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Event Notification Report for November 18, 2002


                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           11/15/2002 - 11/18/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

39205  39366  39375  39376  39377  39378  39379  39380  39381  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39205       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/20/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:02[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB LANCE                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/15/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO PRESSURE AND SPEED FLUCTUATIONS                       |
|                                                                              |
| "On 9/20/02 at 10:02 AM EDT, the Unit 1 HPCI system was declared inoperable  |
| due to observation of speed and pressure fluctuations while operating in the |
| manual mode. HPCI was being run for the quarterly surveillance test. Site    |
| engineering is currently troubleshooting. This report is being made pursuant |
| to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for failure of a single train accident mitigation  |
| system."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| *** UPDATE ON 11/15/02 AT 1032 EST BY PETER GARDNER TO HOWIE CROUCH ***      |
|                                                                              |
| "Troubleshooting identified that the output of the Ramp Generator and Signal |
| Converter (RGSC) was fluctuating.  The HPCI RGSC and Electronic Governor     |
| [-Motor] (EG-M) were replaced and the post maintenance testing (PMT) was     |
| successfully completed.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The HPCI safety function requires the system to provide adequate coolant     |
| makeup to the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) in the automatic mode for the    |
| spectrum of analyzed events.  The small break LOCA [Loss of Coolant          |
| Accident] event (one-inch diameter pipe break) requires the greatest HPCI    |
| flowrate.  HPCI must provide adequate RPV coolant makeup to maintain core    |
| coverage and prevent an actuation of ADS [Automatic Depressurization System] |
| during this event.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| HPCI successfully completed the portion of the surveillance test that        |
| required operation in the automatic mode just prior to the observed speed    |
| fluctuation.  Two successful HPCI runs were performed following the          |
| replacement of the RGSC and EG-M in June 2002.  The speed fluctuation        |
| occurred intermittently in the manual mode of operation following a          |
| reduction in speed to 3150 rpm.  Failure analysis of the RGSC and EG-M did   |
| not reveal any condition that would have prevented HPCI from providing the   |
| required coolant makeup."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Therefore,  the licensee is retracting this event.                           |
|                                                                              |
| Licensee notified the NRC resident of the retraction.                        |
|                                                                              |
| NRC region 1 duty officer (Harold Gray) was notified.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39366       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/2002|
|LICENSEE:  HUNTINGTON TESTING AND TECHNOLOGY INC|NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EST]|
|    CITY:  GHENT                    REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        10/18/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  KY |EVENT TIME:        07:30[CST]|
|LICENSE#:  201-551-05            AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/12/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|                                                |FRED BROWN           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB JOHNSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| KY AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN OVER EXPOSURE OF A RADIOGRAPHER       |
|                                                                              |
| "This letter is notification of an overexposure incident that occurred on    |
| October 8, 2002 in Ghent, Kentucky. The licensee involved was Huntington     |
| Testing & Technology Inc.. Kentucky Radioactive Material License Number      |
| 201-551-05. The incident occurred while performing radiography at Kentucky   |
| Utilities. The radiography source was 103 Ci [Curies] of Ir-192 [Iridium],   |
| housed in a 660 B Camera, S/N B2954. The licensee's interpretation of the    |
| reporting criteria resulted in late notification thirty (30) days after the  |
| incident. That information was not only delayed, but also incomplete         |
| requiring further development before the State of Kentucky could forward     |
| this report.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At approximately 7:00 a.m., on October 18, 2002, when reeling in the        |
| radiography source after an exposure, it was not fully retracted, nor        |
| recognized for approximately three (3) minutes by the radiographer who had   |
| entered the area. Upon realization that the source was not fully retracted,  |
| the radiographer immediately left the area, extended the source and then     |
| retracted it to the housed position. The RSO [Radiation Safety Officer] was  |
| contacted and the radiographer removed from any radiological work.           |
|                                                                              |
| "The radiographer's dosimetry was immediately sent to Landauer for           |
| processing. The result of his exposure was 4.86 Rem whole body, in addition  |
| to his year-to-date exposure of 1.4 Rem, for total yearly whole body         |
| exposure of 6.26 Rem. These numbers appear to be close estimates, ending     |
| further evaluation of the radiographer's position in relation to the exposed |
| source. Initial reports indicate a survey instrument failure, and failure of |
