Event Notification Report for November 18, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
11/15/2002 - 11/18/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39205 39366 39375 39376 39377 39378 39379 39380 39381
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39205 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/20/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:02[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB LANCE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/15/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JOHN KINNEMAN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO PRESSURE AND SPEED FLUCTUATIONS |
| |
| "On 9/20/02 at 10:02 AM EDT, the Unit 1 HPCI system was declared inoperable |
| due to observation of speed and pressure fluctuations while operating in the |
| manual mode. HPCI was being run for the quarterly surveillance test. Site |
| engineering is currently troubleshooting. This report is being made pursuant |
| to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for failure of a single train accident mitigation |
| system." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 11/15/02 AT 1032 EST BY PETER GARDNER TO HOWIE CROUCH *** |
| |
| "Troubleshooting identified that the output of the Ramp Generator and Signal |
| Converter (RGSC) was fluctuating. The HPCI RGSC and Electronic Governor |
| [-Motor] (EG-M) were replaced and the post maintenance testing (PMT) was |
| successfully completed. |
| |
| The HPCI safety function requires the system to provide adequate coolant |
| makeup to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in the automatic mode for the |
| spectrum of analyzed events. The small break LOCA [Loss of Coolant |
| Accident] event (one-inch diameter pipe break) requires the greatest HPCI |
| flowrate. HPCI must provide adequate RPV coolant makeup to maintain core |
| coverage and prevent an actuation of ADS [Automatic Depressurization System] |
| during this event. |
| |
| HPCI successfully completed the portion of the surveillance test that |
| required operation in the automatic mode just prior to the observed speed |
| fluctuation. Two successful HPCI runs were performed following the |
| replacement of the RGSC and EG-M in June 2002. The speed fluctuation |
| occurred intermittently in the manual mode of operation following a |
| reduction in speed to 3150 rpm. Failure analysis of the RGSC and EG-M did |
| not reveal any condition that would have prevented HPCI from providing the |
| required coolant makeup." |
| |
| Therefore, the licensee is retracting this event. |
| |
| Licensee notified the NRC resident of the retraction. |
| |
| NRC region 1 duty officer (Harold Gray) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39366 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/2002|
|LICENSEE: HUNTINGTON TESTING AND TECHNOLOGY INC|NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EST]|
| CITY: GHENT REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 10/18/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: KY |EVENT TIME: 07:30[CST]|
|LICENSE#: 201-551-05 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/12/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LEONARD WERT R2 |
| |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB JOHNSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: RICH LAURA | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| KY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN OVER EXPOSURE OF A RADIOGRAPHER |
| |
| "This letter is notification of an overexposure incident that occurred on |
| October 8, 2002 in Ghent, Kentucky. The licensee involved was Huntington |
| Testing & Technology Inc.. Kentucky Radioactive Material License Number |
| 201-551-05. The incident occurred while performing radiography at Kentucky |
| Utilities. The radiography source was 103 Ci [Curies] of Ir-192 [Iridium], |
| housed in a 660 B Camera, S/N B2954. The licensee's interpretation of the |
| reporting criteria resulted in late notification thirty (30) days after the |
| incident. That information was not only delayed, but also incomplete |
| requiring further development before the State of Kentucky could forward |
| this report. |
| |
| "At approximately 7:00 a.m., on October 18, 2002, when reeling in the |
| radiography source after an exposure, it was not fully retracted, nor |
| recognized for approximately three (3) minutes by the radiographer who had |
| entered the area. Upon realization that the source was not fully retracted, |
| the radiographer immediately left the area, extended the source and then |
| retracted it to the housed position. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was |
| contacted and the radiographer removed from any radiological work. |
| |
| "The radiographer's dosimetry was immediately sent to Landauer for |
| processing. The result of his exposure was 4.86 Rem whole body, in addition |
| to his year-to-date exposure of 1.4 Rem, for total yearly whole body |
| exposure of 6.26 Rem. These numbers appear to be close estimates, ending |
| further evaluation of the radiographer's position in relation to the exposed |
| source. Initial reports indicate a survey instrument failure, and failure of |
| the radiographer to monitor the instrumentation and position indicator to |
| ensure retraction of the radiography source. |
| |
| "Further evaluation of the cause of this incident and final dose estimates |
| will be forwarded ending further investigation." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39375 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/2002|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:49[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/15/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:57[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RUSS LONG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/15/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |TERRY REIS NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A GENERATOR LOCKOUT |
| |
| "At 0957 EST, 345 Kv Breaker 3 failed open resulting in breakers 1, 5 and 6 |
| opening. This electrically isolated Unit 3 resulting in the Main Generator |
| primary and backup lockout relays (86P and 86 Bu) tripping. This resulted |
| in an immediate reactor trip. All equipment operated as expected with the |
| following exceptions: |
| |
| 1. 32 Source Range failed to come on scale as required |
| |
| 2. 34 Circulating Water Pump transferred to standby drive when normal drive |
| tripped |
| |
| 3. 36 Circulating Water Pump tripped |
| |
| "The plant is stable in mode 3. Post trip review is in progress and will be |
| completed prior to restart. The Public Service Commission has been |
| notified." |
| |
| There was no maintenance or other activities in progress in the switchyard |
| at the time the 345 Kv Breaker 3 catastrophically failed. Unit 3 is |
