United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated With Events > Event Notification Reports > 2002

Event Notification Report for August 19, 2002



                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/16/2002 - 08/19/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

39125  39128  39132  39133  39135  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39125       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2002|
|LICENSEE:   GEOTEK, INC                         |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:39[EDT]|
|    CITY:  Sandy                    REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        08/12/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  UT |EVENT TIME:        10:30[MDT]|
|LICENSE#:  UT-1800427            AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/14/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|                                                |DOUG BROADDUS        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  UTAH DIV OF RAD CONTROL      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST PORTABLE MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE                |
|                                                                              |
| "A Troxler Electronic Laboratories, Inc. Model 3430, portable gauging device |
| serial number 30302, containing 8 millicuries of cesium-137 (source serial   |
| number 750-4769), and 40 millicuries of americium-241/beryllium (source      |
| serial number 47-25522) was lost from the bed of a pickup truck while        |
| traveling from the licensee's office in Sandy, Utah to a temporary jobsite   |
| in West Jordan, Utah."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The Utah event report number for this event is UT-02-0002                    |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 8/14/02 @ 1152 BY FELICE TO GOULD * * *                      |
|                                                                              |
| The device was found by another Utah licensee as soon as it dropped off the  |
| truck.  It was returned to the owner and it did not appear to be damaged.    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   39128       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/2002|
|LICENSEE:  SOUTHERN RESOURCES                   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:40[EDT]|
|    CITY:  CHARLOTTE                REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/13/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MILLER                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA RECEIVED NOTICED THAT A NITON ALLOY ANALYZER WAS |
| STOLEN.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| On August 13. 2002 the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section was       |
| notified by Southern Resources, 3826 Raleigh St., Charlotte, NC 28208 that a |
| Niton Alloy Analyzer [Model XL 801S] containing a 10 millicurie Cd-109       |
| sealed source [assay date 10/01] was stolen from their office.  The local    |
| police-department is investigating.  The NC Radiation Protection Section,    |
| Southern Resources, Niton Corp. and local law enforcement agencies are       |
| working together to recover the device.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The State has not yet determined if Southern Resources is a State Licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39132       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HARRIS                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:49[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        08/15/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:26[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DONALD McGEE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/16/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW BUS VOLTAGE ON REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS       |
|                                                                              |
| "An automatic reactor trip occurred at 2126 on 8/15/02. The reactor trip was |
| caused by low bus voltage for reactor coolant pumps and the cause is under   |
| investigation. All safety systems responded properly. Both motor driven AFW  |
| pumps automatically started due to low steam generator level. At 2155, a     |
| second AFW actuation was received due to low steam generator level in one    |
| steam generator while recovering level. Both motor driven AFW pumps were     |
| already running in response to the first actuation signal."                  |
|                                                                              |
| A voltage transient occurred when central distribution near Raleigh, NC      |
| (about 20 miles away) was restoring a 230 kV to 115 kV bank that had tripped |
| due to a lightning strike.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   39133       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:54[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/15/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/16/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |C.W. (BILL) REAMER   NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. C. PITTMAN                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR REPORT - LACK OF APPROVED NCS EVALUATION FOR      |
| OPERATION                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The following is taken from a facsimile report:                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 1613, on 08-15-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| a fissile material operation was identified without an approved NCS          |
| evaluation. Two full 2S sample cylinders, which originated outside of C-310, |
| were evacuated to the cascade via the sample cabinet in C-310. No NCSE       |
| exists to cover refeed operations of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid        |
| Sampling System. Thus, no NCSA controls have been established to perform     |
| this operation in C-310.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event.           |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| Two full 2S cylinders do not contain sufficient mass of uranium to support a |
| criticality. However, double contingency was not maintained because no NCSA  |
| controls have been established to perform this operation in C-310.           |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR)                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, more than a critical mass would   |
| have to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.                                |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC        |
|                                                                              |
| Since this operation does not have an NCSA for it,  there is no controlled   |
| parameter.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORMS OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDES PROCESS   |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| 2S Cylinder N-260 - 1384 grams UF6 with an enrichment of 4.4012% U-235. 2S   |
| cylinder N-19 - 1486 grams UF6 with an enrichment of 4.3983% U-235.          |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL SYSTEM(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND        |
| DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Refeed of 2S cylinders in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System has not been      |
| evaluated for nuclear criticality safety. Therefore, double contingency was  |
| not maintained,                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| Revise procedures to prevent the refeed of 2S cylinders, which originated    |
| outside of C-310, in the C-310 Liquid Sampling System.                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   39135       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/16/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/16/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM WILSON                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/16/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN VALVE 1MS-5959 MAY NOT CLOSE AGAINST FULL STEAM     |
| GENERATOR PRESSURE.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "A draft calculation (01109-C-015) and a review of this calculation          |
| concluded that 1MS-5959 would not shut against the maximum differential      |
| pressure (dp) assumed within the calculation.  The actual dp used for the    |
| calculation review is based on the SG atmospheric dump valve set point of    |
| 1085 psig.  This is the SG pressure assumed for aux feed flow requirements   |
| to the SGs.  At this dp (1085 psig), 1MS-5959 blow down isolation valve      |
| would not shut (1MS-5959 HX-1A SG-Blow down isolation ).  All other (3)      |
| steam generator blowdown valves would shut against this d/p.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The blowdown isolation valves are required to isolate to support two        |
| functions; 1) containment isolation and , 2) steam generator pressure        |
| boundary isolation.  The containment isolation function is a class 4         |
| containment penetration (FSAR page 5.2-3), which is a normally operating     |
| line connected to a closed system inside of containment, provided with at    |
| least one manual valve located outside of containment, and missile protected |
| throughout its length.  FSAR Figure 5.2-51-2 lists manual valve 1MS-265 as   |
| the containment isolation valve, but also lists 1MS-5959 as an isolation     |
| valve inside of containment.  Although 1MS-5959 may not be able to close at  |
| full SG pressure, it is expected to be able to close at the maximum          |
| containment design pressure (60 psig), which may occur if a SG is faulted.   |
| Since the requirement for class 4 penetration is still met by using 1MS-265, |
| and 1MS-5959 would still function under the conditions of a faulted SG, the  |
| containment isolation function of 1MS-5959  is considered to be operable.    |
|                                                                              |
| "The function to establish the SG pressure boundary is based on the          |
| requirements of the Chapter 14 accident analysis for the Loss of Normal      |
| Feedwater (LONF, Section 14.1.10) and the Loss of All AC Power to the        |
| Station Auxiliaries (LOAC, Section 14.1.11).  The accident analyses credit   |
| 200 gpm AFW flow delivered to the SGs after a five minute delay.  The        |
| acceptance criteria for both accidents is that the pressurizer does not      |
| overfill.  Overfilling of the pressurizer could result in a small break LOCA |
| due to the assumed failure of a pressurizer safety valve or PORV when        |
| passing liquid.  If the SG blowdown valve cannot perform its isolation, then |
| an undetermined (although significant) portion of the AFW will be diverted   |
| from flowing around the u-tube region.  Heat removal assumed in the analysis |
| will not meet the minimum credited in the accident analysis based on a full  |
| 200 gpm AFW flow.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "1MS-5959 was shut based on engineering judgement and declared inoperable at |
| 1415, 08/16/02.  The valve operator on 1MS-5959 was adjusted per routine     |
| maintenance procedure (RMP) 9141, Air operated valve testing and adjustment, |
| such that the valve would shut under the analyzed conditions.  1MS-5959 was  |
| declared operable at 1925 08/16/02."                                         |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+