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Event Notification Report for November 1, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/31/2000 - 11/01/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37444  37476  37477  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37444       |
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| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/20/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:50[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        19:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE SAUER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/31/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| DESIGN ISSUE REGARDING MSIV CLOSURE ABILITY DURING MODE TRANSITION           |
|                                                                              |
| "The main steam isolation valves, which accomplish the steam line isolation  |
| function, require steam pressure assist to close (fast close). They can also |
| be closed hydraulically (slow close).                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The main steam isolation valve function had been demonstrated to be         |
| acceptable in Mode 1, 2, and 3. However, the analyses performed for Mode 3   |
| do not explicitly address all steam pressures in region between the NOP/NOT  |
| area of Mode 3 and the entry condition to Mode 4. The potential could exist  |
| where the plant is in a Mode 3 condition in transition to a Mode 4           |
| condition. During this transition condition, if a steam line break were to   |
| occur, closure of the MSIVs would be required. If the steam pressure in this |
| transition condition were near the minimum pressure required to close the    |
| MSIVs at the initiation of the event, it is possible that the steam pressure |
| in the system could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs.    |
| This would mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation Function could-be   |
| inoperable in Mode 3.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "This function is operable in Modes 1 and 2. Further analysis is required to |
| demonstrate operability in all conditions bounded by Mode 3."                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the      |
| licensee.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1636 EST 10/31/2000 FROM SIMPSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| "On October 20, 2000, Salem Units 1 and 2 reported that the potential exists |
| with the plant in Mode 3 conditions that if a steam line break were to       |
| occur, closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) may be required    |
| and may not be available for fast closure. If the steamline pressure was     |
| near the minimum pressure required to close the MSIVs at the initiation of   |
| the event, it is possible that the steamline pressure during a steamline     |
| break could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. This would |
| mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation function could be inoperable   |
| in Mode 3.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon further evaluation at the main steam line break analysis during Mode 3 |
| Conditions, PSEG now concludes that the MSIVs will be and have always been   |
| operable in all parts of Mode 3. The evaluation concluded that although the  |
| MSIVs may not always close automatically for the range of steam line break   |
| sizes and initial conditions in Mode 3, for those situations where the MSIVs |
| do not close upon receipt of an automatic or manual signal, MSIV closure has |
| been shown to not be required to provide protection to satisfy design basis  |
| requirements (e.g. minimum DNBR remains above the minimum DNBR limit value   |
| and peak containment pressure remains below 47 psig).                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Based on the above information, the 4-hour report made in accordance with   |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) is being retracted."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified    |
| R1DO (McFadden).                                                             |
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|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37476       |
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| REP ORG:  CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/31/2000|
|LICENSEE:  YUASA, INC.                          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:30[EST]|
|    CITY:                           REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        06/09/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NY |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/31/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  R. LOUIE                     |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| PART 21 NOTIFICATION -                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Consolidated Edison Company of New York,  |
| Inc., the licensee for Indian Point Unit No. 2 hereby provides initial       |
| notification of a defect determined to be reportable under 10 CFR Part 21.   |
| The reported condition involves a 2GN23 1800 Amp-hour battery produced by    |
| YUASA, Inc.   These batteries are used in the 125V DC System, and provide a  |
| primary source of 125V DC power to safeguards equipment and logic circuitry  |
| at Indian Point.   On June 9, 2000, during the performance of a battery load |
| test (PT-R76B), 22 Battery failed its two-hour minimum voltage               |
| characteristic (110.2VDC).   It also failed to satisfy its required amp-hour |
| capacity (greater than 90%).  Following initial troubleshooting activities,  |
| similar load capacity failures occurred on June 18 and July 18, 2000.        |
| Various load tests and destructive examinations of the battery cells were    |
| performed over the next several weeks.   A visual examination of the plates  |
| and separators did not indicate any discrepancies.   However, microscopic    |
| analysis of samples obtained from two different positive plates revealed     |
| cracks within the positive active material, small pores, and small particle  |
| size.  This would result in higher internal cell resistance when charging    |
| and discharging a battery. These cracks appear to have been produced during  |
| the manufacturing operation.                                                 |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37477       |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/31/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:40[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/31/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:15[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/31/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |C.W. (BILL) REAMER   NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  K. BEASLEY                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1715 CST on 10-31-00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified  |
| of a violation of an NCSA In the C-400 building. A negative air machine      |
| (NAM) was operated in the C-400 Sear Disassembly Area with an expired        |
| calibration date on the magnehelic gauge in violation of NCSE GEN-09. The    |
| magnehelic gauge is a safety related item relied on to measure differential  |
| pressure across each filter bank to ensure that uranium is not excessively   |
| loaded onto filters and to prevent fissile material accumulating in the NAM  |
| in quantities grater than a maximum subcritical mass.                        |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
| "The NAM was operated with an expired calibration date on the magnehelic     |
| delta pressure gauge, The system design limits the ability to accumulate a   |
| critical mass, however, a control for double contingency was lost.           |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the NAM would have to be         |
| operated with a differential pressure above 20 In. WG. The filters would     |
| have to be fully loaded with fissile/potentially fissile material and        |
| dislodged from the filters more than two times, accumulating in the bottom   |
| of the NAM.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC.):      |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by Implementing two     |
| controls on mass.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND %WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                        |
| "The assay of any material is less than 2.75 wt. % U235.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two     |
| controls on mass.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is an administrative control to limit   |
| the delta pressure across the prefilter to a maximum of 12 in. WG or an      |
| increase across the HEPA filter to 2 in. WG by using calibrated              |
| instrumentation, This will limit the filter loading to less than a           |
| subcritical mass. Since the instrumentation was outside the calibration      |
| date, this control must be assumed to be violated.                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is a safety-related Item, which limits |
| the ability of the NAM to exceed a differential pressure of 20 In. WG. This  |
| is accomplished by limiting the motor power rating. This prevents an         |
| accumulation of more than the subcritical mass. This control was not         |
| violated.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Since double contingency is based on two controls on mass and the           |
| differential pressure control was lost, double contingency was not           |
| maintained.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS              |
| IMPLEMENTED:                                                                 |
| "Access to the area has been controlled by ropes and signs and the NAM unit  |
| has been tagged to prevent use. The NAM will not be operated until           |
| inspection, filter change, and replacement of the magnehelic gauge is        |
| performed."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.           |
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