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Event Notification Report for October 4, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
10/03/2000 - 10/04/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37330 37402 37403 37404 37405 37406 37407
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37330 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/15/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JESSE JAMES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES TRAPP R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 M/R Y 15 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUALLY SCRAMMED THE REACTOR AFTER ENTERING THE RESTRICTIVE AREA OF THE |
| POWER TO FLOW MAP. |
| |
| On September 15, 2000 at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Unit 2 |
| was manually scrammed per operating procedure during turbine testing in |
| preparation for the refuel outage. |
| |
| The manual scram was due to entering restricted area of the power to flow |
| map from Technical Specification 3.4.1, after the trip of the "2B" |
| recirculation pump. All rods fully inserted and the reactor was shutdown. |
| Reactor level during the scram lowered to 0" and a Group II and III primary |
| and secondary containment isolation was received. The isolations functioned |
| as designed. The plant is stable in hot shutdown with the main condenser as |
| a heat sink and the feedwater system is in service for level control. No |
| radioactive release or Emergency Core Cooling System injection occurred |
| during the scram. |
| |
| The turbine was tripped in accordance with the refuel outage plan when the |
| recirculation pump tripped. The plan was to perform turbine testing and |
| then to manually scram the reactor at the same power level. |
| |
| The reactor was manually scrammed less than one minute after entering the |
| restricted area of the power to flow map. No power oscillations were seen. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1715 EDT ON 9/21/00 BY ANDREW WINTER TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| * |
| |
| "On September 15, 2000 PBAPS reported that Unit 2 was manually scrammed in |
| accordance with operating instructions during turbine testing. The report |
| identified that the manual scram was initiated based on entering the |
| restricted area of the power to flow map after the tripping of the 2B |
| Recirculation Pump. This notification is being retracted based on the |
| following: |
| |
| "NUREG 1022 Revision 1 specifically states that 'The Commission is |
| interested both in events where an ESF was needed to mitigate the |
| consequences (whether or not the equipment performed properly) and events |
| where an ESF actuated unnecessarily....This indicates an intent to require |
| reporting actuations of features that mitigate the consequences of |
| significant events.' Therefore, the following is an analysis of these two |
| underlying reasons for reporting ESF actuations: |
| |
| 1. The need for the ESF to mitigate the consequences of an event: |
| |
| The September 15, 2000 PBAPS manual scram was initiated because the plant |
| operator made a conservative decision in accordance with station procedures |
| to initiate a reactor scram. At the time this decision was made, the plant |
| conditions were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. |
| Although this condition is close to an operational limit conservatively |
| established by the licensee and the operator made the correct decision to |
| commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate |
| the consequences of this evolution. Moreover, plant conditions were not |
| changing in a direction that would have required the manual scram to |
| mitigate the consequences of significant events. |
| |
| 2. Events where an ESF actuated unnecessarily: |
| |
| The actuation of a manual scram and the subsequent PCIS Group II and Ill |
| actuations were part of a preplanned shutdown for the commencement of the |
| PBAPS Unit 2's thirteenth refueling outage (2R13) and were necessary to |
| complete the plant shutdown. The decision to insert the manual scram in |
| accordance with station procedures, resulted in the preplanned shutdown |
| commencing slightly early. Therefore, the ESP did not actuate unnecessarily |
| since it was already planned to shutdown the plant by inserting a manual |
| scram. |
| |
| "Therefore, based on the above discussion, this event is not reportable |
| because the manual scram resulted from and was, in accordance with the |
| licensee's procedure, and part of a preplanned sequence of reactor |
| operation." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (William Ruland) |
| has been notified. |
| |
| ***** UPDATE AT 1554 ON 10/03/00 FROM ANDREW WINTER TO LEIGH TROCINE ***** |
| |
| Via this update, the licensee is resubmitting this event notification |
| because the event was determined to represent an unplanned ESF actuation. |
| The licensee is also providing additional clarification to the original |
| report because it was determined that the unit was not operating in an |
| unrestricted region of the technical specifications. |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On September 23, 2000, PBAPS submitted a retraction to Event #37330. After |
| further review, it was determined that the basis for the PBAPS retraction |
| was not consistent with the NRC interpretation of the reporting requirement. |
| Therefore, the following event report is being resubmitted:" |
| |
