Event Notification Report for November 1, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/31/2000 - 11/01/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37444 37476 37477
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37444 |
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| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/20/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:50[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE SAUER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/31/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DESIGN ISSUE REGARDING MSIV CLOSURE ABILITY DURING MODE TRANSITION |
| |
| "The main steam isolation valves, which accomplish the steam line isolation |
| function, require steam pressure assist to close (fast close). They can also |
| be closed hydraulically (slow close). |
| |
| "The main steam isolation valve function had been demonstrated to be |
| acceptable in Mode 1, 2, and 3. However, the analyses performed for Mode 3 |
| do not explicitly address all steam pressures in region between the NOP/NOT |
| area of Mode 3 and the entry condition to Mode 4. The potential could exist |
| where the plant is in a Mode 3 condition in transition to a Mode 4 |
| condition. During this transition condition, if a steam line break were to |
| occur, closure of the MSIVs would be required. If the steam pressure in this |
| transition condition were near the minimum pressure required to close the |
| MSIVs at the initiation of the event, it is possible that the steam pressure |
| in the system could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. |
| This would mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation Function could-be |
| inoperable in Mode 3. |
| |
| "This function is operable in Modes 1 and 2. Further analysis is required to |
| demonstrate operability in all conditions bounded by Mode 3." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION 1636 EST 10/31/2000 FROM SIMPSON TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "On October 20, 2000, Salem Units 1 and 2 reported that the potential exists |
| with the plant in Mode 3 conditions that if a steam line break were to |
| occur, closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) may be required |
| and may not be available for fast closure. If the steamline pressure was |
| near the minimum pressure required to close the MSIVs at the initiation of |
| the event, it is possible that the steamline pressure during a steamline |
| break could decay below the required pressure to close the MSIVs. This would |
| mean that the fast close Main Steam Isolation function could be inoperable |
| in Mode 3. |
| |
| "Upon further evaluation at the main steam line break analysis during Mode 3 |
| Conditions, PSEG now concludes that the MSIVs will be and have always been |
| operable in all parts of Mode 3. The evaluation concluded that although the |
| MSIVs may not always close automatically for the range of steam line break |
| sizes and initial conditions in Mode 3, for those situations where the MSIVs |
| do not close upon receipt of an automatic or manual signal, MSIV closure has |
| been shown to not be required to provide protection to satisfy design basis |
| requirements (e.g. minimum DNBR remains above the minimum DNBR limit value |
| and peak containment pressure remains below 47 psig). |
| |
| "Based on the above information, the 4-hour report made in accordance with |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii) is being retracted." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified |
| R1DO (McFadden). |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37476 |
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| REP ORG: CONSOLIDATED EDISON COMPANY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/31/2000|
|LICENSEE: YUASA, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:30[EST]|
| CITY: REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 06/09/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NY |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/31/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |HAROLD GRAY R1 |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: R. LOUIE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PART 21 NOTIFICATION - |
| |
| Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Consolidated Edison Company of New York, |
| Inc., the licensee for Indian Point Unit No. 2 hereby provides initial |
| notification of a defect determined to be reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. |
| The reported condition involves a 2GN23 1800 Amp-hour battery produced by |
| YUASA, Inc. These batteries are used in the 125V DC System, and provide a |
| primary source of 125V DC power to safeguards equipment and logic circuitry |
| at Indian Point. On June 9, 2000, during the performance of a battery load |
| test (PT-R76B), 22 Battery failed its two-hour minimum voltage |
| characteristic (110.2VDC). It also failed to satisfy its required amp-hour |
| capacity (greater than 90%). Following initial troubleshooting activities, |
| similar load capacity failures occurred on June 18 and July 18, 2000. |
| Various load tests and destructive examinations of the battery cells were |
| performed over the next several weeks. A visual examination of the plates |
| and separators did not indicate any discrepancies. However, microscopic |
| analysis of samples obtained from two different positive plates revealed |
| cracks within the positive active material, small pores, and small particle |
| size. This would result in higher internal cell resistance when charging |
| and discharging a battery. These cracks appear to have been produced during |
| the manufacturing operation. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37477 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/31/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:40[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/31/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:15[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/31/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |C.W. (BILL) REAMER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: K. BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "At 1715 CST on 10-31-00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| of a violation of an NCSA In the C-400 building. A negative air machine |
| (NAM) was operated in the C-400 Sear Disassembly Area with an expired |
| calibration date on the magnehelic gauge in violation of NCSE GEN-09. The |
| magnehelic gauge is a safety related item relied on to measure differential |
| pressure across each filter bank to ensure that uranium is not excessively |
| loaded onto filters and to prevent fissile material accumulating in the NAM |
| in quantities grater than a maximum subcritical mass. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| "The NAM was operated with an expired calibration date on the magnehelic |
| delta pressure gauge, The system design limits the ability to accumulate a |
| critical mass, however, a control for double contingency was lost. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the NAM would have to be |
| operated with a differential pressure above 20 In. WG. The filters would |
| have to be fully loaded with fissile/potentially fissile material and |
| dislodged from the filters more than two times, accumulating in the bottom |
| of the NAM. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION ETC.): |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by Implementing two |
| controls on mass. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND %WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| "The assay of any material is less than 2.75 wt. % U235. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on mass. |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is an administrative control to limit |
| the delta pressure across the prefilter to a maximum of 12 in. WG or an |
| increase across the HEPA filter to 2 in. WG by using calibrated |
| instrumentation, This will limit the filter loading to less than a |
| subcritical mass. Since the instrumentation was outside the calibration |
| date, this control must be assumed to be violated. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is a safety-related Item, which limits |
| the ability of the NAM to exceed a differential pressure of 20 In. WG. This |
| is accomplished by limiting the motor power rating. This prevents an |
| accumulation of more than the subcritical mass. This control was not |
| violated. |
| |
| "Since double contingency is based on two controls on mass and the |
| differential pressure control was lost, double contingency was not |
| maintained. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED: |
| "Access to the area has been controlled by ropes and signs and the NAM unit |
| has been tagged to prevent use. The NAM will not be operated until |
| inspection, filter change, and replacement of the magnehelic gauge is |
| performed." |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
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