Event Notification Report for July 18, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
07/17/2000 - 07/18/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37153 37170 37171 37172 37173
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37153 |
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| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/08/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:19[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 07/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:07[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN CLAIRE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |STEVEN DENNIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| UNIT OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS FOLLOWING CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM |
| BACKFLUSHING |
| |
| The licensee reported that the service water system inlet temperature |
| exceeded the design basis temperature of 75� F for approximately 9 minutes |
| following the completion of a condenser backwashing operation. Actual system |
| temperatures increased from an initial temperature of 66� F to a high of |
| 90.6� F before returning to normal. |
| |
| The licensee stated that a new procedure for cleaning the circulating water |
| system was being used; instead of elevating and holding system temperature |
| ("mussel cooking"), a high flow rate "velocity flush" was performed. The |
| flushing was performed for approximately four minutes, during which time |
| service water inlet temperatures remained normal. However, after the |
| flushing was completed, service water system inlet temperatures, as measured |
| at various system headers, increased unexpectedly. The licensee has |
| cancelled additional flushing operations that had been planned for the |
| weekend. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 7/17/00 @ 1049 BY NELSON TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| Subsequent review and evaluation determined that the plant did operate |
| within the confines of its design basis. Therefore, this event was not |
| reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). This report is therefore |
| withdrawn. |
| |
| Specifically, as stated in the Basis for the Ultimate Heat Sink Technical |
| Specification (TS 3.7.11), the limitation on the ultimate heat sink |
| temperature ensures that sufficient cooling is available to either: |
| |
| 1.provide normal cooldown of the facility, or |
| 2. to mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits. |
| |
| This limitation is based on a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related |
| equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature. This basis |
| constitutes the design basis for the ultimate heat sink temperature |
| limitation. |
| |
| The temperature excursion that occurred was approximately 8 minutes in |
| duration. This period of time constitutes less than 2/1000 of 1 percent of |
| the aggregate time and is therefore insignificant relative to maintaining a |
| 30 day cooling water supply. Additionally, the indicated temperature at the |
| Vital switchgear cooling heat exchanger (X-183), while peaking at 90.6 �F, |
| was not indicative of the bulk (i.e. Long Island Sound) temperature of the |
| ultimate heat sink but rather was a localized effect resulting from the |
| planned backwashing |
| evolution that was the direct cause of the increased temperature |
| indication. |
| |
| The magnitude and duration of the temperature excursion was such that it |
| would not have inhibited the units ability to perform a normal cooldown of |
| the facility if it had been required. In addition, since the ultimate heat |
| sink temperature was restored to less than 75 �F within 8 minutes, the |
| ability to provide a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment |
| without exceeding their design basis temperature supply was not impacted. |
| Therefore, the power plant was not in a condition during operation that |
| resulted in the nuclear power plant being |
| outside of the design basis. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The Reg 1 RDO(Cranston) was |
| informed. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37170 |
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| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 07/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KERRY ALLEN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREGORY CRANSTON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| - LICENSEE NOTIFIED NY STATE DEC OF FAILURE OF PLANT FISH DETERRENT SYSTEM |
| - |
| |
| AT 1310 ON 07/17/00, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LICENSEE'S STATE POLLUTANT |
| DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW YORK |
| STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) REGARDING THE FAILURE |
| OF THE PLANT INTAKE STRUCTURE FISH DETERRENT SYSTEM. THE LICENSEE IS |
| INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE AND DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37171 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:33[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 07/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE GIOFFRE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/17/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |GREGORY CRANSTON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - LICENSEE NOTIFIED MD DOE OF COLIFORM FOUND IN PLANT DOMESTIC WATER SAMPLES |
| - |
| |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT (DOE) THAT THE |
| LICENSEE HAD OBTAINED POSITIVE COLIFORM RESULTS IN PLANT DOMESTIC WATER |
| SAMPLES DRAWN ON 07/10/00. THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING THE SOURCE OF THE |
| COLIFORM AND TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37172 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:14[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/17/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:20[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/17/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| At 1320 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA spacing control was lost |
| in a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building. It was |
