Event Notification Report for October 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/12/2000 - 10/13/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37285 37423 37424 37425
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37285 |
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| FACILITY: PILGRIM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/01/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:08[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 09/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MCDONNELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION DECLARED INOPERABLE PLACING THE PLANT IN A |
| 14 DAY LCO ACTION STATEMENT. |
| |
| During the performance of 8.5.4.1 (HPCI operability test), HPCI failed to |
| meet acceptance criteria. The HPCI pump failed to meet the required flow, |
| pressure and rpm requirements. Troubleshooting of the problem is in |
| progress to make HPCI operable within the 14 day LCO action statement |
| requirement. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/12/00 @ 1736 BY OLSON TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| After further analysis of this event, it was determined HPCI would have |
| performed its safety function, therefore, this event is not reportable and |
| is being retracted. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| Region 1 RDO(Doerflein) was informed. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37423 |
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| FACILITY: SUMMER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:07[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PAUL CROGEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KEN BARR R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |ED GOODWIN NRR |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| |TAD MARSH EO |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| POTENTIAL CONDITION OF A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BOUNDARY DEGRADATION |
| |
| The following text is s portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "... The plant is currently in Cold Shutdown (Mode 6) of Refueling Outage |
| 12." |
| |
| "On October 7 [at] 2000 [hours], plant personnel identified an accumulation |
| of approximately 100 pounds of boric acid in the 'A' hot leg area of the |
| reactor vessel. Some boric acid and insulation was removed from the area of |
| the suspected leak path to allow for further inspection." |
| |
| "On October 12 at 0630 hours, plant personnel visually identified a |
| potential leak area on the first weld off the reactor vessel at the nozzle |
| to pipe connection of the 'A' loop hot leg. Visual inspection has revealed |
| trace amounts of boron buildup on the weld between the vessel nozzle and the |
| hot leg pipe. Based on this preliminary information, plant personnel |
| suspect some leakage has occurred through the pressure boundary at this |
| weld." |
| |
| "The RCS is currently depressurized. We have suspended preparations to |
| remove the reactor vessel head to allow time to perform [non-destructive |
| examination (NDE)] on the weld. V.C. Summer expects the NDE inspection to |
| be completed around noon today. The results will be used to develop repair |
| plans." |
| |
| "The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed of the condition." |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 10/12/00 @ 1452 BY CROGEN TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| V. C. Summer is providing an update to the initial 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) |
| notification made at 0907 this morning. Plant personnel have completed the |
| cleanup and dye penetrant test of the weld on the 'A' RCS Hot Leg. The test |
| has confirmed a 4" long hairline crack in the weld between the hot leg |
| piping and the Reactor vessel nozzle. This pipe is about 30" in diameter. |
| This weld is located about 3 feet from the vessel wall and is accessible in |
| the inspection port at the Reactor vessel flange area. The crack is located |
| about 17" from the top of the pipe. |
| |
| The plant will continue defueling and initiate weld repair of the affected |
| nozzle. Technical and repair support is being pursued at this time to make |
| appropriate inspections and repairs. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been made aware of the latest findings. |
| |
| |
| The Reg 2 RDO(Barr), EO(Goodwin), IRO(Giitter) were notified. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37424 |
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| FACILITY: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:39[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2) |EVENT DATE: 10/11/2000|
| FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY |EVENT TIME: 10:45[PDT]|
| COMMERICAL LWR FUEL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/12/2000|
| CITY: RICHLAND REGION: 4 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: BENTON STATE: WA |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: SNM-1227 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
| DOCKET: 07001257 |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MAAS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN VIOLATION OF MASS CONTROL |
| |
| "On 10/10/00 at about 11:30 a.m. while sorting drums of 'wet waste' in the |
| Modular Extraction/ Recovery Facility (MERF), SPC process operators found |