| "On September 15, 2000, PBAPS Unit 2 was manually scrammed. The manual |
| reactor scram was initiated by the plant operator based on the understanding |
| that the plant conditions placed the plant in the restricted area of the |
| power-to-flow map after the unplanned tripping of the 2B Reactor |
| Recirculation Pump. The plant conditions at the time of the manual scram |
| were approximately 16 percent power and 24 percent core flow. Although this |
| condition is close to an operational limit conservatively established by the |
| licensee to commence the plant shutdown, the ESF actuation was not necessary |
| to mitigate the consequences of this evolution. Furthermore, the plant was |
| not in an unrestricted region of Technical Specification 3.4.1, and |
| emergency systems subsequently performed as required." |
| |
| "Although the ESF actuation was not necessary to mitigate an event, it is |
| the conclusion of the licensee that this event does represent an unplanned |
| ESF actuation. Therefore, this event is reportable under 10 CFR |
| 50.72(b)(2)(ii)." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector and plans to submit a |
| Licensee Event Report by 10/15/00. The NRC operations officer notified the |
| R1DO (Linville). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37402 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:16[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE GABRIELE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |facsimile to HQs PAO |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISSUANCE OF A PRESS RELEASE REGARDING A TEMPORARY WORK STOPPAGE ON MOST |
| PLANT DISMANTLEMENT ACTIVITIES FOLLOWING A CONTAMINATION INCIDENT |
| |
| At 1250 on 10/03/00, the licensee issued a press release regarding an |
| incident that occurred on 09/29/00. The following text is a portion of a |
| this press release: |
| |
| "Maine Yankee has temporarily halted work on most plant dismantlement |
| activities following an incident last Friday [09/29/00] where the clothing |
| of 4 workers was slightly contaminated with radiological material. The |
| workers were welding shielding plates in 2 waste shipping containers on the |
| non-nuclear side of the plant. The shipping containers previously had been |
| mistakenly released from the nuclear side of the facility. There was no |
| measurable internal dose to the workers or skin contamination from the |
| incident. The radiological dose to the exposed workers was less than one |
| millirem. In Maine, the annual radiological dose an individual receives |
| from all sources, natural and manmade, is about 350 millirem." |
| |
| "The clothing contamination was discovered early Saturday morning when one |
| of the workers who had been sent to perform a task on the nuclear side of |
| the plant alarmed a radiation monitor when exiting. Technicians identified |
| the shipping containers as the source of the contamination and evaluated 3 |
| other workers who had been working on the containers. No contamination was |
| found on the clothing of these individuals. Maine Yankee also followed up |
| with another ten workers who worked on the containers during the day shift |
| Friday to determine whether there were any additional articles of |
| contaminated clothing. Three of these individuals were found to have |
| slightly contaminated clothing. As a precautionary measure, Maine Yankee is |
| surveying the homes and vehicles of the affected workers. No additional |
| contamination has been identified." |
| |
| "An analysis is underway to determine specifically how the contaminated |
| containers were released to the non-nuclear side of the plant. Radiological |
| work will only resume when Maine Yankee's senior management is convinced |
| work control procedures are appropriate and are being implemented thoroughly |
| and completely. Maine Yankee has discussed this incident and our response |
| with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the State of Maine." |
| |
| " 'Controlling radiological material is fundamental to the success of the |
| decommissioning project. That is why, even though there is no health |
| concern as a result of this incident, we stopped plant dismantlement |
| activities until we have convinced ourselves that we are ready to return to |
| work,' said Mike Meisner, Maine Yankee President. Meisner added, 'I am |
| pleased, however, that redundant controls and processes we have in place as |
| well as our professional staff helped us identify the problem and react |
| appropriately.' " |
| |
| The licensee notified an onsite NRC inspector. (Call the NRC operations |
| officer for a licensee contact name and telephone number.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37403 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MERRILL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LEONARD WERT R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |CHRISTOPHER GRIMES NRR |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT REACTOR POWER EXCEEDED 100% FOR A PERIOD OF GREATER THAT 8 |
| HOURS DUE TO AN INSTRUMENT FAILURE ON THE LEADING EDGE FLOW METER |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "St. Lucie Unit 2 average power level was calculated to have been 100.1% |
| power for greater than 8 hours on September 25, 2000. This power level |
| resulted from an instrumentation failure on the Leading Edge Flow Meter |
| (LEFM) which was utilized by the [Digital Data Processing System (DDPS)] |
| Plant Computer Calorimetric power level indication. A failure in the DP1 |
