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Event Notification Report for October 25, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/24/2000 - 10/25/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37391  37448  37452  37453  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37391       |
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| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        09/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER          |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRENT CLAYTON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       99       Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE                         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1320 hours on 9/29/00,  the seismic bolts of the Division 3 Diesel        |
| Generator (DG) control panel door were discovered missing.   At 1450,        |
| Engineering determined that the seismic qualification of the control panel   |
| was in question with these bolts missing.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| On 9/27/00, during the day shift, the Division 3 DG was tested per Clinton   |
| Power Station (CPS) procedure 9080.02,  DIESEL GENERATOR 1C OPERABILITY -    |
| MANUAL AND QUICK START OPERABILITY.  This procedure requires instrumentation |
| to be connected within the local control panel (1E22-S001B).  The bolts to   |
| this panel were discovered missing today at 1320.   It is possible that they |
| had been missing since the performance of CPS 9080.02 but is unknown at this |
| time.  The Division 3 DG is not analyzed for these missing bolts and is      |
| considered inoperable while in this condition.                               |
|                                                                              |
| This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) as a      |
| condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the High        |
| Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, a single-train safety system needed to    |
| mitigate the consequences of an accident, since the Division 3 DG is an      |
| essential support system for the HPCS system needed to mitigate a small      |
| break LOCA concurrent with a Loss of offsite power.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The bolts were restored at 1442 today and the Division 3 DG is operable.     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1826 BY SCHOTTEL TO GOULD * * *   RETRACTION      |
|                                                                              |
| Further evaluation of this condition by engineering concluded that the       |
| absence of the bolts was seismically acceptable.  A calculation determined   |
| that the estimated impact acceleration resulting from the unsecured door     |
| impacting the panel is 0.06g.  Because this acceleration is small in         |
| relation to the seismic test margin documented in the original seismic       |
| calculation of the panel, the unsecured door would not have prevented the    |
| control panel from performing its safety function during seismic events.  On |
| this basis, the Division 3 DG and HPCS safety functions were not adversely   |
| affected by the absence of the bolts. Therefore, this issue Is not           |
| reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73 and this event   |
| notification is retracted.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 3 RDO(Vegel) was informed.                                           |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37448       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:55[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/22/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        01:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN DONALLY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM COOK         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - 10 CFR 50.72 AND APPENDIX R                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "A section of the high pressure fire header will be isolated and drained.    |
| The reason for the impairment is planned maintenance for the replacement of  |
| a section of 12" piping and various small bore valve replacements. This      |
| header section provides fire protection for the Units 1 and 2 Intake         |
| Structure, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building, the Transformer Yard and |
| the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Indian Point Station is in cold shutdown with the reactor defueled and      |
| steam generator replacement in progress. Therefore, the Auxiliary Boiler     |
| Feed Pumps and the Main and Unit Auxiliary Transformers are out of service   |
| and do not require fire protection. The safety related equipment that is     |
| required to be protected under this plant condition are the Service Water    |
| Pumps and the 480 VAC Electrical Cables for the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps and |
| Component Cooling Pumps which traverse the Electrical Tunnel. Compensatory   |
| hoses will be staged prior to applying the tagout. Fire tours will also be   |
| established to supplement the frequency with which these and the other       |
| impaired areas are surveilled.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The 24 Hour notification to the NRC for the Fire header impairment will     |
| made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and App. R as well as the written report to      |
| follow within 14 days. The alternate fire protection system will not be      |
| established since the station is already in cold shutdown. A 30 day action   |
| statement will be entered for the inoperable hydrants protecting the Intake  |
| Structure and Service Water Pumps. A separate 14 day action statement will   |
| be entered for the inoperable Electrical Tunnel Deluge System. The duration  |
| of the impairment will be minimized and further compensatory measures may be |
| necessary should any of the time limits be approached due to unforeseen      |
| circumstances."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1524 BY DONNELLY TO GOULD * * *                   |
|                                                                              |
| The following update is providing additional information to clarify this     |
| event report.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The following is an update to NRC event number 37448.  A section of the      |
| high-pressure fire header will be isolated and drained for planned           |
| maintenance.  A section of 12-inch piping is being replaced along with       |
| various sections of valves.  The isolated section of piping supplies high    |
| pressure fire water to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Intake structure, the Auxiliary |
| Boiler Feed Pump Building, and the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System.          |
|                                                                              |
| The Indian Point Unit 2 Fire Protection Program requires that all piping and |
