Event Notification Report for May 15, 2002
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/14/2002 - 05/15/2002
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38915 38919
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38915 |
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| FACILITY: COOK REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/13/2002|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:39[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/12/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:01[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRADDOCK D. LEWIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2002|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |ANTON VEGEL R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO AN INSTRUMENTATION RACK POWER SUPPLY
FAILURE |
| WHICH CAUSED A STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER REGULATING VALVE TO FAIL
CLOSED |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "DC Cook Unit 2 tripped from full power due to an instrumentation rack power |
| supply failure on 05/12/02 [at] 2301. All control rods fully inserted. No |
| Safety Injection was required. The Unit 2 Reactor is stable and |
| subcritical. The Steam Generator Stop Valves were manually closed by the |
| Operating Crew to stabilize RCS Temperature in accordance with Plant |
| operating procedures. Reactor Coolant Temperature is being maintained |
| manually on the Steam Generator Atmospheric relief valves at No-Load T(ave) |
| in accordance with plant procedures." |
| |
| "This instrumentation rack power supply failure caused the #21 Steam |
| Generator Feed Regulating Valve to fail CLOSED. The Unit 2 Reactor |
| subsequently TRIPPED on Low Level in [the] #21 Steam Generator coincident |
| with Low Feedwater Flow. Several control systems were affected by the |
| control rack instrumentation failure: Pressurizer Pressure Control - |
| transferred control to manual and restored Pressurizer pressure, Pressurizer |
| Level Control - transferred control to manual and restored Pressurizer water |
| level, Refueling Water Sequence - Manually transferred Charging Pump Suction |
| to the RWST. Manual Operator response maintained and restored critical |
| plant parameters in MANUAL to normal parameter values." |
| |
| "Unit 2 entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 for 34 minutes because the |
| control system failures and plant system response temporarily caused the |
| Boration Flow paths from both the Refueling Water Storage Tank and Boric |
| Acid Storage Tanks to become INOPERABLE. Both Boration flow paths were |
| subsequently returned to OPERABLE status by manual Operator action." |
| |
| "The Reactor trip is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) |
| as an actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) when the Reactor was |
| critical. The Reactor TRIP was the result of an instrumentation rack power |
| supply failure and was not part of any preplanned test or evolution." |
| |
| The licensee stated that the unit is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot |
| Standby). The reactor coolant pumps are available for primary system |
| transport control. Pressurizer level and pressure control are in manual. |
| Normal charging and makeup are available, but the automatic function of the |
| refueling water sequence is not available. The auxiliary feedwater pumps |
| automatically started as expected and are currently being utilized to supply |
| water to the steam generators. Secondary steam is being dumped to |
| atmosphere. There is no evidence of steam generator tube leakage, and |
| containment parameters are as expected. There were no safety injections and |
| none were required, and none of the primary power-operated relief valves |
| lifted. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| ****UPDATE 5/14/02 At 13:20 From B. Bates To R. Laura**** |
| |
| The initial report stated that the reactor coolant temperature is being |
| maintained manually on the steam generator atmospheric relief valves at |
| no-load Tave in accordance with plant procedures. Temperature control was |
| actually established in automatic on the steam generator atmospheric relief |
| valves and remains in automatic. |
| |
| A statement was made in the original report that Unit 2 entered Technical |
| Specification 3.0.3 for 34 minutes. Upon further review, there was no |
| requirement to enter Technical Specification 3.0.3. The control system |
| failures and plant system response caused the boration flowpaths from both |
| the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) and Boric Acid Storage Tanks to |
| become inoperable. Therefore, the Unit was actually in Technical |
| Specification 3.1.2.2 actions (a)and (b) concurrently. This did not |
| constitute an entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 because entry into |
| both actions is not prohibited. |
| |
| Another statement was made that both boration fiowpaths were subsequently |
| returned to operable status by manual operator action. The boration flowpath |
| from the boric acid storage tanks was returned to operable. However, after |
| further investigation, it was determined that the boration flow path from |
| the RWST remained inoperable due to the inability of the refueling water |
| sequence to automatically initiate. The NRC Resident Inspector was |
| notified. |
| |
| Notified R3DO R. Gardner. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38919 |
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| REP ORG: ABB, INC. |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/2002|
|LICENSEE: ABB, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:05[EDT]|
| CITY: FLORENCE REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 05/14/2002|
