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Event Notification Report for November 19, 2002


                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           11/18/2002 - 11/19/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

39121  39236  39371  39372  39382  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39121       |
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| FACILITY: NORTH ANNA               REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/09/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:31[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/09/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WILLIAMS                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/18/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNUSUAL EVENT         |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |BOB DENNIG           EO      |
|AAEC 50.72(a) (1) (i)    EMERGENCY DECLARED     |RICHARD WESSMAN      IRO     |
|                                                |BUTCH STINEDURF      FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| NOUE DECLARED DUE TO LOW  WATER LEVEL IN LAKE ANNA                           |
|                                                                              |
| The plant declared an NOUE due to lake level falling below 246' which was    |
| caused by lack of rainfall.  This level may continue to decrease if the      |
| drought continues.  If the level reaches 244', they will enter TS 3.7.5.1    |
| requiring the plant to be in hot standby within 6 hours and cold shutdown    |
| within 30 hours at which time they can exit the NOUE.   However, if the      |
| level increases to 246.4' they will also exit the NOUE.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified along with State and Local           |
| agencies.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 11/18/02 at 08:55 FROM RON BUTLER TO RICH LAURA ***            |
|                                                                              |
| Notification on 11/18/02 at 08:55 by the Licensee (Ron Butler) that Lake     |
| Anna levels increased above the minimum level of 246'4'' to 246'9'' on       |
| 11/18/02 and the UE was terminated at 08:51. Notified R2DO (David Ayres),    |
| NRR EO (Stuart Richards), FEMA (Rene Zapata) and DIRO Manager (Joe           |
| Holonich).                                                                   |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39236       |
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| REP ORG:  GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/01/2002|
|LICENSEE:  GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:24[EDT]|
|    CITY:  San Jose                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        10/01/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:             [PDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/18/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PETE ESELGROTH       R1      |
|                                                |JAY HENSON           R2      |
+------------------------------------------------+SONIA BURGESS        R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JASON S. POST                |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  |WILLIAM DEAN         NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+VERN HODGE           NRR     |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| PART 21.21 REPORT INVOLVING STABILITY OPTION III                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Subject: Stability Option III: Possible Successive Confirmation Count       |
| Resets                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "This letter provides notification of a 60 Day Interim Report per  21.21    |
| (a)(2) for plants that have selected stability long-term solution Option     |
| III. The basis for this notification is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) has not  |
| completed the evaluation of a potential problem with the algorithm that      |
| provides the licensing basis Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety      |
| Limit protection for stability Option III. The algorithm determines          |
| Successive Confirmation Count (SCC) of an oscillating power signal. A        |
| reactor trip is generated when SCC and oscillation amplitude reach their     |
| trip setpoints in accordance with the Option III and reactor protection      |
| system configuration. The concern is that the oscillation period could       |
| change for an oscillation that initiates while reactor state conditions are  |
| changing rapidly (e.g., during a two-recirculation pump trip event) and      |
| cause the SCC to reset, thus delaying the reactor scram.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "GE believes that there is low potential for the MCPR Safety Limit to be     |
| violated as a result of this concern. However, a 60 Day Interim Report is    |
| required since the evaluation has not been completed. Further information is |
| provided in the attached notification.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component   |
| supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which   |
| fails to comply or contains a defect:                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The affected basic component is the Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA) |
| of stability long-term solution Option III. The PEDA provides the licensing  |
| basis MCPR Safety Limit protection for anticipated coupled thermal           |
| hydraulic-neutronic reactor instabilities. The concern is that the           |
| Successive Confirmation Count (SCC) could reset if an oscillation develops   |
| while reactor state conditions are changing rapidly (e.g., during a two      |
| recirculation pump trip event) and delay a reactor scram beyond that assumed |
| in the licensing basis analysis. The algorithm is more susceptible to SCC    |
| resets with a period tolerance that is near to the minimum allowed by        |
| licensing documents (e.g., 50 msec). SCC resets are less likely with higher  |
| period tolerance values (e.g., 100 to 300 msec).                             |
|                                                                              |
| "(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the |
| basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect:                  |
|                                                                              |
| "GE Nuclear Energy, San Jose, California                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is   |
| created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply:             |
|                                                                              |
