Event Notification Report for May 21, 2001
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/18/2001 - 05/21/2001
** EVENT NUMBERS **
38006 38007 38008 38009 38010 38011 38012 38013 38015 38016
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38006 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/17/2001|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:14[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 05/17/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BALDWIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES R. OGLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |RICHARD ROSANO IAT |
|*PRE 50.72(b)(2)(xi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |CHUCK CASTO R2 |
| |ROBERTA WARREN IAT |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTIFICATION OF THE OCONEE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE |
| |
| The switchboard was notified by an individual of a possible bomb threat |
| concerning the Oconee site that was left on her home answering machine. The |
| licensee notified the Oconee County Sheriffs Department to investigate. No |
| other law enforcement agencies have been notified. They do not consider it |
| a credible threat. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/18/01 @ 1936 BY CONSTANCE TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The FBI and the County Sheriff have determined that the bomb threat was not |
| a credible threat. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. |
| |
| The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38007 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:36[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/17/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:40[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MATT MAUER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2) SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILUR| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE |
| |
| At 1440 on 05/17/01, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by |
| engineering that load cell calibration data for the C-333 U/5 C/9 and C-337 |
| U/2 C/2 freezer sublimers is suspected to be non-conforming. The load cells |
| are part of the High High Weight Trip System for the freezer sublimers which |
| is required by TSR to be operable. It is suspected that a batch of 24 load |
| cells do not meet the specifications credited in the existing setpoint |
| calculations and the calibration procedures. The load cell calibration data |
| from 2 other load cells in this batch indicated less weight than what is |
| actually applied. It has been determined that this deficiency may affect |
| the freezer sublimers ability to actuate the High High Weight Trip System at |
| the required Limited Control Setting (LCS). This deficiency would not |
| affect the ability of the freezer sublimers to actuate the High High Weight |
| Trip System below the Safety Limit (SL). These 2 suspected freezer |
| sublimers were declared inoperable by the PSS. |
| |
| The safety system deficiency is reportable to the NRC as required by |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2). The equipment is required by TSR to be available and |
| operable and should have been operating. No redundant equipment is |
| available and operable to perform the required safety function. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified.. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38008 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:32[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/18/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 11:18[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |FRED BROWN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCCLEARY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4 HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN |
| |
| During normal operations, a concern was identified of a potential fissile |
| material operation in equipment that had been previously identified as an |
| operation that contained material <1 % U-235. Upon investigation of the |
| concern Nuclear Criticality Safety Personnel identified an unanalyzed |
| condition in the X-330/333 "A" booster. Based on the identified condition |
| this is a 4 hour reportable event. Currently the equipment is isolated. A |
| sample shows the equipment contains material at <1% U-235. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| LOW. the equipment is shutdown and has a pressure of 0.8 psia. The maximum |
| mass in the X-330 to X-333 "A" compressor at this pressure is 41 gram U-235 |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| For a criticality to occur, the mass in the compressor would have to |
| increase to greater than 10.35 kg. The material then would have to be |
| moderated and the deposit would have to reflected |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY. CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Enrichment and Mass |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Estimated enrichment is 1.5 weight percent U-235, the mass is estimated at |
| 41 grams. The form of the material would be UF6. The optimum safe mass and |
| critical mass at an enrichment of 1.5 % U-235 is 4.5 Kg and 16.502 Kg |
| respectively. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| There were no NCSA controls on the identified equipment because the |
| enrichment in the equipment was to be less than 1 weight percent U-235 in an |
| operating cascade. In the current configuration it is not credible that |
| enrichment would be exceeded. The deficiency was the equipment was not |
