Event Notification Report for May 21, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 05/18/2001 - 05/21/2001 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 38006 38007 38008 38009 38010 38011 38012 38013 38015 38016 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38006 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/17/2001| | UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:14[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 05/17/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:40[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BALDWIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES R. OGLE R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: |RICHARD ROSANO IAT | |*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |CHUCK CASTO R2 | | |ROBERTA WARREN IAT | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | |3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NOTIFICATION OF THE OCONEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE | | | | The switchboard was notified by an individual of a possible bomb threat | | concerning the Oconee site that was left on her home answering machine. The | | licensee notified the Oconee County Sheriffs Department to investigate. No | | other law enforcement agencies have been notified. They do not consider it | | a credible threat. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 5/18/01 @ 1936 BY CONSTANCE TO GOULD * * * | | | | The FBI and the County Sheriff have determined that the bomb threat was not | | a credible threat. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. | | | | The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38007 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:36[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/17/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:40[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 | | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATT MAUER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |OCBA 76.120(c)(2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR| | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE | | | | At 1440 on 05/17/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by | | engineering that load cell calibration data for the C-333 U/5 C/9 and C-337 | | U/2 C/2 freezer sublimers is suspected to be non-conforming. The load cells | | are part of the High High Weight Trip System for the freezer sublimers which | | is required by TSR to be operable. It is suspected that a batch of 24 load | | cells do not meet the specifications credited in the existing setpoint | | calculations and the calibration procedures. The load cell calibration data | | from 2 other load cells in this batch indicated less weight than what is | | actually applied. It has been determined that this deficiency may affect | | the freezer sublimers ability to actuate the High High Weight Trip System at | | the required Limited Control Setting (LCS). This deficiency would not | | affect the ability of the freezer sublimers to actuate the High High Weight | | Trip System below the Safety Limit (SL). These 2 suspected freezer | | sublimers were declared inoperable by the PSS. | | | | The safety system deficiency is reportable to the NRC as required by | | 10CFR76.120(c)(2). The equipment is required by TSR to be available and | | operable and should have been operating. No redundant equipment is | | available and operable to perform the required safety function. | | | | The NRC resident inspector was notified.. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38008 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:32[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/18/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:18[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GARY SHEAR R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |FRED BROWN NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCLEARY | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN | | | | During normal operations, a concern was identified of a potential fissile | | material operation in equipment that had been previously identified as an | | operation that contained material <1 % U-235. Upon investigation of the | | concern Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel identified an unanalyzed | | condition in the X-330/333 "A" booster. Based on the identified condition | | this is a 4 hour reportable event. Currently the equipment is isolated. A | | sample shows the equipment contains material at <1% U-235. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | LOW. the equipment is shutdown and has a pressure of 0.8 psia. The maximum | | mass in the X-330 to X-333 "A" compressor at this pressure is 41 gram U-235 | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | For a criticality to occur, the mass in the compressor would have to | | increase to greater than 10.35 kg. The material then would have to be | | moderated and the deposit would have to reflected | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | Enrichment and Mass | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): | | | | Estimated enrichment is 1.5 weight percent U-235, the mass is estimated at | | 41 grams. The form of the material would be UF6. The optimum safe mass and | | critical mass at an enrichment of 1.5 % U-235 is 4.5 Kg and 16.502 Kg | | respectively. | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES | | | | There were no NCSA controls on the identified equipment because the | | enrichment in the equipment was to be less than 1 weight percent U-235 in an | | operating cascade. In the current configuration it is not credible that | | enrichment would be exceeded. The deficiency was the equipment was not | | isolated from equipment that is allowed to see enrichment greater than 1 | | weight percent U-235. | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | The Plant Shift Superintendent directed the "A" booster isolated. The | | equipment was sampled and found below 1% U-235. Engineering continues to | | investigate the issue. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be | | informed. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38009 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:08[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/18/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:30[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CASPERSEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*UNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AN UNANALYZED CONDITION WAS FOUND WHEN AN EXISTING PIPE TRENCH BLOCKOUT | | PATHWAY SEPARATING TWO ROOMS WAS FOUND TO BE BLOCKED. | | | | After reviewing the Unit 2 flooding calculation (environmental calculations | | for Auxiliary Feedwater and performing a walkdown of the area, it was | | determined that the calculation model which assumed an existing pipe trench | | blockout pathway separating the 2 rooms to be an open pathway. This pathway | | was found to be blocked leading to an unanalyzed condition. | | | | A PRA evaluation was performed for this condition. The result of this | | evaluation shows that the potential degraded condition due to the sealed | | pathway and missing backwater check valves in the drain lines does not pose | | a significant increase in the core damage risk. However, an additional | | review on May 15, 2001, it was deemed that the