Event Notification Report for October 24, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/23/2000 - 10/24/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37441 37450 37451
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37441 |
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| FACILITY: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/19/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:53[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 10/18/2000|
| COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL |EVENT TIME: 09:30[EDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2000|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 2 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: RICHLAND STATE: SC |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1107 AGREEMENT: Y |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
| DOCKET: 07001151 |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
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| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM HEATH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
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|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FAILURE OF VAPORIZE LEVEL PROBE IN "3A" VAPORIZER |
| |
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| Periodic testing of the condensate level detection system in the 3A |
| vaporizer steam chest determined that the system could not perform its |
| intended function due to blockage in the system by loose debris. Further |
| investigation determined that paint flaked from the recently processed |
| cylinder and collected in the bottom of the vaporizer. However, the debris |
| did not block the main condensate removal drain which allowed condensate to |
| be removed from the vaporizer, so there was no condensate accumulation. |
| |
| The vaporizer bottom was cleaned and the level detection system was checked. |
| The system responded correctly. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| No contingency occurred. No accumulation of water in the bottom of the |
| vaporizer occurred. No SNM was involved. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETER: |
| |
| Mass and moderator are the controlled parameters for the vaporizer. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM of LICENSED MATERIAL: |
| |
| Cylinders heated in the vaporizer contain uranium hexafluoride gas with a |
| uranium-235 enrichment less than 5.0 weight percent. No SNM was involved in |
| this incident since uranium hexafluoride was contained at all times within |
| the uranium hexafluoride piping system. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(s) OR CONTROLLED SYSTEM(s) AND |
| DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The condensate level detection system in the 3A vaporizer was rendered |
| inoperable as a result of a drain line that was blocked by debris which came |
| from the most recently processed cylinder. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| The debris in the 3A vaporizer was removed and proper functioning of the |
| level detection system was verified. The 3A vaporizer was released for |
| restart on October 19, 2000 at 0730 hours. Other vaporizers not in use at |
| the time of the incident were checked for proper functioning of the level |
| detection system; each system responded correctly. Other vaporizers in use |
| at the time were subject to increased-frequency checks to verify proper |
| functioning of the condensate removal system; all vaporizers were draining |
| properly. In addition, the condensate level detection system for in-use |
| vaporizers will be function-tested immediately after the uranium |
| hexafluoride cylinder currently being processed is removed. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/23/00 @ 1210 BY HEATH TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| Reason for submitting supplemental information: |
| |
| Supplemental information is submitted to provide further information on the |
| as found condition and to clarify the safety significance of the event. |
| |
| Double Contingency Protection: |
| |
| 30B UF6 cylinders are heated in the vaporizers with saturated steam. The |
| steam is removed via a condensate removal system. Double contingency |
| protection for the vaporizers is based on mass and moderator control. Mass |
| control consists of controls to prevent and detect an uncontrolled release |
| of UF6 inside the vaporizer. Moderator control consists of controls to |
| detect accumulation of moderator (specifically condensate) and prevent the |
| accumulation of moderator in the bottom of the vaporizer. |
| |
| As Found Condition: |
| |
| Two drains are present in the bottom of each vaporizer which allow steam to |
| enter the condensate removal system. Each drain has an individual drain |
| screen. A larger removable debris screen rests in the bottom of the |
| vaporizer above the two individual drain screens. One drain flows through a |
| pot in which reside the high and high-high level probes. The second drain |
| proceeds directly to the condensate system. In this event the screen which |
| covers the drain which flows to the level pot was obstructed with paint |
| residue, thereby isolating the level probes. As a result of the isolation |
| of the level probes, the ability to detect high level was lost. However, at |
| no time was the condensate removal path closed. There was no accumulation |
| of water in the vaporizer and no SNM was present. |
| |
| The cylinder from which the paint residue came was provided by Urenco. |
| Urenco has been advised by this facility of the situation. Prior to |
| processing, the paint showed no indication of being defective. The paint was |
| not chipped, peeling, bubbling from the surface, discolored, or otherwise |
| distinguishable as flawed. |
| |
| It is also very likely that the plugging of the drain occurred as a result |
| of the functional test which detected it. The functional test of the |
| vaporizer level probes is performed by filling the bottom of the empty |
| vaporizer with water from a hose. During steady state operation the |
| expected flow rate of condensate through a vaporizer is on the order of 1.48 |
| gallons per hour. As was described earlier, the larger debris screen rests |
| above the two drains. The seal along the bottom perimeter of the debris |
| screen is not air or water tight and need not be due to the fact that it |
| sees a low flow rate of steam and not a flow of liquid. During the |
| functional test, it is likely the paint debris was sluiced underneath the |
| debris screen by the relatively high flow rate of water which is used for |
| the test. Notification was nevertheless made due to the fact that there is a |
| small possibility that the vaporizer was operated in this condition. |
| |
| |
| Conclusions related to safety significance: |
| |
| * Loss of double contingency protection may have occurred. |
| * No UF6 leaks occurred in the vaporizer. No failure of mass controls |
| occurred. No SNM was involved. |
| * The condensate flow path from the vaporizer was not blocked. No moderator |
| accumulated in the vaporizer |
| * At no time was there any risk to the health or safety of any employee or |
| member of the public. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. |
| * The safety significance of this event is evaluated to be low. |
| |
| |
| The Reg 2 RDO(Belise) and the MNSS EO(Schnieder) were notified |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37450 |
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| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:31[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/23/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BREEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |AL BELISLE R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| THE LICENSEE MADE NOTIFICATION TO FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION |
| COMMISSION |
| |
| This notification was made due to a live loggerhead turtle being found in |
| the intake net. The turtle was not in very good condition. It will be sent |
| off site for rehabilitation. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37451 |
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| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/23/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/23/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:37[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BAHNER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/23/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREG PICK R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
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|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
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EVENT TEXT
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| PLANT HAD AUTO START OF ALL THREE DIESEL GENERATORS DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR |
| |
| Startup Power was being cleared to Unit 1 for refueling outage maintenance. |
| Part of the clearance was to open switch 211-1 for Unit 1 Startup |
| Transformer. Operators inadvertently opened switch 211-2 for Unit 2 Startup |
| Transformer. This caused all three Unit 2 Diesel Generators (D/G) to start |
| on loss of Startup Power signal. Starting of the D/G's is considered to be |
| an ESF actuation and constitutes a 4 hour non-emergency report per |
| 10CFR50.72(B)(2). Startup Power was restored three minutes later and the |
| D/G's returned to standby condition. The D/G's did not load on the bus and |
| no other ESF systems were affected. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021