  5.0 wt. % U-235) PWR fuel  |

| fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.           |

|                                                                              |

| Time and Date of Event:  18:30 hours, April 11, 2003.                        |

|                                                                              |

| Reason for Notification:                                                     |

|                                                                              |

| On March 19, 2003, six UF6 cylinders were placed on hold because             |

| Westinghouse questioned if the cylinders were properly tested following      |

| repair. The ANSI N14.1 nameplate had been removed from supporting "feet"     |

| and-welded directly onto the pressure vessel dome. The "U" Stamp had been    |

| replaced with an "R" Stamp and documentation from the shipper indicated that |

| the fillet weld on the dome had undergone dye-penetrant testing. The UF6     |

| cylinder pressure vessel, however, had not undergone hydrostatic testing.    |

|                                                                              |

| The "hold" consisted of a flag in the UF6 cylinder tracking computer         |

| database, which was inserted as a manual edit. The hold flag should have     |

| prevented the cylinders from being transferred into work in process (WIP) to |

| allow processing.  On March 31, 2003 one of  the six cylinders was allowed   |

| by the tracking database to be processed. A second cylinder with the hold    |

| flag was allowed to be processed on April 1, 2003.                           |

|                                                                              |

| Unaware of the failure of the hold flags, the safety analysis proceeded. On  |

| April 10, 2003 NCS and process engineering completed the safety review begun |

| on March 19, 2003 of the nameplate welding using applicable pressure vessel  |

| standards including an on-site interview with a certified boiler code        |

| inspector. The conclusion of the safety review was that the "R" Stamp        |

| cylinders met the ANSI N 14.1 requirements and were acceptable for           |

| processing.                                                                  |

|                                                                              |

| On April 11, 2003, NCS began a review of the sequence of events leading to   |

| the processing of the two hold tagged cylinders. At approximately 18:30      |

| hours April 11, 2003 NCS completed its final interview. Shortly thereafter,  |

| it was determined that there had been a loss of previously documented        |

| double contingency protection. NCS immediately informed the EH&S manager of  |

| the event.                                                                   |

|                                                                              |

| Double Contingency Protection:                                               |

|                                                                              |

| The parameters that directly affect neutron multiplication for the           |

| vaporizers are mass (density) and geometry (level control). A criticality    |

| could be possible in a vaporizer under the following conditions:             |

|                                                                              |

| Sufficient material is discharged from the cylinder into the vaporizer in    |

| order to form a critical UO2F2 H2O density (optimum moderation), and water   |

| slab height increases to a critical height.                                  |

|                                                                              |

| Cylinder  integrity maintains mass control.  The U235 mass control depends   |

| upon maintaining the structural integrity of the cylinder to  ensure that no |

| material is released due to a sudden uncontrollable rupture.                 |

|                                                                              |

| The geometry control consists of ensuring that condensate drains properly    |

| from the vaporizer, and detecting water accumulation should it occur.        |

|                                                                              |

| It has been determined that less than previously documented double           |

| contingency protection remained for the system and that greater than a safe  |

| mass was involved. Double Contingency protection was restored within 4       |

| hours. In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107),         |

| paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criterion for a 24-hour     |

| notification.                                                                |

|                                                                              |

| As Found Condition:                                                          |

|                                                                              |

| See "Reason for Notification." As detailed above, the Investigation found    |

| that the cylinders were safe to process. In fact, there never was an actual  |

| safety issue. The event did point out a weakness in our control of UF6       |

| cylinders that will be addressed.                                            |

|                                                                              |

| Summary of Activity:                                                         |

|                                                                              |

| 1) The four remaining cylinders were physically tagged out.                  |

| 2) A complete inventory and inspection of all cylinders on-site was          |

| performed.                                                                   |

| 3) It was verified that no movement of UF6 cylinders onto the site or into   |

| processing will occur for the next week.                                     |

|                                                                              |

| Conclusions:                                                                 |

|                                                                              |

| 1) Loss of double contingency protection occurred. Greater than a safe mass  |

| was involved.                                                                |

| 2) At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the      |

| public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.          |

| 3)The Incident Review Committee (IRC) determined that this is a safety       |

| significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.                |

