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Event Notification Report for April 22, 2002

                         
                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           04/19/2002 - 04/22/2002

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38762  38827  38860  38861  38864  38865  38866  38867  38868  38869  38870  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38762       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:51[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS JESSESSKY             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/19/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  GERRY WAIG                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNANALYZED CONDITION, APPENDIX R VALVE UNABLE TO SATISFY DESIGN
FUNCTION     |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1430 on 3/12/02, an Appendix R credited valve was determined to be       |
| unable to satisfy its design function of providing a flow path from the      |
| Charging System to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The credited flow path  |
| is necessary to control RCS inventory and maintain the plant in Mode 3 (Hot  |
| Standby) during an Appendix R fire. The flow path is also utilized           |
| procedurally in controlling RCS inventory while the RCS is cooled down and   |
| depressurized from Mode 3 (Hot Standby) to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).           |
|                                                                              |
| "This issue places the plant in an unanalyzed condition and thus is          |
| reportable under 50.73 (a)(2)(ii).                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The specific valve is 1/2CV-1296 Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation valve.   |
| The valve's design function is to open on a differential pressure of 200     |
| psid (with or without instrument air) between the discharge of the charging  |
| pumps and the RCS. This line is not utilized during normal operations but is |
| an available charging path to the RCS and utilized during plant shutdown in  |
| the event of an Appendix R fire. The valve is an air operated valve that is  |
| assumed to have failed close due to a loss of instrument air. It has been    |
| found that the valve will not open until a much higher differential pressure |
| is reached. If the RCS is at normal operating pressure (2235 psig), and the  |
| actual lift pressure of the valve is greater than 500 psid, charging flow    |
| will be unavailable to the RCS. A relief on the discharge of the outlet of   |
| the charging pump will lift at 2735 and prevent flow to the RCS. The         |
| charging pump maximum discharge pressure is 3000 psig.                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Compensatory actions have been undertaken that establish plantwide fire     |
| rounds. Fire rounds will be continued until the condition is corrected or a  |
| suitable evaluation is completed that establishes other actions."            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| ****RETRACTION 4/19/02 at 1821 from Mike Holzmann to Rich Laura****          |
|                                                                              |
| "RETRACTION OF EVENT NOTIFICATION #38762                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2051 EST on March 12, 2002, ENS Event Notification # 38762 was made in   |
| accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for identification of an           |
| unanalyzed condition that had the potential to significantly degrade plant   |
| safety involving the Appendix R safe shutdown fire analysis. PBNP Unit 1 and |
| 2 valve CV-1296, 'Auxiliary Charging Line Isolation Valve,' are air-operated |
| valves. These valves, one in each unit, are credited with opening at 200     |
| psid to provide a charging system flow path to control RCS inventory and to  |
| maintain the plant in Mode 3 (hot standby) during the Appendix R safe        |
| shutdown fire with loss of instrument air. The notification was made when we |
| identified that the CV-1296 valves will not open until a much higher         |
| differential pressure is reached and; therefore, the flow path through the   |
| valve may not be capable of providing the Appendix R function of controlling |
| RCS inventory. At the time of this notification an evaluation of the         |
| consequences of this Condition had not been assessed, and the report was     |
| made because of the potential for the plant being in an unanalyzed condition |
| that significantly degrades plant safety.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "We have subsequently completed an engineering evaluation which identified   |
| the differential pressure necessary to permit charging flow through the      |
| CV-1296 valve. This evaluation is based on the measured lifting force of the |
| valve stem with zero differential pressure across the valve. We have further |
| determined, based on engineering analysis supported by MAAP4 computer runs,  |
| and using a more conservative RCS injection pressure then identified above,  |
| that the RCS pressure would drop low enough to permit charging flow into the |
| RCS, before the RCS pressurizer level is lost. We have thus concluded that   |
| the condition identified in our event notification would not result in a     |
| significant degradation of plant safety. Therefore, this condition is not    |
| reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73, and we are hereby retracting this    |
| event notification."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.  The R3DO (J. Madera) has   |
| been notified.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38827       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE:
04/03/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:54[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        04/03/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        11:59[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/19/2002|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 (CRITICALITY CONTROLS) ISSUE AT PORTSMOUTH       
|
| GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1159 hours today after Nuclear Materials Engineering completed a review  |
| of their databases for batched items stored in 55 gal. drums, it was         |
| discovered that 26 drums with questionable Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS)     |
