Event Notification Report for October 25, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/24/2000 - 10/25/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37391 37448 37452 37453
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37391 |
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| FACILITY: CLINTON REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/29/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 09/29/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:20[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 99 Power Operation |99 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DIESEL GENERATOR INOPERABLE |
| |
| At 1320 hours on 9/29/00, the seismic bolts of the Division 3 Diesel |
| Generator (DG) control panel door were discovered missing. At 1450, |
| Engineering determined that the seismic qualification of the control panel |
| was in question with these bolts missing. |
| |
| On 9/27/00, during the day shift, the Division 3 DG was tested per Clinton |
| Power Station (CPS) procedure 9080.02, DIESEL GENERATOR 1C OPERABILITY - |
| MANUAL AND QUICK START OPERABILITY. This procedure requires instrumentation |
| to be connected within the local control panel (1E22-S001B). The bolts to |
| this panel were discovered missing today at 1320. It is possible that they |
| had been missing since the performance of CPS 9080.02 but is unknown at this |
| time. The Division 3 DG is not analyzed for these missing bolts and is |
| considered inoperable while in this condition. |
| |
| This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(iii)(D) as a |
| condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the High |
| Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, a single-train safety system needed to |
| mitigate the consequences of an accident, since the Division 3 DG is an |
| essential support system for the HPCS system needed to mitigate a small |
| break LOCA concurrent with a Loss of offsite power. |
| |
| The bolts were restored at 1442 today and the Division 3 DG is operable. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1826 BY SCHOTTEL TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| Further evaluation of this condition by engineering concluded that the |
| absence of the bolts was seismically acceptable. A calculation determined |
| that the estimated impact acceleration resulting from the unsecured door |
| impacting the panel is 0.06g. Because this acceleration is small in |
| relation to the seismic test margin documented in the original seismic |
| calculation of the panel, the unsecured door would not have prevented the |
| control panel from performing its safety function during seismic events. On |
| this basis, the Division 3 DG and HPCS safety functions were not adversely |
| affected by the absence of the bolts. Therefore, this issue Is not |
| reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.72 or 10CFR50.73 and this event |
| notification is retracted. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| The Reg 3 RDO(Vegel) was informed. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37448 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/22/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/22/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 01:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN DONALLY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM COOK R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24 HOUR REPORT - 10 CFR 50.72 AND APPENDIX R |
| |
| "A section of the high pressure fire header will be isolated and drained. |
| The reason for the impairment is planned maintenance for the replacement of |
| a section of 12" piping and various small bore valve replacements. This |
| header section provides fire protection for the Units 1 and 2 Intake |
| Structure, the Auxiliary Boiler Feed Pump Building, the Transformer Yard and |
| the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System. |
| |
| "Indian Point Station is in cold shutdown with the reactor defueled and |
| steam generator replacement in progress. Therefore, the Auxiliary Boiler |
| Feed Pumps and the Main and Unit Auxiliary Transformers are out of service |
| and do not require fire protection. The safety related equipment that is |
| required to be protected under this plant condition are the Service Water |
| Pumps and the 480 VAC Electrical Cables for the Spent Fuel Cooling Pumps and |
| Component Cooling Pumps which traverse the Electrical Tunnel. Compensatory |
| hoses will be staged prior to applying the tagout. Fire tours will also be |
| established to supplement the frequency with which these and the other |
| impaired areas are surveilled. |
| |
| "The 24 Hour notification to the NRC for the Fire header impairment will |
| made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and App. R as well as the written report to |
| follow within 14 days. The alternate fire protection system will not be |
| established since the station is already in cold shutdown. A 30 day action |
| statement will be entered for the inoperable hydrants protecting the Intake |
| Structure and Service Water Pumps. A separate 14 day action statement will |
| be entered for the inoperable Electrical Tunnel Deluge System. The duration |
| of the impairment will be minimized and further compensatory measures may be |
| necessary should any of the time limits be approached due to unforeseen |
| circumstances." |
| |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/24/00 @ 1524 BY DONNELLY TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| The following update is providing additional information to clarify this |
| event report. |
| |
| The following is an update to NRC event number 37448. A section of the |
| high-pressure fire header will be isolated and drained for planned |
| maintenance. A section of 12-inch piping is being replaced along with |
| various sections of valves. The isolated section of piping supplies high |
| pressure fire water to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Intake structure, the Auxiliary |
| Boiler Feed Pump Building, and the Electrical Tunnel Deluge System. |
| |
| The Indian Point Unit 2 Fire Protection Program requires that all piping and |
