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Event Notification Report for May 21, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/18/2001 - 05/21/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

38006  38007  38008  38009  38010  38011  38012  38013  38015  38016 


+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38006       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/17/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        05/17/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BALDWIN                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES R. OGLE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |RICHARD ROSANO       IAT     |
|*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |CHUCK CASTO          R2      |
|                                                |ROBERTA WARREN       IAT     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTIFICATION OF THE OCONEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE                           |
|                                                                              |
| The switchboard was notified by an individual of a possible bomb threat      |
| concerning the Oconee site that was left on her home answering machine.  The |
| licensee notified the Oconee County Sheriffs Department to investigate.  No  |
| other law enforcement agencies have been notified.  They do not consider it  |
| a credible threat.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/18/01 @ 1936 BY CONSTANCE TO GOULD * * *                   |
|                                                                              |
| The FBI and the County Sheriff have determined that the bomb threat was not  |
| a credible threat.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified.                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38007       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:36[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/17/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:40[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MATT MAUER                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)        SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| At 1440 on 05/17/01,  the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by   |
| engineering that load cell calibration data for the C-333 U/5 C/9 and C-337  |
| U/2 C/2 freezer sublimers is suspected to be non-conforming.  The load cells |
| are part of the High High Weight Trip System for the freezer sublimers which |
| is required by TSR to be operable.  It is suspected that a batch of 24 load  |
| cells do not meet the specifications credited in the existing setpoint       |
| calculations and the calibration procedures.  The load cell calibration data |
| from 2 other load cells in this batch indicated less weight than what is     |
| actually applied.   It has been determined that this deficiency may affect   |
| the freezer sublimers ability to actuate the High High Weight Trip System at |
| the required Limited Control Setting (LCS).   This deficiency would not      |
| affect the ability of the freezer sublimers to actuate the High High Weight  |
| Trip System below the Safety Limit (SL).  These 2 suspected freezer          |
| sublimers were declared inoperable by the PSS.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The safety system deficiency is reportable to the NRC as required by         |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2).   The equipment is required by TSR to be available and    |
| operable and should have been operating.   No redundant equipment is         |
| available and operable to perform the required safety function.              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified..                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38008       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:32[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/18/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        11:18[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2001|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |FRED BROWN           NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MCCLEARY                     |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| During normal operations, a concern was identified of a potential fissile    |
| material operation in equipment that had been previously identified as an    |
| operation that contained material <1 % U-235.  Upon investigation of the     |
| concern Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel identified an unanalyzed        |
| condition in the X-330/333 "A" booster. Based on the identified condition    |
| this is a 4 hour reportable event.  Currently the equipment is isolated.  A  |
| sample shows the equipment contains material at <1% U-235.                   |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| LOW. the equipment is shutdown and has a pressure of 0.8 psia. The maximum   |
| mass in the X-330 to X-333 "A" compressor at this pressure is 41 gram U-235  |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| For a criticality to occur, the mass in the compressor would have to         |
| increase to greater than 10.35 kg. The material then would have to be        |
| moderated and the deposit would have to reflected                            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Enrichment and Mass                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Estimated enrichment is 1.5 weight percent U-235, the mass is estimated at   |
| 41 grams. The form of the material would be UF6. The optimum safe mass and   |
| critical mass at an enrichment of 1.5 % U-235 is 4.5 Kg and 16.502 Kg        |
| respectively.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| There were no NCSA controls on the identified equipment because the          |
| enrichment in the equipment was to be less than 1 weight percent U-235 in an |
| operating cascade.  In the current configuration it is not credible that     |
| enrichment would be exceeded.  The deficiency was the equipment was not      |
| isolated from equipment that is allowed to see enrichment greater than 1     |