| "A reactor scram is only initiated by the PBDA when the SCC exceeds the      |
| count setpoint and the oscillation amplitude exceeds the amplitude setpoint  |
| The licensing basis is that the SCC will exceed the count setpoint before    |
| the amplitude reaches the amplitude setpoint. If the SCC resets, then the    |
| amplitude could exceed the amplitude setpoint before SCC reaches the count   |
| setpoint. This could lead to violation of the MCPR Safety Limit.             |
|                                                                              |
| "If scram is delayed, boiling transition could be experienced on a portion   |
| of some fuel bundles. This would be a violation of a Technical Specification |
| Safety Limit and is reportable under 10 CFR 21. However, it would not        |
| produce a significant safety hazard or threat to public health and safety.   |
|                                                                              |
| "(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply   |
| was obtained:                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to |
| comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied  |
| for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to   |
| the regulations in this part:                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "A defect has not been confirmed to exist. The potentially affected plants   |
| are listed in Attachment 2.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the |
| name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the   |
| length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note,  |
| these are actions specifically associated with the identified Reportable     |
| Condition):                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "GE has communicated this concern to the BWR Owners' Group Potential Issues  |
| Resolution Team (PIRT) and to the Stability Detect & Suppress Committee.     |
|                                                                              |
| "GE is continuing to evaluate the potential for the SCC to be reset for      |
| current licensed reactor operating conditions. This effort will be completed |
| by November 18, 2002.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the      |
| facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be   |
| given to purchasers or licensees:                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "It is recommended that potentially affected licensees keep informed through |
| the BWR Owners' Group. No specific plant actions are recommended at this     |
| time."                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Plants listed on Attachment 2                                                |
| Clinton, Brunswick 1& 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Columbia, Dresden 2 &   |
| 3, LaSalle 1 & 2, Limerick 1 & 2, Peach Bottom 2 & 3, Quad Cities 1 & 2,     |
| Perry 1, Susquehanna 1 & 2, Hope Creek, Hatch 1 & 2, and Browns Ferry 1, 2 & |
| 3.                                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 11/18/02 AT 1856  FROM JASON POST (VIA FAX) TO GERRY WAIG *  |
| * *                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Subject: Final Report, Stability Option III: Possible Successive            |
| Confirmation Count Resets - Not Reportable                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Reference: MFN02-063, Stability Option III: Possible Successive             |
| Confirmation Count Resets, 10CFR Part 21 60 Day Interim Report, October 1,   |
| 2002                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "This letter provides closure of the reference 21.21(a)(2) 60 Day Interim   |
| Report notification for plants that have selected stability long-term        |
| solution Option III. The closure is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) has          |
| determined that this is not a reportable condition, however, GE recommends   |
| that the BWR Owners' Group Detect & Suppress Committee evaluate the need to  |
| change the minimum allowable value for period tolerance used in the          |
| Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM).                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "As described in the reference notification, the potential problem was       |
| associated with the algorithm that provides the licensing basis Minimum      |
| Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit protection for stability Option     |
| III. The algorithm determines Successive Confirmation Count (SCC) of an      |
| oscillating power signal. A reactor trip is generated when SCC and           |
| oscillation amplitude reach their trip setpoints in accordance with the      |
| Option III and reactor protection system configuration. The concern was that |
| the oscillation period could change for an oscillation that initiates while  |
| reactor state conditions are changing towards equilibrium state (e.g.,       |
| following a two-recirculation pump (2RPT) trip event) and cause the SCC to   |
| prematurely reset, thus delaying the reactor scram.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "A reactor trip signal is generated when the OPRM SCC setpoint and the       |
| amplitude setpoint are reached or exceeded for at least one OPRM cell in     |
| each trip system channel required to generate the trip signal (e.g.,         |
| one-out-of two taken twice). The Period Based Detection Algorithm (PBDA)     |
| determines the SCC for each OPRM cell. When an oscillation in an OPRM cell   |
| signal is detected by the PBDA it sets the base period for that cell. The    |
| period tolerance is used to determine if the period of each subsequent       |
| oscillation is within an acceptable difference from the base period. The     |
| acceptable range for period tolerance specified in stability Option Ill      |
| licensing topical reports is 100 to 300 msec. A period tolerance of 50 msec  |
| has been approved for OPRM systems that have a 25 msec sampling frequency.   |
|                                                                              |
| "GE evaluated this concern with TRACG simulations of a 2RPT event for        |
| typical Option III plants for reasonably limiting Extended Power Uprate      |
| (EPU) and Maximum Extended Load Line Limit Analysis (MELLLA) conditions.     |
| TRACG calculates channel power, which can be evaluated as representative of  |
| an OPRM cell signal through the hot channel oscillation reload licensing     |
| methodology, and evaluated by the PBDA for successive confirmation counts.   |
|                                                                              |
| "PBDA resets occur when the difference between the current period and the    |