| the radiographer to monitor the instrumentation and position indicator to    |
| ensure retraction of the radiography source.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Further evaluation of the cause of this incident and final dose estimates   |
| will be forwarded ending further investigation."                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39375       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/2002|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:49[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/15/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:57[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RUSS LONG                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/15/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |TERRY REIS           NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A GENERATOR LOCKOUT      |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0957 EST, 345 Kv Breaker 3 failed open resulting in breakers 1, 5 and 6  |
| opening.  This electrically isolated Unit 3 resulting in the Main Generator  |
| primary and backup lockout relays (86P and 86 Bu) tripping.  This resulted   |
| in an immediate reactor trip.  All equipment operated as expected with the   |
| following exceptions:                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| 1.  32 Source Range failed to come on scale as required                      |
|                                                                              |
| 2.  34 Circulating Water Pump transferred to standby drive when normal drive |
| tripped                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| 3.  36 Circulating Water Pump tripped                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant is stable in mode 3.  Post trip review is in progress and will be |
| completed prior to restart.  The Public Service Commission has been          |
| notified."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| There was no maintenance or other activities in progress in the switchyard   |
| at the time the 345 Kv Breaker 3 catastrophically failed.  Unit 3 is         |
| currently removing decay heat via the steam dump bypass to the main          |
| condenser.  Both motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps autostarted and are  |
| in-service.   The steam generator atmospheric dumps may have lifted during   |
| the transient.  There is no known primary-secondary tube leakage.  The       |
| licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans on issuing a press    |
| release.                                                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39376       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:17[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/15/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:20[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN JOHNSON                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/16/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       12       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO HIGH  FEEDWATER HEATER LEVEL                      |
|                                                                              |
| "While reducing power for a planned refueling outage, at 2020, U1 reactor    |
| was manually tripped at 12% power due to Hi Hi Level in 13 'A' Feedwater     |
| heater. An existing problem with an extraction bellows in 13 'A' Feedwater   |
| heater had been previously identified and contingency plans were in place    |
| for monitoring the level during the load decrease. Levels were being         |
| monitored locally by Engineering and Operations during the load decrease in  |
| anticipation of level control problems. Control Room Operators made the      |
| decision as planned, to manually trip the reactor per annunciator response   |
| procedures, when it was determined that level in 13 'A' Feedwater heater     |
| could not be reduced. During performance of reactor trip recovery            |
| procedures, 11 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump auto started when the |
| running Main Feedwater Pump was secured. 11 Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater     |
| Pump was secured and Steam Generator levels are being maintained with 12     |
| Motor Driven Aux Feedwater Pump."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Additionally, the Licensee stated that all control rods properly inserted    |
| into the core and that all safety systems responded as required.             |
|                                                                              |
| The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   39377       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:44[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        11/15/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        03:15[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/16/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |ERIC LEEDS           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  E.G. WALKER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL ISSUE AT PADUCAH              |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0315 on 11-15-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the pressure chart recorder for the C-333  'C' surge drum bank had failed,   |
| violating an SRI in NCSE.016.  As a result of this failure, the shiftly      |
| pressure checks performed prior to this discovery were performed using a     |
| failed AQ-NCS pressure instrument and therefore were not valid. The purpose  |
| of this pressure check is to identify if wet air inleakage has begun on the  |
| surge drum bank. Following identification and remediation of failure,        |
| pressure checks were performed and it was determined that no wet air         |
| inleakage had occurred and double contingency was restored.                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE: Although pressure readings were taken using a failed   |
| AQ-NCS pressure instrument, there are several important mitigating factors.  |
