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Event Notification Report for October 4, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           10/03/2000 - 10/04/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37330  37402  37403  37404  37405  37406  37407  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37330       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/15/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JESSE JAMES                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES TRAPP          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     M/R        Y       15       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR AFTER ENTERING THE RESTRICTIVE AREA OF THE     |
| POWER TO FLOW MAP.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| On September 15, 2000 at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit 2   |
| was manually scrammed per operating procedure during turbine testing in      |
| preparation for the refuel outage.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The manual scram was due to entering restricted area of the power to flow    |
| map from Technical Specification 3.4.1, after the trip of the "2B"           |
| recirculation pump.  All rods fully inserted and the reactor was shutdown.   |
| Reactor level during the scram lowered to 0" and a Group II and III primary  |
| and secondary containment isolation was received.  The isolations functioned |
| as designed.  The plant is stable in hot shutdown with the main condenser as |
| a heat sink and the feedwater system is in service for level control.  No    |
| radioactive release or Emergency Core Cooling System injection occurred      |
| during the scram.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The turbine was tripped in accordance with the refuel outage plan when the   |
| recirculation pump tripped.  The plan was to perform turbine testing and     |
| then to manually scram the reactor at the same power level.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor was manually scrammed less than one minute after entering the    |
| restricted area of the power to flow map.  No power oscillations were seen.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1715 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ANDREW WINTER TO FANGIE JONES * *  |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 15, 2000 PBAPS reported that Unit 2 was manually scrammed in   |
| accordance with operating instructions during turbine testing. The report    |
| identified that the manual scram was initiated based on entering the         |
| restricted area of the power to flow map after the tripping of the 2B        |
| Recirculation Pump. This notification is being retracted based on the        |
| following:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "NUREG 1022 Revision 1 specifically states that 'The Commission is           |
| interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the            |
| consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events    |
| where an ESF actuated unnecessarily....This indicates an intent to require   |
| reporting actuations of features that mitigate the consequences of           |
| significant events.' Therefore, the following is an analysis of these two    |
| underlying reasons for reporting ESF actuations:                             |
|                                                                              |
| 1. The need for the ESF to mitigate the consequences of an event:            |
|                                                                              |
| The September 15, 2000 PBAPS manual scram was initiated because the plant    |
| operator made a conservative decision in accordance with station procedures  |
| to initiate a reactor scram. At the time this decision was made, the plant   |
| conditions were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow.     |
| Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively      |
| established by the licensee and the operator made the correct decision to    |
| commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate |
| the consequences of this evolution. Moreover, plant conditions were not      |
| changing in a direction that would have required the manual scram to         |
| mitigate the consequences of significant events.                             |
|                                                                              |
| 2. Events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily:                               |
|                                                                              |
| The actuation of a manual scram and the subsequent PCIS Group II and Ill     |
| actuations were part of a preplanned shutdown for the commencement of the    |
| PBAPS Unit 2's thirteenth refueling outage (2R13) and were necessary to      |
| complete the plant shutdown. The decision to insert the manual scram in      |
| accordance with station procedures, resulted in the preplanned shutdown      |
| commencing slightly early. Therefore, the ESP did not actuate unnecessarily  |
| since it was already planned to shutdown the plant by inserting a manual     |
| scram.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Therefore, based on the above discussion, this event is not reportable      |
| because the manual scram resulted from and was, in accordance with the       |
| licensee's procedure, and part of a preplanned sequence of reactor           |
| operation."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R1DO (William Ruland) |
| has been notified.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| ***** UPDATE AT 1554 ON 10/03/00 FROM ANDREW WINTER TO LEIGH TROCINE *****   |
|                                                                              |
| Via this update, the licensee is resubmitting this event notification        |
| because the event was determined to represent an unplanned ESF actuation.    |
| The licensee is also providing additional clarification to the original      |
| report because it was determined that the unit was not operating in an       |
| unrestricted region of the technical specifications.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 23, 2000, PBAPS submitted a retraction to Event #37330.  After |
| further review, it was determined that the basis for the PBAPS retraction    |
| was not consistent with the NRC interpretation of the reporting requirement. |
| Therefore, the following event report is being resubmitted:"                 |
|                                                                              |