| weight percent U-235.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| The Plant Shift Superintendent directed the "A" booster isolated.  The       |
| equipment was sampled and found below 1% U-235.  Engineering continues to    |
| investigate the issue.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be   |
| informed.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38009       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:08[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/18/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CASPERSEN                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BLAIR SPITZBERG      R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*UNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)  UNANALYZED CONDITION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AN UNANALYZED CONDITION WAS FOUND WHEN AN EXISTING PIPE TRENCH BLOCKOUT      |
| PATHWAY SEPARATING TWO ROOMS WAS FOUND TO BE BLOCKED.                        |
|                                                                              |
| After reviewing the Unit 2 flooding calculation (environmental calculations  |
| for Auxiliary Feedwater and performing a walkdown of the area, it was        |
| determined that the calculation model which assumed an existing pipe trench  |
| blockout pathway separating the 2 rooms to be an open pathway.  This pathway |
| was found to be blocked leading to an unanalyzed condition.                  |
|                                                                              |
| A PRA evaluation was performed for this condition.  The result of this       |
| evaluation shows that the potential degraded condition due to the sealed     |
| pathway and missing backwater check valves in the drain lines does not pose  |
| a significant increase in the core damage risk.  However, an additional      |
| review on May 15, 2001, it was deemed that the cumulative risk increase is   |
| potentially significant assuming the condition existed since initial         |
| evaluation.  Therefore, this issue is being conservatively reported pursuant |
| to 10 CFR 50.72 (ii)(B).                                                     |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| No Technical Specification OPERABILITY issues are identified as a result of  |
| this event.  Additionally this event has been evaluated per GL 91-18 and     |
| actions are being taken to be in compliance with the flooding calculations.  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   38010       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|LICENSEE:  OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MED CENTER     |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EDT]|
|    CITY:  COLUMBUS                 REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        05/11/2001|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  OH |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  02110-250037          AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|                                                |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LIGHT                        |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| A patient was being treated with Ir-192 and after 2 minutes of treatment     |
| verification of the location of the wire could not be made and a decision to |
| terminate the treatment was made.  When they attempted to terminate the      |
| treatment a problem arose with the clutch mechanism on the device which      |
| resulted in the wire slipping.  The manufacturer was called and the medical  |
| staff continued to troubleshoot the system.  The delivery wires for the      |
| system were cleaned and the treatment was resumed.  On 5/14/01 the           |
| University RSO investigated the situation and decided not to use this device |
| until it was evaluated by the manufacturer.   On 5/16/01 it was discovered   |
| that the cable had some lubricant that leached from the cable and caused     |
| increased friction in the treatment catheter.                                |
| Further evaluation of the film that was shot during this procedure           |
| determined that the source was between 4.5 and 5mm from where the treatment  |
| site was, therefore there was a delivery to an area that was unintended.     |
| The patient and physician were notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38011       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/07/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:37[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/18/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |SUSAN FRANT          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WHITE                        |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At 1640, on 5-17-01 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that   |
| the independent verification required by procedure CP2-CU-CH2137  was not    |
| performed.  The maintenance segment was not independently verified to be     |
| isolated.  The same person signed for performance as well as the             |
| verification of the segment isolation.  NCSA 400.009 requires that fissile   |
| operations that credit AQ-NCS function that is disabled due to maintenance   |
| must be identified independently, and disabled using a tagout prior to       |
| disabling the feature and commencing maintenance.  This is done to prevent   |
| operation of a system while an AQ-NCS component function is disabled. Since  |
| the independent verification was not performed,  the process condition was   |
| not maintained, therefore double contingency was not maintained.             |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY  SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| While the NCS control was violated the fissile operation containing the      |
| component(s) undergoing maintenance was tagged out using LOTO both as a      |
| standard maintenance practice in C-400 and due to other NCS requirements.    |
| In addition, the equipment items removed had no AQ-NCS function which was    |