| values were located in the XT-847. The concern about the SGS not correctly   |
| counting the U-235 mass was identified earlier but at that time no drums     |
| were identified in the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) leased    |
| spaces. The mass counting error identified between the SCS and the Low       |
| Density Waste Assay Monitor (LDWAM) was at times off by a factor of 10 or    |
| more. Because of the questionable SGS measurements it could not be assured   |
| the 350 gram U-235 limit per batched drum was maintained. The governing NSCA |
| X-0847_ 001. A04 Operation of the XT-847 Facility in it's NCSE accounted for |
| an error of a factor of two in mass calculations, as a bounding condition.   |
| Thus with the loss of the bounding calculations and the potential error in   |
| mass calculations, this resulted in the loss of both legs of the double      |
| contingency basis (mass & the factor of two bounding error) for NCSA         |
| X-847_001.A04.  At the present time Waste Material handlers in the XT-847    |
| are moving all 26 drums from their storage area to another storage location  |
| within the building to allow for remeasurement of the drums. The guidance    |
| for moving and relocating these drums for remeasurement is covered by        |
| existing procedures and NCSAs.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The safety significance of this event is low |
| because the actual uranium mass content of the drums in question would not   |
| be expected to contain more than a safe amount of uranium bearing material.  |
| Other similar drums of trapping material batched during the same period      |
| using LDWAM measurements contain considerably less than a safe mass of       |
| U-235. The uranium mass limits assume optimum moderation and 100%            |
| enrichment. The drums in question are known to contain less than 10%         |
| enrichment (based upon process knowledge or sampling) and the material       |
| stored in the XT-847 is dry trapping material (alumina, etc). Even with the  |
| maximum potential error in the SGS measurements, the total mass in any drum  |
| (or group) would be less than the safe mass of uranium at an H/U of 4 (wet   |
| air moderation of approximately 7.9 kg of U-235 (100% enrichment)            |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
| For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: One or   |
| more drums must contain greater than a minimum critical mass of uranium (at  |
| this time, the measurement results are in question, but greater than a safe  |
| mass has not actually been measured in any drum), the contents of the drums  |
| would need to be moderated by water or oil (the material is dry trapping     |
| material), and some amount of reflection would be required (for the drums,   |
| or groups of drums, currently spaced 2 feet edge-to-edge apart).             |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION,
ETC.):    |
| The drums were filled by batching small diameter containers of trapping      |
| material based upon NDA or sample measurements of the uranium mass present.  |
| The batching limits are 43.5% of the minimum critical mass assuming optimum  |
| moderation, concentration, geometry, reflection, etc. In the applicable      |
| NCSE, credit is taken for a double batch scenario bounding potential uranium |
| mass upsets; however, the potential error in the SGS measurements may be     |
| greater than a factor of two. Spacing is controlled for drums, or groups of  |
| drums, unless categorized as containing less than 15 grams U-235.            |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): The contents of the drums are dry  |
| trapping material from the cascade buildings, and are known to be enriched   |
| to 10% or less.  At the time they were filled, the total mass was calculated |
| to be less than 350 grams U-235. However, the SGS used to measure source     |
| containers has been questioned. The variability of the SGS results indicate  |
| that the total uranium mass in containers batched into a drum could be       |
| non-conservative by a factor of 10 or more.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Recent NDA measurements performed on the    |
| Low Density Waste Assay Monitor (LDWAM) have identified discrepancies in the |
| gram quantity of U-235 when compared to the Segmented Gamma Scanner (SGS)    |
| measured values (see PR-PTS-02-01398). The SGS values are biased low which   |
| could have resulted in underestimatlng the total batch quantity for          |
| previously batched drums. Until confirmatory measurements of the drums are   |
| obtained, the potential mass content represents a loss of both legs of       |
| double contingency as described in the applicable NCSE.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS
IMPLEMENTED:  |
| These drums are not safety systems but corrective actions to regain          |
| compliance was started at 1530 hours 4/2/02."                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the certificate holder.           |
|                                                                              |
| ****UPDATE 4/19/02 at 1533, J. McCleery to R. Laura****                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Update 1: There is no safety significance for this event because all 21     |
| drums have now been confirmed to contain less than a safe mass for the       |
| enrichment of material. While one drum was found to exceed the 350 grams     |
| U-235 control limit. The actual U-235 mass is less than a safe mass and the  |
| process conditions credited for double contingency were maintained. All      |
| potential drum groups that could have exceeded 350 gram U-235 were examined, |
| the maximum mass for a drum group would have been approximately 620 grams    |
| U-235, at a maximum of 5% enrichment. Therefore, all drum groups would have  |
| been below safe mass at process conditions. Criticality was determined       |
| noncredible given the new measurements for these drums."                     |
|                                                                              |
| Notified R3DO (J. Madera) and NMSS (F. Brown) of this update.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38860       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/17/2002|