| "On September 15, 2000, PBAPS Unit 2 was manually scrammed.  The manual      |
| reactor scram was initiated by the plant operator based on the understanding |
| that the plant conditions placed the plant in the restricted area of the     |
| power-to-flow map after the unplanned tripping of the 2B Reactor             |
| Recirculation Pump.  The plant conditions at the time of the manual scram    |
| were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow.  Although this |
| condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the |
| licensee to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary |
| to mitigate the consequences of this evolution.  Furthermore, the plant was  |
| not in an unrestricted region of Technical Specification 3.4.1, and          |
| emergency systems subsequently performed as required."                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Although the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate an event, it is    |
| the conclusion of the licensee that this event does represent an unplanned   |
| ESF actuation.  Therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR             |
| 50.72(b)(2)(ii)."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to submit a       |
| Licensee Event Report by 10/15/00.  The NRC operations officer notified the  |
| R1DO (Linville).                                                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37402       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:16[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE GABRIELE                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |facsimile to HQs PAO         |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Decommissioned   |0        Decommissioned   |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISSUANCE OF A PRESS RELEASE REGARDING A TEMPORARY WORK STOPPAGE ON MOST      |
| PLANT DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING A CONTAMINATION INCIDENT            |
|                                                                              |
| At 1250 on 10/03/00, the licensee issued a press release regarding an        |
| incident that occurred on 09/29/00.  The following text is a portion of a    |
| this press release:                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Maine Yankee has temporarily halted work on most plant dismantlement        |
| activities following an incident last Friday [09/29/00] where the clothing   |
| of 4 workers was slightly contaminated with radiological material.  The      |
| workers were welding shielding plates in 2 waste shipping containers on the  |
| non-nuclear side of the plant.  The shipping containers previously had been  |
| mistakenly released from the nuclear side of the facility.  There was no     |
| measurable internal dose to the workers or skin contamination from the       |
| incident.  The radiological dose to the exposed workers was less than one    |
| millirem.  In Maine, the annual radiological dose an individual receives     |
| from all sources, natural and manmade, is about 350 millirem."               |
|                                                                              |
| "The clothing contamination was discovered early Saturday morning when one   |
| of the workers who had been sent to perform a task on the nuclear side of    |
| the plant alarmed a radiation monitor when exiting.  Technicians identified  |
| the shipping containers as the source of the contamination and evaluated 3   |
| other workers who had been working on the containers.  No contamination was  |
| found on the clothing of these individuals.  Maine Yankee also followed up   |
| with another ten workers who worked on the containers during the day shift   |
| Friday to determine whether there were any additional articles of            |
| contaminated clothing.  Three of these individuals were found to have        |
| slightly contaminated clothing.  As a precautionary measure, Maine Yankee is |
| surveying the homes and vehicles of the affected workers.  No additional     |
| contamination has been identified."                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "An analysis is underway to determine specifically how the contaminated      |
| containers were released to the non-nuclear side of the plant.  Radiological |
| work will only resume when Maine Yankee's senior management is convinced     |
| work control procedures are appropriate and are being implemented thoroughly |
| and completely.  Maine Yankee has discussed this incident and our response   |
| with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of Maine."         |
|                                                                              |
| " 'Controlling radiological material is fundamental to the success of the    |
| decommissioning project.  That is why, even though there is no health        |
| concern as a result of this incident, we stopped plant dismantlement         |
| activities until we have convinced ourselves that we are ready to return to  |
| work,' said Mike Meisner, Maine Yankee President.  Meisner added, 'I am      |
| pleased, however, that redundant controls and processes we have in place as  |
| well as our professional staff helped us identify the problem and react      |
| appropriately.' "                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified an onsite NRC inspector.  (Call the NRC operations     |
| officer for a licensee contact name and telephone number.)                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37403       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MERRILL                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/03/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LEONARD WERT         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |CHRISTOPHER GRIMES   NRR     |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT REACTOR POWER EXCEEDED 100% FOR A PERIOD OF GREATER THAT 8    |
| HOURS DUE TO AN INSTRUMENT FAILURE ON THE LEADING EDGE FLOW METER            |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "St. Lucie Unit 2 average power level was calculated to have been 100.1%     |
| power for greater than 8 hours on September 25, 2000.  This power level      |
| resulted from an instrumentation failure on the Leading Edge Flow Meter      |
| (LEFM) which was utilized by the [Digital Data Processing System (DDPS)]     |
| Plant Computer Calorimetric power level indication.  A failure in the DP1    |
| transducer path on the 'A' Loop of the LEFM instrument resulted in a         |
