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Event Notification Report for July 18, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           07/17/2000 - 07/18/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37153  37170  37171  37172  37173  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37153       |
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| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/08/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:19[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        07/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:07[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN CLAIRE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |STEVEN DENNIS        R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| UNIT OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS FOLLOWING CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM              |
| BACKFLUSHING                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that the service water system inlet temperature        |
| exceeded the design basis temperature of 75 F for approximately 9 minutes   |
| following the completion of a condenser backwashing operation. Actual system |
| temperatures increased from an initial temperature of 66 F to a high of     |
| 90.6 F before returning to normal.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that a new procedure for cleaning the circulating water  |
| system was being used; instead of elevating and holding system temperature   |
| ("mussel cooking"), a high flow rate "velocity flush" was performed. The     |
| flushing was performed for approximately four minutes, during which time     |
| service water inlet temperatures remained normal. However, after the         |
| flushing was completed, service water system inlet temperatures, as measured |
| at various system headers, increased unexpectedly. The licensee has          |
| cancelled additional flushing operations that had been planned for the       |
| weekend.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 7/17/00 @ 1049 BY NELSON TO GOULD * * *     RETRACTION       |
|                                                                              |
| Subsequent review and evaluation determined that the plant did operate       |
| within the confines of its design basis. Therefore, this event was not       |
| reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). This report is therefore   |
| withdrawn.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Specifically, as stated in the Basis for the Ultimate Heat Sink Technical    |
| Specification (TS 3.7.11), the limitation on the ultimate heat sink          |
| temperature ensures that sufficient cooling is available to either:          |
|                                                                              |
| 1.provide normal cooldown of the facility, or                                |
| 2. to mitigate the effects of accident conditions within acceptable limits.  |
|                                                                              |
| This limitation is based on a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related  |
| equipment without exceeding their design basis temperature. This basis       |
| constitutes the design basis for the ultimate heat sink temperature          |
| limitation.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The temperature excursion that occurred was approximately 8 minutes in       |
| duration. This period of time constitutes less than 2/1000 of 1 percent of   |
| the aggregate time and is therefore insignificant relative to maintaining a  |
| 30 day cooling water supply.  Additionally, the indicated temperature at the |
| Vital switchgear cooling heat exchanger (X-183), while peaking at 90.6 F,   |
| was not indicative of the bulk (i.e. Long Island Sound) temperature of the   |
| ultimate heat sink but rather was a localized effect resulting from the      |
| planned backwashing                                                          |
| evolution that was the direct cause of the increased temperature             |
| indication.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The magnitude and duration of the temperature excursion was such that it     |
| would not have inhibited the units ability to perform a normal cooldown of   |
| the facility if it had been required.  In addition, since the ultimate heat  |
| sink temperature was restored to less than 75 F within 8 minutes, the       |
| ability to provide a 30 day cooling water supply to safety related equipment |
| without exceeding their design basis temperature supply was not impacted.    |
| Therefore, the power plant was not in a condition during operation that      |
| resulted in the nuclear power plant being                                    |
| outside of the design basis.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.  The Reg 1 RDO(Cranston) was        |
| informed.                                                                    |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37170       |
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| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:55[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        07/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:10[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KERRY ALLEN                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREGORY CRANSTON     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - LICENSEE NOTIFIED NY STATE DEC OF FAILURE OF PLANT FISH DETERRENT SYSTEM   |
| -                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1310 ON 07/17/00, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LICENSEE'S STATE POLLUTANT       |
| DISCHARGE ELIMINATION SYSTEM PERMIT, THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW YORK      |
| STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION (DEC) REGARDING THE FAILURE   |
| OF THE PLANT INTAKE STRUCTURE FISH DETERRENT SYSTEM.  THE LICENSEE IS        |
| INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE AND DETERMINING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.                  |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37171       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:33[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        07/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE GIOFFRE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GREGORY CRANSTON     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - LICENSEE NOTIFIED MD DOE OF COLIFORM FOUND IN PLANT DOMESTIC WATER SAMPLES |
| -                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT (DOE) THAT THE  |
| LICENSEE HAD OBTAINED POSITIVE COLIFORM RESULTS IN PLANT DOMESTIC WATER      |
| SAMPLES DRAWN ON 07/10/00.  THE LICENSEE IS DETERMINING THE SOURCE OF THE    |
| COLIFORM AND TAKING CORRECTIVE ACTIONS.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37172       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:14[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        07/17/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:20[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/17/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |MICHAEL PARKER       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -                                         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1320 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA spacing control was lost |
| in a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building.  It was         |