| valves necessary for proper functioning of any portion of the system |
| required for protection of safe shutdown systems be operable. If this |
| condition is not restored within 24 hours, then an alternate fire protection |
| system must be established or the plant must be placed in the hot shutdown |
| condition utilizing normal operating procedures. Within the next 48 hours, |
| if the system is not restored or an alternate system is not established, |
| then the plant must be placed in the cold shutdown condition. Currently, |
| Indian Point 2 station is in the de-fueled condition, with the core fully |
| unloaded. Therefore, compensatory actions are not required to maintain the |
| plant in the shutdown condition.. |
| |
| Compensatory measures are being undertaken by Indian Point 2 station for |
| prudence. The intake structure contains the Service Water Pumps, which are |
| safe shutdown equipment and are used to cool the Spent Fuel Pool. The |
| inoperable hydrant on the intake structure will be supplemented by staged |
| fire hoses and a 4 hour fire tour, and Indian Point 2 will enter a 30 Day |
| Action Statement per SAO-703. Additional fire hoses will also be staged |
| for the inoperable hydrant outside the auxiliary pump building. The |
| electrical tunnel contains the 480 VAC Electrical cables for the Spent Fuel |
| Cooling Pumps, the Component Cooling Water Pumps as well as additional |
| electrical loads. Compensatory hoses will be staged in this area and the |
| fire detectors are all still operational. A 14 Day Action Statement per |
| SAQ-703 will be entered for this impairment. |
| |
| The 24 Hour Notification to the NRC for the fire header impairment will be |
| made pursuant to 10CFR50.72 and Appendix R by telephone and a follow up |
| facsimile. The duration of the impairment will be minimized and further |
| compensatory measures may be necessary should any of the time limits be |
| approached. due to unforeseen circumstances. Additional action statements |
| may be entered if changes in plant status are required. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. |
| |
| The Reg 1 RDO(Silk) was notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37452 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:35[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:58[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL MOOKHOEK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION RESULTING IN A SINGLE VALVE ISOLATION |
| |
| "On October 24, 2000, at 0458 hours, while Unit 1 was operating at 100% |
| power, a spurious actuation of the Train C Phase B Containment Isolation |
| Signal occurred. This actuation resulted in the closure of a single |
| Engineered Safety Features Containment Isolation Valve servicing the cooling |
| supply to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. Cooling to the Reactor Coolant Pumps |
| was not interrupted since there are two parallel paths in this penetration |
| to prevent inadvertent isolation of the cooling supply. No other components |
| changed position and the Unit continued to operate at 100% power. The cause |
| of the actuation is not yet known, but the actuation only effected valve |
| 1-CC-MOV-0404. Trouble shooting is in process to determine the cause of the |
| event, No other components are controlled by the Train C Phase B actuation |
| logic." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37453 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SURRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/24/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:30[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/24/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:41[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LISA HILBERT-SEMMES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/24/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ANNE BOLAND R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO WORK DONE ON WRONG UNIT'S EHC |
| |
| "At 0741 hours, with Surry Power Station Unit 1 at 100% reactor power, a low |
| low S/G level condition was received and an automatic reactor trip occurred. |
| lmmediately prior to the trip, the Main Steam Dump Valves were observed to |
| have received an open demand, and a loss of turbine load was exhibited. The |
| loss of turbine load was caused by human error due to work on the wrong |
| unit. It was determined that work was being conducted on the Unit 1 EHC |
| System. The work was intended to be one on the Unit 2 EHC System. |
| |
| "All control rods inserted into the core as designed. IRPI B8 rod bottom |
| light was not received due to a burned out light bulb. The light bulb was |
| replaced and indicated properly. The IRPI indication for this rod trended |
| with all other IRPI indications, and indicated <20 steps withdrawn. The |
| shutdown margin for Unit 1 was determined to be satisfactory. Auxiliary |
| feedwater automatically initiated as designed on low low steam generator |
| level following the trip. Primary RCS temperature decreased to |
| approximately 543 degrees following the reactor trip. |
| |
| "No primary safety or power operated relief valves were actuated during he |
| event. As a result of the loss of turbine load, the secondary power |
| operated relief valves actuated during the transient. No indication of |
| primary to secondary leakage exists, therefore no adverse radiological |
| consequences resulted from this event. |
| |
| "All electrical busses transferred properly following the trip and all |
| emergency diesel generators are operable. There were no radiation releases |
| due to this event, nor were there any personnel injuries or contamination |
| events. The cause of the event is being investigated. |
| |
| "Unit 1 is currently at Hot Shutdown with RCS temperature being maintained |
| at approximately 547 degrees. |
| |
| "Unit 2 was not affected by this event and remains stable at CSD with RCS |
| temperature at approximately 100�F and the RCS depressurized to atmospheric |
| pressure with containment Type A test conditions being established. |
| |
| "This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(ii)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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