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Event Notification Report for September 19, 2002



                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/18/2002 - 09/19/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

39152  39196  39197  39198  39199  39200  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39152       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/25/2002|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:45[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/24/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PETE SENA                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GAS VOIDING IN ECCS PIPING                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0425 hrs on 8/24/2002, a gas void was identified in Emergency Core       |
| Cooling System (ECCS) piping at Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No.  |
| 2 that exceeded the gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet. A gas void     |
| which exceeds .872 cubic feet could potentially disable a single High Head   |
| Safety Injection (HHSI) pump if ingested. The gas void was located in the    |
| 'B' train piping which would be used (only) following the                    |
| transfer-to-recirculation phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).        |
| Technical Specification Action 3.5.2.a and 3.5.2.d was entered for 'B' ECCS  |
| train not being operable. The piping where the void was located leads to a   |
| common HHSI pump suction header which connects to both trains' HHSI pumps.   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1345 hrs on 8/24/2002, an isolation valve (2SIS-MOV863B) was             |
| de-energized closed. De-energizing this isolation valve prevents the gas     |
| void traveling to the common HHSI suction header during                      |
| transfer-to-recirculation flow. This was done as a general precaution to     |
| strengthen the operable 'A' HHSI train during the ongoing gas void           |
| generation investigation since this gas void generation process was not yet  |
| fully understood.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1638 hrs on 8/24/2002 it was calculated that the actual gas void volume  |
| in the 'B' train piping was 1.3 cubic feet. It was also identified that the  |
| previously established gas void volume limit of .872 cubic feet was          |
| incorrect and the applicable gas void volume limit was .319 cubic feet. With |
| an evaluation of the new gas void limit, it was concluded at 2000 hrs that   |
| BVPS Unit No. 2 had been vulnerable to a degradation of both trains' HHSI    |
| pumps between 0425 and 1345. This would be possible since the gas void could |
| potentially have split in half (0.65 cubic feet) and migrated during         |
| post-LOCA transfer-to-recirculation flow through the common HHSI suction     |
| header. Each half-sized void could enter each train's HHSI pump, potentially |
| affecting both trains of HHSI pumps (.65 cubic feet would exceed the limit   |
| of .319 cubic feet for each pump). This is reportable pursuant to            |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as being in an unanalyzed condition that             |
| significantly degraded plant safety. This is also reportable pursuant to     |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that at the time of discovery could    |
| have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to   |
| mitigate consequences of an accident.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Currently with 2SIS-M0V863B de-energized closed, the gas void can not       |
| travel to the 'A' train HHSI pump. Actions are being initiated to eliminate  |
| this gas void. BVPS Unit No. 2 remains in Tech Specification Action 3.5.2.a  |
| and 3.5.2.d for one ECCS subsystem inoperable. The investigation of the gas  |
| void generation process is continuing."                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| ***RETRACTION KEN TIEFENTHAL TO MIKE NORRIS 9/18/02 1743 EDT***              |
|                                                                              |
| "Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit No. 2 retracts the notification     |
| made on 08/25/2002 at 00:45 hrs regarding the event reported under 10 CFR    |
| 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) [ENS #39152].                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent analysis of the event identified that the gas void previously    |
| located in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) piping at BVPS Unit No.  |
| 2 would not have rendered either train's High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)   |
| pump incapable of performing its intended safety function. A detailed        |
| evaluation of the void size and the exact piping arrangement concluded that  |
| for an analyzed void size of 3 cu. ft. (which bounds the as-found void), the |
| void fraction reaching the HHSI pump would have been 5% or less. At this     |
| level of void fraction, a HHSI pump at BVPS Unit No. 2 would have continued  |
| to operate and pass flow through the discharge lines to the RCS during the   |
| short duration when the void was present. The small temporary degradation in |
| flow would also not have adversely affected any transient in progress.       |
| Therefore, the HHSI pumps would have been able to pass the void and continue |
| to perform its safety function if the ECCS had been called upon to operate.  |
|                                                                              |
| "Given that both trains of HHSI were able to perform their safety functions, |
| this void was not a condition that significantly degraded plant safety and   |
| did not prevent the ECCS system from being able to fulfill its safety        |
| function."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, notified R1DO          |
| (Kinneman).                                                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   39196       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ANDERSON ENGINEERING                 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
|LICENSEE:  ANDERSON ENGINEERING                 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:12[EDT]|
|    CITY:  Joplin                   REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        09/18/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MO |EVENT TIME:        07:30[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  24-20063-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK RING            R3      |
|                                                |FRED BROWN           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SIEGFRIED TARNOWIECKYI       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BLO1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CPN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS STOLEN FROM THE BACK OF A PICKUP TRICK.       |
|                                                                              |
| At 0730 CT 09/18/02 an  employee of Anderson Engineering found that a CPN    |
| moisture density gauge which had been chained to the back of his 1992,       |
| open-bed, Ford Pickup truck was missing.  The gauge was in its case at the   |
| time that it was stolen.  The last time he saw the CPN gauge  was at 1500    |