| COUNTY: STATE: SC |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2002|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DANIEL HOLODY R1 |
| |ROBERT HAAG R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+RONALD GARDNER R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PATRICK O'NEAL (fax) |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NOTIFICATION OF A POTENTIAL DEFECT REGARDING K-LINE MECHANISM FAILURES
TO |
| CHARGE AND CLOSE |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from ABB, Inc.: |
| |
| "In August of 2001, Southern California Edison, San Onofre Nuclear |
| Generating Station, reported and submitted an operating mechanism for |
| evaluation to the ABB, Inc., Florence, SC Breaker Manufacturing Facility due |
| to suspected shipping damage causing 'failure to charge' symptoms. The |
| mechanism was a special configuration of the base 709774 Model '05' |
| mechanism manufactured in 10/1997. This mechanism was in a Nuclear |
| Safety-Related application. The mechanism was received by the factory in |
| September of 2001, and the reported failure mode was not duplicated in |
| Florence. However, under the auspices of a 'refurbishment,' ABB, Inc., |
| personnel performed an evaluation of critical characteristics for parts that |
| could be contributory to the failure mode described herein." |
| |
| "On 7 February 2002, Ameren - Union Electric's Sioux Generating Plant |
| reported a failure to charge and close of a Model '05' K-Line K-600S circuit |
| breaker (Serial Number 935461B--010496) manufactured 04/96. This breaker |
| was purchased for a Non-1E application. The cause of the breaker failure |
| was determined to be a culmination of energy utilization deficits. |
| Specifically, the condition of lubricant (Anderol 757), the surface and |
| finish of parts critical to the charging operation, and the interaction of |
| critical latching surfaces serve to impede the ability of the mechanism to |
| fully charge through the end of the charge cycle." |
| |
| "In March 2002, Dominion Virginia Power's Surry Nuclear Station reported the |
| failure to charge and close of a 1993 K-800M (Serial Number |
| 865613B033--010793). In this case the breaker was refurbished in the hopes |
| of alleviating the symptoms, only to find they returned a short time after |
| return to service. ABB, Inc., had already initiated Part 21 reporting |
| proceedings as this latest failure was announced, and the Florence Breaker |
| Manufacturing Facility is awaiting a customer report to verify the failure |
| mode." |
| |
| "In all cases, the end user is observing a failure to charge and/or close in |
| electrically operated mechanisms. These failures are due to one of the |
| following two scenarios:" |
| |
| "1. A failure to charge and close, either mechanically or electrically, |
| until the needed energy is supplied to rotate the charging cam over the |
| center-point into a fully charged position -- either by mechanical vibration |
| or operator rotation of the charging cam." |
| |
| "2. A failure to close where the above scenario does not exist but the |
| fully charged mechanism does not close due to the fact that the primary |
| close latch does not fully clear in response the secondary close latch |
| actuation." |
| |
| "With the introduction of the Model '07' mechanism in December 1998, while |
| maintaining backward compatibility with pre-existing models, ABB has |
| facilitated improvements to be incorporated into every mechanism that is |
| built at the Florence Breaker Manufacturing Facility. ABB recognizes that |
| this failure mode may exist in any K-Line circuit breaker manufactured or |
| having undergone mechanism repair, refurbishment, or replacement between |
| January 1, 1988 and December 31, 1998 and, therefore, recommends that |
| utilities address this issue at the next available maintenance interval. |
| This includes any 'spare' K-Line mechanisms manufactured during the afore |
| determined time frame that may be in stock." |
| |
| "Three equally viable options are available to rectify this situation. They |
| are, listed in order of ABB preference, most desirable first:" |
| |
| "1. Replacement of suspect K-Line operating mechanism (ABB part number |
| 709774T##) with a Model '07' mechanism (ABB part number 716785T##). This |
| option will require the purchase of an Engineering Qualification Report |
| Addendum so that 1E dedication traceability is maintained." |
| |
| "2. Upgrade of suspect K-Line operating mechanism to a Model '07' mechanism |
| utilizing one of ABB upgrade kits, numbers 716659T03 through T10. This |
| option will require the purchase of an Engineering Qualification Report |
| Addendum so that 1E dedication traceability is maintained." |
| |
| "3. Improvement of suspect K-Line operating mechanism within the original |
| model class utilizing ABB repair kit number 716659T01 or T02." |
| |
| "Work required by the options listed above should only be performed by |
| personnel trained and/or authorized by ABB, Inc. ABB is available to |
| perform the work in the Florence, South Carolina, factory or perform |
| in-factory training if non-ABB personnel are to be used or contracted." |
| |
| "Note: If work associated with options 2 or 3 above is performed by |
| personnel outside of the Florence, SC factory, one minor configuration |
| change must be noted. During mechanism re-assembly, technicians must |
| relocate the washer (ABB part number 650351A57) from its original location |
| on the control device side on the Primary Close Latch Pivot Pin (ABB part |
| number 702883D00) to the charging motor side." |
| |
| "ABB [plans to] notify all Nuclear Utility Companies." |
| |
| Call the NRC operations officer for ABB, Inc., contact information. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021