Event Notification Report for October 1, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/30/2002 - 10/01/2002 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 39217 39231 39232 39233 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 39217 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/26/2002| |LICENSEE: CONSTRUCTION TESTING AND ENGINEERING,|NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:26[EDT]| | CITY: REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/24/2002| | COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 07:30[PDT]| |LICENSE#: CA 5309-37 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/26/2002| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |JOHN PELLET R4 | | |DON COOL NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT GREGER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | STOLEN AND RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE | | | | "The facility [Construction Testing and Engineering, Inc.] reported a stolen | | gauge this morning and within an hour called back to report that the gauge | | had been recovered [by police]. | | | | "The gauge had been picked up from the storage location around 4:30 AM that | | morning and was transported by the user to his home. The gauge remained | | locked by chain in the vehicle. When the user returned to his vehicle | | between 7:30 - 8 AM he discovered the chain had been cut and the case with | | the gauge was missing. He contacted the police and the Alternate Radiation | | Safety Officer for his region." | | | | CA Rad Health Branch will follow-up with the licensee to obtain the make, | | model, and serial number of the stolen/recovered gauge and will forward that | | information to the Headquarters Operations Officer. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 39231 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2002| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:05[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/29/2002| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:04[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN WEAVER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2002| | HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GLENN MEYER R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM FUNCTION | | | | "This report is being made due to a loss of function of the Control Room | | Envelope Filtration (CREF) system. On 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs., an operator on | | rounds identified that control room envelope boundary door #288-1 was open | | instead of closed as expected. The door was found to be hung up open due to | | interference between the bottom door seal and the door stop. The operator | | closed the door upon discovery. This door is controlled with a key card | | reader however it can also be opened from both sides with a thumb latch as | | it is not a security vital door. An initial investigation using the security | | computer revealed that the Fire Chief accessed the door at 19:04:26 Hrs. | | during daily door checks and checked it shut at that time. The next card | | reader activity was at 20:04:50 Hrs. by the operator on rounds who | | discovered the door open. With the door having been open for other than | | normal entry/exit, a loss of the control room envelope boundary existed. The | | control room envelope boundary is required for CREF operability and | | function. As a result, both subsystems of the CREF system were declared | | inoperable on 9/29/2002 @ 19:04 Hrs. in accordance with Technical | | Specification LCO 3.7.2 Condition A, Action A.1 and Condition B, Action B. | | I. Both CREF subsystems were restored to operable and applicable Conditions | | and Actions exited on 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs when the door was closed. LCO | | completion times were not exceeded. Deviation/Event Report (DER) | | NM-2002-4233 was written for event followup and Action Request (ACR) | | 02-04252 was written to correct the problem with the door hanging up on the | | door stop. After contacting supporting organizations to determine the | | reportability of the loss of the control room envelope boundary, this event | | was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 39232 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2002| |LICENSEE: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:06[EDT]| | CITY: SAN JOSE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/30/2002| | COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2002| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |GLENN MEYER R1 | | |VERN HODGE NRR | +------------------------------------------------+JAY HENSON R2 | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JASON S. POST (fax) |SONIA BURGESS R3 | | HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS |KRISS KENNEDY R4 | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | PART 21.21 REPORT REGARDING MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE OUT OF SERVICE | | | | "This letter provides final notification of a Reportable Condition under | | 10CFR 21.21(d), as committed in the Reference letter. It was previously | | submitted as a Reportable Condition for Brunswick Units 1 & 2 and as a 60 | | Day Interim Report per �21.21 (a)(2) for other plants that may be determined | | to be affected. | | | | "The evaluation has been completed and it has been determined that in | | addition to Brunswick 1 & 2, this is a Reportable Condition for Duane | | Arnold, FitzPatrick, Hatch 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Perry 1 and Pilgrim. The | | basis for this conclusion is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) analyses for these | | plants to justify operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one Main | | Steam line Isolation Valve (MSIV) Out of Service (OOS) (i.e., one steam line | | isolated) did not adequately address the long term impact of increased flow | | induced vibration on the remaining open MSIVs. Without a supporting bases, | | it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would be able to perform