Event Notification Report for November 17, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
11/16/2000 - 11/17/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37524 37525 37527 37528 37529
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37524 |
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| FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:49[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:22[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: VERITA BELLAMY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO FAILURE OF TURBINE RUNBACK ACTUATION CIRCUITS |
| |
| Unit 2 experienced a turbine runback at 1410 EST. The control room |
| operators noticed all status lights for overpower and overtemperature delta |
| T runback were illuminated. The operators decided to manually trip the |
| reactor from about 23 % rated thermal power. The reactor trip resulted in a |
| turbine trip as expected. Auxiliary feedwater pumps started due to low-low |
| steam generator levels. The unit is stable in Mode 3. |
| |
| The runback bistables are locked in without having the logic bistables |
| tripped that feed the trip circuit. The licensee is troubleshooting the |
| problem and the cause is unknown at this time. The plant will remain in |
| Mode 3 until the problem is corrected. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1345EST FROM TIM HEADNON TO BOB STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The licensee is updating their report to include the following information: |
| |
| "On November 15, 2000, McGuire Unit 2 experienced a turbine runback which |
| ultimately resulted in plant operators manually tripping the reactor (RPS |
| Actuation). Following the trip, the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started |
| due to low-low steam generator levels (ESF Actuation) |
| |
| "Further investigation has determined that the turbine runback was caused by |
| actuation of all four channels of over power delta temperature (OPDT) and |
| over temperature delta temperature (OTDT) runback logic following a trip of |
| an electrical breaker which supplies power to the logic circuitry. The |
| turbine runback was a result of the breaker trip and was not initiated by a |
| valid OPDT or OTDT condition. Subsequent to the turbine runback, a decision |
| was made to manually trip the reactor. Plant equipment necessary to safely |
| shutdown the unit operated correctly and the Unit is stable and in Mode 3. |
| The Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps have been secured. Actions needed to |
| restart Unit 2 are in progress." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. Notified R2DO(Ernstes). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37525 |
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| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/15/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:04[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 11/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERE FREEMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RICHARD BARKLEY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 1 Startup |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL |
| |
| The plant received a low water level reactor scram during turbine |
| manipulation after 2 turbine bypass valves opened. All systems functioned |
| as designed. The actual cause is not fully understood and is under |
| investigation. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1513EST ON 11/16/00 FROM STEVE FULLER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The following information was received as an update: |
| |
| "On 11/15/00 at 1748 EST, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station |
| automatically scrammed on reactor low water level (as described on Event |
| Number 37525). The station was in the process of restarting from the plant |
| from the recent 1 SR refueling outage. The operators were in the process of |
| securing High Pressure Turbine warm-up and preparing to perform Steam Chest |
| warm-up. As they transitioned between these activities, the turbine bypass |
| valves opened. As a result of the bypass valves opening, reactor water level |
| increased. The operators responded to the reactor water level transient but |
| failed to recognize the pressure reduction. The loss of inventory resulted |
| in a low water level reactor scram. |
| |
| "The station has conducted a transient assessment of this incident. The |
| preliminary root cause was identified as a procedural deficiency. The |
| Turbine System Operating Procedure did not provide the appropriate guidance |
| for preventing the bypass valves from opening. Additionally, the operators |
| demonstrated a lack of integrated system knowledge and response regarding |
| the turbine controls system. |
| |
| "Subsequent reviews of the plant data revealed that the cool down rate |
| exceeded the plant's Technical Specification limit of 100 degrees per hour. |
| This occurred because of the low initial power level coupled with the bypass |
| valves not being closed in a timely manner. Engineering has assessed this |
| condition and determined that the plant response was within our design |
| bases. Additionally, the Post Transient Review Group (PTRG) identified a |
| potential concern regarding the operation of the reactor low water level |
| transmitters. One of the four reactor low water level scram switches did not |
| actuate. Even though the PTRG suspected this switch didn't actuate because |
| the decrease in reactor water level wasn't sufficient due to the low initial |
| power level, this switch was subsequently tested and operated |
| appropriately. |
| |
| "Following completion of the required restart activities, the plant |
| commenced startup activities at 2:57 EST on 11/16/00. In accordance with |
| 10CFR50.73 a Licensee Event Report will be submitted to describe this |
| incident, the root cause, and associated corrective actions." |
| |
| The licensee will inform the NRC resident inspector. Notified |
