United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated With Events > Event Notification Reports > 2001

Event Notification Report for September 19, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/18/2001 - 09/19/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38292  38293  38294  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38292       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:22[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/10/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM BRADLEY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINV 50.73(a)(1)         INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF SPECIFIED SYSTEM - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION  |
| AND STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "This 60-day optional report. as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being     |
| made under the reporting requirement in                                      |
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified    |
| system, specifically Secondary Containment Isolation and Standby Gas         |
| Treatment System.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 10, 2001, a lightning storm struck the Peach Bottom Atomic     |
| Power Station and resulted in a trip of the 2B Reactor Protection System     |
| (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set due to a blown fuse. As a result of the loss  |
| of the 2B RPS power supply, the Secondary Containment outboard isolation     |
| valves closed and the Standby Gas Treatment system automatically started.    |
|                                                                              |
| "The Secondary Containment outboard isolation valves and the Standby Gas     |
| Treatment responded as expected for the given conditions. Both systems were  |
| subsequently returned to their normal configuration per plant procedures. No |
| deficiencies were noted during actuation of either system.                   |
|                                                                              |
| "This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action        |
| program for resolution.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC resident has been informed."                                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38293       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/18/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ED BURKETT                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |SCOTT SPARKS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)  DEGRADED CONDITION     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING (LLRT) OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) "2B"     |
| LIMITS EXCEEDED.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| During LLRT of MSIV's per appendix J of 10CFR50 the "2B"  21F022A and "2B"   |
| 21F028A were found to be leaking 192 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour);    |
| diagnostic testing determined that "2B"  21F022A is leaking at approximately |
| 130 scfh.  (Technical Specification Surveillance requirement limit is 100    |
| scfh).The "2B" 21F022B was found to be leaking above 100 scfh and above the  |
| maximum pathway allowable leakage of 250 scfh for all four lines.            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38294       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        09/18/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:04[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/18/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |MELVYN LEACH         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOE HOLONICH         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MCCLEERY                     |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          NON EMERGENCY         |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At 1404 during facility stand down recovery efforts, a wall penetration for  |
| conduit lines above the A-loop concentrate slab was questioned as a possible |
| violation on NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers.  The concrete blocks     |
| used in the construction of the wall have internal void spaces which could   |
| accumulate an unsafe amount of material in the event of a spill or leak.     |
| The edges of the penetration were not sealed or covered to prevent solution  |
| from entering.  If the feed pump for the A-loop concentrate slab were        |
| operating (X-705 operations are currently in stand-down mode), solution      |
| could potentially spray onto the conduit and run into the openings.  The     |
| feed pump will remain administratively tagged out of service until the       |
| potential spray path is mitigated.  Repairs are in progress.                 |
|                                                                              |
| Following identification of the above event, a walkdown was conducted in all |
| inadvertent Container Areas to locate any similar problems.  Numerous        |
| cracks, holes, and penetrations were identified in the block walls of the    |
| Recovery Area.  Small cracks and joints in the walls are not considered a    |
| violation of the NCSA controls because it is not credible that an unsafe     |
| amount of material could seep through a crack in a (vertical) wall and       |
| collect in an unsafe geometry.  However, many holes were observed that could |
| potentially collect an NCS significant amount of material if a spray or leak |
| stream were to be aimed directly at the hole.  This is a violation of the    |
| administrative controls of NCSA-0705_076 for Inadvertent Containers.  Due to |
| the number of penetrations/holes identified by subsequent walkdowns of the   |
| Recovery Area, compliance with NCSA controls could not be reestablished      |
| within 4 hours.  Thus making this event a criticality control 4-hour 91-01   |
| bulletin event.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing  |
| material near the identified openings in the walls of the Recovery Area.     |
|                                                                              |
| A walkdown of the Microfiltration Area and Tunnel Basement Area (also        |
| subject to Inadvertent Container controls) did not find any violations of    |
| NCS controls.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing  |
| material near the identified openings in the walls of the Recovery Area.     |
| The area in question is designated an "Inadvertent Container Area" due to    |
| the presence of the Recovery System, which is not currently in operation due |
| to a stand down of all X-705 operations.  The presence of an inadvertent     |
| container in the are is a violation of NCS controls and one leg of the       |
| double contingency principle as described in NCSE-705_076.E03.               |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(s) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The      |
| recovery system would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing    |
| liquid with a high concentration of uranium.  Then a leak in the system must |
| occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid sprays from the system directly   |
| into one of the identified openings in the block wall.  The liquid would     |
| then have to flow through the small opening and collect in the internal void |
| spaces of the block wall forming an unsafe geometry.  Depending on the       |
| volume collected, some reflection would also be required to sustain a        |
| critical chain reaction.  The Recovery System is not currently an operation, |
| and will remain shutdown until the holes/penetrations are mitigated.         |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Inadvertent containers are controlled based upon volume (2.5 liters maximum) |
| or geometry (1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter).  The exact        |
| potential collection volume inside the block wall is unknown.  Although      |
| analyzed for 100% enriched materials. The Recovery System would currently    |
| process material with less than or equal to 5% enrichment.                   |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| No uranium bearing material was involved in this event.  There was no leaks  |
| of uranium bearing material in the area while the opening in the walls were  |
| present.  The event involves the presence of an unsafe geometry (the inside  |
| of the block wall) that could collect solution in the event of a spill.      |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(s) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(s) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The presence of holes in the block walls could lead to the collection of a   |
| spill or leak on the unfavorable geometry void spaces.  This is a violation  |
| of control # 3 of NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers, which specifically  |
| evaluates this event.  Note that it was not possible to mitigate all of the  |
| holes in the Recovery Area walls; therefore, Recovery operations  remain     |
| shutdown until expedited repairs can be completed.                           |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| Feed pump for the A-loop concentration slab will remain tagged out of        |
| service until the potential path is mitigated.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event.                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+