cumulative risk increase is | | potentially significant assuming the condition existed since initial | | evaluation. Therefore, this issue is being conservatively reported pursuant | | to 10 CFR 50.72 (ii)(B). | | | | | | No Technical Specification OPERABILITY issues are identified as a result of | | this event. Additionally this event has been evaluated per GL 91-18 and | | actions are being taken to be in compliance with the flooding calculations. | | | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 38010 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001| |LICENSEE: OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MED CENTER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EDT]| | CITY: COLUMBUS REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/11/2001| | COUNTY: STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: [EDT]| |LICENSE#: 02110-250037 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |GARY SHEAR R3 | | |SUSAN FRANT NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: LIGHT | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION | | | | A patient was being treated with Ir-192 and after 2 minutes of treatment | | verification of the location of the wire could not be made and a decision to | | terminate the treatment was made. When they attempted to terminate the | | treatment a problem arose with the clutch mechanism on the device which | | resulted in the wire slipping. The manufacturer was called and the medical | | staff continued to troubleshoot the system. The delivery wires for the | | system were cleaned and the treatment was resumed. On 5/14/01 the | | University RSO investigated the situation and decided not to use this device | | until it was evaluated by the manufacturer. On 5/16/01 it was discovered | | that the cable had some lubricant that leached from the cable and caused | | increased friction in the treatment catheter. | | Further evaluation of the film that was shot during this procedure | | determined that the source was between 4.5 and 5mm from where the treatment | | site was, therefore there was a delivery to an area that was unintended. | | The patient and physician were notified. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38011 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/07/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:37[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: WHITE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN | | | | At 1640, on 5-17-01 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that | | the independent verification required by procedure CP2-CU-CH2137 was not | | performed. The maintenance segment was not independently verified to be | | isolated. The same person signed for performance as well as the | | verification of the segment isolation. NCSA 400.009 requires that fissile | | operations that credit AQ-NCS function that is disabled due to maintenance | | must be identified independently, and disabled using a tagout prior to | | disabling the feature and commencing maintenance. This is done to prevent | | operation of a system while an AQ-NCS component function is disabled. Since | | the independent verification was not performed, the process condition was | | not maintained, therefore double contingency was not maintained. | | | | SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | While the NCS control was violated the fissile operation containing the | | component(s) undergoing maintenance was tagged out using LOTO both as a | | standard maintenance practice in C-400 and due to other NCS requirements. | | In addition, the equipment items removed had no AQ-NCS function which was | | affected by the maintenance actions. | | | | POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: | | | | In order for criticality to be possible, the components undergoing | | maintenance must have an AQ-NCS function that is disabled, and the affected | | operations must be subsequently performed with fissile solution. | | Additionally, the maintenance activity must be one of the relatively few | | maintenance activities that do not require tagout for another NCS reason, | | such as to prevent fissile solution from leaking from the system. | | | | CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): | | | | Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing | | independently verifying the prevention of the affected fissile operation. | | | | ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | | | Maximum assay of 2.75 wt. % U-235 | | | | NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES; | | | | The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing operation of the | | Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the AQ-NCS component. | | The components were properly identified as non-AQ-NCS, therefore this | | control was not violated. | | | | The second leg of double contingency is based on independently preventing | | operation of the Cylinder Wash facility during maintenance affecting the | | AQ-NCS component. The requirement to Independently verify the AQ-NCS | | function of all components affected by maintenance was not performed. The | | control was violated and the process condition was not maintained. | | | | Since the independent verification was not performed, the process condition | | was not maintained, therefore double contingency was not maintained | | | | CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: | | | | This condition was Identified while reviewing completed maintenance work | | packages. There is no action that can be performed to resolve this | | condition and bring the process back Into compliance since the maintenance | | activity has been completed. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be | | informed. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38012 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2001| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:46[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/19/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:06[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SHEAR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/19/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN ZWOLINSKI NRR | |*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|NADER MAMISH IRO | |*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | UNIT 2 ON NATURAL CIRCULATION AFTER A AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP. | | | | | | Unit 2 reactor coolant pump low flow reactor trip occurred due to a loss of | | a non-vital 6.9kV bus. The cause of the trip was human error while | | manipulating electrical plant equipment for planned work. The trip caused a | | loss of all non-ESF power to Unit 2. All safety systems actuated as | | required (all rods fully inserted into the core). The plant is currently in | | Mode 3 (Hot Standby) on natural circulation. No radioactive releases | | occurred. | | | | The licensee took their system Auxiliary Transformer out of service for | | planned work. The Auxiliary Transformer is the normal offsite power supply | | to Unit 2 ESF (vital) buses. Unit 2 was cross tied to Unit 1 offsite power | | supply to supply power to the Unit 2 vital buses while Unit 2 Auxiliary | | Transformer was out of service. While preparing to restore the auxiliary | | transformer to service personnel were sent to the 6.9kV non-ESF switchgear | | room