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Event Notification Report for January 31, 2001

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           01/30/2001 - 01/31/2001

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37655  37691  37693  37696  37701  37702  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37655       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/08/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:32[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        01/08/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:50[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEPHEN JOBE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable   |
| due to an air line leak. The unplanned loss of a single train system (such   |
| as HPCI) is reportable as a loss of safety function. The air line supplies   |
| air to air-operated valves for draining the steam supply line to ensure that |
| the HPCI steam supply line does not fill with water. Upon a HPCI initiation  |
| signal that would cause the steam supply valve to open or on a loss of air   |
| pressure, these air-operated valves automatically shut. With the degraded    |
| condition of the air supply line, assurance could not be maintained that the |
| steam lines would be maintained clear of water. HPCI is presently available  |
| and capable of injecting if required."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @0951 BY WHEELER TO GOULD * * *   RETRACTION         |
|                                                                              |
| The affected air line supplies air to air operated drain valves for draining |
| the HPCI System steam supply line.  On a HPCI System initiation signal or on |
| a loss of instrument air (i.e. the failure or isolation of the air supply    |
| line), the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would automatically    |
| close.   In this condition, in the response to high level alarms, manual     |
| opening of the HPCI System steam supply line drain valves would have been    |
| performed, in accordance with procedures, to ensure the HPCI System steam    |
| supply line remains clear of water. However, no water had accumulated in the |
| HPCI System steam supply line prior to or during the condition (as evidenced |
| by the lack of alarms).   In the event water had accumulated in the HPCI     |
| System steam supply line and had not been removed, the HPCI turbine has been |
| designed and tested to ensure that water carry-over (from the reactor        |
| vessel) will not cause damage to the turbine.  The HPCI System has adequate  |
| capacity to accept the small losses in efficiency due to any moisture        |
| carryover.  In addition, in preparation for and during maintenance/repair of |
| the air supply line, no actions were taken which would have prevented the    |
| HPCI System from functioning.  Based on this analysis, the HPCI System was   |
| fully capable of performing its safety functions and HPCI System Technical   |
| Specification Surveillance Requirements continued to be satisfied at all     |
| times.  The HPCI System remained operable during this period.  Therefore,    |
| Event Number 37655 is retracted.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Region 4 RDO (Spitzberg) was notified.                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37691       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/25/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [4] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:03[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/25/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:51[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS S. WACH               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*RPS 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B)  RPS ACTUATION - CRITICA|                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|4     M/R        Y       50       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TWO DROPPED RODS IN DIFFERENT BANKS               |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "While conducting a plant shutdown due to a dropped rod in shutdown bank 'B' |
| (H-6), another rod in control bank 'D' (H-10) dropped.  In accordance with   |
| [procedure] 4-ONOP-028.3, 'Dropped RCC,' with two dropped rods in different  |
| banks the reactor was manually tripped and [procedure] 4-EOP-E-0 was         |
| entered.  All equipment operated as expected, and [the] plant is stable in   |
| Mode 3.  [An] investigation is in progress to determine [the] reason for     |
| [the] dropped rods."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that all rods fully inserted.  Auxiliary feedwater       |
| automatically started as expected and has since been secured.  Normal        |
| feedwater is currently being utilized to supply water to the steam           |
| generators, and the main condenser is available as the heat sink for         |
| secondary steam.  Normal charging, makeup, and letdown are being utilized    |
| for primary system inventory control.  Pressurizer heaters and sprays are    |
| being utilized for primary system pressure control, and the reactor coolant  |
| pumps are being utilized for primary system transport control.  Offsite      |
| power is available.  There were no emergency core cooling system actuations, |
| and none were required.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1123 BY HICKEY TO GOULD * * *                      |
|                                                                              |
| The H-6 rod drop was determined to be due to a circuit discontinuity In a    |
| bulkhead connector.  One hundred percent of the bulkhead connectors for the  |
| 45 Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDMs) were inspected.  Investigation is in |
| progress to determine the cause of the connector discontinuity.              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37693       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2001|
