Event Notification Report for September 19, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/18/2001 - 09/19/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38292 38293 38294
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38292 |
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| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:22[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM BRADLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF SPECIFIED SYSTEM - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION |
| AND STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM |
| |
| "This 60-day optional report. as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being |
| made under the reporting requirement in |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified |
| system, specifically Secondary Containment Isolation and Standby Gas |
| Treatment System. |
| |
| "On September 10, 2001, a lightning storm struck the Peach Bottom Atomic |
| Power Station and resulted in a trip of the 2B Reactor Protection System |
| (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set due to a blown fuse. As a result of the loss |
| of the 2B RPS power supply, the Secondary Containment outboard isolation |
| valves closed and the Standby Gas Treatment system automatically started. |
| |
| "The Secondary Containment outboard isolation valves and the Standby Gas |
| Treatment responded as expected for the given conditions. Both systems were |
| subsequently returned to their normal configuration per plant procedures. No |
| deficiencies were noted during actuation of either system. |
| |
| "This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action |
| program for resolution. |
| |
| "The NRC resident has been informed." |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38293 |
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| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ED BURKETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |SCOTT SPARKS R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING (LLRT) OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) "2B" |
| LIMITS EXCEEDED. |
| |
| During LLRT of MSIV's per appendix J of 10CFR50 the "2B" 21F022A and "2B" |
| 21F028A were found to be leaking 192 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour); |
| diagnostic testing determined that "2B" 21F022A is leaking at approximately |
| 130 scfh. (Technical Specification Surveillance requirement limit is 100 |
| scfh).The "2B" 21F022B was found to be leaking above 100 scfh and above the |
| maximum pathway allowable leakage of 250 scfh for all four lines. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38294 |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:04[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |MELVYN LEACH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOE HOLONICH IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCLEERY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| At 1404 during facility stand down recovery efforts, a wall penetration for |
| conduit lines above the A-loop concentrate slab was questioned as a possible |
| violation on NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers. The concrete blocks |
| used in the construction of the wall have internal void spaces which could |
| accumulate an unsafe amount of material in the event of a spill or leak. |
| The edges of the penetration were not sealed or covered to prevent solution |
| from entering. If the feed pump for the A-loop concentrate slab were |
| operating (X-705 operations are currently in stand-down mode), solution |
| could potentially spray onto the conduit and run into the openings. The |
| feed pump will remain administratively tagged out of service until the |
| potential spray path is mitigated. Repairs are in progress. |
| |
| Following identification of the above event, a walkdown was conducted in all |
| inadvertent Container Areas to locate any similar problems. Numerous |
| cracks, holes, and penetrations were identified in the block walls of the |
| Recovery Area. Small cracks and joints in the walls are not considered a |
| violation of the NCSA controls because it is not credible that an unsafe |
| amount of material could seep through a crack in a (vertical) wall and |
| collect in an unsafe geometry. However, many holes were observed that could |
| potentially collect an NCS significant amount of material if a spray or leak |
| stream were to be aimed directly at the hole. This is a violation of the |
| administrative controls of NCSA-0705_076 for Inadvertent Containers. Due to |
| the number of penetrations/holes identified by subsequent walkdowns of the |
| Recovery Area, compliance with NCSA controls could not be reestablished |
| within 4 hours. Thus making this event a criticality control 4-hour 91-01 |
| bulletin event. |
| |
| The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing |
| material near the identified openings in the walls of the Recovery Area. |
| |
| A walkdown of the Microfiltration Area and Tunnel Basement Area (also |
| subject to Inadvertent Container controls) did not find any violations of |
| NCS controls. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing |
| material near the identified openings in the walls of the Recovery Area. |
| The area in question is designated an "Inadvertent Container Area" due to |
| the presence of the Recovery System, which is not currently in operation due |
| to a stand down of all X-705 operations. The presence of an inadvertent |
| container in the are is a violation of NCS controls and one leg of the |
| double contingency principle as described in NCSE-705_076.E03. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(s) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The |
| recovery system would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing |
| liquid with a high concentration of uranium. Then a leak in the system must |
| occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid sprays from the system directly |
| into one of the identified openings in the block wall. The liquid would |
| then have to flow through the small opening and collect in the internal void |
| spaces of the block wall forming an unsafe geometry. Depending on the |
| volume collected, some reflection would also be required to sustain a |
| critical chain reaction. The Recovery System is not currently an operation, |
| and will remain shutdown until the holes/penetrations are mitigated. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Inadvertent containers are controlled based upon volume (2.5 liters maximum) |
| or geometry (1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter). The exact |
| potential collection volume inside the block wall is unknown. Although |
| analyzed for 100% enriched materials. The Recovery System would currently |
| process material with less than or equal to 5% enrichment. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| No uranium bearing material was involved in this event. There was no leaks |
| of uranium bearing material in the area while the opening in the walls were |
| present. The event involves the presence of an unsafe geometry (the inside |
| of the block wall) that could collect solution in the event of a spill. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(s) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(s) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| The presence of holes in the block walls could lead to the collection of a |
| spill or leak on the unfavorable geometry void spaces. This is a violation |
| of control # 3 of NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers, which specifically |
| evaluates this event. Note that it was not possible to mitigate all of the |
| holes in the Recovery Area walls; therefore, Recovery operations remain |
| shutdown until expedited repairs can be completed. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Feed pump for the A-loop concentration slab will remain tagged out of |
| service until the potential path is mitigated. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event. |
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