| transducer path on the 'A' Loop of the LEFM instrument resulted in a |
| decreasing feedwater (FW) flow output value." |
| |
| "Detailed analysis of the plant's performance over September 24, 2000, and |
| September 25, 2000, indicate an unexpected decrease in 'A' LEFM Feedwater |
| Flow indicated to the DDPS beginning approximately mid-day on September 24, |
| 2000, without a corresponding decrease in 'A' Venturi based Feedwater Flow. |
| A direct and corresponding decrease in DDPS Calorimetric Power results from |
| the 'A' LEFM FW Flow decrease. A corresponding decrease in 'B' side LEFM or |
| Venturi FW Flow was not present. This confirmed the Vendor's initial report |
| of an 'A' side instrumentation problem within the LEFM System. The |
| Operations Crew questioned this decrease and initiated conservative action |
| as a result of DDPS Calorimetric Power observed to be lowering. Prior to |
| and during the LEFM instrument failure, the indicated Calorimetric Power |
| level in use by the plant operators did not exceed 100.0% for greater than 8 |
| hours. The LEFM transducer was repaired and returned to service [on] |
| October 1, 2000." |
| |
| "Based upon subsequent analysis of 'B' side LEFM FW Flow and 'A' [and] 'B' |
| side Venturi FW Flow, the change in power was approximately 0.2% reactor |
| power. The maximum power level was approximately 99.9% on September 24, |
| 2000, and approximately 100.1% (with a maximum of 100.2%) power on September |
| 25, 2000. An increase to 100.2% is well within the uncertainty for DDPS |
| Calorimetric Power of 1.3% and initial power assumed within the Safety |
| Analysis of 2%." |
| |
| "This event was determined to be reportable at 15:22 on October 3, 2000, in |
| accordance with St. Lucie Unit 2 Operating License condition 2.F: Operation |
| of St. Lucie Unit 2 in excess of 100% power for greater than 8 hours is in |
| excess of the plant's Operating License limit of 'not in excess of 2700 |
| megawatts thermal (100% power).' The Unit 2 License requires that [the |
| licensee] 'shall report any violations of these requirements within 24 hours |
| by telephone and confirm by telegram, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to |
| the NRC Regional Administrator, Region II, or his designee, no later than |
| the first working day following the violation, with a written follow-up |
| report with 14 days.' " |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37404 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: ADAC LABORATORIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:17[EDT]|
| CITY: MILPITAS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/02/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: 10:00[PDT]|
|LICENSE#: 2760-43 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
| |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KENT PRENDERGAST | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING THE LOSS OF FIVE SEALED SOURCES AT ADAC |
| LABORATORIES IN MILPITAS, CALIFORNIA |
| |
| Adac Laboratories (State license #2760-43) in Milpitas, California, |
| manufactures nuclear medicine equipment and utilizes sealed sources for |
| testing cameras, etc. The sources are stored in a depleted uranium storage |
| container. |
| |
| On 09/26/00, Adac Laboratories performed an audit, and the location of five |
| sealed sources could not be determined (one 28.5 mCi cesium-137 source and |
| four gadolinium-153 sources with activities of 14.2 mCi, 0.87 mCi, 0.2 mCi, |
| and 0.15 mCi). Adac Laboratories has taken action to secure that remaining |
| sources and is making efforts to locate the missing sources. |
| |
| The licensee notified the State of California at approximately 1000 PDT on |
| 10/02/00, and a representative from the State of California Radiologic |
| Health Branch (Kent Prendergast) in turn notified the NRC Operations Center |
| of the loss of five sealed sources at 1617 on 10/03/00. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, |
| licensee address, and licensee radiation safety officer name.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37405 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:39[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 08:35[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK LARSON | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT AN AUTOMATIC SHUTDOWN OF AN AUTOCLAVE ON 09/26/00 WAS A VALID |
| SAFETY SYSTEM ACTIVATION (24-hour report) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "At 0835 [hours] on 10/03/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent was informed by |
| the Autoclave System Engineer that a Safety System actuation that occurred |
| on 09/29/00 was a valid event. At the time of the event, all indications |
| available to the operators indicated an invalid activation. The autoclave |
| was declared inoperable, and testing of the instruments for as-found |
| readings was performed. After obtaining the as-found readings on the |
| instrument loops, additional testing was conducted during the evening of |
| 10/02/00. This steam load testing allowed the pressure to reach the trip |
| point assigned value for shell high steam shutdown. Based on this |
| information, we are reporting an actuation of a safety system. There was no |
| release of radioactive material from this event." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector as well as the |
| Department of Energy site representative. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37406 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/03/2000|