| valves necessary for proper functioning of any portion of the system         |
| required for protection of safe shutdown systems be operable.  If this       |
| condition is not restored within 24 hours, then an alternate fire protection |
| system must be established or the plant must be placed in the hot shutdown   |
| condition utilizing normal operating procedures.  Within the next 48 hours,  |
| if the system is not restored or an alternate system is not established,     |
| then the plant must be placed in the cold shutdown condition.  Currently,    |
| Indian Point 2 station is in the de-fueled condition, with the core fully    |
| unloaded. Therefore, compensatory actions are not required to maintain the   |
| plant in the shutdown condition..                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Compensatory measures are being undertaken by Indian Point 2 station for     |
| prudence. The intake structure contains the Service Water Pumps, which are   |
| safe shutdown equipment and are used to cool the Spent Fuel Pool.  The       |
| inoperable hydrant on the intake structure will be supplemented by staged    |
| fire hoses and a 4 hour fire tour, and Indian Point 2 will enter a 30 Day    |
| Action Statement per SAO-703.   Additional fire hoses will also be staged    |
| for the inoperable hydrant outside the auxiliary pump building.  The         |
| electrical tunnel contains the 480 VAC Electrical cables for the Spent Fuel  |
| Cooling Pumps, the Component Cooling Water Pumps as well as additional       |
| electrical loads.  Compensatory hoses will be staged in this area and the    |
| fire detectors are all still operational.   A 14 Day Action Statement per    |
| SAQ-703 will be entered for this impairment.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The 24 Hour Notification to the NRC for the fire header impairment will be   |
| made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and Appendix R by telephone and a follow up      |
| facsimile. The duration of the impairment will be minimized and further      |
| compensatory measures may be necessary should any of the time limits be      |
| approached. due to unforeseen circumstances.   Additional action statements  |
| may be entered if changes in plant status are required.                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 1 RDO(Silk) was notified.                                            |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37452       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:35[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/24/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:58[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL MOOKHOEK                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREG PICK            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION RESULTING IN A SINGLE VALVE ISOLATION                          |
|                                                                              |
| "On October 24, 2000, at 0458 hours, while Unit 1 was operating at 100%      |
| power, a spurious actuation of the Train C Phase B Containment Isolation     |
| Signal occurred. This actuation resulted in the closure of a single          |
| Engineered Safety Features Containment Isolation Valve servicing the cooling |
| supply to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps    |
| was not interrupted since there are two parallel paths in this penetration   |
| to prevent inadvertent isolation of the cooling supply. No other components  |
| changed position and the Unit continued to operate at 100% power. The cause  |
| of the actuation is not yet known, but the actuation only effected valve     |
| 1-CC-MOV-0404. Trouble shooting is in process to determine the cause of the  |
| event, No other components are controlled by the Train C Phase B actuation   |
| logic."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37453       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:30[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        10/24/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:41[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LISA HILBERT-SEMMES          |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/24/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ANNE BOLAND          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO WORK DONE ON WRONG UNIT'S EHC                  |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0741 hours, with Surry Power Station Unit 1 at 100% reactor power, a low |
| low S/G level condition was received and an automatic reactor trip occurred. |
| lmmediately prior to the trip, the Main Steam Dump Valves were observed to   |
| have received an open demand, and a loss of turbine load was exhibited. The  |
| loss of turbine load was caused by human error due to work on the wrong      |
| unit.  It was determined that work was being conducted on the Unit 1 EHC     |
| System.  The work was intended to be one on the Unit 2 EHC System.           |
|                                                                              |
| "All control rods inserted into the core as designed.  IRPI B8 rod bottom    |
| light was not received due to a burned out light bulb.  The light bulb was   |
| replaced and indicated properly.  The IRPI indication for this rod trended   |
| with all other IRPI indications, and indicated <20 steps withdrawn.  The     |
| shutdown margin for Unit 1 was determined to be satisfactory.  Auxiliary     |
| feedwater automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator     |
| level following the trip.  Primary RCS temperature decreased to              |
| approximately 543 degrees following the reactor trip.                        |
|                                                                              |
| "No primary safety or power operated relief valves were actuated during he   |
| event.  As a result of the loss of turbine load, the secondary power         |
| operated relief valves actuated during the transient.  No indication of      |
| primary to secondary leakage exists, therefore no adverse radiological       |
| consequences resulted from this event.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "All electrical busses transferred properly following the trip and all       |
| emergency diesel generators are operable. There were no radiation releases   |
| due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination    |
| events.  The cause of the event is being investigated.                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 is currently at Hot Shutdown with RCS temperature being maintained   |
| at approximately 547 degrees.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains stable at CSD with RCS    |
| temperature at approximately 100F and the RCS depressurized to atmospheric  |
| pressure with containment Type A test conditions being established.          |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)."      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
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