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Event Notification Report for June 27, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/26/2000 - 06/27/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36712  37113  37114  37115  37116  37117  37118  37119  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36712       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:22[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/21/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/26/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |ROBERT PIERSON       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN PITTMAN               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT -                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Material storage areas transferred from DOE to USEC contain uncharacterized  |
| potentially fissile material that does not comply with USEC NCS program      |
| requirements. The stored material also does not meet DOE NCS requirements.   |
| Responsibility for the storage areas was transferred to USEC for more rapid  |
| remediation of the non-conforming conditions, in part to support the Seismic |
| Upgrade Project in C-331 and C-335, and to improve overall site safety.      |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The DOE material storage areas were located  |
| within the boundaries of USEC leased space. Transfer to USEC control allows  |
| more timely remediation to establish double contingency controls on the      |
| material.  Timely remediation will improve overall site safety.  The         |
| material is in a stable condition and double contingency will be established |
| using USEC procedures.  These procedures ensure that safety is not degraded  |
| during the remediation actions.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:  In order for a criticality to be possible, more   |
| than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.     |
| The stored material is primarily equipment items in which the fissile        |
| material is deposited in small quantities widely dispersed over large        |
| surface areas.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, etc):       |
| Since no NCS controls were applied to the equipment, double contingency can  |
| not be demonstrated.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT,  ENRICHMENT,  FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS   |
| LIMIT AND %  WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):  Unknown due to DOE previously       |
| controlling areas.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  No NCS controls (other than providing 10   |
| feet buffer zone) where in place.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| Areas are to be remediated in accordance with NCS program requirements.      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
|                                                                              |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-OO-1009:  PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-017.   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1232 4/18/2000 FROM PITTMAN TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *             |
|                                                                              |
| An additional area, DMSA 30 in C-337, was transferred from DOE to USEC on    |
| 4/18/2000 at 1000 CST. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this  |
| update. Notified  R3DO (Ring), NMSS (Sturz).                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1640EDT ON 6/26/00 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| Assay results identified three converters each containing >400 grams U-235.  |
| This amount of material is beyond the scope of the NCS program.  Corrective  |
| actions have not been identified.  The assay results are as follows:         |
|                                                                              |
| 956   gms U-235 assay 42.65%                                                 |
| 973   gms U-235 assay 57.45%                                                 |
| 1230 gms U-235 assay 29.75%                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.  Notified R3DO(Leach) and      |
| NMSS(Piccone).                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The following UPDATE information was received via fax:                       |
|                                                                              |
| EVENT DESCRIPTION:                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were discovered that contained greater |
| than 5.5 wt. % enrichment and greater than 400 grams 235U. There are no      |
| actions specified in NCSA GEN-20 which will result in the ability to         |
| establish double contingency. Three items were discovered in DMSA-331-09     |
| containing 956 grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and |
| 1230 grams 235U at 29.75 wt. %.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items have been identified that contain      |
| greater than the minimum critical mass. The minimum critical mass Is based   |
| on optimum geometry, moderation, and reflection conditions. The material     |
| contained within the subject equipment is expected to be distributed         |
| throughout the equipment. Due to process nature and equipment design, there  |
| are no credible mechanisms for accumulation of material in an optimum        |
| geometrical configuration. The subject equipment openings are covered to     |
| preclude intrusion of fire sprinkler water and optimum moderation conditions |
| are not credible. A minimum 10-foot exclusion zone has been established      |
| around the three equipment items to preclude Increased reflection effects    |
| due to equipment/ personnel in the immediate vicinity.                       |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: Three equipment items were identified as containing greater  |
| than the minimum critical mass. Since the three items contain approximately  |