to pull the potential transformer fuses. Instead they pulled the bus | | potential transformer fuses which resulted in a loss of the bus which in | | turn tripped the reactor coolant pumps. The bus potential transformer fuses | | are located in a drawer just above the potential transformer fuses drawer. | | Once the drawer is opened the fuses come out of their holder. | | | | After the reactor trip the diesel driven and the motor driven auxiliary | | feedwater pumps started. The diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump was | | secured and now the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is supplying | | water to maintain proper steam generator water levels. The steam generator | | atmospheric valves are being used to maintain the plant in Hot Standby, no | | primary to secondary leakage. Both emergency diesel generators were | | manually started and they are supplying electrical power to the vital buses | | and power to two non-vital buses. The Unit 2 cross tie to Unit 1 offsite | | power supply was de-energized after Unit 2 emergency diesel generators were | | brought into service. If the emergency diesel generators are loss it will | | take less than 5 minutes to return Unit 1 offsite power back to Unit 2 ESF | | (vital) buses. All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable and | | pressurizer water level is within its proper range. Offsite power should | | be restored in about 4 hours. | | | | Unit 1 is at 100% power. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | | | | * * * UPDATE ON 05/19/01 AT 1127 ET BY CAROL ROCHA TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * | | | | The purpose of this update is to notify the NRC within 8 hours of a valid | | actuation of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System. Both trains of | | Auxiliary Feedwater actuated, as expected, on a Low-2 Steam Generator Level | | Signal. | | | | Division 11 4 kV offsite power was restored to the vital buses via 242-1 | | (at 0901CT) and 242-2 (at 0906CT). 6.9kV non -vital power was | | restored at 0727 CT and 0726CT. The emergency diesel generators "2A" & "2B" | | were secured at 0907CT and 0929CT respectively. A Reactor Coolant Pump was | | started and forced flow was restored to the reactor coolant system. R3DO | | (Shear) & NRR EO (Zwolinski) notified. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38013 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2001| | UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/19/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:06[MST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: STROUD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/19/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | |3 A/R Y 19 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | On May 19, 2001, at approximately 0306 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a | | reactor trip (reactor protection system actuation) from 19% rated thermal | | power due axial shape index trips on all four channels of the core | | protection calculators.(CPCs). All control element assemblies inserted and | | plant equipment response was normal and as expected. | | | | Prior to the plant trip, Unit 3 had reduced power to 19% and had stabilized | | as part of pre-planned activities to perform maintenance on the main | | turbine, which had been taken offline at 0252 MST. The unit was at normal | | temperature and pressure prior to the trip. | | | | After the plant rip, control room staff entered the emergency operating | | procedures and diagnosed the event as an uncomplicated reactor trip with no | | emergency classifications being required. The primary plant was stabilized | | in Mode 3 in forced circulation with both steam generators used for heat | | removal. | | | | Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. | | Other than the reactor protection system actuation no other engineered | | safety feature actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not | | result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any | | releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences | | or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely | | affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 38015 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:31[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/20/2001| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:56[PDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAAB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/20/2001| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING THE AUTO TRANSFER TO STARTUP POWER FAILED TO | | PICK UP A VITAL BUS. | | | | During performance of Part 2 of surveillance test procedures M-13H (4kV Bus | | H Non-SI Auto Transfer Test) the auto transfer to startup power failed to | | pick up the bus when the auxiliary feeder breaker was opened. This was a | | result of the startup feeder breaker being in the test position. This | | resulted in the 4kV and 480 V bus H being de-energized. For this test | | diesel generator 2-2 is in manual and it did not load to the bus. With the | | dead bus the procedure contains a contingency to return diesel generator 2-2 | | to auto to re-energize bus H. This was done. This was a valid actuation of | | a diesel generator auto start due to bus undervoltage. Power was lost to | | bus H for about one minute, no important vital loads were lost and RHR was | | powered from a different vital bus. | | | | Surveillance test procedure M-13H is divided into four parts. The | | surveillance test procedure assumes that you perform parts 1,2, 3, and 4 in | | order. Part 1 of the surveillance was done 2 days ago. Part 1 placed the | | startup feeder breaker in the test position. Later parts 3 and 4 of the | | surveillance test procedure were performed. Nothing in parts 3 or 4 of the | | surveillance test procedure took the startup feeder breaker out of its test | | position. When part 2 of the surveillance test procedure was performed it | | has the testing personnel look at the control panel to verify that the | | startup feeder breaker is racked in. With the breaker in test the control | | board looks exactly the same as if the breaker was racked in. There should | | have been something to state that the breaker was in test but it was not | | done. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38016 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/20/2001| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:56[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/20/2001| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. MAURER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM | | | | At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain | | Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave | | Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be | | operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The | | autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the | | alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal. The autoclave was removed | | from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable | | by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Autoclave # 1 was removed from service | | and is inoperable. | | | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate | | holder. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021