| isolated from equipment that is allowed to see enrichment greater than 1 |
| weight percent U-235. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| The Plant Shift Superintendent directed the "A" booster isolated. The |
| equipment was sampled and found below 1% U-235. Engineering continues to |
| investigate the issue. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38009 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:08[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/18/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CASPERSEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*UNA 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) UNANALYZED CONDITION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AN UNANALYZED CONDITION WAS FOUND WHEN AN EXISTING PIPE TRENCH BLOCKOUT |
| PATHWAY SEPARATING TWO ROOMS WAS FOUND TO BE BLOCKED. |
| |
| After reviewing the Unit 2 flooding calculation (environmental calculations |
| for Auxiliary Feedwater and performing a walkdown of the area, it was |
| determined that the calculation model which assumed an existing pipe trench |
| blockout pathway separating the 2 rooms to be an open pathway. This pathway |
| was found to be blocked leading to an unanalyzed condition. |
| |
| A PRA evaluation was performed for this condition. The result of this |
| evaluation shows that the potential degraded condition due to the sealed |
| pathway and missing backwater check valves in the drain lines does not pose |
| a significant increase in the core damage risk. However, an additional |
| review on May 15, 2001, it was deemed that the cumulative risk increase is |
| potentially significant assuming the condition existed since initial |
| evaluation. Therefore, this issue is being conservatively reported pursuant |
| to 10 CFR 50.72 (ii)(B). |
| |
| |
| No Technical Specification OPERABILITY issues are identified as a result of |
| this event. Additionally this event has been evaluated per GL 91-18 and |
| actions are being taken to be in compliance with the flooding calculations. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 38010 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
|LICENSEE: OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY MED CENTER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:20[EDT]|
| CITY: COLUMBUS REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/11/2001|
| COUNTY: STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 02110-250037 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LIGHT | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION |
| |
| A patient was being treated with Ir-192 and after 2 minutes of treatment |
| verification of the location of the wire could not be made and a decision to |
| terminate the treatment was made. When they attempted to terminate the |
| treatment a problem arose with the clutch mechanism on the device which |
| resulted in the wire slipping. The manufacturer was called and the medical |
| staff continued to troubleshoot the system. The delivery wires for the |
| system were cleaned and the treatment was resumed. On 5/14/01 the |
| University RSO investigated the situation and decided not to use this device |
| until it was evaluated by the manufacturer. On 5/16/01 it was discovered |
| that the cable had some lubricant that leached from the cable and caused |
| increased friction in the treatment catheter. |
| Further evaluation of the film that was shot during this procedure |
| determined that the source was between 4.5 and 5mm from where the treatment |
| site was, therefore there was a delivery to an area that was unintended. |
| The patient and physician were notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38011 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/18/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:37[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/07/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:37[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/18/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN FRANT NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN |
| |
| At 1640, on 5-17-01 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the independent verification required by procedure CP2-CU-CH2137 was not |
| performed. The maintenance segment was not independently verified to be |
| isolated. The same person signed for performance as well as the |
| verification of the segment isolation. NCSA 400.009 requires that fissile |
| operations that credit AQ-NCS function that is disabled due to maintenance |
| must be identified independently, and disabled using a tagout prior to |
| disabling the feature and commencing maintenance. This is done to prevent |
| operation of a system while an AQ-NCS component function is disabled. Since |
| the independent verification was not performed, the process condition was |
| not maintained, therefore double contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| While the NCS control was violated the fissile operation containing the |
| component(s) undergoing maintenance was tagged out using LOTO both as a |
| standard maintenance practice in C-400 and due to other NCS requirements. |
| In addition, the equipment items removed had no AQ-NCS function which was |
| affected by the maintenance actions. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| In order for criticality to be possible, the components undergoing |
| maintenance must have an AQ-NCS function that is disabled, and the affected |
| operations must be subsequently performed with fissile solution. |
| Additionally, the maintenance activity must be one of the relatively few |