| 105, 112, and 120% of the estimated minimum critical mass at their           |
| respective enrichments, the mass would have to exist in a near optimum       |
| geometry, moderation, and reflection before a criticality could occur.       |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
| Unknown due to DOE previously controlling areas.                             |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: The three subject equipment items respectively contained 956 |
| grams 235U at 42.65 wt. %, 973 grams 235U at 57.45 wt. %, and 1230 grams     |
| 235U at 29.75 wt. %. Limits as established in NCSA GEN-20 are 400 grams 235U |
| at 5.5 wt. %.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone    |
| shall [be] established around the three equipment items located in           |
| DMSA-331-09 which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The        |
| exclusion zone shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge |
| of the subject equipment.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| UPDATE 6-26-00: In addition to the 10-foot buffer zone, an exclusion zone    |
| shall be established around the three equipment items located in DMSA-331-09 |
| which contain greater than the minimum critical mass. The exclusion zone     |
| shall be posted with a minimum 10-foot boundary from the edge of the subject |
| equipment.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37113       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:28[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        06/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:53[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID HANKS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/26/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOE TAPIA            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF POWER TO AT LEAST 13 OF 43 EVACUATION PUBLIC NOTIFICATION SYSTEM     |
| SIRENS FOR APPROXIMATELY 20 MINUTES FOLLOWED BY SIRENS FALSELY IN ALARM FOR  |
| ABOUT 4 MINUTES                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Tensas Perish in Louisiana reported a loss of power to evacuation public     |
| notification system sirens.  At least 13 of 43 sirens lost power for         |
| approximately 20 minutes, and upon restoration, the sirens were in alarm for |
| approximately 4 minutes.  Local public address station KNOE was notified of  |
| the false alarm by Tensas Perish.  The system has been restored to normal.   |
| All systems functioned as required once power was restored.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee made applicable local and media notifications and plans to      |
| notify the NRC resident inspector.                                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37114       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WNP-2                    REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:05[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-5                             |EVENT DATE:        06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:25[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID SWANK                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/26/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GAIL GOOD            R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ROBERT DENNIG        EO      |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING A TRIP OF THE MAIN     |
| TURBINE                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "MAIN TURBINE TRIP RESULTING IN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM.  ALL RODS INSERTED. |
| TWO MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES AUTOMATICALLY OPENED ON HIGH PRESSURE.          |
| EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES WERE ENTERED ON LOW REACTOR LEVEL [+13        |
| INCHES].  BYPASS VALVE #1 OPENED AND STUCK OPEN RESULTING IN REACTOR         |
| PRESSURE DECREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 500 PSIG.  COOLDOWN RATE WAS NOT          |
| EXCEEDED.  THE BYPASS VALVE IS CURRENTLY CLOSED.  REACTOR WATER LEVEL        |
| INCREASED ABOVE LEVEL 8 [+54.5 INCHES].  PRESSURE CONTROL IS CURRENTLY ON    |
| SRVs [SAFETY RELIEF VALVES].  LEVEL CONTROL IS CURRENTLY ON CONDENSATE AND   |
| BOOSTER PUMPS.  ALL SYSTEMS STABLE."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| ALL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT IS AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED.  ELECTRICAL LOADS ARE  |
| CURRENTLY SUPPLIED BY OFFSITE POWER.  ONE TRAIN OF SUPPRESSION POOL [SP]     |
| COOLING IS IN OPERATION MAINTAINING SP TEMPERATURE AT 86 DEGREES F.  THE     |
| LICENSEE IS INVESTIGATING THE CAUSE OF THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP AND FAILURE OF  |
| THE #1 BYPASS VALVE TO CLOSE.  THERE WAS NO ELECTRICAL MAINTENANCE OR        |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING IN PROGRESS PRIOR TO THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP.             |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37115       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  WA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:20[EDT]|
|    CITY:  LYNNWOOD                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        06/13/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  WA |EVENT TIME:        10:30[PDT]|
|LICENSE#:  WN-L073-1             AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GAIL GOOD            R4      |
|                                                |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY FRAZEE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A DAMAGED TROXLER GAUGE                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was received via fax (event report #WA-00-022):    |
|                                                                              |
| This is notification of an event in Washington state as investigated by the  |
| WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection.                   |
|                                                                              |
