Event Notification Report for October 1, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/30/2002 - 10/01/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39217 39231 39232 39233
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39217 |
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| REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/26/2002|
|LICENSEE: CONSTRUCTION TESTING AND ENGINEERING,|NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:26[EDT]|
| CITY: REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/24/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 07:30[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: CA 5309-37 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/26/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |JOHN PELLET R4 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT GREGER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| STOLEN AND RECOVERED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| "The facility [Construction Testing and Engineering, Inc.] reported a stolen |
| gauge this morning and within an hour called back to report that the gauge |
| had been recovered [by police]. |
| |
| "The gauge had been picked up from the storage location around 4:30 AM that |
| morning and was transported by the user to his home. The gauge remained |
| locked by chain in the vehicle. When the user returned to his vehicle |
| between 7:30 - 8 AM he discovered the chain had been cut and the case with |
| the gauge was missing. He contacted the police and the Alternate Radiation |
| Safety Officer for his region." |
| |
| CA Rad Health Branch will follow-up with the licensee to obtain the make, |
| model, and serial number of the stolen/recovered gauge and will forward that |
| information to the Headquarters Operations Officer. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39231 |
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| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/29/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:04[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN WEAVER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GLENN MEYER R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION SYSTEM FUNCTION |
| |
| "This report is being made due to a loss of function of the Control Room |
| Envelope Filtration (CREF) system. On 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs., an operator on |
| rounds identified that control room envelope boundary door #288-1 was open |
| instead of closed as expected. The door was found to be hung up open due to |
| interference between the bottom door seal and the door stop. The operator |
| closed the door upon discovery. This door is controlled with a key card |
| reader however it can also be opened from both sides with a thumb latch as |
| it is not a security vital door. An initial investigation using the security |
| computer revealed that the Fire Chief accessed the door at 19:04:26 Hrs. |
| during daily door checks and checked it shut at that time. The next card |
| reader activity was at 20:04:50 Hrs. by the operator on rounds who |
| discovered the door open. With the door having been open for other than |
| normal entry/exit, a loss of the control room envelope boundary existed. The |
| control room envelope boundary is required for CREF operability and |
| function. As a result, both subsystems of the CREF system were declared |
| inoperable on 9/29/2002 @ 19:04 Hrs. in accordance with Technical |
| Specification LCO 3.7.2 Condition A, Action A.1 and Condition B, Action B. |
| I. Both CREF subsystems were restored to operable and applicable Conditions |
| and Actions exited on 9/29/2002 @ 20:05 Hrs when the door was closed. LCO |
| completion times were not exceeded. Deviation/Event Report (DER) |
| NM-2002-4233 was written for event followup and Action Request (ACR) |
| 02-04252 was written to correct the problem with the door hanging up on the |
| door stop. After contacting supporting organizations to determine the |
| reportability of the loss of the control room envelope boundary, this event |
| was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39232 |
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| REP ORG: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2002|
|LICENSEE: GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:06[EDT]|
| CITY: SAN JOSE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 09/30/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GLENN MEYER R1 |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+JAY HENSON R2 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JASON S. POST (fax) |SONIA BURGESS R3 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS |KRISS KENNEDY R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21.21 REPORT REGARDING MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE OUT OF SERVICE |
| |
| "This letter provides final notification of a Reportable Condition under |
| 10CFR 21.21(d), as committed in the Reference letter. It was previously |
| submitted as a Reportable Condition for Brunswick Units 1 & 2 and as a 60 |
| Day Interim Report per �21.21 (a)(2) for other plants that may be determined |
| to be affected. |
| |
| "The evaluation has been completed and it has been determined that in |
| addition to Brunswick 1 & 2, this is a Reportable Condition for Duane |
| Arnold, FitzPatrick, Hatch 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Perry 1 and Pilgrim. The |
| basis for this conclusion is that GE Nuclear Energy (GE) analyses for these |
| plants to justify operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one Main |
| Steam line Isolation Valve (MSIV) Out of Service (OOS) (i.e., one steam line |
| isolated) did not adequately address the long term impact of increased flow |
| induced vibration on the remaining open MSIVs. Without a supporting bases, |
| it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would be able to perform their |
| required safety function following extended operation at greater than 75% of |