|LICENSEE: UNKNOWN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:56[EDT]|
| CITY: SAN JOSE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: CA |EVENT TIME: [PDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/03/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAVE LOVELESS R4 |
| |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KENT PRENDERGAST |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT REGARDING A SHIPMENT OF CONTAMINATED SCRAP METAL AT |
| AMERICAN METAL AND IRON COMPANY IN SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA |
| |
| A few months ago, American Metal and Iron Company sent a shipment of scrap |
| metal to South Korea. South Korea subsequently rejected the material and |
| returned it to American Metal and Iron Company in San Jose, California, |
| because the material was contaminated with radium-226. (American Metal and |
| Iron Company is a scrap metals dealer/metal recycler, and the scrap metal |
| involved was a mixture of sheet metal conduit that had been compressed into |
| a 4' by 4' by 6' block weighing approximately 1 ton.) |
| |
| American Metal and Iron Company representatives originally thought that the |
| material had come from Lawrence Livermore and that it was the responsibility |
| of the Department of Energy (DOE). Accordingly, American Metal and Iron |
| Company representatives contacted DOE, and a DOE representative responded to |
| the site to characterize the contamination. The highest radiation reading |
| at the surface of the scrap metal was 0.2 mR/hour, and the highest wipe test |
| result was 3,000 dpm. |
| |
| DOE subsequently denied that this was their material because the contract |
| for Lawrence Livermore expired in January and because American Metal and |
| Iron Company received the material a few months ago. In addition, DOE |
| regulations would not allow DOE to sent out metal contaminated with oil. At |
| the time of this notification, American Metal and Iron Company personnel did |
| not know where they got the material. |
| |
| On the premise that this is not DOE material, the State of California |
| Radiologic Health Branch plans to assume responsibility to make sure that |
| American Metal and Iron Company either sends the material to a licensed |
| waste site for disposal or gets a health physicist to characterize the |
| material and provide a request as to why they should not sent it to a |
| licensed waste site. |
| |
| The State (Kent Prendergast) requested that this information be entered as |
| an event report and into the N-Med system. The State also reported that |
| they had received calls from both the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) |
| and the NRC Region 4 office regarding this issue. |
| |
| HOO NOTE: At 1312 EDT on 10/03/00, the NRC Operations Center received some |
| information regarding this |
| issue from an independent marine surveyor in Oakland, CA. At 1354 EDT, the |
| same individual |
| reported that the survey meter had been read incorrectly and that this was a |
| none issue. In order to |
| ensure that all of the appropriate parties were involved and that |
| appropriate actions were being |
| taken, a conference call was subsequently conducted at 1500 EDT with |
| representatives from the |
| State of California, EPA Region IX, and the NRC. Participants included the |
| State of California Office |
| of Emergency Services (Richard Osborne) and EPA San Francisco (Terry |
| Brubaker) as well as |
| NRC representatives from the Region IV office (Dave Loveless and Dwight |
| Chamberlain), the Office |
| of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (Brian Smith and Fred Brown), and |
| Incident Response |
| Operations (Charles Miller). During this conference call, it was agreed |
| that the State would followup |
| on this event and report the results to both EPA and NRC Region IV. |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for a State contact telephone number, the |
| address for American Metal and Iron Company, and the name and telephone |
| number of the independent marine surveyor.) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37407 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DRESDEN REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 10/04/2000|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:23[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 10/03/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:51[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SALGADO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 10/04/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 23 Power Operation |23 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE |
| |
| Failed to receive proper indication of turbine position circuitry indicating |
| lamp following HPCI system run at rated pressure. Investigation by station |
| personnel identified a failed oil pressure switch which provides indication |
| of stop valve closure to turbine reset circuit. |
| |
| Failure of the switch prevents automatic and remote reset of HPCI turbine |
| trips. This failure renders HPCI inoperable and would prevent it from |
| fulfilling its safety function. Technical Specification 3.5.a (14 days to |
| return to service or shutdown) entered. All other Emergency Core Cooling |
| Systems are fully operable. |
| |
| Efforts are proceeding to repair/replace the switch. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+