| affected by the maintenance actions.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In order for criticality to be possible, the components undergoing           |
| maintenance must have an AQ-NCS function that is disabled, and the affected  |
| operations must be subsequently performed with fissile solution.             |
| Additionally, the maintenance activity must be one of the relatively few     |
| maintenance activities that do not require tagout for another NCS reason,    |
| such as to prevent fissile solution from leaking from the system.            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):      |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing          |
| independently verifying the prevention of the affected fissile operation.    |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Maximum assay of 2.75 wt. % U-235                                            |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES;                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing operation of the  |
| Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the AQ-NCS component.    |
| The components were properly identified as non-AQ-NCS, therefore this        |
| control was not violated.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independently preventing    |
| operation of the Cylinder Wash facility during maintenance affecting the     |
| AQ-NCS component.  The requirement to Independently verify the AQ-NCS        |
| function of all components affected by maintenance was not performed.  The   |
| control was violated and the process condition was not maintained.           |
|                                                                              |
| Since the independent verification was not performed, the process condition  |
| was not maintained, therefore double contingency was not maintained          |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| This condition was Identified while reviewing completed maintenance work     |
| packages.  There is no action that can be performed to resolve this          |
| condition and bring the process back Into compliance since the maintenance   |
| activity has been completed.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be   |
| informed.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38012       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD                REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:46[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:06[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SHEAR                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/19/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN ZWOLINSKI       NRR     |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|NADER MAMISH         IRO     |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 ON NATURAL CIRCULATION AFTER A AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP.                |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 2 reactor coolant pump low flow reactor trip occurred due to a loss of  |
| a non-vital 6.9kV bus. The cause of the trip was human error while           |
| manipulating electrical plant equipment for planned work.  The trip caused a |
| loss of all non-ESF power to Unit 2.  All safety systems actuated as         |
| required (all rods fully inserted into the core).  The plant is currently in |
| Mode 3 (Hot Standby) on natural circulation.  No radioactive releases        |
| occurred.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee took their system Auxiliary Transformer out of service for      |
| planned work.  The Auxiliary Transformer is the normal offsite power supply  |
| to Unit 2 ESF (vital) buses. Unit 2 was cross tied to Unit 1 offsite power   |
| supply to supply power to the Unit 2 vital buses while Unit 2 Auxiliary      |
| Transformer was out of service.  While preparing to restore the auxiliary    |
| transformer to service personnel were sent to the 6.9kV non-ESF switchgear   |
| room to pull the potential transformer fuses.  Instead they pulled the bus   |
| potential transformer fuses which resulted in a loss of the bus which in     |
| turn tripped the reactor coolant pumps. The bus potential transformer fuses  |
| are located in a drawer just above the potential transformer fuses drawer.   |
| Once the drawer is opened the fuses come out of their holder.                |
|                                                                              |
| After the reactor trip the diesel driven and the motor driven auxiliary      |
| feedwater pumps started.  The diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump was     |
| secured  and now the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is supplying      |
| water to maintain proper steam generator water levels.  The steam generator  |
| atmospheric valves are being used to maintain the plant in Hot Standby, no   |
| primary to secondary leakage.  Both emergency diesel generators were         |
| manually started and they are supplying electrical power to the vital buses  |
| and power to two non-vital buses.  The Unit 2 cross tie to Unit 1 offsite    |
| power supply was de-energized after Unit 2 emergency diesel generators were  |
| brought into service.  If the emergency diesel generators are loss it will   |
| take less than 5 minutes to return Unit 1 offsite power back to Unit 2 ESF   |
| (vital) buses. All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable and     |
| pressurizer water level is within its proper range.   Offsite power should   |
| be restored in about 4 hours.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 is at 100% power.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/19/01 AT 1127 ET BY CAROL ROCHA TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *  |
|                                                                              |
| The purpose of this update is to notify the NRC within 8 hours of a valid    |
| actuation of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System.   Both trains of         |
| Auxiliary Feedwater actuated, as expected, on a Low-2 Steam Generator Level  |
| Signal.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Division 11 4 kV  offsite power was restored to the vital buses via 242-1    |