| 4) Notification was the result of an event, not a deficient NCS analysis.    |

| 5) A causal analysis will be performed.                                      |

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39752       |

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| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2003|

|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:55[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:47[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVEN SULLIVAN              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JAMES TRAPP          R1      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM- ALL RODS FULLY INSERTED                             |

|                                                                              |

| At 1847 hours on 04/12/03 the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2       |

| experienced an automatic reactor scram and shutdown following an air line    |

| failure which resulted in the closure of the "D" outboard main steam line    |

| isolation valve.  The closure of this valve resulted in a Reactor High       |

| Pressure Automatic Scram Signal.  This caused a actuation of the Alternate   |

| Rod Insertion system on reactor high pressure of 1106 psi.  All rods fully   |

| inserted. Additionally reactor vessel water level lowered to approximately   |

| negative 10 inches which resulted in a RPS and  PCIS Group 2 & 3             |

| isolations.  All systems activated as required. The outage control center is |

| currently staffed and repair/planning and restart preparation activities are |

| in progress.  Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station Unit 2 plant conditions are  |

| currently stable.                                                            |

|                                                                              |

| A copper air line going to the solenoid valve which operated the "D"         |

| outboard main steam isolation valve failed.  Cause of the line failure is    |

| unknown at this time.  The offsite electrical grid is stable and all         |

| emergency core cooling systems are fully operable if needed.                 |

|                                                                              |

| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39753       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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| FACILITY: SEQUOYAH                 REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2003|

|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  TN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:50[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:21[EDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MITCHEL TAGGART              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/13/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |

|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|                                                   |                          |

|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| TURBINE TRIP CAUSES REACTOR TRIP AT SEQOUYAH UNIT 2                          |

|                                                                              |

| "While resetting a turbine trip supervisory module, the unit 2 turbine       |

| tripped from "Turbine High Vibration Turbine Trip" at 22:21. The reactor     |

| tripped as a result of the turbine trip. Investigation is pending concerning |

| the turbine vibration equipment.                                             |

|                                                                              |

| "Auxiliary feed water system initiated as designed. All secondary plant      |

| equipment performed as expected.                                             |

|                                                                              |

| "The plant is being maintained in Mode 3 at NOT/NOP, 547  degrees F and 2235 |

| psig, with auxiliary feed water supplying the Steam Generators and steam     |

| dumps removing the decay heat."                                              |

|                                                                              |

| All control rods inserted into the core with no problems. The NRC Resident   |

| Inspector was notified.                                                      |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+



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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39754       |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/13/2003|

|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:06[EDT]|

|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/13/2003|

+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:56[CDT]|

| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RON GIBBS                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/13/2003|

|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |

|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID LOVELESS       R4      |

|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |

|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)  DEGRADED CONDITION     |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

|                                                |                             |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |

+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+

|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |

|                                                   |                          |

|                                                   |                          |

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

| REACTOR VESSEL BOTTOM HEAD DEGRADED CONDITION                                |

|                                                                              |

| "On 4/12/2003, during the Unit 1 11th (1RE11) refueling outage, an           |

| inspection was performed of the vessel bottom head. This bare metal          |

| inspection identified a potential leak indication at the head to penetration |

| interface for Bottom Mounted Instrumentation (BMI) penetrations 1 and 46.    |

| There was a small amount of residue around the outer circumference of the    |

| BMI penetrations. No wastage was observed. Samples of the residue were taken |

| and the area was cleaned with demineralized water. Chemical sample results   |

| available as of 1300 on 4/13/2003 are not conclusive; however, they have     |

| confirmed that the residue found at the Penetration 46 contains boron,       |

| indicating that this could be an RCS leak. The residue removed from          |

| Penetration 1 was characterized as 'gummy' and its composition is still      |

| under investigation. Additional exams are planned to confirm the likely      |

| origin of the residue and to determine the scope of any repairs. There has   |

| been no indication of RCS leakage observed at the BMI penetrations during    |

| previous operational cycles. This notification is being made in accordance   |

| with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)."                                             |

|                                                                              |

| Unit 1 will remain in mode 5 until appropriate corrective actions are        |

| identified.  The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.               |

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