| decreasing feedwater (FW) flow output value."                                |
|                                                                              |
| "Detailed analysis of the plant's performance over September 24, 2000, and   |
| September 25, 2000, indicate an unexpected decrease in 'A' LEFM Feedwater    |
| Flow indicated to the DDPS beginning approximately mid-day on September 24,  |
| 2000, without a corresponding decrease in 'A' Venturi based Feedwater Flow.  |
| A direct and corresponding decrease in DDPS Calorimetric Power results from  |
| the 'A' LEFM FW Flow decrease.  A corresponding decrease in 'B' side LEFM or |
| Venturi FW Flow was not present.  This confirmed the Vendor's initial report |
| of an 'A' side instrumentation problem within the LEFM System.  The          |
| Operations Crew questioned this decrease and initiated conservative action   |
| as a result of DDPS Calorimetric Power observed to be lowering.  Prior to    |
| and during the LEFM instrument failure, the indicated Calorimetric Power     |
| level in use by the plant operators did not exceed 100.0% for greater than 8 |
| hours.  The LEFM transducer was repaired and returned to service [on]        |
| October 1, 2000."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Based upon subsequent analysis of 'B' side LEFM FW Flow and 'A' [and] 'B'   |
| side Venturi FW Flow, the change in power was approximately 0.2% reactor     |
| power.  The maximum power level was approximately 99.9% on September 24,     |
| 2000, and approximately 100.1% (with a maximum of 100.2%) power on September |
| 25, 2000.  An increase to 100.2% is well within the uncertainty for DDPS     |
| Calorimetric Power of 1.3% and initial power assumed within the Safety       |
| Analysis of 2%."                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "This event was determined to be reportable at 15:22 on October 3, 2000, in  |
| accordance with St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating License condition 2.F:  Operation |
| of St. Lucie Unit 2 in excess of 100% power for greater than 8 hours is in   |
| excess of the plant's Operating License limit of 'not in excess of 2700      |
| megawatts thermal (100% power).'  The Unit 2 License requires that [the      |
| licensee] 'shall report any violations of these requirements within 24 hours |
| by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to |
| the NRC Regional Administrator, Region II, or his designee, no later than    |
| the first working day following the violation, with a written follow-up      |
| report with 14 days.' "                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37404       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|LICENSEE:  ADAC LABORATORIES                    |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:17[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MILPITAS                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        10/02/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:        10:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#:  2760-43               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/03/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|                                                |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KENT PRENDERGAST             |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING THE LOSS OF FIVE SEALED SOURCES AT ADAC     |
| LABORATORIES IN MILPITAS, CALIFORNIA                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Adac Laboratories (State license #2760-43) in Milpitas, California,          |
| manufactures nuclear medicine equipment and utilizes sealed sources for      |
| testing cameras, etc.  The sources are stored in a depleted uranium storage  |
| container.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| On 09/26/00, Adac Laboratories performed an audit, and the location of five  |
| sealed sources could not be determined (one 28.5 mCi cesium-137 source and   |
| four gadolinium-153 sources with activities of 14.2 mCi, 0.87 mCi, 0.2 mCi,  |
| and 0.15 mCi).  Adac Laboratories has taken action to secure that remaining  |
| sources and is making efforts to locate the missing sources.                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the State of California at approximately 1000 PDT on   |
| 10/02/00, and a representative from the State of California Radiologic       |
| Health Branch (Kent Prendergast) in turn notified the NRC Operations Center  |
| of the loss of five sealed sources at 1617 on 10/03/00.                      |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number,       |
| licensee address, and licensee radiation safety officer name.)               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37405       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:39[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        08:35[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/03/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT AN AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF AN AUTOCLAVE ON 09/26/00 WAS A VALID |
| SAFETY SYSTEM ACTIVATION (24-hour report)                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0835 [hours] on 10/03/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent was informed by |
| the Autoclave System Engineer that a Safety System actuation that occurred   |
| on 09/29/00 was a valid event.  At the time of the event, all indications    |
| available to the operators indicated an invalid activation.  The autoclave   |
| was declared inoperable, and testing of the instruments for as-found         |
| readings was performed.  After obtaining the as-found readings on the        |
| instrument loops, additional testing was conducted during the evening of     |
| 10/02/00.  This steam load testing allowed the pressure to reach the trip    |
| point assigned value for shell high steam shutdown.  Based on this           |
| information, we are reporting an actuation of a safety system.  There was no |
| release of radioactive material from this event."                            |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the      |
| Department of Energy site representative.                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37406       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM    |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|LICENSEE:  UNKNOWN                              |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:56[EDT]|