| identified that two groups of seal cans were not spaced in accordance with   |
| control #8 of NCSA-0330_003.A02. The NCSA requires that groups of up to 50   |
| seal cans be spaced a minimum of 48 inches edge-to-edge.  One group of 48    |
| and one group of 11 seal cans were discovered spaced 38 inches edge-to-edge  |
| in the X-330 building cold recovery seal storage area,                       |
|                                                                              |
| This event resulted in a loss of one control (interaction/spacing) of the    |
| double criticality control principle.  NCS mass control was maintained for   |
| the affected seal groups throughout this event.                              |
|                                                                              |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 compliance was restored at 1705 at which time the seal can |
| groups were properly spaced under NCS Engineering guidance.                  |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of this even is low.  NCSE-0330_003.101 states:  "If |
| two groups of fifty seals are not spaced as required, the mass of uranium is |
| estimated to be 3500 grams uranium or 525 grams of U-235. This amount of     |
| uranium is a factor of 2.2 less than the minimum critical mass and is        |
| therefore subcritical.  Also since the seal sets are placed in cylindrical   |
| cans approximately 19 inches in diameter and 9.5 inches tall and limited to  |
| a stack not greater than six high, the material is not in its optimum        |
| geometry.  Therefore, even if two groups of fifty seals are placed together  |
| or if spacing is not maintained while placing the seal groups in place,      |
| criticality will not result since greater than the allowable mass would have |
| to be present also."                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| For a criticality to occur, the spacing would have to be violated and the    |
| controls on mass would also need to be violated.                             |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS. MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):      |
|                                                                              |
| The controlled parameters in this case are interaction and mass.             |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The maximum amount of uranium in the 59 seal cans involved is estimated to   |
| be 2055 grams uranium or 309.7 grams of U-235.  The maximum enrichment       |
| assumed in the analysis is 15% U-235 and the form of the material is dry     |
| UO2F2.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NCS interaction control was lost in this case.  The seal can group was   |
| required to be spaced 48 inches edge-to-edge and was found to be spaced only |
| 38 inches edge-to-edge.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| The NCS interaction control was reestablished at 1705 when the proper        |
| spacing for the seal can groups was restored.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of  |
| this event.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| PTS-2000-03533       PR-PTS-00-065                                           |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37173       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 07/17/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:18[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        07/17/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:35[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  07/17/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |MICHAEL PARKER       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |M. WAYNE HODGES      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -                                         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1335 on 07/17/00, it was discovered that an NCSA mass control was lost in |
| a compressor seal can storage area in the X-330 building. Two seal cans were |
| identified to contain more items than specifically permitted by              |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 which states:  "Only one seal set shall be  |
| in each seal can."  One seal can was discovered to contain two seal sets and |
| a second seal can was discovered to contain one seal with several (3 or 4)   |
| additional seal parts.  This deficiency was discovered during recovery       |
| activities for NCS event report PTS-00-065 (NRC Event Number #37172)         |
| involving a spacing violation of NCSA-0330_003.A02, requirement #8.          |
|                                                                              |
| This event resulted in the loss of one control (mass) of the double          |
| criticality control principle.  NCS interaction and enrichment control was   |
| maintained throughout this event.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| NCSA-0330_003.A02 requirement #4 compliance was restored at 1415 when the    |
| extra seal and seal parts were stored individually in seal cans under NCS    |
| Engineering guidance.  Complete compliance with NCSA-0330_003.A02 (refer to  |
| NCS event #PTS-00-065) was established at 1705.                              |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of this event is low.  NCSE-0330_003.101 analyzes    |
| greater than safe mass in a group of seal cans.  In this analysis it states  |
| that with an enrichment limit of 15% U-235, the amount of uranium in a seal  |
| can would have to be exceeded by 4.6 times the normal amount to reach the    |
| minimum critical mass.  In this event two seal cans were found to be double  |
| loaded.  Assuming that both overloaded seal cans were next to each other,    |
| the mass in the cans is less than the minimum critical mass.  Note: these    |
| cans were found because the group they were in was being moved to correct a  |
| spacing violation between two other seal can groups. The overloaded seal     |
| cans were not directly involved in the spacing violation.                    |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| For a criticality to occur, the seal cans would have to have more than a     |
| double batch and the enrichment exceed 15% U-235.                            |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, (GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):     |
|                                                                              |
| The controlled parameters in this case are mass, enrichment and              |
| interaction.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The total amount of uranium in the 47 seal cans involved (including the two  |
| overloaded cans) is estimated to be 1715 grams uranium or 257.3 grams of     |
| U-235.  The maximum enrichment for this NCSA is limited to 15% U-235 and the |
| form of the material is dry UO2F2.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NCS mass control was lost in this case.  Only one seal is allowed to be  |
| placed In a seal can.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1415, NCSA-0330_ 003.A02 compliance was restored. The extra seal parts    |
| were removed and stored individually in separate seal storage cans.          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the DOE Site Representative were notified of  |
| this event.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| PTS-2000-03534      PR-PTS-00-066                                            |
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