| three sock filters that contained larger than expected amounts of sludge. |
| These sock filters came from two separate waste drums that had been packaged |
| in 1993 or early 1994. Per Criticality Safety Specifications and Standard |
| Operating Procedures, the process operators removed the sludge from the |
| filters and placed it into three separate 4-gallon containers. Operators |
| sampled the material in each of the containers and sent the samples to the |
| SPC laboratory for analysis. The 4-gallon containers were transferred from |
| MERF to an authorized storage location for moderated material. The lead |
| process operator contacted the process engineer who in turn contacted |
| Criticality Safety." |
| |
| "On 10/11/00 at about 10:45 a.m., the SPC laboratory reported the percent U |
| in the sludge. The results are summarized in the following table." |
| |
| "Container # Net Wt.(kg) %U %235U |
| Grams U Grams 235U |
| |
| 56696 15.4 71.4 |
| 3.55 10,979.8 389.8 |
| |
| 56697 8.7 74.4 |
| 1.88 6,635.8 123.1 |
| |
| 56698 13.9 72.4 |
| 1.89 10,111.2 191.3 |
| |
| Total 38.1 NA |
| NA 27,626.8 704.2 " |
| |
| "The total 235U present in the process batch at MERF (in the sock filter |
| sludge plus other waste material) was calculated to be 895.9 grams, which |
| exceeds the 790 gram 235U limit for the facility by about 106 grams." |
| |
| "This data also indicates an infraction of the 200 g 235U mass control limit |
| placed on individual waste drums on the waste storage pad." |
| |
| "Safety Significance Of Event:" |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. The mass of uranium present |
| in the process batch of waste drums being sorted in MERF was less than a |
| safe mass (45% of critical) for the enrichments actually present. The |
| actual enrichment of the materials involved was less than 3.6% 235U, however |
| if the facility enrichment limit of 5 wt.% 235U is assumed, the total 235U |
| mass was about 51% of a minimum critical mass. The information derived from |
| the MERF infraction reveals an infraction of the mass control limit for |
| drums on the storage pad." |
| |
| "The criticality safety limit on surface density restricts a vertical stack |
| of waste drums to 626 grams 235U. This is controlled by limiting any drum |
| in a three tier array of waste drums to 200 grams 235U. If the two drums |
| containing sock filters and another drum at the 200 g 235U limit were |
| present in a three tier stack, the total mass in the stack would have been |
| approximately 965 g 225U. A criticality area density is over 550 g 235U per |
| sq. ft. which corresponds to 1,512 g 235U in a 2.75 sq. ft. area, the |
| footprint area of a single drum. This is less than 64% of a minimum |
| critical surface density." |
| |
| "Potential Criticality Pathways:" |
| |
| "For criticality to occur in a single waste drum requires a minimum of about |
| 40 kg U02 enriched to 5 wt.% 235U. Current SOPs require sorting of waste and |
| NDA assay before waste can be moved to the waste pad." |
| |
| "To exceed an allowed surface density for stacked drums on the waste pad |
| would require more than 600 grams 235U in a vertical stack of drums. This |
| surface density limit would result in drum arrays that are substantially |
| subcritical." |
| |
| "For criticality to occur in the processing equipment in MERF would require |
| a minimum of 40 kg U02 enriched to 5 wt.% 235U. Before such large amounts |
| could be processed in this equipment, the operating staff would have to fail |
| to perform the following actions required by the applicable criticality |
| safety specification (CSS) and SOPs: |
| * re-sort the waste and remove all uniquely identifiable quantities of |
| uranium, |
| * shred cartridge filters, HEPA filters and similar items |
| * re-assay the sorted and shredded waste |
| * remove any material in excess of 250 grams 235U mass from the mass |
| controlled area and stage it to become part of the next process batch to be |
| processed through the MERF equipment." |
| |
| "Controlled Parameters:" |
| |
| "For the MERF process, the controlled criticality parameter is mass. Per |
| the SPC operating license, mass control as the only controlled parameter is |
| allowed provided:" |
| |
| "1. The work station shall be limited to one safe batch, where a safe batch |
| is defined as no more than 0.45 of the minimum critical mass of the material |
| in process;" |
| |
| "2. No more than one safe batch may be moved at one time when introducing or |
| removing material from a workstation;" |
| |
| "3. Individual safe batches shall be spaced a specified minimum distance |
| apart;" |
| |
| "4. A record shall be maintained of the SNM inventory at each mass-limited |
| workstation; and" |
| |
| "5. SNM inventory control shall assure material buildup over time will not |
| cause the batch limit to be exceeded." |
| |
| "In MERF the mass limit is 790 g 235U, < 45% of a minimum critical mass at 5 |
| wt.% enriched. An inventory of the material processed through the facility |
| is maintained and the facility is inspected by operating and engineering |
| personnel for potential holdup after each batch is processed through the |
| facility. The following controls are used to ensure compliance with the 790 |
| g 235U mass limit:" |
| |
| "Prior to being considered for a process batch, each drum / HEPA filter has |