| maintenance activities that do not require tagout for another NCS reason, |
| such as to prevent fissile solution from leaking from the system. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing |
| independently verifying the prevention of the affected fissile operation. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Maximum assay of 2.75 wt. % U-235 |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES; |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency is based on preventing operation of the |
| Cylinder Wash Facility during maintenance affecting the AQ-NCS component. |
| The components were properly identified as non-AQ-NCS, therefore this |
| control was not violated. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on independently preventing |
| operation of the Cylinder Wash facility during maintenance affecting the |
| AQ-NCS component. The requirement to Independently verify the AQ-NCS |
| function of all components affected by maintenance was not performed. The |
| control was violated and the process condition was not maintained. |
| |
| Since the independent verification was not performed, the process condition |
| was not maintained, therefore double contingency was not maintained |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| This condition was Identified while reviewing completed maintenance work |
| packages. There is no action that can be performed to resolve this |
| condition and bring the process back Into compliance since the maintenance |
| activity has been completed. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified and the DOE Representative will be |
| informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38012 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:46[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:06[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SHEAR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/19/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GARY SHEAR R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN ZWOLINSKI NRR |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|NADER MAMISH IRO |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 ON NATURAL CIRCULATION AFTER A AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP. |
| |
| |
| Unit 2 reactor coolant pump low flow reactor trip occurred due to a loss of |
| a non-vital 6.9kV bus. The cause of the trip was human error while |
| manipulating electrical plant equipment for planned work. The trip caused a |
| loss of all non-ESF power to Unit 2. All safety systems actuated as |
| required (all rods fully inserted into the core). The plant is currently in |
| Mode 3 (Hot Standby) on natural circulation. No radioactive releases |
| occurred. |
| |
| The licensee took their system Auxiliary Transformer out of service for |
| planned work. The Auxiliary Transformer is the normal offsite power supply |
| to Unit 2 ESF (vital) buses. Unit 2 was cross tied to Unit 1 offsite power |
| supply to supply power to the Unit 2 vital buses while Unit 2 Auxiliary |
| Transformer was out of service. While preparing to restore the auxiliary |
| transformer to service personnel were sent to the 6.9kV non-ESF switchgear |
| room to pull the potential transformer fuses. Instead they pulled the bus |
| potential transformer fuses which resulted in a loss of the bus which in |
| turn tripped the reactor coolant pumps. The bus potential transformer fuses |
| are located in a drawer just above the potential transformer fuses drawer. |
| Once the drawer is opened the fuses come out of their holder. |
| |
| After the reactor trip the diesel driven and the motor driven auxiliary |
| feedwater pumps started. The diesel driven auxiliary feedwater pump was |
| secured and now the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump is supplying |
| water to maintain proper steam generator water levels. The steam generator |
| atmospheric valves are being used to maintain the plant in Hot Standby, no |
| primary to secondary leakage. Both emergency diesel generators were |
| manually started and they are supplying electrical power to the vital buses |
| and power to two non-vital buses. The Unit 2 cross tie to Unit 1 offsite |
| power supply was de-energized after Unit 2 emergency diesel generators were |
| brought into service. If the emergency diesel generators are loss it will |
| take less than 5 minutes to return Unit 1 offsite power back to Unit 2 ESF |
| (vital) buses. All emergency core cooling systems are fully operable and |
| pressurizer water level is within its proper range. Offsite power should |
| be restored in about 4 hours. |
| |
| Unit 1 is at 100% power. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/19/01 AT 1127 ET BY CAROL ROCHA TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| The purpose of this update is to notify the NRC within 8 hours of a valid |
| actuation of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater System. Both trains of |
| Auxiliary Feedwater actuated, as expected, on a Low-2 Steam Generator Level |
| Signal. |
| |
| Division 11 4 kV offsite power was restored to the vital buses via 242-1 |
| (at 0901CT) and 242-2 (at 0906CT). 6.9kV non -vital power was |
| restored at 0727 CT and 0726CT. The emergency diesel generators "2A" & "2B" |
| were secured at 0907CT and 0929CT respectively. A Reactor Coolant Pump was |
| started and forced flow was restored to the reactor coolant system. R3DO |