| current rated power with one steam line isolated. This could possibly result |
| in offsite doses in excess of 10CFR 100.11 limits. |
| |
| "The actual impact of this condition would only be of concern if MSIV |
| operability had not been demonstrated following extended plant operation at |
| greater than 75% of current rated power with one MSIV OOS, or if a plant was |
| currently in extended operation at greater than 75% of rated power with one |
| MSIV OOS. |
| |
| "All other plants which have an MSIV OOS analysis provided by GE were either |
| limited to 75% of rated power, or the impact of long term operation on the |
| open MSIVs was adequately evaluated for the power level specified in the |
| analysis. |
| |
| "(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component |
| supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which |
| fails to comply or contains a defect: |
| |
| "The Main Steam Line Valve Out-of-Service analysis for: |
| Utility |
| Plant Name |
| Carolina Power & Light Brunswick 1 and 2 |
| Nuclear Management Co. Duane Arnold |
| Entergy Nuclear Northeast FitzPatrick, Pilgrim |
| Southern Nuclear Operating Co. Hatch 2 |
| Constellation Nuclear Nine Mile Point 2 |
| First Energy Nuclear Operating Co. Perry 1 |
| |
| "(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the |
| basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: |
| |
| "GE Nuclear Energy, San Jose, California |
| |
| "(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard which is |
| created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply: |
| |
| "The MSIV OOS analysis performed by GE evaluated plant operation at greater |
| than 75% of rated power with three active steam lines and one steam line |
| isolated. The GE analysis for the affected plants did not address the effect |
| of potential long-term flow induced vibration degradation on the open MSIVs, |
| including the effect on the MSIV air operated controls. Without adequate |
| justification, it cannot be assured that the open MSIVs would close |
| following extended operation with one MSIV OOS at greater than 75% of |
| current rated power. |
| |
| "If it is postulated that the plant operated for an extended period in the |
| MSIV OOS condition and then a main steam line break were to occur in one of |
| the three operational steam lines, then there is the potential that MSIVs |
| would not close to terminate the release from a steam line break either from |
| a common mode failure of both MSIVs, in the broken line, or failure of one |
| MSIV due to the high flow induced vibration and the other MSIV as the design |
| basis single failure. This condition would result in an un-terminated |
| release, which would exceed the existing 10 CFR 100 radiation release |
| limits. |
| |
| "(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply |
| was obtained: |
| |
| "June 24, 2002 |
| |
| "(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or failure to |
| comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied |
| for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to |
| the regulations in this part: |
| |
| "A defect has been confirmed to exist in analysis provided by GE for |
| Brunswick 1 and 2, Duane Arnold, Fitzpatrick, Pilgrim, Hatch 2, Nine Mile |
| Point 2, and Perry 1. |
| |
| "(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the |
| name of the, individual or organization responsible for the action; and the |
| length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note, |
| these are actions specifically associated with the identified Reportable |
| Condition): |
| |
| "GE has communicated to the affected plants the 75% power limitation when |
| operating with one MSIV OOS. |
| |
| "GE has revised existing internal engineering and program processes to |
| explicitly screen any limiting configurations/conditions for current and |
| future MSIV OOS evaluations. |
| |
| "(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the |
| facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be |
| given to purchasers or licensees: |
| |
| "GE recommends limiting operation to 75% of current rated power when |
| operating with one MSIV OOS, unless there is an adequate justification to |
| support extended operation at a higher power level." |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39233 |
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| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/30/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/30/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROBERT BOESCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/30/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: MIKE NORRIS +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GLENN MEYER R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 70 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON MAIN TURBINE TRIP DUE TO LOW CONDENSER VACUUM |
| |
| "Susquehanna Unit 2 experienced a automatic reactor SCRAM on a Main Turbine |
| trip due to low condenser vacuum. The unit experienced a momentary loss of |
| 2D130 (120 V AC power). The loss caused the offgas system to isolate, a |
| runback on the A Reactor Recirc Pump and a scoop tube lock on the B reactor |
| Recirc Pump. Efforts to re-establish the offgas system were unsuccessful. |
| Following the SCRAM, reactor water level dropped to approx. -0.2", and was |
| recovered by the Feedwater System. The offgas system and Condenser vacuum |
| were restored shortly after the SCRAM to maintain the condenser available |
| for heat removal. There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to |
| containment. |
| |
| "This event is an Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation when the reactor |
| is critical, and is reportable as a four hour ENS Notification under 10 CFR |
| 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)." |
| |
| The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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