|    UNIT:  [] [4] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:29[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/26/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  P LAFONTAINE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KERRY LANDIS         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |ED GOODWIN           NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|4     N          N       0        Hot Standby      |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POSSIBLE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) LEAKAGE                                |
|                                                                              |
| Possible RCS boundary leakage from around a part length CRDM housing.  Dry   |
| boric acid crystal buildup, less than one cup, was found around a part       |
| length CRDM housing.  Licensee will have to remove missile shield, etc. to   |
| determine which part length CRDM housing has the leak or possibly leaked in  |
| the past.  Currently the licensee is cooling down the plant and should be in |
| a cold shutdown condition in 6 or 7 hours from 1130 ET.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident was notified of this by the licensee.                       |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1123 BY HICKEY TO GOULD * * *                      |
|                                                                              |
| Wet boric acid was identified on the mechanical seal area at the top of CRDM |
| H-14. and a small ring of dry boric acid was found at the CRDM B-8 vent plug |
| cap.  Neither leak point constituted RCS pressure boundary leakage, as       |
| defined in Technical Specifications.  H-14 and B-8 are both abandoned        |
| part-length CRDM housings.  Boric acid had run down the outside of the H-14  |
| housing, but there was no visual indication of leakage in the welded areas.  |
| The welds on H-14 were examined by NDE; no indications were found.  Unit 4   |
| was refueled in October, 2000.  Neither of these leaks was identified during |
| the restart inspection at the end of the refueling outage.  The top closure  |
| assembly on both housings was replaced with a threaded and welded plug       |
| design. Preparations are underway to return Unit 4 to service.               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.  The Reg 2 RDO(Wert) was notified.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   37696       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/26/2001|
|LICENSEE:  CITIZENS GENERAL HOSPITAL            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EST]|
|    CITY:  NEW KENSINGTON           REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        01/25/2001|
|  COUNTY:  ALLEGHENY                 STATE:  PA |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2001|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |STEVEN DENNIS        R1      |
|                                                |C.W. (BILL) REAMER   NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+DALE POWERS          R4      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ANDREW BUKOVITZ              |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)   LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF THE POSSIBLE LOSS OF TWO GADOLINIUM-153 SOURCES AT CITIZENS     |
| GENERAL HOSPITAL IN NEW KENSINGTON, PENNSYLVANIA                             |
|                                                                              |
| Due to an ongoing merger with Allegheny Valley Hospital, Citizens General    |
| Hospital ceased nuclear medical activities and properly transferred all      |
| sources (except for two gadolinium-153 sources) to Allegheny Valley Hospital |
| (located within approximately 2 miles).  The gadolinium sources were not     |
| included because Allegheny Valley Hospital was not licensed for              |
| gadolinium-153.  (A license amendment has been requested.)  Accordingly, the |
| gadolinium-153 sources were being kept in Hot Lab at Citizens General        |
| Hospital in the meantime.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Approximately 3 weeks ago, a closeout survey was preformed of the Nuclear    |
| Medicine Department at Citizens General Hospital (where the gamma camera was |
| located and recorded were done).  The results indicated that there were no   |
| activities.  There was also documentation in place to prohibit use of the    |
| Hot Lab because it had not yet been closed out.                              |
|                                                                              |
| It was reported that an unknown individual made arrangements to de-install   |
| and sell the gamma camera and other equipment.  Two individuals (middlemen   |
| for other companies) arrived yesterday (01/25/01) with a crew.  The          |
| individuals were told that they could take the gamma camera and other items  |
| but not to touch the gadolinium sources, which were located in the Hot Lab.  |
|                                                                              |
| This morning (01/26/01), it was discovered that the gadolinium sources were  |
| missing.  Apparently, the de-installation crew left a mess and took more     |
| than they were authorized to take including a refrigerator, survey meters,   |
| signs off the walls, etc.  The Director of Materials Management did not have |
| a list.  It is currently believed that the sources were removed at           |
| approximately 1600 EST on 01/25/01 by an individual who worked for  BC       |
| Technical, and it was reported that the sources may currently be in Salt     |
| Lake City, Utah.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The other individual worked as an independent for Jet Services and was       |
| believed to be involved with removal of the gamma camera.  The licensee was  |
| able to contact this individual, who in turn informed the licensee that the  |