| (Shear) & NRR EO (Zwolinski) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38013 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PALO VERDE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/19/2001|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: AZ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/19/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:06[MST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STROUD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/19/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 A/R Y 19 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| On May 19, 2001, at approximately 0306 MST Palo Verde Unit 3 experienced a |
| reactor trip (reactor protection system actuation) from 19% rated thermal |
| power due axial shape index trips on all four channels of the core |
| protection calculators.(CPCs). All control element assemblies inserted and |
| plant equipment response was normal and as expected. |
| |
| Prior to the plant trip, Unit 3 had reduced power to 19% and had stabilized |
| as part of pre-planned activities to perform maintenance on the main |
| turbine, which had been taken offline at 0252 MST. The unit was at normal |
| temperature and pressure prior to the trip. |
| |
| After the plant rip, control room staff entered the emergency operating |
| procedures and diagnosed the event as an uncomplicated reactor trip with no |
| emergency classifications being required. The primary plant was stabilized |
| in Mode 3 in forced circulation with both steam generators used for heat |
| removal. |
| |
| Unit 3 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3. |
| Other than the reactor protection system actuation no other engineered |
| safety feature actuations occurred and none were required. The event did not |
| result in any challenges to the fission product barrier or result in any |
| releases of radioactive materials. There were no adverse safety consequences |
| or implications as a result of this event. The event did not adversely |
| affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 38015 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:31[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/20/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:56[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAAB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/20/2001|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BLAIR SPITZBERG R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|*ESF 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUAT| |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING THE AUTO TRANSFER TO STARTUP POWER FAILED TO |
| PICK UP A VITAL BUS. |
| |
| During performance of Part 2 of surveillance test procedures M-13H (4kV Bus |
| H Non-SI Auto Transfer Test) the auto transfer to startup power failed to |
| pick up the bus when the auxiliary feeder breaker was opened. This was a |
| result of the startup feeder breaker being in the test position. This |
| resulted in the 4kV and 480 V bus H being de-energized. For this test |
| diesel generator 2-2 is in manual and it did not load to the bus. With the |
| dead bus the procedure contains a contingency to return diesel generator 2-2 |
| to auto to re-energize bus H. This was done. This was a valid actuation of |
| a diesel generator auto start due to bus undervoltage. Power was lost to |
| bus H for about one minute, no important vital loads were lost and RHR was |
| powered from a different vital bus. |
| |
| Surveillance test procedure M-13H is divided into four parts. The |
| surveillance test procedure assumes that you perform parts 1,2, 3, and 4 in |
| order. Part 1 of the surveillance was done 2 days ago. Part 1 placed the |
| startup feeder breaker in the test position. Later parts 3 and 4 of the |
| surveillance test procedure were performed. Nothing in parts 3 or 4 of the |
| surveillance test procedure took the startup feeder breaker out of its test |
| position. When part 2 of the surveillance test procedure was performed it |
| has the testing personnel look at the control panel to verify that the |
| startup feeder breaker is racked in. With the breaker in test the control |
| board looks exactly the same as if the breaker was racked in. There should |
| have been something to state that the breaker was in test but it was not |
| done. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 38016 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/20/2001|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:47[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/20/2001|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 03:56[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/20/2001|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |GARY SHEAR R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |JOHN GREEVES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: M. C. MAURER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NONR OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| VALID HIGH LEVEL DRAIN SECONDARY ALARM |
| |
| At 0356 on 05/20/01, the PSS office was notified that a High Level Drain |
| Secondary alarm was received on the C-360 position 1 (autoclave 1) Autoclave |
| Water Inventory Control System (WICS). The WICS system is required to be |
| operable while heating in mode 5 (heat mode) according to TSR 2.2.4.2. The |
| autoclave was checked according to the alarm response procedure and the |
| alarm was determined to be due to a valid signal. The autoclave was removed |
| from service and the Water Inventory Control System was declared inoperable |
| by the Plant Shift Superintendent. Autoclave # 1 was removed from service |
| and is inoperable. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021