| currently removing decay heat via the steam dump bypass to the main |
| condenser. Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps autostarted and are |
| in-service. The steam generator atmospheric dumps may have lifted during |
| the transient. There is no known primary-secondary tube leakage. The |
| licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans on issuing a press |
| release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39376 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:17[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/15/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:20[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN JOHNSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ARLON COSTA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 12 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH FEEDWATER HEATER LEVEL |
| |
| "While reducing power for a planned refueling outage, at 2020, U1 reactor |
| was manually tripped at 12% power due to Hi Hi Level in 13 'A' Feedwater |
| heater. An existing problem with an extraction bellows in 13 'A' Feedwater |
| heater had been previously identified and contingency plans were in place |
| for monitoring the level during the load decrease. Levels were being |
| monitored locally by Engineering and Operations during the load decrease in |
| anticipation of level control problems. Control Room Operators made the |
| decision as planned, to manually trip the reactor per annunciator response |
| procedures, when it was determined that level in 13 'A' Feedwater heater |
| could not be reduced. During performance of reactor trip recovery |
| procedures, 11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump auto started when the |
| running Main Feedwater Pump was secured. 11 Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater |
| Pump was secured and Steam Generator levels are being maintained with 12 |
| Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump." |
| |
| Additionally, the Licensee stated that all control rods properly inserted |
| into the core and that all safety systems responded as required. |
| |
| The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 39377 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:44[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 11/15/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:15[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |ERIC LEEDS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: E.G. WALKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ARLON COSTA | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL ISSUE AT PADUCAH |
| |
| "At 0315 on 11-15-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the pressure chart recorder for the C-333 'C' surge drum bank had failed, |
| violating an SRI in NCSE.016. As a result of this failure, the shiftly |
| pressure checks performed prior to this discovery were performed using a |
| failed AQ-NCS pressure instrument and therefore were not valid. The purpose |
| of this pressure check is to identify if wet air inleakage has begun on the |
| surge drum bank. Following identification and remediation of failure, |
| pressure checks were performed and it was determined that no wet air |
| inleakage had occurred and double contingency was restored. |
| |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Although pressure readings were taken using a failed |
| AQ-NCS pressure instrument, there are several important mitigating factors. |
| First the integrity of the drum bank has been maintained. Second, the drum |
| contained non-fissile material. Third, the UF6 has maintained in the gas |
| phase. Because the drum contained non-fissile material, the NCS controls |
| were not necessary to prevent a criticality from occurring. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS: These drums are used to store gases. |
| Therefore, in order for a criticality to be possible, the drum would have to |
| contain fissile UF6. Wet air would have to react with any UF6 in the drum. |
| Wet air inleakage would have to occur over a long period of time in order to |
| create a large mass of UO2F2 and then sufficiently moderate the material. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency is maintained by implementation |
| of two controls on moderation. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Drum bank contains |
| gaseous UF6 enriched to [ ]. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is |
| based on maintaining the integrity of the surge drum against wet air |
| inleakage. This integrity is insured by an SRI for the unlikely breach of |
| the surge drum system. Structural integrity of the drum is intact, therefore |
| this SRI was maintained. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based performance of shiftly checks |
| using an AQ-NCS instrument as an indication of wet air inleakage. The |
| required checks were performed using a failed instrument. Since a failed |
| instrument was used, the shiftly checks were invalid resulting in a loss of |
| this control. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| "Even though moderation control was maintained, double contingency is based |
| on two controls on moderation. Therefore double contingency was not |
| maintained. The drum contained a non-fissile material. It should be noted |
| that a second parameter, assay (not controlled in the NCSA), was maintained |
| since the drum bank contained non-fissile material. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION: Approximately |
| one hour after discovery, AQ-NCS Instrumentation was connected to surge drum |
| manifold and pressure was verified to less than NCS limit. Readings are |
| being obtained from this instrumentation pending calibration of recorder. |
| |
| "DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: The pressure chart recorder for the C-333 'C' |
| surge drum bank failed, violating an SRI in NCSE.016. As a result of this |
| failure the shiftly pressure checks were performed using a failed AQ-NCS |
| pressure instrument and therefore were not valid. The purpose of the |
| pressure check is to identify if wet air inleakage has begun on the surge |
| drum bank. |
| |
| "It is important to note that an AQ-NCS pressure instrument was subsequently |
| connected to the system and pressure readings have been taken. The pressure |
| readings indicate there has been no wet air inleakage. Double contingency |
| has been restored since the ability to read pressure in the surge drum bank |
| using a properly operating AQ-NCS pressure instrument has been restored |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY: Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls |
| on moderation. |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining the integrity |
| of the surge drum system against wet air inleakage. This integrity is |
| assured by an SRI for the unlikely breach of the surge drum system. |
