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Event Notification Report for October 4, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 10/03/2000 - 10/04/2000 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 37330 37402 37403 37404 37405 37406 37407 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37330 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/15/2000| | UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/15/2000| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:05[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JESSE JAMES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES TRAPP R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |2 M/R Y 15 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR AFTER ENTERING THE RESTRICTIVE AREA OF THE | | POWER TO FLOW MAP. | | | | On September 15, 2000 at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit 2 | | was manually scrammed per operating procedure during turbine testing in | | preparation for the refuel outage. | | | | The manual scram was due to entering restricted area of the power to flow | | map from Technical Specification 3.4.1, after the trip of the "2B" | | recirculation pump. All rods fully inserted and the reactor was shutdown. | | Reactor level during the scram lowered to 0" and a Group II and III primary | | and secondary containment isolation was received. The isolations functioned | | as designed. The plant is stable in hot shutdown with the main condenser as | | a heat sink and the feedwater system is in service for level control. No | | radioactive release or Emergency Core Cooling System injection occurred | | during the scram. | | | | The turbine was tripped in accordance with the refuel outage plan when the | | recirculation pump tripped. The plan was to perform turbine testing and | | then to manually scram the reactor at the same power level. | | | | The reactor was manually scrammed less than one minute after entering the | | restricted area of the power to flow map. No power oscillations were seen. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | | | | * * * RETRACTED AT 1715 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ANDREW WINTER TO FANGIE JONES * * | | * | | | | "On September 15, 2000 PBAPS reported that Unit 2 was manually scrammed in | | accordance with operating instructions during turbine testing. The report | | identified that the manual scram was initiated based on entering the | | restricted area of the power to flow map after the tripping of the 2B | | Recirculation Pump. This notification is being retracted based on the | | following: | | | | "NUREG 1022 Revision 1 specifically states that 'The Commission is | | interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the | | consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events | | where an ESF actuated unnecessarily....This indicates an intent to require | | reporting actuations of features that mitigate the consequences of | | significant events.' Therefore, the following is an analysis of these two | | underlying reasons for reporting ESF actuations: | | | | 1. The need for the ESF to mitigate the consequences of an event: | | | | The September 15, 2000 PBAPS manual scram was initiated because the plant | | operator made a conservative decision in accordance with station procedures | | to initiate a reactor scram. At the time this decision was made, the plant | | conditions were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. | | Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively | | established by the licensee and the operator made the correct decision to | | commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate | | the consequences of this evolution. Moreover, plant conditions were not | | changing in a direction that would have required the manual scram to | | mitigate the consequences of significant events. | | | | 2. Events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily: | | | | The actuation of a manual scram and the subsequent PCIS Group II and Ill | | actuations were part of a preplanned shutdown for the commencement of the | | PBAPS Unit 2's thirteenth refueling outage (2R13) and were necessary to | | complete the plant shutdown. The decision to insert the manual scram in | | accordance with station procedures, resulted in the preplanned shutdown | | commencing slightly early. Therefore, the ESP did not actuate unnecessarily | | since it was already planned to shutdown the plant by inserting a manual | | scram. | | | | "Therefore, based on the above discussion, this event is not reportable | | because the manual scram resulted from and was, in accordance with the | | licensee's procedure, and part of a preplanned sequence of reactor | | operation." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (William Ruland) | | has been notified. | | | | ***** UPDATE AT 1554 ON 10/03/00 FROM ANDREW WINTER TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** | | | | Via this update, the licensee is resubmitting this event notification | | because the event was determined to represent an unplanned ESF actuation. | | The licensee is also providing additional clarification to the original | | report because it was determined that the unit was not operating in an | | unrestricted region of the technical specifications. | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "On September 23, 2000, PBAPS submitted a retraction to Event #37330. After | | further review, it was determined that the basis for the PBAPS retraction | | was not consistent with the NRC interpretation of the reporting requirement. | | Therefore, the following event report is