| STATUS: new                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Licensee: Washington Department of Transportation                            |
| City and state: Seattle, WA                                                  |
| License number: WN-L073-1                                                    |
| Type of license: Portable Gauge                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Date of event: 6/13/00                                                       |
| Location of Event: Lynnwood, WA                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ABSTRACT: At approximately, 10:30 AM, a construction contractor working for  |
| the Washington Department of Transportation (DOT) drove a bulldozer over a   |
| Troxler Model 3430 moisture/density gauge adjacent to the northbound off     |
| ramp at exit 186 on Interstate 5.  The exact cause of the accident is not    |
| known at this time.  However, an underlying cause seems to be the constant   |
| pressure to keep working.  This brings huge machinery and tiny testing       |
| equipment into the same area at the same time.  The gauge was in use at the  |
| time with the 8 millicuries Cs-137 source extended from the gauge body which |
| also contains a 40 millicuries Am-241/Be source.  A representative from the  |
| Division of Radiation Protection (DRP) was on the scene by 11:30 AM.  The    |
| local Fire Department, the State Patrol and at least one news crew also      |
| responded.  The work site was stopped and both off ramps and the overpass    |
| were closed by the Fire Department as an additional precaution.  The DRP     |
| representative determined that the impact demolished the gauge and jammed    |
| the extended source so that it could not be returned to the shielding.  The  |
| DRP representative assisted the licensee in securing the sources in the      |
| transport box and filling it with dirt to provide additional shielding.  The |
| sources were transported to the Olympia DOT Materials Lab where proper       |
| shields were available.  The sources will remain there until the             |
| manufacturer sends an appropriate shipping container.  DOT issued a press    |
| release and coverage appeared on television and in local and regional        |
| newspapers.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? WAC 46-221-250      |
| (damaged equipment)                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Activity and isotope(s) involved: 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be          |
|                                                                              |
| Overexposures?  none                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Lost, Stolen or Damaged?  Damage to Troxler Model 3430 portable gauge        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37116       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  INGERSOLL-DRESSER PUMP COMPANY       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  INGERSOLL-DRESSER PUMP COMPANY       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
|    CITY:  HUNTINGTON PARK          REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        06/26/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  CA |EVENT TIME:             [PDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GAIL GOOD            R4      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL SHAFER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING A DESIGN DEFECT IN A SPLIT RING RETAINER (DRAWING   |
| B65573)                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is written to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 21.21.4.    |
| The numbering of the information given here correlates with the numbering in |
| 21.21.4:                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| (i)   Bill Shaffer                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| Director of Operations                                                       |
| Ingersoll-Dresser Pump                                                       |
| 5715 Bickett Street                                                          |
| Huntington Park, CA 90255                                                    |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| (ii)  Split Ring Retainer                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Drawing B65573 Rev.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| (iii)  Ingersoll-Dresser Pump                                                |
| 5715 Bickett Street                                                          |
| Huntington Park, CA 90255                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| (iv) The Split Ring Retainer (Drawing B65573 Rev. 0) specifies a drilled and |
| counter bored bolt hole diameter too large to allow the bolting to secure    |
| this retainer in its intended position. Based on an evaluation of this       |
| condition, it has been determined that this design defect could allow the    |
| subject Split Ring Retainer and other adjacent parts including the Split     |
| Ring Retainer bolting, split ring and pressure reducing sleeve to move out   |
| of position. This could result in a seal failure or a catastrophic pump      |
| failure.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| (v)  IDP Huntington Park was informed of this defect on 6-22-00.             |
|                                                                              |
| (vi) Three defective split ring retainers were manufactured. The location of |
| all three are known to IDP-HP. Three were shipped to STP Nuclear Operating   |
| Co. One of the defective split ring retainers was installed and put into     |
| service at STP.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| (vii) On June 23rd Dennis Stark of STP was notified of the defective split   |
| ring retainer and that it could result in a catastrophic failure.            |
| Replacement split ring retainers with corrected design will be ship[ed] by   |