| (at 0901CT) and 242-2 (at 0906CT).        6.9kV non -vital power was         |
| restored at 0727 CT and 0726CT.  The emergency diesel generators "2A" & "2B" |
| were secured at 0907CT and 0929CT respectively.  A Reactor Coolant Pump was  |
| started and forced flow was restored to the reactor coolant system.    R3DO  |
| (Shear) & NRR EO (Zwolinski) notified.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38013       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE                 |EVENT DATE:        05/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:06[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STROUD                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/19/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BLAIR SPITZBERG      R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     A/R        Y       19       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| On May 19, 2001, at approximately 0306 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a   |
| reactor trip (reactor protection system actuation) from 19% rated thermal    |
| power due axial shape index trips on all four channels of the core           |
| protection calculators.(CPCs). All control element assemblies inserted and   |
| plant equipment response was normal and as expected.                         |
|                                                                              |
| Prior to the plant trip, Unit 3 had reduced power to 19% and had stabilized  |
| as part of pre-planned activities to perform maintenance on the main         |
| turbine, which had been taken offline at 0252 MST. The unit was at normal    |
| temperature and pressure prior to the trip.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| After the plant rip, control room staff entered the emergency operating      |
| procedures and diagnosed the event as an uncomplicated reactor trip with no  |
| emergency classifications being required. The primary plant was stabilized   |
| in Mode 3 in forced circulation with both steam generators used for heat     |
| removal.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3.     |
| Other than the reactor protection system actuation no other engineered       |
| safety feature actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not |
| result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any     |
| releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences |
| or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely       |
| affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   38015       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:31[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/20/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:56[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAAB                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BLAIR SPITZBERG      R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)  VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING THE AUTO TRANSFER TO STARTUP POWER FAILED TO     |
| PICK UP A VITAL BUS.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| During performance of Part 2 of surveillance test procedures M-13H (4kV Bus  |
| H Non-SI Auto Transfer Test) the auto transfer to startup power failed to    |
| pick up the bus when the auxiliary feeder breaker was opened.  This was a    |
| result of the startup feeder breaker being in the test position.  This       |
| resulted in the 4kV and 480 V bus H being de-energized.  For this test       |
| diesel generator 2-2 is in manual and it did not load to the bus.  With the  |
| dead bus the procedure contains a contingency to return diesel generator 2-2 |
| to auto to re-energize bus H.  This was done.  This was a valid actuation of |
| a diesel generator auto start due to bus undervoltage.  Power was lost to    |
| bus H for about one minute, no important vital loads were lost and RHR was   |
| powered from a different vital bus.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Surveillance test procedure M-13H is divided into four parts.  The           |
| surveillance test procedure assumes that you perform parts 1,2, 3, and 4 in  |
| order.  Part 1 of the surveillance was done 2 days ago.  Part 1 placed the   |
| startup feeder breaker in the test position.  Later parts 3 and 4 of the     |
| surveillance test procedure were performed.  Nothing in parts 3 or 4 of the  |
| surveillance test procedure took the startup feeder breaker out of its test  |
| position.  When part 2 of the surveillance test procedure was performed it   |
| has the testing personnel look at the control panel to verify that the       |
| startup feeder breaker is racked in.  With the breaker in test the control   |
| board looks exactly the same as if the breaker was racked in.  There should  |
| have been something to state that the breaker was in test but it was not     |
| done.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   38016       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/20/2001|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        03:56[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/20/2001|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |JOHN GREEVES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  M. C. MAURER                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NONR                     OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM                                       |
|                                                                              |
| At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain     |
| Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave |
| Water Inventory Control System (WICS).  The WICS system is required to be    |
| operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2.  The  |
| autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the      |
| alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal.  The autoclave was removed |
| from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable  |
| by the Plant Shift Superintendent.  Autoclave # 1 was removed from service   |
| and is inoperable.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+