being resubmitted:" | | | | "On September 15, 2000, PBAPS Unit 2 was manually scrammed. The manual | | reactor scram was initiated by the plant operator based on the understanding | | that the plant conditions placed the plant in the restricted area of the | | power-to-flow map after the unplanned tripping of the 2B Reactor | | Recirculation Pump. The plant conditions at the time of the manual scram | | were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. Although this | | condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the | | licensee to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary | | to mitigate the consequences of this evolution. Furthermore, the plant was | | not in an unrestricted region of Technical Specification 3.4.1, and | | emergency systems subsequently performed as required." | | | | "Although the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate an event, it is | | the conclusion of the licensee that this event does represent an unplanned | | ESF actuation. Therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR | | 50.72(b)(2)(ii)." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to submit a | | Licensee Event Report by 10/15/00. The NRC operations officer notified the | | R1DO (Linville). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37402 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:16[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:50[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE GABRIELE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES LINVILLE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: |facsimile to HQs PAO | |APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ISSUANCE OF A PRESS RELEASE REGARDING A TEMPORARY WORK STOPPAGE ON MOST | | PLANT DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING A CONTAMINATION INCIDENT | | | | At 1250 on 10/03/00, the licensee issued a press release regarding an | | incident that occurred on 09/29/00. The following text is a portion of a | | this press release: | | | | "Maine Yankee has temporarily halted work on most plant dismantlement | | activities following an incident last Friday [09/29/00] where the clothing | | of 4 workers was slightly contaminated with radiological material. The | | workers were welding shielding plates in 2 waste shipping containers on the | | non-nuclear side of the plant. The shipping containers previously had been | | mistakenly released from the nuclear side of the facility. There was no | | measurable internal dose to the workers or skin contamination from the | | incident. The radiological dose to the exposed workers was less than one | | millirem. In Maine, the annual radiological dose an individual receives | | from all sources, natural and manmade, is about 350 millirem." | | | | "The clothing contamination was discovered early Saturday morning when one | | of the workers who had been sent to perform a task on the nuclear side of | | the plant alarmed a radiation monitor when exiting. Technicians identified | | the shipping containers as the source of the contamination and evaluated 3 | | other workers who had been working on the containers. No contamination was | | found on the clothing of these individuals. Maine Yankee also followed up | | with another ten workers who worked on the containers during the day shift | | Friday to determine whether there were any additional articles of | | contaminated clothing. Three of these individuals were found to have | | slightly contaminated clothing. As a precautionary measure, Maine Yankee is | | surveying the homes and vehicles of the affected workers. No additional | | contamination has been identified." | | | | "An analysis is underway to determine specifically how the contaminated | | containers were released to the non-nuclear side of the plant. Radiological | | work will only resume when Maine Yankee's senior management is convinced | | work control procedures are appropriate and are being implemented thoroughly | | and completely. Maine Yankee has discussed this incident and our response | | with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of Maine." | | | | " 'Controlling radiological material is fundamental to the success of the | | decommissioning project. That is why, even though there is no health | | concern as a result of this incident, we stopped plant dismantlement | | activities until we have convinced ourselves that we are ready to return to | | work,' said Mike Meisner, Maine Yankee President. Meisner added, 'I am | | pleased, however, that redundant controls and processes we have in place as | | well as our professional staff helped us identify the problem and react | | appropriately.' " | | | | The licensee notified an onsite NRC inspector. (Call the NRC operations | | officer for a licensee contact name and telephone number.