| First the integrity of the drum bank has been maintained. Second, the drum   |
| contained non-fissile material. Third, the UF6 has maintained in the gas     |
| phase. Because the drum contained non-fissile material, the NCS controls     |
| were not necessary to prevent a criticality from occurring.                  |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS: These drums are used to store gases.        |
| Therefore, in order for a criticality to be possible, the drum would have to |
| contain fissile UF6. Wet air would have to react with any UF6 in the drum.   |
| Wet air inleakage would have to occur over a long period of time in order to |
| create a large mass of UO2F2 and then sufficiently moderate the material.    |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS: Double contingency is maintained by implementation   |
| of two controls on moderation.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL: Drum bank contains |
| gaseous UF6 enriched to [ ].                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: The first leg of double contingency is      |
| based on maintaining the integrity of the surge drum against wet air         |
| inleakage. This integrity is insured by an SRI for the unlikely breach of    |
| the surge drum system. Structural integrity of the drum is intact, therefore |
| this SRI was maintained.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based performance of shiftly checks |
| using an AQ-NCS instrument as an indication of wet air inleakage. The        |
| required checks were performed using a failed instrument. Since a failed     |
| instrument was used, the shiftly checks were invalid resulting in a loss of  |
| this control. Since there are two controls on one parameter, double          |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Even though moderation control was maintained, double contingency is based  |
| on two controls on moderation. Therefore double contingency was not          |
| maintained. The drum contained a non-fissile material. It should be noted    |
| that a second parameter, assay (not controlled in the NCSA), was maintained  |
| since the drum bank contained non-fissile material.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS IMPLEMENTATION: Approximately  |
| one hour after discovery, AQ-NCS Instrumentation was connected to surge drum |
| manifold and pressure was verified to less than NCS limit. Readings are      |
| being obtained from this instrumentation pending calibration of recorder.    |
|                                                                              |
| "DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: The pressure chart recorder for the C-333  'C'   |
| surge drum bank failed, violating an SRI in NCSE.016. As a result of this    |
| failure the shiftly pressure checks were performed using a failed AQ-NCS     |
| pressure instrument and therefore were not valid. The purpose of the         |
| pressure check is to identify if wet air inleakage has begun on the surge    |
| drum bank.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "It is important to note that an AQ-NCS pressure instrument was subsequently |
| connected to the system and pressure readings have been taken. The pressure  |
| readings indicate there has been no wet air inleakage. Double contingency    |
| has been restored since the ability to read pressure in the surge drum bank  |
| using a properly operating AQ-NCS pressure instrument has been restored      |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE     |
| CONTINGENCY: Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls   |
| on moderation.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on maintaining the integrity   |
| of the surge drum system against wet air inleakage. This integrity is        |
| assured by an SRI for the unlikely breach of the surge drum system.          |
| Structural integrity of the drum is intact, therefore this SRI is            |
| maintained.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on the performance of shiftly |
| pressure checks using an AQ-NCS instrument as an indication of wet air       |
| inleakage. The required checks were performed using a failed instrument.     |
| Since a failed instrument was used, the shiftly checks were invalid          |
| resulting in a loss of this control. Since there are two controls on one     |
| parameter, double contingency was not maintained.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Even though moderation control was maintained; double contingency is based  |
| on two controls on moderation. Therefore double contingency was not          |
| maintained. The drum contained non-fissile material. It should be noted that |
| a second parameter (not controlled in the NCSA) was maintained since the     |
| drum contained non-fissile material.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Potential Critical Pathways: These drums are used to store gases.           |
| Therefore, in order for a criticality to be possible, the drum would have to |
| contain fissile UF6. Wet air would have to react with any UF6 in the drum.   |
| The leak would have to occur over a long period of time in order to create a |
| large mass of UO2F2 and then sufficiently moderate the material.             |
|                                                                              |
| "Safety Significance: Although pressure readings were taken using a failed   |
| AQ-NCS pressure instrument, there are several important mitigating factors.  |
| First the integrity of the drum bank has been maintained. Second, the drum   |
| contained non-fissile material. Third, the uranium has been maintained in    |
| the gas phase. Because the drum contained non-fissile material, the NCS      |
| controls were not necessary to prevent a criticality from occurring."        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39378       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:31[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        11/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  E. HINSON                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/16/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  ARLON COSTA                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CHUCK CAIN           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71(b)(1)         SAFEGUARDS REPORTS     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY REPORT INVOLVING A LOST ACCESS BADGE                                |