| hours CT on 09/17/02 when he parked his pickup truck in the back of his      |
| house.  He discovered that the CPN gauge had been stolen when he got up this |
| morning and went to his truck to go to work.  The caller stated that it is   |
| company policy that the gauge be dropped off and stored at the main office   |
| before the worker goes home.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The Model number of the stolen CPN moisture density gauge is MC-1-DR and the |
| serial number of the gauge is MD01205992. The gauge contains 10 millicuries  |
| of Cesium-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241/Be.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee will notify the Joplin, MO Police Department and informed them  |
| that one of their CPN moisture density gauges has been stolen.   The         |
| licensee notified NRC Region 3 (Cassandra Frazier) of this event.            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39197       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        07/21/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL FORD                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JOHN KINNEMAN        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTIFICATION UNDER 10 CFR PART 21 FOR  LEAKING FUEL PUMP ON FAIRBANKS MORSE  |
| EMERGENCY DIESEL ENGINE                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following are the contents of a facsimile:                               |
|                                                                              |
| "This initial notification addresses the reporting requirements of 10 CFR    |
| 21.21(d)(3)(i) and provides preliminary information applicable to 10 CFR     |
| 21.21 (d)(4).                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| 1. Name and address of the individual informing the Commission.              |
|                                                                              |
| G.M. Dugger                                                                  |
| Vice President Operations                                                    |
| Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.                                             |
| Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station                                                |
| 600 Rocky Hill Road                                                          |
| Plymouth, MA 02360                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| 2. Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component      |
| supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which   |
| fails to comply or contains a defect.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Facility                         Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station               |
|                                                                              |
| Component                Fuel Injector Pump for ALCo (Fairbanks Morse),      |
| model 251 F, Emergency Diesel Generator, Part Number 23200127, Serial Number |
| 9611071                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| 3. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the     |
| basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.                  |
|                                                                              |
| Supplier                   Coltec Industries                                 |
| Fairbanks Morse Engine Division                                              |
| 701 White Avenue                                                             |
| Beloit, WI 53511-5492                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| 4. Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard, which is |
| created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.             |
|                                                                              |
| The fuel injector pump was found to be leaking excessively through a         |
| nameplate rivet hole that had been drilled through-wall in the pump body.    |
| The drilled hole allowed fuel to leak through the pump body.                 |
|                                                                              |
| This fuel injector pump was being installed on a safety-related emergency    |
| diesel generator. It was through visual observation of the pump during the   |
| post work test that the fuel leak through the nameplate rivet hole was       |
| detected. If the leak had not been identified during the post work test, the |
| leak could have gone unnoticed during subsequent emergency diesel generator  |
| operation. The failure of the fuel injector pump could have adversely        |
| impacted emergency diesel generator operation and prevented the emergency    |
| diesel generator from being able the supply all of the necessary accident    |
| loads.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| 5. The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was |
| obtained.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The defect was discovered during post work testing on July 19, 2002 while    |
| the emergency diesel generator was tagged out of service for the overhaul    |
| that installed the subject fuel injector pump. A determination that the      |
| defect could create a substantial safety hazard was completed on September   |
| 12, 2002.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| In accordance with 10 CFR 21.21 (a)(3) and Pilgrim Station procedure, the    |
| Pilgrim Site Vice President was notified of the conclusion. The notification |
| was made on September 17, 2002.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| 6. In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to      |
| comply, the number and location of all such components in use at, supplied   |
| for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to   |
| the regulations of this part.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| At Pilgrim Station, there are two emergency diesel generators and one        |
| Station Blackout Diesel Generator (SBODG). There are 18 fuel injector pumps  |
| installed on each emergency diesel generator and 12 fuel injector pumps on   |
| the SBODG. Except for the defective fuel injector pump that was installed    |
| while the emergency diesel generator was tagged out service for overhaul,    |
| none of the fuel injector pumps installed on either emergency diesel         |
| generator or the SBODG have exhibited a similar leak (through-wall rivet     |
| hole leak in the pump body).                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| 7. The corrective action, which has been taken, is being, or will be taken;  |
| the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and   |
| the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action.    |
|                                                                              |
| The fuel injector pump that contained the through-wall rivet hole in the     |
| pump body was removed from the emergency diesel generator and was replaced   |
| with a spare fuel pump. The spare fuel pump was visually inspected for leak  |
| tightness when the emergency diesel generator was post work tested after the |
| defective pump was replaced. The emergency diesel generator post work        |
| testing was completed With satisfactory results and returned to operable     |