| base period exceeds the period tolerance. The worst case would be if a       |
| spurious SCC reset occurred immediately before the amplitude trip setpoint   |
| was reached. For this case, that cell would not generate a trip signal until |
| SCC had again counted up to the trip setpoint, which could be a delay of 10  |
| to 12 seconds.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "GE evaluated the potential for SCC spurious resets far period tolerance     |
| values of 50, 100 and 150 msec. In general, more frequent spurious resets    |
| occur with shorter period tolerance. However, the spurious SCC reset does    |
| not occur at the same time for all the OPRM cells in an OPRM channel. Some   |
| OPRM cell resets delay the trip generated by that cell, while others reset   |
| at sufficiently early times that they have again counted up to exceed the    |
| count setpoint when the amplitude setpoint is reached, and others do not     |
| reset at all. Only one OPRM cell trip in an OPRM channel is sufficient to    |
| cause an OPRM channel trip, and each OPRM channel typically has 18 to 33     |
| OPRM cells. In addition, typical core loading schemes ensure that multiple   |
| OPRM cells respond very near the peak oscillation magnitude. The analysis    |
| concluded that even though spurious resets occur, these resets are not       |
| expected to significantly delay reactor scram. Therefore, the currently      |
| licensed PBDA provides adequate protection against a MCPR Safety Limit       |
| violation for instabilities initiated during a fast transient such as a 2RPT |
| event. Therefore, this does not represent a Reportable Condition under       |
| 10CFR21.21.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Even tough this is not a reportable condition, the potential for some OPRM  |
| cells to prematurely reset SCC for an instability initiated during a 2RPT is |
| not consistent with thc original design basis of the PBDA. The original      |
| design basis was that continuous confirmation counts would occur for fully   |
| coupled neutronic/thermal-hydraulic reactor instability. Since this may not  |
| occur for a 2RPT with period tolerance values of 50 and 100 msec, it is      |
| recommended that Option III plants evaluate the need to change the minimum   |
| allowable value for period tolerance."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Notified (via email) R1DO (Mohamed Shanbaky), R2DO (David Ayres), R3DO (     |
| Brent Clayton), R4DO (Dale Powers), NRREO (Stu Richards), NRR (Jack Foster). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39371       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| REP ORG:  FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/14/2002|
|LICENSEE:  GEOVERSE INC                         |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:12[EST]|
|    CITY:  SUNRISE                  REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        11/13/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  FL |EVENT TIME:        15:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#:  2540-1                AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/14/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|                                                |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  E-MAIL                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN SOIL MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The state licensee notified the State of Florida of a soil moisture density  |
| gauge that was stolen from the back of a pickup truck located at a temporary |
| worksite.  The gauge was last seen between 1500 and 1700 [EST].   The gauge  |
| which was a Troxler model 3430 serial # 24277 with activity of 8mCi          |
| [millicuries] of Cs-137 and 40 mCi [millicuries] of Am-241/Be had been       |
| chained to the truck.   A police report was made a reward is being offered   |
| and the state is investigating.                                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39372       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/14/2002|
|LICENSEE:  BYRD REGIONAL HOSPITAL               |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:00[EST]|
|    CITY:  LEESVILLE                REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        11/08/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  LA |EVENT TIME:             [CST]|
|LICENSE#:  LA-1431-L01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/14/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CHUCK CAIN           R4      |
|                                                |TOM ESSIG            NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCOTT BLACKWELL (VIA FAX)    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION                   |
|                                                                              |
| On November 8, 2002, a patient at the Byrd Regional Hospital located in      |
| Leesville, LA, "received a 26 millicurie dose of Tc-99 Sestamibi instead of  |
| a 25 millicurie dose of Tc-99 MDP. This occurred [when] the technologist     |
| picked up the wrong syringe from the 'hot lab.' The technologist immediately |
| notified the Radiation Safety Officer once he discovered what happened.      |
| There appears to be no adverse effects to the patient. The patient did       |
| receive the correct dose on November 12, 2002. The technologist will review  |
| the facilities procedures to prevent this type of incident from occurring    |
| again. The facility notified the doctor, patient, and the Louisiana          |
| Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Louisiana event report ID No.: LA020015                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39382       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/18/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:05[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4           |EVENT DATE:        11/18/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:20[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY KNUETTEL               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/18/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVID AYRES          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FITNESS FOR DUTY - CONTRACT FOREMAN FAILED RANDOM DRUG TEST                  |
|                                                                              |
| A non-licensed, contract employee tested positive for drugs during a random  |
| drug test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact   |
| the HOO for additional details.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this event.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+