| June 30, 2000.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| (viii) IDP-HP advised Dennis Stark of STP that the pump with the installed   |
| defective split ring retainer should be taken out of service."               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37117       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SEABROOK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:23[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:53[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK O'CONNOR                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |SCOTT MORRIS         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING A LOSS OF THE "A" MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP (MFP)  |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1900EDT ON 6/26/00, THE UNIT EXPERIENCED A PLANT SETBACK TO 55% POWER     |
| FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF THE "A" MFP.  OPERATORS INSERTED A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP |
| AS STEAM GENERATOR LEVELS APPROACHED THE LOW LEVEL TRIP SETPOINT.  ALL       |
| SYSTEMS FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED WITH  ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTING.       |
| EMERGENCY FEEDWATER (EFW) ACTUATED AS EXPECTED.  THE MAIN CONDENSER IS       |
| AVAILABLE ACCEPTING DECAY HEAT VIA STEAM BYPASS.  NO PRIMARY/SECONDARY       |
| SAFETIES/RELIEFS LIFTED DURING THE TRANSIENT.  ALL THREE OFFSITE POWER       |
| SOURCES ARE AVAILABLE.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR AND WILL ISSUE A PRESS      |
| RELEASE.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| ********** UPDATE AT 0015 ON 06/27/00 FROM DAMON RITTER TO LEIGH TROCINE     |
| **********                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee updated this event notification to document an abnormal         |
| post-trip response and to correct the event time.  The following text is a   |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent to the trip, one channel of intermediate and source range        |
| nuclear instrumentation did not energize.  The cause is under investigation. |
| [The licensee stated that this did not place the unit in a limiting          |
| condition for operation because there was still one channel in operation.]   |
| Additionally, the event time for the event notification is corrected.  The   |
| reactor trip was initiated at 1853 [on] 26 June 2000 [in lieu of 1900]."     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Morris).                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37118       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:58[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  S. SAUER                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |SCOTT MORRIS         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       92       Power Operation  |92       Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY SIRENS                    |
|                                                                              |
| "NOTIFIED BY EMERGENCY PLANNING PERSONNEL THAT AS OF 2058[EDT] ON 6/26/00,   |
| NINETEEN [19] OFFSITE SIRENS HAD BEEN LOST.  AS OF 2158[EDT] EFFORTS TO      |
| RESTORE ARE STILL IN PROGRESS.  OF THE NINETEEN [19], SIXTEEN [16] ARE IN    |
| DELAWARE AND THREE [3] ARE IN NEW JERSEY.  THE NINETEEN [19] SIRENS          |
| REPRESENTS LOSS OF GREATER THAN 25% OF THE TOTAL OF SEVENTY-ONE [71]         |
| SIRENS."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE, HOWEVER, THEY ARE CURRENTLY       |
| EXPERIENCING ADVERSE WEATHER.  THIS REPORT ALSO AFFECTS THE HOPE CREEK       |
| STATION.  THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.               |
|                                                                              |
| ********** UPDATE AT 0043 ON 06/27/00 FROM STEVE SAUER TO LEIGH TROCINE      |
| **********                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 2340 on 06/26/00, the licensee was notified that the bulk of the offsite  |
| emergency sirens (all but three) had been restored to service.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Morris).                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37119       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/27/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        06/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:22[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARK ABRAMSKI                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/27/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |SCOTT MORRIS         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATIONS DUE TO THE TRIPPING   |
| OF ELECTRICAL PROTECTION ASSEMBLIES (EPA) AND SUBSEQUENT HALF SCRAM          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "[The unit experienced a loss] of [the] 'A' [reactor protection system       |
| (RPS)] bus[.  Output] EPAs tripped causing [this 120-volt AC] bus to         |
| de-energize.  This caused the reactor building ventilation to isolate[,]     |
| both [standby gas treatment systems (SBGT)] to start[, and the] 'A'          |
| [hydrogen/oxygen (H2/O2)] monitor to trip (PCIS valves).  [The reactor water |
| cleanup (RWCU)] system tripped on low flow due to 12MOV-15 closure (PCIS     |
| valve)."                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that there was nothing unusual or not understood and     |
| that all systems functioned as required.  The licensee also stated that the  |
| cause of this event is currently under investigation.  The EPAs tripped      |
| under normal supply, and the RPS motor-generator set was functioning         |
| properly.  There were no maintenance or surveillance activities underway at  |
| the time of the event.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The reactor building and H2/O2 analyzers have since been un-isolated.  SBGT  |
| is currently under normal operation and is being used for venting.  RWCU has |
| not yet been restored to normal.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+