Event Notification Report for August 19, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/16/2002 - 08/19/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
39125 39128 39132 39133 39135
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39125 |
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| REP ORG: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2002|
|LICENSEE: GEOTEK, INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:39[EDT]|
| CITY: Sandy REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 08/12/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: UT |EVENT TIME: 10:30[MDT]|
|LICENSE#: UT-1800427 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/14/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GARY SANBORN R4 |
| |DOUG BROADDUS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: UTAH DIV OF RAD CONTROL | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: GERRY WAIG | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| "A Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. Model 3430, portable gauging device |
| serial number 30302, containing 8 millicuries of cesium-137 (source serial |
| number 750-4769), and 40 millicuries of americium-241/beryllium (source |
| serial number 47-25522) was lost from the bed of a pickup truck while |
| traveling from the licensee's office in Sandy, Utah to a temporary jobsite |
| in West Jordan, Utah." |
| |
| The Utah event report number for this event is UT-02-0002 |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 8/14/02 @ 1152 BY FELICE TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The device was found by another Utah licensee as soon as it dropped off the |
| truck. It was returned to the owner and it did not appear to be damaged. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 39128 |
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| REP ORG: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2002|
|LICENSEE: SOUTHERN RESOURCES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:40[EDT]|
| CITY: CHARLOTTE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 08/13/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/13/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MARK LESSER R2 |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MILLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
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| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA RECEIVED NOTICED THAT A NITON ALLOY ANALYZER WAS |
| STOLEN. |
| |
| On August 13. 2002 the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section was |
| notified by Southern Resources, 3826 Raleigh St., Charlotte, NC 28208 that a |
| Niton Alloy Analyzer [Model XL 801S] containing a 10 millicurie Cd-109 |
| sealed source [assay date 10/01] was stolen from their office. The local |
| police-department is investigating. The NC Radiation Protection Section, |
| Southern Resources, Niton Corp. and local law enforcement agencies are |
| working together to recover the device. |
| |
| The State has not yet determined if Southern Resources is a State Licensee. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39132 |
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| FACILITY: HARRIS REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:49[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/15/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:26[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DONALD McGEE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/16/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW BUS VOLTAGE ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS |
| |
| "An automatic reactor trip occurred at 2126 on 8/15/02. The reactor trip was |
| caused by low bus voltage for reactor coolant pumps and the cause is under |
| investigation. All safety systems responded properly. Both motor driven AFW |
| pumps automatically started due to low steam generator level. At 2155, a |
| second AFW actuation was received due to low steam generator level in one |
| steam generator while recovering level. Both motor driven AFW pumps were |
| already running in response to the first actuation signal." |
| |
| A voltage transient occurred when central distribution near Raleigh, NC |
| (about 20 miles away) was restoring a 230 kV to 115 kV bank that had tripped |
| due to a lightning strike. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 39133 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:54[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/15/2002|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/16/2002|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT - LACK OF APPROVED NCS EVALUATION FOR |
| OPERATION |
| |
| The following is taken from a facsimile report: |
| |
| At 1613, on 08-15-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| a fissile material operation was identified without an approved NCS |
| evaluation. Two full 2S sample cylinders, which originated outside of C-310, |
| were evacuated to the cascade via the sample cabinet in C-310. No NCSE |
| exists to cover refeed operations of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid |
| Sampling System. Thus, no NCSA controls have been established to perform |
| this operation in C-310. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| Two full 2S cylinders do not contain sufficient mass of uranium to support a |
| criticality. However, double contingency was not maintained because no NCSA |
| controls have been established to perform this operation in C-310. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR) |
| |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would |
| have to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC |
| |
| Since this operation does not have an NCSA for it, there is no controlled |
| parameter. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORMS OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| 2S Cylinder N-260 - 1384 grams UF6 with an enrichment of 4.4012% U-235. 2S |
| cylinder N-19 - 1486 grams UF6 with an enrichment of 4.3983% U-235. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND |
| DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| Refeed of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System has not been |
| evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was |
| not maintained, |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Revise procedures to prevent the refeed of 2S cylinders, which originated |
| outside of C-310, in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 39135 |
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| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM WILSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/16/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
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| | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN VALVE 1MS-5959 MAY NOT CLOSE AGAINST FULL STEAM |
| GENERATOR PRESSURE. |
| |
| |
| "A draft calculation (01109-C-015) and a review of this calculation |
| concluded that 1MS-5959 would not shut against the maximum differential |
| pressure (dp) assumed within the calculation. The actual dp used for the |
| calculation review is based on the SG atmospheric dump valve set point of |
| 1085 psig. This is the SG pressure assumed for aux feed flow requirements |
| to the SGs. At this dp (1085 psig), 1MS-5959 blow down isolation valve |
| would not shut (1MS-5959 HX-1A SG-Blow down isolation ). All other (3) |
| steam generator blowdown valves would shut against this d/p. |
| |
| "The blowdown isolation valves are required to isolate to support two |
| functions; 1) containment isolation and , 2) steam generator pressure |
| boundary isolation. The containment isolation function is a class 4 |
| containment penetration (FSAR page 5.2-3), which is a normally operating |
| line connected to a closed system inside of containment, provided with at |
| least one manual valve located outside of containment, and missile protected |
| throughout its length. FSAR Figure 5.2-51-2 lists manual valve 1MS-265 as |
| the containment isolation valve, but also lists 1MS-5959 as an isolation |
| valve inside of containment. Although 1MS-5959 may not be able to close at |
| full SG pressure, it is expected to be able to close at the maximum |
| containment design pressure (60 psig), which may occur if a SG is faulted. |
| Since the requirement for class 4 penetration is still met by using 1MS-265, |
| and 1MS-5959 would still function under the conditions of a faulted SG, the |
| containment isolation function of 1MS-5959 is considered to be operable. |
| |
| "The function to establish the SG pressure boundary is based on the |
| requirements of the Chapter 14 accident analysis for the Loss of Normal |
| Feedwater (LONF, Section 14.1.10) and the Loss of All AC Power to the |
| Station Auxiliaries (LOAC, Section 14.1.11). The accident analyses credit |
| 200 gpm AFW flow delivered to the SGs after a five minute delay. The |
| acceptance criteria for both accidents is that the pressurizer does not |
| overfill. Overfilling of the pressurizer could result in a small break LOCA |
| due to the assumed failure of a pressurizer safety valve or PORV when |
| passing liquid. If the SG blowdown valve cannot perform its isolation, then |
| an undetermined (although significant) portion of the AFW will be diverted |
| from flowing around the u-tube region. Heat removal assumed in the analysis |
| will not meet the minimum credited in the accident analysis based on a full |
| 200 gpm AFW flow. |
| |
| "1MS-5959 was shut based on engineering judgement and declared inoperable at |
| 1415, 08/16/02. The valve operator on 1MS-5959 was adjusted per routine |
| maintenance procedure (RMP) 9141, Air operated valve testing and adjustment, |
| such that the valve would shut under the analyzed conditions. 1MS-5959 was |
| declared operable at 1925 08/16/02." |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
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