| identified that two groups of seal cans were not spaced in accordance with |
| control #8 of NCSA-0330_003.A02. The NCSA requires that groups of up to 50 |
| seal cans be spaced a minimum of 48 inches edge-to-edge. One group of 48 |
| and one group of 11 seal cans were discovered spaced 38 inches edge-to-edge |
| in the X-330 building cold recovery seal storage area, |
| |
| This event resulted in a loss of one control (interaction/spacing) of the |
| double criticality control principle. NCS mass control was maintained for |
| the affected seal groups throughout this event. |
| |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 compliance was restored at 1705 at which time the seal can |
| groups were properly spaced under NCS Engineering guidance. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: |
| |
| The safety significance of this even is low. NCSE-0330_003.101 states: "If |
| two groups of fifty seals are not spaced as required, the mass of uranium is |
| estimated to be 3500 grams uranium or 525 grams of U-235. This amount of |
| uranium is a factor of 2.2 less than the minimum critical mass and is |
| therefore subcritical. Also since the seal sets are placed in cylindrical |
| cans approximately 19 inches in diameter and 9.5 inches tall and limited to |
| a stack not greater than six high, the material is not in its optimum |
| geometry. Therefore, even if two groups of fifty seals are placed together |
| or if spacing is not maintained while placing the seal groups in place, |
| criticality will not result since greater than the allowable mass would have |
| to be present also." |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: |
| |
| For a criticality to occur, the spacing would have to be violated and the |
| controls on mass would also need to be violated. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| |
| The controlled parameters in this case are interaction and mass. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The maximum amount of uranium in the 59 seal cans involved is estimated to |
| be 2055 grams uranium or 309.7 grams of U-235. The maximum enrichment |
| assumed in the analysis is 15% U-235 and the form of the material is dry |
| UO2F2. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The NCS interaction control was lost in this case. The seal can group was |
| required to be spaced 48 inches edge-to-edge and was found to be spaced only |
| 38 inches edge-to-edge. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| The NCS interaction control was reestablished at 1705 when the proper |
| spacing for the seal can groups was restored. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of |
| this event. |
| |
| PTS-2000-03533 PR-PTS-00-065 |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37173 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:18[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 07/17/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:35[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 07/17/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |MICHAEL PARKER R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |M. WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| At 1335 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA mass control was lost in |
| a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building. Two seal cans were |
| identified to contain more items than specifically permitted by |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 which states: "Only one seal set shall be |
| in each seal can." One seal can was discovered to contain two seal sets and |
| a second seal can was discovered to contain one seal with several (3 or 4) |
| additional seal parts. This deficiency was discovered during recovery |
| activities for NCS event report PTS-00-065 (NRC Event Number #37172) |
| involving a spacing violation of NCSA-0330_003.A02, requirement #8. |
| |
| This event resulted in the loss of one control (mass) of the double |
| criticality control principle. NCS interaction and enrichment control was |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 compliance was restored at 1415 when the |
| extra seal and seal parts were stored individually in seal cans under NCS |
| Engineering guidance. Complete compliance with NCSA-0330_003.A02 (refer to |
| NCS event #PTS-00-065) was established at 1705. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is low. NCSE-0330_003.101 analyzes |
| greater than safe mass in a group of seal cans. In this analysis it states |
| that with an enrichment limit of 15% U-235, the amount of uranium in a seal |
| can would have to be exceeded by 4.6 times the normal amount to reach the |
| minimum critical mass. In this event two seal cans were found to be double |
| loaded. Assuming that both overloaded seal cans were next to each other, |
| the mass in the cans is less than the minimum critical mass. Note: these |
| cans were found because the group they were in was being moved to correct a |
| spacing violation between two other seal can groups. The overloaded seal |
| cans were not directly involved in the spacing violation. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: |
| |
| For a criticality to occur, the seal cans would have to have more than a |
| double batch and the enrichment exceed 15% U-235. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, (GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| |
| The controlled parameters in this case are mass, enrichment and |
| interaction. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| The total amount of uranium in the 47 seal cans involved (including the two |
| overloaded cans) is estimated to be 1715 grams uranium or 257.3 grams of |
| U-235. The maximum enrichment for this NCSA is limited to 15% U-235 and the |
| form of the material is dry UO2F2. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The NCS mass control was lost in this case. Only one seal is allowed to be |
| placed In a seal can. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| At 1415, NCSA-0330_ 003.A02 compliance was restored. The extra seal parts |
| were removed and stored individually in separate seal storage cans. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of |
| this event. |
| |
| PTS-2000-03534 PR-PTS-00-066 |
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