| a three party check or an electronic comparison between two separate record |
| systems to ensure that the mass assigned to the drum is free from |
| transcription / transposition errors. If sufficient data does not exist, |
| the drum or HEPA must be recounted." |
| |
| "Target batch size is limited to 250 g 235U." |
| |
| "SPC operating staff selects a batch of drums and transfer them to a locked |
| location." |
| |
| "SPC engineering staff verifies the target batch size of 250 g 235U is not |
| exceeded." |
| |
| "SPC Process Operator and Supervisor or lead technician verify the drums in |
| the locked area are part of the designated batch and that the target batch |
| size of 250 g 235U is not exceeded." |
| |
| "Operating staff then resorts the waste to identify any uniquely |
| identifiable quantities of U compounds prior to processing the waste through |
| the washer." |
| |
| "After resorting and shredding cartridge filters, HEPA filters and similar |
| items, the material in the process batch is recounted using NDA. Any |
| material in excess of 250 g 235U is set aside outside the mass controlled |
| area and becomes a part of the next process batch." |
| |
| "Estimated Amount, Enrichment, and Form Of Licensed Material:" |
| |
| "The licensed material is urania sludge. The total 235U present in the |
| process batch was calculated to be 895.9 grams. This is 51% of the minimum |
| critical mass for this type of material enriched to 5 wt.% 235U. The actual |
| material involved was enriched to less than 3.6 wt% 235U." |
| |
| "Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) Or Control Systems and a Description |
| of the Failures Or Deficiencies:" |
| |
| "The filters came from two separate waste drums that had been packaged in |
| 1993 or early 1994. Although waste segregation/accumulation controls were |
| not as robust at that time as they are presently, wastes placed in such |
| drums were required by criticality safety instructional card to contain only |
| contamination levels of uranium. Therefore, sock filters containing this |
| much U bearing material should not have been placed in a waste drum. The NDA |
| system used to determine the U content of waste drums does not provide |
| accurate results for concentrated high density materials such as the sludge |
| contained in the sock filters. This is a known limitation of the NDA |
| system. SPC currently takes extra precautions to ensure that the use of NDA |
| is compatible with the known limitations of this equipment and that the |
| waste matrix in the waste drums is adequately similar to that in the |
| standard used to calibrate the NDA system. As previously stated, in 1993 |
| and 1994 the procedures for segregating and processing waste were not as |
| stringent as they are now." |
| |
| "Corrective Actions To Restore Safety Systems and When Each Was |
| Implemented:" |
| |
| "The MERF process operators promptly segregated, sampled, and then removed |
| from MERF the sludge accumulations discovered in the waste drums, thereby |
| restoring compliance with the mass control limit for the facility." |
| |
| "SPO operating, engineering and safety personnel have reviewed all other |
| stored containerized waste types and have confirmed that only wet waste |
| drums may be subject to this type of failure. This determination is based on |
| the date of generation of the other drums in storage and the types of |
| material in the drums." |
| |
| "As a precautionary measure, SPC operating personnel have started placing |
| wet waste drums on the waste storage pad into a single tier storage array. |
| Because record keeping requirements dictate that the storage location of |
| each drum be accurately recorded, this action is expected to be completed in |
| about 1 week." |
| |
| "Additional corrective actions are still being evaluated." |
| |
| The licensee will notify NRC Region 4. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37425 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/12/2000|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 10/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:59[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: YOUNG |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LAWRENCE DOERFLEIN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| SPRAY ADDITIVE TANK 31 INOPERABLE DURING MAINTENANCE |
| |
| On July 21, 2000 the Spray Additive Tank 31 Outlet Isolation Valve (SI-1841) |
| was shut for approximately eight and one half-hours, to perform maintenance |
| on one of the downstream automatic Sodium Hydroxide isolation valves. This |
| would have effectively prevented Sodium Hydroxide from being sprayed into |
| Containment if the Spray Pumps had been required. This is not in accordance |
| with Tech Spec 3.3.B.1a, and the associated Bases which requires the Spray |
| Additive Tank to be operable above Cold Shutdown. |
| |
| Therefore, isolation of this tank could have potentially placed the |
| Containment Spray System outside of its design basis; however, the |
| investigation of this event is ongoing. |
| |
| This event was discovered by the System Engineer while performing a periodic |
| review of system unavailability (time) in accordance with the Maintenance |
| Rule. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
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