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37403 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:22[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MERRILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LEONARD WERT R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: |CHRISTOPHER GRIMES NRR | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT |CHARLES MILLER IRO | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY THAT REACTOR POWER EXCEEDED 100% FOR A PERIOD OF GREATER THAT 8 | | HOURS DUE TO AN INSTRUMENT FAILURE ON THE LEADING EDGE FLOW METER | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "St. Lucie Unit 2 average power level was calculated to have been 100.1% | | power for greater than 8 hours on September 25, 2000. This power level | | resulted from an instrumentation failure on the Leading Edge Flow Meter | | (LEFM) which was utilized by the [Digital Data Processing System (DDPS)] | | Plant Computer Calorimetric power level indication. A failure in the DP1 | | transducer path on the 'A' Loop of the LEFM instrument resulted in a | | decreasing feedwater (FW) flow output value." | | | | "Detailed analysis of the plant's performance over September 24, 2000, and | | September 25, 2000, indicate an unexpected decrease in 'A' LEFM Feedwater | | Flow indicated to the DDPS beginning approximately mid-day on September 24, | | 2000, without a corresponding decrease in 'A' Venturi based Feedwater Flow. | | A direct and corresponding decrease in DDPS Calorimetric Power results from | | the 'A' LEFM FW Flow decrease. A corresponding decrease in 'B' side LEFM or | | Venturi FW Flow was not present. This confirmed the Vendor's initial report | | of an 'A' side instrumentation problem within the LEFM System. The | | Operations Crew questioned this decrease and initiated conservative action | | as a result of DDPS Calorimetric Power observed to be lowering. Prior to | | and during the LEFM instrument failure, the indicated Calorimetric Power | | level in use by the plant operators did not exceed 100.0% for greater than 8 | | hours. The LEFM transducer was repaired and returned to service [on] | | October 1, 2000." | | | | "Based upon subsequent analysis of 'B' side LEFM FW Flow and 'A' [and] 'B' | | side Venturi FW Flow, the change in power was approximately 0.2% reactor | | power. The maximum power level was approximately 99.9% on September 24, | | 2000, and approximately 100.1% (with a maximum of 100.2%) power on September | | 25, 2000. An increase to 100.2% is well within the uncertainty for DDPS | | Calorimetric Power of 1.3% and initial power assumed within the Safety | | Analysis of 2%." | | | | "This event was determined to be reportable at 15:22 on October 3, 2000, in | | accordance with St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating License condition 2.F: Operation | | of St. Lucie Unit 2 in excess of 100% power for greater than 8 hours is in | | excess of the plant's Operating License limit of 'not in excess of 2700 | | megawatts thermal (100% power).' The Unit 2 License requires that [the | | licensee] 'shall report any violations of these requirements within 24 hours | | by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to | | the NRC Regional Administrator, Region II, or his designee, no later than | | the first working day following the violation, with a written follow-up | | report with 14 days.' " | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 37404 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000| |LICENSEE: ADAC LABORATORIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:17[EDT]| | CITY: MILPITAS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/02/2000| | COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 10:00[PDT]| |LICENSE#: 2760-43 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |DAVE LOVELESS R4 | | |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KENT PRENDERGAST | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING THE LOSS OF FIVE SEALED SOURCES AT ADAC | | LABORATORIES IN MILPITAS, CALIFORNIA | | | | Adac Laboratories (State license #2760-43) in Milpitas, California, | | manufactures nuclear medicine equipment and utilizes sealed sources for | | testing cameras, etc. The sources are stored in a depleted uranium storage | | container. | | | | On 09/26/00, Adac Laboratories performed an audit, and the location of five | | sealed sources could not be determined (one 28.5 mCi cesium-137 source and | | four gadolinium-153 sources with activities of 14.2 mCi, 0.87 mCi, 0.2 mCi, | | and 0.15 mCi). Adac Laboratories has taken action to secure that remaining | | sources and is making efforts to locate the missing sources. | | | | The licensee notified the State of California at approximately 1000 PDT on | | 10/02/00, and a representative from the State of California Radiologic | | Health Branch (Kent Prendergast) in turn notified the NRC Operations Center | | of the loss of five sealed sources at 1617 on 10/03/00. | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, | | licensee address, and licensee radiation safety officer name.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37405 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:39[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 08:35[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | DISCOVERY THAT AN AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF AN AUTOCLAVE ON 09/26/00 WAS A VALID | | SAFETY SYSTEM ACTIVATION (24-hour report) | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth | | personnel: | | | | "At 0835 [hours] on 10/03/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent was informed by | | the Autoclave System Engineer that a Safety System actuation that occurred | | on 09/29/00 was a valid event. At the time of the event, all indications | | available to the operators indicated an invalid activation. The autoclave | | was declared inoperable, and testing of the instruments for as-found | | readings was performed. After obtaining the as-found readings on the | | instrument loops, additional testing was conducted during the evening of | | 10/02/00. This steam load testing allowed the pressure to reach the trip | | point assigned value for shell high steam shutdown. Based on this | | information, we are reporting an actuation of a safety system. There was no | | release of radioactive material from this event." | | | | Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the | | Department of Energy site representative. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |General Information or Other |Event Number: 37406 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000| |LICENSEE: UNKNOWN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:56[EDT]| | CITY: SAN JOSE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000| | COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]| |LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000| | DOCKET: |+----------------------------+ | |PERSON ORGANIZATION | | |DAVE LOVELESS R4 | | |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: KENT PRENDERGAST |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO | | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING A SHIPMENT OF CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL AT | | AMERICAN METAL AND IRON COMPANY IN SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA | | | | A few months ago, American Metal and Iron Company sent a shipment of scrap | | metal to South Korea. South Korea subsequently rejected the material and | | returned it to American Metal and Iron Company in San Jose, California, | | because the material was contaminated with radium-226. (American Metal and | | Iron Company is a scrap metals dealer/metal recycler, and the scrap metal | | involved was a mixture of sheet metal conduit that had been compressed into | | a 4' by 4' by 6' block weighing approximately 1 ton.) | | | | American Metal and Iron Company representatives originally thought that the | | material had come from Lawrence Livermore and that it was the responsibility | | of the Department of Energy (DOE). Accordingly, American Metal and Iron | | Company representatives contacted DOE, and a DOE representative responded to | | the site to characterize the contamination. The highest radiation reading | | at the surface of the scrap metal was 0.2 mR/hour, and the highest wipe test | | result was 3,000 dpm. | | | | DOE subsequently denied that this was their material because the contract | | for Lawrence Livermore expired in January and because American Metal and | | Iron Company received the material a few months ago. In addition, DOE | | regulations would not allow DOE to sent out metal contaminated with oil. At | | the time of this notification, American Metal and Iron Company personnel did | | not know where they got the material. | | | | On the premise that this is not DOE material, the State of California | | Radiologic Health Branch plans to assume responsibility to make sure that | | American Metal and Iron Company either sends the material to a licensed | | waste site for disposal or gets a health physicist to characterize the | | material and provide a request as to why they should not sent it to a | | licensed waste site. | | | | The State (Kent Prendergast) requested that this information be entered as | | an event report and into the N-Med system. The State also reported that | | they had received calls from both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) | | and the NRC Region 4 office regarding this issue. | | | | HOO NOTE: At 1312 EDT on 10/03/00, the NRC Operations Center received some | | information regarding this | | issue from an independent marine surveyor in Oakland, CA. At 1354 EDT, the | | same individual | | reported that the survey meter had been read incorrectly and that this was a | | none issue. In order to | | ensure that all of the appropriate parties were involved and that | | appropriate actions were being | | taken, a conference call was subsequently conducted at 1500 EDT with | | representatives from the | | State of California, EPA Region IX, and the NRC. Participants included the | | State of California Office | | of Emergency Services (Richard Osborne) and EPA San Francisco (Terry | | Brubaker) as well as | | NRC representatives from the Region IV office (Dave Loveless and Dwight | | Chamberlain), the Office | | of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (Brian Smith and Fred Brown), and | | Incident Response | | Operations (Charles Miller). During this conference call, it was agreed | | that the State would followup | | on this event and report the results to both EPA and NRC Region IV. | | | | (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, the | | address for American Metal and Iron Company, and the name and telephone | | number of the independent marine surveyor.) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 37407 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000| | UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:23[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:51[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: SALGADO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2000| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | | | | |3 N Y 23 Power Operation |23 Power Operation | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE | | | | Failed to receive proper indication of turbine position circuitry indicating | | lamp following HPCI system run at rated pressure. Investigation by station | | personnel identified a failed oil pressure switch which provides indication | | of stop valve closure to turbine reset circuit. | | | | Failure of the switch prevents automatic and remote reset of HPCI turbine | | trips. This failure renders HPCI inoperable and would prevent it from | | fulfilling its safety function. Technical Specification 3.5.a (14 days to | | return to service or shutdown) entered. All other Emergency Core Cooling | | Systems are fully operable. | | | | Efforts are proceeding to repair/replace the switch. | | | | The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+