|LICENSEE:  UNKNOWN                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:17[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ASHEVILLE                REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        04/13/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/17/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GRANT MILLS                  |EPA, DOT(via NRC)    FAX     |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT/POSSIBLE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL INCIDENT
INVOLVING      |
| DISCOVERY AND DISPOSAL (AS TRASH) OF CONTAINERS WITH RADIOACTIVE LABELS
IN   |
| NORTH CAROLINA                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the North       |
| Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Division of        |
| Radiation Protection:                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "On April 17, 2002, the North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection,     |
| Radioactive Material Section, was notified by the North Carolina Hazardous   |
| Material staff of an ongoing event possibly involving radioactive material.  |
| During the clean up of an unoccupied home (located in Asheville, NC) by a    |
| church group, several containers with radioactive labels were discovered and |
| disposed of as trash (on April 13, 2002).  The containers (approximately 10  |
| in number) were described as 3 inches in diameter (possibly lead), labeled   |
| with the radiation symbol, and labeled 'TC'.  Local authorities have         |
| concluded the trash was deposited at the local landfill (Buncombe Co.) and   |
| is currently under 1,500 tons of trash.  Local authorities have performed    |
| radiation exposure measurements at the landfill and home site[.  They]       |
| report no significant measurements above background levels.  The North       |
| Carolina Division of Radiation Protection is continuing to gather            |
| information."                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38861       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/17/2002|
|LICENSEE:  MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER-BAPTIST CAMPU|NOTIFICATION TIME:
16:30[EDT]|
|    CITY:  NEW ORLEANS              REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2002|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  LA |EVENT TIME:             [CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  LA-0349-L01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/17/2002|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|                                                |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCOTT BLACKWELL              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT/MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATIONS INVOLVING THREE
PATIENTS   |
| AT MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER-BAPTIST CAMPUS IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA         
|
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the Louisiana   |
| Department of Environmental Quality:                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Event Report ID No.:  LA020007"                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "License No.:  LA-0349-L01"                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Licensee:  Memorial Medical Center-Baptist Campus"                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Event [Date] and Time:  At the beginning of March 2002"                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Event Location:  [... New Orleans, LA ...]"                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Event [Type]:  Misadministration"                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Notifications:  Notified the patients and physician."                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Event [Description]:  On April 12, 2002, it was discovered that [three]     |
| patients received a misadministration on a therapy procedure.  All three     |
| patients were to receive therapy doses to the prostate.  While planning the  |
| therapy, the Dosimetrist put Nucletron Source Positioning Simulator (Part    |
| #111.094) together the wrong way.  The design of the Simulator allows it to  |
| be put together backwards.  The correct distance for the dose was 1408 mm,   |
| but the actual distance was 1117 mm.  The dose the patient received was      |
| calculated as 70 centigray to the knees, thighs, and scrotum of the three    |
| patients.  As of now, there appears to be no observable effects to the       |
| patients.  All three patients were notified and agreed to have the therapy   |
| again for the correct site.  This facility uses a Nucletron Vectrave HDR     |
| with a 10-Ci source of Ir-192.  The activity during the patient therapy was  |
| 8.06 Ci for one patient, 5.45 Ci for another, and 4.8 Ci for the third       |
| patient.  The policy has been changed so that the physicist will check the   |
| position simulator before use.  Further details will be placed in the NMED   |
| database as soon as the details are available."                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Transport [Vehicle Description]:  NA"                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Media [Attention]:  NA"                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Call the NRC operations officer for state contact information and event      |
| location details.                                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38864       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/2002|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:25[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        04/19/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:03[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN KOSHMERAL              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/19/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |CHRIS GRIMES         NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       99       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AT MILLSTONE UNIT 2                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that all control rods inserted properly and all        |
| systems functioned as designed.  The reactor trip was initiated from a main  |
| turbine protective trip which may be related to a stator cooling             |
| malfunction. The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby.  The licensee has |
