Event Notification Report for August 31, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
08/30/2000 - 08/31/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37273 37274 37275 37276 37277
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37273 |
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| REP ORG: U.S. ARMY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/2000|
|LICENSEE: U.S. ARMY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:01[EDT]|
| CITY: ROCK ISLAND REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 08/23/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: IL |EVENT TIME: [CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 12-00722-06 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/30/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF HAVENNER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| MISSING M43A1 CHEMICAL AGENT DETECTOR |
| |
| The licensee reported that one M43A1 chemical agent detector, containing 250 |
| �Ci of Am-241, had been lost during a training exercise at Camp Shelby, |
| Mississippi. The Alabama National Guard was conducting a class, removed |
| the cell containing the chemical agent detector which apparently was not |
| replaced. This was discovered when the assembly was sent in for the |
| detector to be leak checked. An investigation has looked for the missing |
| detector and is still looking for it. |
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|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37274 |
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| REP ORG: QSL INSPECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/2000|
|LICENSEE: QSL INSPECTION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:30[EDT]|
| CITY: TRAINER REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 08/29/2000|
| COUNTY: DELAWARE STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: 14:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 37-28085-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/30/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
| |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LANGE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|IBBF 30.50(b)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 30 CURIE IRIDIUM-192 SOURCE'S PIG TAIL DISCONNECTED FROM ITS DRIVE CABLE. |
| |
| Event was reported by the Radiation Safety Officer for QSL Inspection. |
| |
| Disconnect of a Sentinel Amersham 660 exposure device occurred in Bensalem, |
| Pa., yesterday afternoon. After completing an exposure it was discovered |
| that the source had become disconnected from its drive cable and it could |
| not be retracted back to its storage position. The pig tail had become |
| disconnected from the drive cable. The licensee shielded the source and |
| retrieved it. Maximum reading of the radiographers pocket dosimetry devices |
| was 130 mRem (the radiographers actual exposure in retrieving the 30 curie |
| Ir-192 source was less than 130 mRem because he had been wearing the same |
| pocket dosimetry devices during other radiography shots) . On |
| investigation the licensee found that the drive cable selector ring was worn |
| (connects the drive cable to the pig tail). The licensee has taken all of |
| their 30 exposure controls and 27 devices out of service and is inspecting |
| them for any problems. The licensee notified NRC Region 1, John Kinneman, |
| of this event. |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37275 |
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| REP ORG: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/2000|
|LICENSEE: EATON CUTLER-HAMMER |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:06[EDT]|
| CITY: WARRENDALE REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 07/31/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: PA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/30/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PETE ESELGROTH R1 |
| |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
+------------------------------------------------+MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: LAURENCE PATTERSON |CHUCK PAULK R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE |VERN HODGE (via fax) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
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| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| 10 CFR PART 21 NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE POTENTIAL FAILURE OF |
| EATON-CUTLER-HAMMER DS-206 CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO CLOSE ON DEMAND |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Eaton |
| Cutler-Hammer Nuclear Programs personnel: |
| |
| "The following information is provided pursuant to the requirements of 10 |
| CFR Part 21 to report a potential safety concern. This issue concerns the |
| possibility for malfunction of the Eaton Cutler-Hammer DS-206 circuit |
| breakers due to 'shock-out' of Direct Trip Actuators (DTA). Shock-out is |
| defined as the unwarranted or undesired change in the state of a DTA from |
| the normally un-tripped state to a tripped state. Shock-out occurs as a |
| result of shock caused by the circuit breaker cycling from the open position |
| to the closed position. The shock force is supplied by the closing springs |
| striking the bottom plate of the breaker frame during the breaker closing |
| operation. The result of shock-out is that the DTA trips immediately, |
| returning the breaker to an open condition, which is neither required nor |
| desired." |
| |
| "[Eaton Cutler-Hammer Nuclear Programs (C-HNP)] has determined that the root |
| cause of DTA shock-out in DS-206 breakers is the replacement of operating |
| mechanisms and/or closing springs with new operating mechanisms and/or new |
| closing springs, as part of the standard reconditioning process. DTA |
| shock-out has not been observed in vintage DS-206 breakers that are |
| reconditioned in accordance with C-HNP procedures, which does not include |
| the replacement of operating mechanisms and/or closing springs as part of |
| the standard reconditioning process. The standard C-HNP reconditioning |
| process DOES include installation of design upgrades." |
| |
| "To eliminate the possibility of shock-out, when the DS-206 breaker |
| reconditioning process includes installation of a new operating mechanism |
| and/or closing springs, C-HNP recommends the installation of a modified |
| bottom plate to eliminate transmission of shock to the DTA. A modified |
| bottom plate has been designed, [and] tested and is being seismically |
| qualified by C-HNP." |
| |
| "This deficiency was identified and determined to be of a chronic reportable |
| nature on approximately July 31, 2000." |
| |
| "The installed base of the C-HNP supplied operating mechanisms and closing |
| springs is limited to a single utility and plant, Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. C-HNP does not know where operating mechanisms and |
| closing springs, procured commercially by third party dedicators, may have |
| been installed in safety-related applications." |
| |
| (Contact the NRC operations officer for supplier contact information.) |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37276 |
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| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/30/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:18[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 08/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:05[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN PEDERSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/30/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| FAILURE OF A MAIN STEAM LINE DRAIN PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE TO |
| COMPLETELY OPEN DUE TO LOOSE TORQUE SWITCH WIRE CONNECTIONS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "During plant shutdown, primary containment isolation valve MO-2373 failed |
| to properly function. The failure was caused by loose torque switch wire |
| connections which caused a failure of the valve to completely open. |
| Improper electrical connections could have prevented full closure of the |
| valve. Therefore, the valve was determined to be inoperable prior to the |
| repair. ([The] valve has been repaired.) The safety function of the |
| redundant primary containment isolation valve was available." |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37277 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/31/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:30[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 08/30/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:10[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 08/31/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: - | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i) ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
|OCBC 76.120(c)(2)(iii) REDUNDANT EQUIP INOP | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AREA CONTROL ROOM (ACR) ALARM POWER LOST DUE TO A FAILURE IN THE POWER |
| TRANSFER SWITCH |
| |
| "At 1610 on 08-30-00 the PSS was informed of a C-331 CAAS Cluster J Trouble |
| alarm. Investigation of trouble alarm revealed that C-331 CAAS Horns |
| solenoids had lost DC power. The C-331 ACR DC alarm power was lost due to |
| the failures in the power transfer switch. Contacts fused together and a |
| solenoid failed which allowed the transfer switch to reposition to the mid |
| (no power) position and prevented repositioning to the emergency power |
| position. Since the CAAS horns did not have power, they were unable to |
| perform the intended safety function, rendering the system inoperable for |
| audibility. The system is required to be operable according to TSR 2.4.4.7.b |
| for the current mode of operation. The horns were without power (inoperable) |
| for approximately 30 minutes until the transfer switch was physically forced |
| to the emergency power position. |
| |
| This event is reportable under 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2) as an event in which |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
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