|                                                                              |
| Immediate compensatory measures taken upon discovery.  Licensee notified the |
| NRC resident inspector.  Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for     |
| details.                                                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39379       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:18[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:20[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICHARD HACKMAN              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/16/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE DISCHARGE TO LAKE MICHIGAN   |
|                                                                              |
| "Notification was made on 11/16/02 at 1150 to the National Response Center   |
| and at 1205 to the Michigan Dept. of Environmental Quality of a Sodium       |
| Hypochlorite discharge to Lake Michigan that exceeded the permitted          |
| concentration.  On 11/16/02 at 0920, a chemist discovered and isolated a     |
| leak from the Hypochlorite facility.  Circulating Water discharge Total      |
| Residual Chlorine (TRC) was measured at that time to be 0.3ppm.  The         |
| concentration dropped below the permit limit of 0.038ppm at 0930.  A         |
| recorded rise in TRC indicated that the leakage started at 0015.  The Unit 1 |
| TRC High Alarm did not function.  The recorded TRC concentration ranged      |
| between 0.26 and 0.4ppm during the 9 hour period.  Hypochlorite tank level   |
| change indicates that approximately 1080 gallons of 12% sodium hypochlorite  |
| solution was discharged from the leak to the forebay and out of the          |
| Circulating Water discharge to Lake Michigan.  No environmental impact is    |
| expected from the discharge based on the chlorine concentration and release  |
| duration."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39380       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:49[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        11/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:42[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN PIERCE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/16/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |CHUCK CAIN           R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ELLIS MERSCHOFF      R4      |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|ELMO COLLINS         R4      |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO A LOSS OF OPEN LOOP COOLING  |
| WATER                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The South Texas Project makes the following 4 hour non-emergency report of  |
| a manual Reactor Protection System actuation per 10CFR50.72.b.2.ii.          |
|                                                                              |
| "At 20:42 on 11/16/02 Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped due to a loss of   |
| open loop cooling water.  Reports indicated flooding in the circulating      |
| water intake structure due to a problem with circulating water pump #11,     |
| which caused the loss of open loop cooling."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Operators received a loss of open loop cooling which supplies auxiliary      |
| cooling to the main generator.  Per procedure, Unit 1 was manually tripped.  |
| Upon investigation, a 4-6 inch crack in circulating water pump #11 housing   |
| was discovered.  A preliminary review indicates that water may have          |
| electrically shorted the three operating open loop cooling pumps which are   |
| also located in the intake structure.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 is currently stable in mode 3 with all auxiliary feedwater pumps in   |
| service.  Vacuum in the main condenser is presently 27 inches with both      |
| circulating water pumps 13 and 14 operating.  All rods fully inserted.       |
| Normal offsite power is available and no electrical buses were lost as a     |
| result of the flooding although electrical maintenance is investigating      |
| several electrical ground alarms.  The licensee reviewed their Emergency     |
| Plan and determined that the criteria for declaration of an NOUE was not     |
| satisfied.  The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and does not    |
| plan on a press release at this time.                                        |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39381       |
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| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/17/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:38[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        11/17/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:06[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICHARD STONE                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  11/17/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DURING QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE TESTING               |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) flow controller indicates 512 |
| GPM with system in standby.  Found when aligning system for surveillance.    |
| Cannot assure system will achieve rated flow automatically.  HPCI is a       |
| single train system."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| HPCI was declared inoperable placing Unit 1 in a 14-day LCO A/S 3.5.1.  The  |
| licensee intends to troubleshoot the problem including a fill/vent of the    |
| applicable flow transmitter.  The licensee will inform the NRC resident      |
| inspector.                                                                   |
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