| Structural integrity of the drum is intact, therefore this SRI is |
| maintained. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on the performance of shiftly |
| pressure checks using an AQ-NCS instrument as an indication of wet air |
| inleakage. The required checks were performed using a failed instrument. |
| Since a failed instrument was used, the shiftly checks were invalid |
| resulting in a loss of this control. Since there are two controls on one |
| parameter, double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| "Even though moderation control was maintained; double contingency is based |
| on two controls on moderation. Therefore double contingency was not |
| maintained. The drum contained non-fissile material. It should be noted that |
| a second parameter (not controlled in the NCSA) was maintained since the |
| drum contained non-fissile material. |
| |
| "Potential Critical Pathways: These drums are used to store gases. |
| Therefore, in order for a criticality to be possible, the drum would have to |
| contain fissile UF6. Wet air would have to react with any UF6 in the drum. |
| The leak would have to occur over a long period of time in order to create a |
| large mass of UO2F2 and then sufficiently moderate the material. |
| |
| "Safety Significance: Although pressure readings were taken using a failed |
| AQ-NCS pressure instrument, there are several important mitigating factors. |
| First the integrity of the drum bank has been maintained. Second, the drum |
| contained non-fissile material. Third, the uranium has been maintained in |
| the gas phase. Because the drum contained non-fissile material, the NCS |
| controls were not necessary to prevent a criticality from occurring." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39378 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:31[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: E. HINSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: ARLON COSTA +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CHUCK CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71(b)(1) SAFEGUARDS REPORTS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY REPORT INVOLVING A LOST ACCESS BADGE |
| |
| Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery. Licensee notified the |
| NRC resident inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for |
| details. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39379 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:18[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICHARD HACKMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE DISCHARGE TO LAKE MICHIGAN |
| |
| "Notification was made on 11/16/02 at 1150 to the National Response Center |
| and at 1205 to the Michigan Dept. of Environmental Quality of a Sodium |
| Hypochlorite discharge to Lake Michigan that exceeded the permitted |
| concentration. On 11/16/02 at 0920, a chemist discovered and isolated a |
| leak from the Hypochlorite facility. Circulating Water discharge Total |
| Residual Chlorine (TRC) was measured at that time to be 0.3ppm. The |
| concentration dropped below the permit limit of 0.038ppm at 0930. A |
| recorded rise in TRC indicated that the leakage started at 0015. The Unit 1 |
| TRC High Alarm did not function. The recorded TRC concentration ranged |
| between 0.26 and 0.4ppm during the 9 hour period. Hypochlorite tank level |
| change indicates that approximately 1080 gallons of 12% sodium hypochlorite |
| solution was discharged from the leak to the forebay and out of the |
| Circulating Water discharge to Lake Michigan. No environmental impact is |
| expected from the discharge based on the chlorine concentration and release |
| duration." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39380 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:49[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:42[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN PIERCE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |CHUCK CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ELLIS MERSCHOFF R4 |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|ELMO COLLINS R4 |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A LOSS OF OPEN LOOP COOLING |
| WATER |
| |
| "The South Texas Project makes the following 4 hour non-emergency report of |
| a manual Reactor Protection System actuation per 10CFR50.72.b.2.ii. |
| |
| "At 20:42 on 11/16/02 Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of |
| open loop cooling water. Reports indicated flooding in the circulating |
| water intake structure due to a problem with circulating water pump #11, |
| which caused the loss of open loop cooling." |
| |
| Operators received a loss of open loop cooling which supplies auxiliary |
| cooling to the main generator. Per procedure, Unit 1 was manually tripped. |
| Upon investigation, a 4-6 inch crack in circulating water pump #11 housing |
| was discovered. A preliminary review indicates that water may have |
| electrically shorted the three operating open loop cooling pumps which are |
| also located in the intake structure. |
| |
| Unit 1 is currently stable in mode 3 with all auxiliary feedwater pumps in |
| service. Vacuum in the main condenser is presently 27 inches with both |
| circulating water pumps 13 and 14 operating. All rods fully inserted. |
| Normal offsite power is available and no electrical buses were lost as a |
| result of the flooding although electrical maintenance is investigating |
| several electrical ground alarms. The licensee reviewed their Emergency |
| Plan and determined that the criteria for declaration of an NOUE was not |
| satisfied. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and does not |
| plan on a press release at this time. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39381 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/17/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:38[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 11/17/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:06[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICHARD STONE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/17/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |LEONARD WERT R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TESTING |
| |
| "Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller indicates 512 |
| GPM with system in standby. Found when aligning system for surveillance. |
| Cannot assure system will achieve rated flow automatically. HPCI is a |
| single train system." |
| |
| HPCI was declared inoperable placing Unit 1 in a 14-day LCO A/S 3.5.1. The |
| licensee intends to troubleshoot the problem including a fill/vent of the |
| applicable flow transmitter. The licensee will inform the NRC resident |
| inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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