| other individual's company (BC Technical in Salt Lake City) had a license to |
| transfer radioactive materials.  Therefore, there was an impression that     |
| they were doing the hospital a favor by getting rid of sources for the       |
| hospital.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee also contacted the company based in Salt Lake City, Utah.  The  |
| individual who actually removed the sources was not available because he was |
| performing a de-installation at another hospital.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The missing gadolinium sources had an activity of 200 millicuries each       |
| approximately 2 years ago.  The current activity level was conservatively    |
| estimated to be approximately 50 millicuries each.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 office (Michelle Beardsley).      |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for licensee contact information and        |
| contact information regarding the individuals involved in the                |
| de-installation and removal of equipment.)                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1330 ON 1/30/01 BY BUKOVITZ, RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| The sources were returned to the hospital on 1/27/01.  The sources had been  |
| shielded the entire time and the radiation field on the exterior of the      |
| shielding was less than 1 mr/hr.    The licensee has notified the NRC Region |
| 1 office (Michelle Beardsley).  The Operations Center notified the R1DO      |
| (Holody).                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37701       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/30/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:34[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        01/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:15[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TEMPOE                       |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*SHU 50.72(b)(2)(i)      PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAFETY RELIEF VALVES WERE DECLARED INOPERABLE                                |
|                                                                              |
| A Technical Specification shutdown was initiated as required by T.S. 3.6.E.2 |
| following the discovery that not all of Section XI requirements were met     |
| with respect to the safety relief valves.  The safety relief valves were     |
| declared inoperable @ 1830 on 1/29/01.  The reactor conditions shall be as   |
| follows within 24 hrs:  reactor pressure <110 psig and reactor temperature   |
| <345F.                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 1/30/01 @ 1049 BY CORRIGAN TO GOULD * * *                    |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0126 CST, January 30, 2001, NRC approved the Licensee's verbal request   |
| for a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) concerning Technical           |
| Specification 3.15.A. 1.  Specifically, this allows us to use the corrective |
| action process, including consideration of Generic Letter 91-18, to resolve  |
| non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code.  In the case of SRVs, a   |
| favorable operability determination will allow us to consider SRVs operable  |
| in spite of existing non-conformances with Section Xl of the ASME code.      |
| Further, the NOED allows us to assess operability of any additional          |
| identified non-conformances with Section Xl through our condition report     |
| process rather than to immediately declare the affected component inoperable |
| as required by Technical Specification 3.15.A.1. Continuance of this NOED is |
| contingent on NRC receipt, by close of business on February 1, 2001, of our  |
| written NOED request and a license amendment request to move inservice       |
| inspection requirements to a licensee controlled program.  The NOED remains  |
| in effect until the license amendment request is dispositioned  (expected    |
| about March 5, 2001)."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 3 RDO(Hills) was notified.                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37702       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PILGRIM                  REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/30/2001|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:40[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        01/30/2001|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:25[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY HAISLET                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  01/30/2001|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DANIEL HOLODY        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|*IND 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)   ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOW CONTROL ROOM PRESSURE WHEN CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION IN OPERATION         |
|                                                                              |
| During testing of CRHEAFS (Control Room High Efficiency Air Filtration       |
| System) the licensee was not able to maintain the control room at a positive |
| pressure as required.  CRHEAFS was inoperable at the time the problem was    |
| noted due to planned maintenance (but still available).  The area outside    |
| the control room is at a higher pressure causing air inflow into the control |
| room while CRHEAFS is operating.  When the ventilation in the area outside   |
| the control is secured, the proper positive pressure is maintained in the    |
| control room.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Procedures are being revised to require securing of the outside ventilation  |
| system if CRHEAFS operation is required.  The licensee is continuing to      |
| investigate this problem and has notified the NRC resident inspector.        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+