Event Notification Report for September 19, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 09/18/2001 - 09/19/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38292 38293 38294 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38292 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:22[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/10/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:16[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM BRADLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |JAMES LINVILLE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AINV 50.73(a)(1) INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM A| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF SPECIFIED SYSTEM - SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION | | AND STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM | | | | "This 60-day optional report. as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being | | made under the reporting requirement in | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified | | system, specifically Secondary Containment Isolation and Standby Gas | | Treatment System. | | | | "On September 10, 2001, a lightning storm struck the Peach Bottom Atomic | | Power Station and resulted in a trip of the 2B Reactor Protection System | | (RPS) Motor Generator (MG) set due to a blown fuse. As a result of the loss | | of the 2B RPS power supply, the Secondary Containment outboard isolation | | valves closed and the Standby Gas Treatment system automatically started. | | | | "The Secondary Containment outboard isolation valves and the Standby Gas | | Treatment responded as expected for the given conditions. Both systems were | | subsequently returned to their normal configuration per plant procedures. No | | deficiencies were noted during actuation of either system. | | | | "This event has been entered into the site-specific corrective action | | program for resolution. | | | | "The NRC resident has been informed." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38293 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:13[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:50[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ED BURKETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY |SCOTT SPARKS R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ADEG 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) DEGRADED CONDITION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING (LLRT) OF MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) "2B" | | LIMITS EXCEEDED. | | | | During LLRT of MSIV's per appendix J of 10CFR50 the "2B" 21F022A and "2B" | | 21F028A were found to be leaking 192 scfh (standard cubic feet per hour); | | diagnostic testing determined that "2B" 21F022A is leaking at approximately | | 130 scfh. (Technical Specification Surveillance requirement limit is 100 | | scfh).The "2B" 21F022B was found to be leaking above 100 scfh and above the | | maximum pathway allowable leakage of 250 scfh for all four lines. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38294 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 09/18/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:04[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/18/2001| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |MELVYN LEACH NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+JOE HOLONICH IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCLEERY | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: NON EMERGENCY | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. | | | | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 4 HOUR NOTIFICATION | | | | At 1404 during facility stand down recovery efforts, a wall penetration for | | conduit lines above the A-loop concentrate slab was questioned as a possible | | violation on NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers. The concrete blocks | | used in the construction of the wall have internal void spaces which could | | accumulate an unsafe amount of material in the event of a spill or leak. | | The edges of the penetration were not sealed or covered to prevent solution | | from entering. If the feed pump for the A-loop concentrate slab were | | operating (X-705 operations are currently in stand-down mode), solution | | could potentially spray onto the conduit and run into the openings. The | | feed pump will remain administratively tagged out of service until the | | potential spray path is mitigated. Repairs are in progress. | | | | Following identification of the above event, a walkdown was conducted in all | | inadvertent Container Areas to locate any similar problems. Numerous | | cracks, holes, and penetrations were identified in the block walls of the | | Recovery Area. Small cracks and joints in the walls are not considered a | | violation of the NCSA controls because it is not credible that an unsafe | | amount of material could seep through a crack in a (vertical) wall and | | collect in an unsafe geometry. However, many holes were observed that could | | potentially collect an NCS significant amount of material if a spray or leak | | stream were to be aimed directly at the hole. This is a violation of the | | administrative controls of NCSA-0705_076 for Inadvertent Containers. Due to | | the number of penetrations/holes identified by subsequent walkdowns of the | | Recovery Area, compliance with NCSA controls could not be reestablished | | within 4 hours. Thus making this event a criticality control 4-hour 91-01 | | bulletin event. | | | | The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing | | material near the identified openings in the walls of the Recovery Area. | | | | A walkdown of the Microfiltration Area and Tunnel Basement Area (also | | subject to Inadvertent Container controls) did not find any violations of | | NCS controls. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | The safety significance is low because there was no leak of uranium bearing | | material near the identified openings in the walls of the Recovery Area. | | The area in question is designated an "Inadvertent Container Area" due to | | the presence of the Recovery System, which is not currently in operation due | | to a stand down of all X-705 operations. The presence of an inadvertent | | container in the are is a violation of NCS controls and one leg of the | | double contingency principle as described in NCSE-705_076.E03. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(s) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | For a criticality to occur, the following events would be required: The | | recovery system would have to be operating and processing uranium bearing | | liquid with a high concentration of uranium. Then a leak in the system must | | occur such that an unsafe amount of liquid sprays from the system directly | | into one of the identified openings in the block wall. The liquid would | | then have to flow through the small opening and collect in the internal void | | spaces of the block wall forming an unsafe geometry. Depending on the | | volume collected, some reflection would also be required to sustain a | | critical chain reaction. The Recovery System is not currently an operation, | | and will remain shutdown until the holes/penetrations are mitigated. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | Inadvertent containers are controlled based upon volume (2.5 liters maximum) | | or geometry (1.5 inches in depth or 4 inches in diameter). The exact | | potential collection volume inside the block wall is unknown. Although | | analyzed for 100% enriched materials. The Recovery System would currently | | process material with less than or equal to 5% enrichment. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): | | | | No uranium bearing material was involved in this event. There was no leaks | | of uranium bearing material in the area while the opening in the walls were | | present. The event involves the presence of an unsafe geometry (the inside | | of the block wall) that could collect solution in the event of a spill. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(s) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(s) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES | | | | The presence of holes in the block walls could lead to the collection of a | | spill or leak on the unfavorable geometry void spaces. This is a violation | | of control # 3 of NCSA-0705_076, Inadvertent Containers, which specifically | | evaluates this event. Note that it was not possible to mitigate all of the | | holes in the Recovery Area walls; therefore, Recovery operations remain | | shutdown until expedited repairs can be completed. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | Feed pump for the A-loop concentration slab will remain tagged out of | | service until the potential path is mitigated. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021