| begun investigating the cause of the event.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector has been notified.  Additionally, the licensee        |
| notified the State and Local officials.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38865       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:50[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        04/19/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  EDWIN URQUHART               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/19/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |RICHARD WESSMAN      IRO     |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |SINGH BAJWA          NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       19       Power Operation  |9        Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT SHUTDOWN REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ON UNIDENTIFIED
DRYWELL  |
| FLOOR LEAKAGE                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(z); 50.72(a) (1) (ii)    |
| and 50.72(b) (i)  the initiation of a nuclear plant shutdown required by the |
| plant's Technical Specifications. Plant E. I. Hatch, unit one has commenced  |
| a plant shutdown as required by Technical Specifications 3.4.4 A (RCS        |
| Operational Leakage). The Reactor Coolant System unidentified leakage has    |
| been calculated to be greater than the Technical Specification limit of 5    |
| GPM. The leakage has been calculated to be 6.85 GPM at 1647 Hrs. Eastern     |
| Time, The plant was operating at 19% rated thermal power (RTP) and commenced |
| a power reduction at 1650 Hrs. Eastern Time. The current power is 9% RTP and |
| shutdown is in progress."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the Resident Inspector.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38866       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2002|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:27[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        04/19/2002|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        07:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/20/2002|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |WAYNE HODGES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  T. E. WHITE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-Hour Report)                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0700, on 04-19-02, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified     |
| errors were found in historical data associated with three 30 gallon drums.  |
| Research to support remediation activities associated with NCS-INC-01-025    |
| revealed that information used to characterize waste drums had been          |
| incorrectly entered onto the Request For Waste Classification (RWC) sheets   |
| for these three 30 gallon waste drums of NCS Spacing Exempt classified       |
| waste, violating requirements of NCSA WM-03 and WMO.001. This violated the   |
| Double Contingency principal. These drums were transitioned to storage under |
| WMO.001 upon deletion of WM-03. The purpose of the requirement is to ensure  |
| the correct Information is available on the RWC for classification.          |
|                                                                              |
| "This Is a legacy issue; upon review of the correct data associated with     |
| these drums, the classification status of NCS Spacing-Exempt is correct. The |
| drums are currently being properly controlled.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.          |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Although the calculations were incorrectly performed and the independent    |
| verification failed to catch the error, the correct data associated with     |
| these drums was reviewed and the drums are still NCS Spacing-Exempt and      |
| controlled properly. However, the paperwork needs to be updated to assure    |
| downstream problems are avoided.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the mass in multiple adjacent     |
| waste drums stored as NCS Spacing Exempt would each have to be greater than  |
| the safe mass determined for that container size and these waste drums would |
| have to be stored together or recontainerized into unfavorable geometry      |
| containers.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,
ETC)      |
|                                                                              |
| "The controlled parameter is mass.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE
PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The correct data indicated that the mass of the drums was less than the     |
| always safe mass of 120 grams of U-235.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND
DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency is maintained by implementing two controls to ensure the |
| uranium mass used for classification is correctly listed on the RWC.         |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on correctly calculating and   |
| transcribing the mass result onto the RWC. The wrong analytical result was   |
| used for the calculation. This wrong calculational result was transcribed    |
| onto the RWC. The control was violated. Since there are two controls on one  |
| parameter, double contingency was not maintained,                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on independently verifying    |
| the mass was correctly calculated and transcribed onto the RWC. The          |
| incorrect calculation and transcription was not discovered during the        |
| independent verification. The control was violated.  Since there are two     |
| controls on one parameter, double Contingency was not maintained.            |
|                                                                              |
| "Since double contingency is based on two controls on one parameter, double  |
| contingency was not maintained.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS            
 |
| IMPLEMENTED:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Correct the RWCs."                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38867       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:52[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        05:12[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROB DORMAN                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/20/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       30       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL RPS ACTIVATION DUE TO LOSS OF FEEDWATER                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 was at approximately 30% power and preparing to synchronize the Main |