| status on July 21, 2002.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The defective pump was not retained.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| There are currently no (zero) fuel injector pumps located in the Pilgrim     |
| Station warehouse.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| 8. Any device related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, |
| activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to    |
| purchasers or licensees.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Pilgrim Station discussed the condition of the defective pump on September   |
| 16, 2002, with the pump supplier. The supplier acknowledges modifying the    |
| mounting of the nameplate label to the pump prior to supply. Pilgrim Station |
| has not supplied any spare fuel injector pumps to a purchaser or other       |
| licensee."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39198       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:19[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        09/18/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:28[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDREW OHRABLO               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(V).                        |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 18, 2002 at 14:28 HPCI declared INOPERABLE due to placing the  |
| Auxiliary Lube Oil Pump [control switch] To Pull-to-lock. This prevents the  |
| HPCI Turbine from automatically starting. The Auxiliary Lube Oil pump        |
| [control switch] was taken to pull-to-lock in accordance with station        |
| operating procedures due to receiving a HPCI Gland Steam Exhauster Condenser |
| Hotwell high level alarm that did not clear due to failure of the Gland Seal |
| Condenser Condensate pump to automatically start.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "NRC Senior Resident has been informed of the HPCI inoperability."           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39199       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE                 |EVENT DATE:        09/17/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:52[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAN MARKS                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/17/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       98       Power Operation  |98       Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       99.6     Power Operation  |99.6     Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HEAT BALANCE CALCULATION ERROR  ON REACTOR POWER                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The following event description is based on information currently           |
| available. It through subsequent reviews of this event, additional           |
| information is identified that Is pertinent to this event or alters the      |
| information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be    |
| made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.          |
|                                                                              |
| "Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3 are evaluating the  |
| potential that the Maximum Power Level of 3876 megawatts thermal (100%       |
| power), specified in Operating License Condition 2.C(1) may have been        |
| exceeded in the past due to an unconservative value of reactor coolant pump  |
| (RCP) heat in the secondary calorimetric calculation since initial plant     |
| operation. The value of total energy input due to RCP operation used in the  |
| calorimetric is 29.53 megawatts (MW) in Unit 1,  29.61 MW in Unit 2 and      |
| 31.88 MW In Unit 3. Conservative engineering calculation of actual RCP heat  |
| input based on electrical load is as low as 24.72 MW. Similarly,             |
| conservative engineering calculation of actual RCP heat input based on fluid |
| power (pump differential pressure) is as low as 22.86 MW. Thus, the          |
| calorimetric error may be as large as (31.88-22.86) 9.02 MW or approximately |
| 0.23%.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The error could have resulted in core power levels above the Operating      |
| License limit of 3876 MW thermal. Due to current operating limitations on    |
| reactor coolant system hot leg temperature, none of the Palo Verde units are |
| presently exceeding the licensed power limit. Unit 1 is at approximately 99% |
| power (3837 MW thermal, 39 MW margin). Unit 2 is at approximately 98% power  |
| (3798 MW thermal, 78 MW margin). Unit 3 is at approximately 99.6% power      |
| (3861 MW thermal, 15 MW margin)                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made because a review of historical operating data may |
| reveal that the Maximum Power Level was exceeded.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The Palo Verde safety analyses bound a power level of 102%, thus the Units  |
| remain within the safety analyses. As a compensatory measure, the station    |
| has established an administrative limit of 99.75% power pending resolution   |
| of this issue.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "No ESF actuations occurred and none were required. There were no            |
| structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the time of       |
| discovery that contributed to this condition. There were no failures that    |
| rendered a train of a safety system inoperable and no failures of components |
| with multiple functions were involved. The event did not result in the       |
| release of radioactivity to the environment and did not adversely affect the |
| safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public."             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39200       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/19/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:41[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        09/18/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:25[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DON CHASE                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/19/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO AUTOMATIC REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM ACTUATION           |
|                                                                              |
| "A reactor scram occurred at River Bend Station @ 2025 on 09/18/02. The      |
| plant was operating at 100% reactor power at the time of the scram. The      |
| plant systems performed as required post scram. Reactor pressure and water   |
| level are stable with reactor level being controlled by the reactor core     |
| isolation cooling system. This event is being reported pursuant to l0 CFR    |
| 50.72 (b)(2)(LV) B (1) a reactor protection system (RPS) scram while         |
| critical (a 4 hour report) and a manual actuation of the reactor core        |
| isolation cooling system (RCIC) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(IV) B (5).   |
| The cause of the scram is still under investigation."                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that all control rods fully inserted during the scram  |
| and that there was no indication of SRV actuation during the event.          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+