their | | required safety function following extended operation at greater than 75% of | | current rated power with one steam line isolated. This could possibly result | | in offsite doses in excess of 10CFR 100.11 limits. | | | | "The actual impact of this condition would only be of concern if MSIV | | operability had not been demonstrated following extended plant operation at | | greater than 75% of current rated power with one MSIV OOS, or if a plant was | | currently in extended operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one | | MSIV OOS. | | | | "All other plants which have an MSIV OOS analysis provided by GE were either | | limited to 75% of rated power, or the impact of long term operation on the | | open MSIVs was adequately evaluated for the power level specified in the | | analysis. | | | | "(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component | | supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which | | fails to comply or contains a defect: | | | | "The Main Steam Line Valve Out-of-Service analysis for: | | Utility | | Plant Name | | Carolina Power & Light Brunswick 1 and 2 | | Nuclear Management Co. Duane Arnold | | Entergy Nuclear Northeast FitzPatrick, Pilgrim | | Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 2 | | Constellation Nuclear Nine Mile Point 2 | | First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. Perry 1 | | | | "(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the | | basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: | | | | "GE Nuclear Energy, San Jose, California | | | | "(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is | | created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: | | | | "The MSIV OOS analysis performed by GE evaluated plant operation at greater | | than 75% of rated power with three active steam lines and one steam line | | isolated. The GE analysis for the affected plants did not address the effect | | of potential long-term flow induced vibration degradation on the open MSIVs, | | including the effect on the MSIV air operated controls. Without adequate | | justification, it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would close | | following extended operation with one MSIV OOS at greater than 75% of | | current rated power. | | | | "If it is postulated that the plant operated for an extended period in the | | MSIV OOS condition and then a main steam line break were to occur in one of | | the three operational steam lines, then there is the potential that MSIVs | | would not close to terminate the release from a steam line break either from | | a common mode failure of both MSIVs, in the broken line, or failure of one | | MSIV due to the high flow induced vibration and the other MSIV as the design | | basis single failure. This condition would result in an un-terminated | | release, which would exceed the existing 10 CFR 100 radiation release | | limits. | | | | "(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply | | was obtained: | | | | "June 24, 2002 | | | | "(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to | | comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied | | for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to | | the regulations in this part: | | | | "A defect has been confirmed to exist in analysis provided by GE for | | Brunswick 1 and 2, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Hatch 2, Nine Mile | | Point 2, and Perry 1. | | | | "(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the | | name of the, individual or organization responsible for the action; and the | | length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note, | | these are actions specifically associated with the identified Reportable | | Condition): | | | | "GE has communicated to the affected plants the 75% power limitation when | | operating with one MSIV OOS. | | | | "GE has revised existing internal engineering and program processes to | | explicitly screen any limiting configurations/conditions for current and | | future MSIV OOS evaluations. | | | | "(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the | | facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be | | given to purchasers or licensees: | | | | "GE recommends limiting operation to 75% of current rated power when | | operating with one MSIV OOS, unless there is an adequate justification to | | support extended operation at a higher power level." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 39233 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2002| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:17[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/30/2002| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:10[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT BOESCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2002| | HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GLENN MEYER R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 A/R Y 70 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON MAIN TURBINE TRIP DUE TO LOW CONDENSER VACUUM | | | | "Susquehanna Unit 2 experienced a automatic reactor SCRAM on a Main Turbine | | trip due to low condenser vacuum. The unit experienced a momentary loss of | | 2D130 (120 V AC power). The loss caused the offgas system to isolate, a | | runback on the A Reactor Recirc Pump and a scoop tube lock on the B reactor | | Recirc Pump. Efforts to re-establish the offgas system were unsuccessful. | | Following the SCRAM, reactor water level dropped to approx. -0.2", and was | | recovered by the Feedwater System. The offgas system and Condenser vacuum | | were restored shortly after the SCRAM to maintain the condenser available | | for heat removal. There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to | | containment. | | | | "This event is an Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation when the reactor | | is critical, and is reportable as a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR | | 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)." | | | | The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021