| Generator to the grid. The A Main Feedwater Pump mini flow valve was         |
| isolated per plant procedures. The isolation of the mini flow valve caused   |
| the Steam Generator levels to rise. A Hi-Hi Steam Generator level occurred   |
| in #4 Steam Generator. This resulted in a trip of the Main Feedwater Pump, a |
| Feedwater Isolation Signal, and the trip of the Main Turbine. The Reactor    |
| was tripped due to having no Main Feedwater available to the Steam           |
| Generators in anticipation of a low-low Steam Generator level trip at 38%    |
| level. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pumps did start as a result of  |
| the only running Main Feedwater pump being tripped."  All rods fully         |
| inserted into the core.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38868       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: YANKEE ROWE              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:49[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        04/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:51[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DON MILLER                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/20/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNUSUAL EVENT         |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |DICK WESSMAN         IRO     |
|AAEC 50.72(a) (1) (i)    EMERGENCY DECLARED     |WAYNE HODGES         NMSS    |
|                                                |S. BAYWA             NRR     |
|                                                |R. ZAPATA            FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Decommissioned   |0        Decommissioned   |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| USUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO SEISMIC ANOMOLY                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Licensee felt tremors in the control room lasting more than 5 seconds and    |
| declared an Unusual Event at 0700 and immediately downgraded at 0701.        |
| Walkdowns were performed and no damage was noted.  Licensee has seismic      |
| monitors which have a setpoint of .01 G and they did not alarm.  Offsite     |
| notifications have been made to the states of MA and VT.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38869       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/20/2002|
|    UNIT:  [] [4] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:34[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/20/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:57[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF DEAL                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/20/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  RICH LAURA                   +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |BRIAN BONSER         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ACOM 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)   LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|4     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNPLANNED LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATORS LESS THAN 15 MINUTES          
  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported the loss of control room annunciators for 9 minutes    |
| when the electrical supply breaker tripped free.  The breaker was reset and  |
| closed which restored the annunciators.  However, later the same electrical  |
| breaker tripped free again resulting in the loss of control annunciators     |
| lasting for 14 minutes.  The breaker was reset and closed for the second     |
| time.  Maintenance troubleshooting revealed that the breaker needed to be    |
| replaced.  The isolation for this corrective maintenance will result in a    |
| planned loss of control room annunciators greater than 15 minutes.           |
| Alternate plant monitoring will be utilized for the duration of the breaker  |
| change out.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38870       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                         
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/22/2002|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:43[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        04/22/2002|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ART FINCH                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/22/2002|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  MIKE NORRIS                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JOHN ROGGE           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE  
|
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       16       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL RPS ACTUATION                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Susquehanna Unit 1 was at 20% power and in the process of preparing to      |
| further increase power following a Refueling and Inspection Outage. At 0016  |
| on 4/22/02, the B Reactor Recirculation Pump tripped for an unexplained      |
| reason. During a review of the plant response to the transient, it was       |
| discovered that the unit was operating to the left of the expected Power to  |
| Flow curve. There was no indication of power flux oscillations from the      |
| nuclear instrumentation, but no guidance was available on how to respond to  |
| this condition. Reactor Engineering and Operations Management were contacted |
| and it was decided to manually scram the unit. At 0115 the Mode Switch was   |
| taken to Shutdown and all control rods inserted. This was an unplanned RPS   |
| Actuation and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires a        |
| four-hour ENS Notification. Reactor water level dropped below level 3 which  |
| is expected during a scram, feedwater level control responded to return      |
| level to normal and all level 3 isolations went to completion. There were no |
| ECCS initiations, no challenges to containment, and no indication of         |
| radiation releases. Operations is currently performing a controlled cooldown |
| to mode 4, an investigation into the cause of the recirc pump trip is        |
| ongoing."                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+


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