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Event Notification Report for October 12, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/11/2000 - 10/12/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37338  37422  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37338       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/18/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:16[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEITH POPE                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |STEPHEN CAHILL       R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH TRAINS OF RHR (RECIRC CAPABILITY) INOPERABLE FOR APPROXIMATELY SEVEN    |
| HOURS                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "While placing RHR Train 'B' in shutdown cooling during a refueling outage   |
| the pump minimum flow valve did not close as expected.   Investigation       |
| revealed that the mini-flow transmitter 1 FIS-0611 was isolated causing the  |
| valve 1 FV0611 to remain open with RHR flow in excess of setpoint that would |
| cause the valve to close.   Work was performed on August 29, 2000, to        |
| calibrate this transmitter.   On September 9, 2000,  RHR Train 'A' seal      |
| cooler was isolated for maintenance rendering both trains of RHR inoperable  |
| for 6 hours and 54 minutes.  The Cold leg injection capability from RHR      |
| Train 'A' remained available during this time. The Cold leg recirculation    |
| capability during these inoperabilities was not available.  This would have  |
| required entry into T. S. 3.0.3.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "RHR Train 'B' mini-flow transmitter 1FIS-0611 was discovered isolated       |
| causing the valve 1FV0611 to remain open with RHR flow in excess of setpoint |
| that would cause the valve to close.  The transmitter has been returned to   |
| service and the valve 1 FV0611 is operating properly."                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1524 EDT ON 10/11/00 BY BILL DUNN TO FANGIE JONES * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| "This retracts the 9-18-2000 notification made per 10 CFR 50.72              |
| (b)(2)(iii)(D). That notification described an event where both trains of    |
| RHR were inoperable for 6 hours and 54 minutes when one train was in a       |
| system outage and the inservice train was found to be inoperable. Full flow  |
| to the RCS cold legs was apparently not available because it was determined  |
| that the inservice train's miniflow line valve would not close had a design  |
| basis accident occurred. Design engineering reviews have revealed that, with |
| the mini-flow valve open, the inservice RHR train remained capable of        |
| providing minimum flow to the RCS for analyzed accident scenarios.           |
| Therefore, because one train of RHR remained operable, a condition did not   |
| exist that would have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed  |
| to mitigate the consequences of an accident."                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R2DO (Ken Barr) has   |
| been notified.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37422       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/11/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:12[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        10/10/2000|
|           LEU FABRICATION                      |EVENT TIME:        17:00[EDT]|
|           LWR COMMERICAL FUEL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/11/2000|
|    CITY:  WILMINGTON               REGION:  2  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  NEW HANOVER               STATE:  NC |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  SNM-1097              AGREEMENT:  Y  |KEN BARR             R2      |
|  DOCKET:  07001113                             |PATRICIA HOLAHAN     NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LON PAULSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "At approximately 1700 hours on October 10, 2000 GNF-A Operations determined |
| that one of two controls established for moderation control on material feed |
| to a process area located within an Moderation Restricted Area (MRA) had     |
| been lost. The controls require two samples that verify acceptable moisture  |
| content for the feed material. One of two required moisture samples was not  |
| analyzed due to an inadvertent purge of the moisture sample request from the |
| IMR (In-process Material Release) database, and the material was improperly  |
| released for processing.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The second independent moisture sample was performed and confirmed the      |
| measured moisture content was satisfactory, therefore no unsafe condition    |
| existed.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 (within 24 hours) due |
| to loss of a single control on moderation. Material can feed to affected     |
| moderation restricted area (MRA) of process have been suspended pending      |
| investigation and implementation of corrective actions.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  Low safety significance - independent       |
| control on moderation remained intact; material met moisture                 |
| specifications.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED:  Multiple failure modes required   |
| before a criticality accident could occur.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETER(S)  (MASS, MODERATION , GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION,       |
| ETC.):  Moderation:  Process equipment limited to uniform moisture content   |
| of 10.5 wt. % (105,000 ppm H2O).  Moderation Safety Factor = safety          |
| moderation limit / process moderation limit = 105,000 / 4000 = 26.2.         |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST BASE CRITICAL MASS):  Affected equipment contained         |
| approximately 100 kgs of UO2 and gadolinia (Gd2O3) at a target enrichment of |
| ~4.40 wt. % U235.  The vibromill blender process equipment is located in the |
| moderation-restricted area, which is demonstrated safe for uniform           |
| moderation limit of 10.5 % water equivalent moderation (105,000 ppm H2O).    |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  One of two required moisture samples was   |
| not analyzed due to an inadvertent purge of the moisture sample request from |
| the IMR (In-process Material Release) database, and the material was         |
| improperly released for processing in the gad shop MRA.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| 1. Feed material re-sampled for moisture content - results satisfactory      |
| (<4000 ppm H2O).  2. Suspended material can feed to the affected process     |
| area.  3. Investigation and implementation of corrective actions pending."   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Region 2 (David Ayres), the New       |
| Hanover County and North Carolina State agencies of this event.              |
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