|    CITY:  SAN JOSE                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:             [PDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/03/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |DAVE LOVELESS        R4      |
|                                                |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KENT PRENDERGAST             |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING A SHIPMENT OF CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL AT   |
| AMERICAN METAL AND IRON COMPANY IN SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA                      |
|                                                                              |
| A few months ago, American Metal and Iron Company sent a shipment of scrap   |
| metal to South Korea.  South Korea subsequently rejected the material and    |
| returned it to American Metal and Iron Company in San Jose, California,      |
| because the material was contaminated with radium-226.  (American Metal and  |
| Iron Company is a scrap metals dealer/metal recycler, and the scrap metal    |
| involved was a mixture of sheet metal conduit that had been compressed into  |
| a 4' by 4' by 6' block weighing approximately 1 ton.)                        |
|                                                                              |
| American Metal and Iron Company representatives originally thought that the  |
| material had come from Lawrence Livermore and that it was the responsibility |
| of the Department of Energy (DOE).  Accordingly, American Metal and Iron     |
| Company representatives contacted DOE, and a DOE representative responded to |
| the site to characterize the contamination.  The highest radiation reading   |
| at the surface of the scrap metal was 0.2 mR/hour, and the highest wipe test |
| result was 3,000 dpm.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| DOE subsequently denied that this was their material because the contract    |
| for Lawrence Livermore expired in January and because American Metal and     |
| Iron Company received the material a few months ago.  In addition, DOE       |
| regulations would not allow DOE to sent out metal contaminated with oil.  At |
| the time of this notification, American Metal and Iron Company personnel did |
| not know where they got the material.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| On the premise that this is not DOE material, the State of California        |
| Radiologic Health Branch plans to assume responsibility to make sure that    |
| American Metal and Iron Company either sends the material to a licensed      |
| waste site for disposal or gets a health physicist to characterize the       |
| material and provide a request as to why they should not sent it to a        |
| licensed waste site.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The State (Kent Prendergast) requested that this information be entered as   |
| an event report and into the N-Med system.  The State also reported that     |
| they had received calls from both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  |
| and the NRC Region 4 office regarding this issue.                            |
|                                                                              |
| HOO NOTE:  At 1312 EDT on 10/03/00, the NRC Operations Center received some  |
| information regarding this                                                   |
| issue from an independent marine surveyor in Oakland, CA.  At 1354 EDT, the  |
| same individual                                                              |
| reported that the survey meter had been read incorrectly and that this was a |
| none issue.  In order to                                                     |
| ensure that all of the appropriate parties were involved and that            |
| appropriate actions were being                                               |
| taken, a conference call was subsequently conducted at 1500 EDT with         |
| representatives from the                                                     |
| State of California, EPA Region IX, and the NRC.  Participants included the  |
| State of California Office                                                   |
| of Emergency Services (Richard Osborne) and EPA San Francisco (Terry         |
| Brubaker) as well as                                                         |
| NRC representatives from the Region IV office (Dave Loveless and Dwight      |
| Chamberlain), the Office                                                     |
| of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (Brian Smith and Fred Brown), and |
| Incident Response                                                            |
| Operations (Charles Miller).  During this conference call, it was agreed     |
| that the State would followup                                                |
| on this event and report the results to both EPA and NRC Region IV.          |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, the   |
| address for American Metal and Iron Company, and the name and telephone      |
| number of the independent marine surveyor.)                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37407       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3           |EVENT DATE:        10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:51[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SALGADO                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  10/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       23       Power Operation  |23       Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE                   |
|                                                                              |
| Failed to receive proper indication of turbine position circuitry indicating |
| lamp following HPCI system run at rated pressure.  Investigation by station  |
| personnel identified a failed oil pressure switch which provides indication  |
| of stop valve closure to turbine reset circuit.                              |
|                                                                              |
| Failure of the switch prevents automatic and remote reset of HPCI turbine    |
| trips.  This failure renders HPCI inoperable and would prevent it from       |
| fulfilling its safety function.  Technical Specification 3.5.a (14 days to   |
| return to service or shutdown) entered.  All other Emergency Core Cooling    |
| Systems are fully operable.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Efforts are proceeding to repair/replace the switch.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+