| R1DO(Barkley). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37527 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FARLEY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:10[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 11/16/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:23[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRAD MOORE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH-HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING A |
| MASTER STEAM GENERATOR FEEDWATER PUMP CONTROLLER FAILURE AND SLUGGISH |
| CONTROLS AFTER SWITCHING TO MANUAL |
| |
| The master steam generator feedwater pump controller failed low and caused |
| feedwater pump speeds to slow down. (Both pumps dropped to 3,200 rpm.) In |
| an attempt to regain feedwater pump speed and steam generator water level in |
| manual, a high-high level was reached in the 2A steam generator. This |
| caused a turbine trip and subsequent reactor trip. All control rods fully |
| inserted. Auxiliary feedwater actuation and feedwater isolation occurred as |
| expected. All systems functioned as required. |
| |
| It was reported that the controller was sluggish after manual control was |
| taken and that operators were not able to terminate the rising level in the |
| 2A steam generator before the high-high level trip setpoint was reached. |
| The lowest steam generator water level attained was approximately 27%. The |
| low level trip occurs at 25%. The cause of the controller failure is |
| currently under investigation. |
| |
| The unit is currently stable in Hot Standby. Pressurizer heaters and |
| sprays, normal charging and letdown, and the reactor coolant pumps are |
| currently being utilized for primary system pressure, level, and transport |
| control. Secondary steam is being dumped to the main condenser, and |
| auxiliary feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators. All |
| containment parameters are normal. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37528 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:06[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 11/16/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:15[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES HURCHALLA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| UNIT 1 PRESSURIZER LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION MAY NOT MEET CABLE SEPARATION |
| CRITERIA |
| |
| "During development of a cable separation modification package for the |
| upcoming 2001 Unit 1 Outage SL1-17, a re-evaluation of the Unit 1 |
| Containment Shutdown Safety Assessment was performed. The re-evaluation |
| identified a separation issue with the cables for pressurizer level |
| instruments LT-1110X and LT-1110Y in the annulus area. At certain |
| locations, these cables are not separated as required by 10 CFR Part 50 |
| Appendix R, Section lll.G.2 as required by the plant design basis as |
| delineated in the FSAR. |
| |
| "Fire protection for nuclear plants is based on the defense in depth concept |
| with three primary barriers - prevention, detection and control, and |
| protection of safe shutdown capabilities. The above concern is considered a |
| degradation of the protection of safe shutdown capability. The affect of |
| this concern on the fire protection program does not eliminate the ability |
| to achieve safe shutdown. The remaining two 'defense in depth' barriers |
| remain intact - (prevention of fires and prompt detection and control of |
| fires that due occur). In an area such as containment (large volume, high |
| ceilings, minimal ignition sources, limited combustibles, limited access, |
| etc.) the potential for a fire of consequence during operation is highly |
| unlikely. In the particular area described, the potential for a fire is even |
| more remote since the combustible loading is negligible. The location where |
| the separation issue exists (at the end of the annulus area near the pipe |
| chase) does not contain significant equipment, significant exposed |
| combustible materials or significant ignition sources. The cable trays |
| routed in this area (between radius lines 1 and 3) are relatively lightly |
| loaded since most cables have previously exited the tray enroute to their |
| respective equipment (e.g., only one tray continues past radius line 2 to |
| radius line 1). |
| |
| "The probability of a fire in Containment is very low. The probability of a |
| fire causing significant damage such that required function is impaired is |
| very low. Therefore, the equipment and system affected by this condition is |
| considered degraded but operable. Based on the guidance provided in GL 91-18 |
| a reasonable assurance of safety is provided." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37529 |
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| REP ORG: USAF RADIOISOTOPE COMMITTEE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/16/2000|
|LICENSEE: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:32[EST]|
| CITY: SARASOTA REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 11/16/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: FL |EVENT TIME: 17:20[EST]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 11/16/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MIKE ERNSTES R2 |
| |LINDA HOWELL R4 |
+------------------------------------------------+E. WILLIAM BRACH NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LT. COL. SWENSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF TWO AMERICIUM-241 SOURCES (4 MICROCURIES EACH) DUE TO THE CRASH OF |
| AN F-16 NEAR SARASOTA, FLORIDA |
| |
| An F-16 crashed near Sarasota, Florida which may have been carrying two (2) |
| Am-241 sources used in the LANTIRN (Low Altitude Navigation Targeting |
| Infrared for Night) pod. The Air Force will followup to determine whether |
| the sources were onboard and, if so, attempt recovery from the crash scene. |
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