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Event Notification Report for June 15, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/14/2000 - 06/15/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37042  37081  37082  37083  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37042       |
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| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        05/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:52[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BART CROW                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CLAUDE JOHNSON       R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       15       Power Operation  |15       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| ENTERED LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATIONS (LCO)  AFTER REACTOR CORE ISOLATION |
| COOLING (RCIC) DECLARED INOPERABLE.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| RCIC was declared inoperable during surveillance testing after RCIC minimum  |
| flow isolation valve failed to open during testing.  Technical Specification |
| 3.5.3, 14 day LCO , was entered after RCIC was declared inoperable.  All     |
| other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable if needed.  Offsite electrical grid is stable.                |
|                                                                              |
| Startup testing is continuing.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| ********** UPDATE AT 1420 ON 06/14/00 FROM BILL GREEN TO LEIGH TROCINE       |
| **********                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following information is a portion of a facsimile received from the      |
| licensee:                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "On 28 May, 2000, at 2017 hours, a [4-]hour report (Event Notification       |
| 37042) was made to the NRC on RCIC system being inoperable due to the        |
| failure of the minimum flow isolation valve to open during surveillance      |
| testing.  Subsequently, it has been determined that RCIC was operable, and   |
| this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) as a loss of      |
| safety function."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The surveillance procedure, 6.RCIC.102, fulfills inservice testing and full |
| flow testing requirements.  Although the procedure does not require the      |
| minimum flow valve to open during the performance of this surveillance, it   |
| has operated during past performances.  Procedure 6.RCIC.102 did reference   |
| Technical Requirements Manual TSR 3.3.2.2 which contains a [>=] 40 gpm       |
| Allowable Value for the RCIC Low Pump Discharge Flow Function, i.e., a       |
| minimum flow requirement."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Further review determined that the reference to TSR 3.3.2.2 is unnecessary  |
| in 6.RCIC.102.  During the performance of 6.RCIC.102, the system line-up     |
| initially allows full flow through the test line, and therefore, minimum     |
| flow valve operation is not required.  Minimum flow valve operation is       |
| dependent upon system variations in flow and pressure during RCIC pump start |
| up and is possible, but not required with the test flow path already         |
| established.  It has subsequently been determined that the minimum flow      |
| valve logic is and was operable and that the minimum flow valve will open    |
| when required."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "As such, RCIC was able to perform its required function and was operable.   |
| Therefore, this event is not reportable, and event notification 37042 is     |
| retracted."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations center |
| notified the R4DO (Linda Smith).                                             |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37081       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER            REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/2000|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP                         |EVENT DATE:        06/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SHAWN SIMON                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RUDOLPH BERNHARD     R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF ACTIVATION CAPABILITY OF ALL OFFSITE SIRENS                          |
|                                                                              |
| Citrus County notified the licensee that the offsite sirens were not able to |
| be activated.  Subsequent tests indicated that all offsite sirens were       |
| inoperable.  The vendor has been notified and is on the way to make          |
| repairs.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the local counties, Citrus and Levy, and intends to    |
| notify the State Warning Point and the NRC Resident Inspector.               |
|                                                                              |
| ********** UPDATE AT 1525 ON 06/14/00 FROM SHAWN SIMON TO LEIGH TROCINE      |
| **********                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| At 1510 on 06/14/00, the licensee was notified that the sirens were fully    |
| operable.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and plans to make a  |
| courtesy notification to the state.  The NRC operations officer notified the |
| R2DO (Bernhard).                                                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37082       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        06/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN NILES                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MOHAMED SHANBAKY     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX     |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |EPA, DOT (via NRC)   FAX     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Decommissioned   |0        Decommissioned   |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A 2-GALLON OIL SPILL INSIDE THE PROTECTED     |
| AREA                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1430 on 06/14/00, the licensee notified the National Response Center of   |
| an oil spill onsite.  Approximately 5 to 10 gallons of hydraulic oil spilled |
| onto the ground near the shoreline of the Back River, and approximately 2    |
| gallons of this hydraulic oil subsequently entered the Back River (a body of |
| water located off of the Sheepscot River).                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The oil leaked from a hydraulic fitting on a tractor trailer (a heavy        |
| hauler) located near the shore line inside the protected area.  At the time  |
| of the event, the tractor trailer was being utilized to load a pressurizer   |
| onto a barge.  The initial spill was reported to the control room at 1315,   |
| and it was discovered that some of the oil entered the water at 1335.        |
|                                                                              |
| The leak has been stopped, booms have been placed into the water to contain  |
| the oil, and clean up efforts are currently in progress.  Oil pads have been |
| placed both on the surface of the water and on the ground to contain and     |
| soak up the oil.  The licensee has also called a local hazardous waste       |
| response organization (Clean Harbors) and their estimated time of arrival is |
| approximately 1630.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently shutdown, and decommissioning is in progress.  There   |
| is no NRC resident inspector assigned to this site at this time.             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37083       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:29[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/14/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:00[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |LARRY CAMPER         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEVIN BEASLEY                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE ESTABLISHED DOUBLE     |
| CONTINGENCY INVOLVING THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CONTROLS (24-HOUR REPORT)       |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah         |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant water hose containing valve W-10 on the C-400 cylinder wash stand |
| was long enough to allow a physical connection to the cylinder wash solution |
| tanks in violation of a safety-related item contained in NCSE.006.03.        |
| Safety-related item 5.5.7 states that the hose shall not be long enough to   |
| connect the plant water system to the cylinder wash tanks.  This is to       |
| prevent the potential for backflow of fissile solution into the plant water  |
| system, which is not analyzed for fissile solution."                         |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:"                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The plant water hose was never connected to the cylinder wash tanks.  The   |
| normal plant water system pressure is well above the maximum pressure in the |
| cylinder wash tanks and would preclude backflow even if connected.  In       |
| addition, the connecting fittings on the plant water hose and on the         |
| cylinder wash tanks were incompatible."                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:"                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the hose would have to be        |
| connected to the solution storage tanks, fissile solution would have to      |
| backflow into the plant water system, and it would have to accumulate a      |
| critical mass in an unsafe geometry."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, ETC):"     |
|                                                                              |
| "[The] double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing   |
| two controls on mass."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):"                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "None.  The C-400 cylinder wash was out of service at the time of discovery. |
| The plant water hose was never connected to the cylinder wash tanks when the |
| cylinder wash was in operation."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:"                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "[The] double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing   |
| two controls on mass."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is an administrative control, which     |
| prohibits connecting the plant water hose directly to the cylinder wash      |
| tanks.  This control was not violated, and the first leg of double           |
| contingency was maintained."                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of [the] double contingency is a physical control on the     |
| length of the plant water hose to prevent connection to the cylinder wash    |
| tanks.  The hose containing valve W-10 was physically long enough to connect |
| to the cylinder wash tank at air sparge valve A-22.  This control was        |
| violated, and [the] double contingency was not maintained."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS              |
| IMPLEMENTED:"                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "This area is being controlled to ensure that the hose is not moved without  |
| NCS approval.  The corrective action will be to reduce the length of the     |
| hose such that it is compliant with the safety-related item."                |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.                       |
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