Event Notification Report for June 15, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/14/2000 - 06/15/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37042 37081 37082 37083
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37042 |
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| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:52[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BART CROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 15 Power Operation |15 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| ENTERED LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATIONS (LCO) AFTER REACTOR CORE ISOLATION |
| COOLING (RCIC) DECLARED INOPERABLE. |
| |
| RCIC was declared inoperable during surveillance testing after RCIC minimum |
| flow isolation valve failed to open during testing. Technical Specification |
| 3.5.3, 14 day LCO , was entered after RCIC was declared inoperable. All |
| other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable if needed. Offsite electrical grid is stable. |
| |
| Startup testing is continuing. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| ********** UPDATE AT 1420 ON 06/14/00 FROM BILL GREEN TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ********** |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification. |
| |
| The following information is a portion of a facsimile received from the |
| licensee: |
| |
| "On 28 May, 2000, at 2017 hours, a [4-]hour report (Event Notification |
| 37042) was made to the NRC on RCIC system being inoperable due to the |
| failure of the minimum flow isolation valve to open during surveillance |
| testing. Subsequently, it has been determined that RCIC was operable, and |
| this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii) as a loss of |
| safety function." |
| |
| "The surveillance procedure, 6.RCIC.102, fulfills inservice testing and full |
| flow testing requirements. Although the procedure does not require the |
| minimum flow valve to open during the performance of this surveillance, it |
| has operated during past performances. Procedure 6.RCIC.102 did reference |
| Technical Requirements Manual TSR 3.3.2.2 which contains a [>=] 40 gpm |
| Allowable Value for the RCIC Low Pump Discharge Flow Function, i.e., a |
| minimum flow requirement." |
| |
| "Further review determined that the reference to TSR 3.3.2.2 is unnecessary |
| in 6.RCIC.102. During the performance of 6.RCIC.102, the system line-up |
| initially allows full flow through the test line, and therefore, minimum |
| flow valve operation is not required. Minimum flow valve operation is |
| dependent upon system variations in flow and pressure during RCIC pump start |
| up and is possible, but not required with the test flow path already |
| established. It has subsequently been determined that the minimum flow |
| valve logic is and was operable and that the minimum flow valve will open |
| when required." |
| |
| "As such, RCIC was able to perform its required function and was operable. |
| Therefore, this event is not reportable, and event notification 37042 is |
| retracted." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The NRC operations center |
| notified the R4DO (Linda Smith). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37081 |
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| FACILITY: CRYSTAL RIVER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/2000|
| UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [3] B&W-L-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SHAWN SIMON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |RUDOLPH BERNHARD R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| LOSS OF ACTIVATION CAPABILITY OF ALL OFFSITE SIRENS |
| |
| Citrus County notified the licensee that the offsite sirens were not able to |
| be activated. Subsequent tests indicated that all offsite sirens were |
| inoperable. The vendor has been notified and is on the way to make |
| repairs. |
| |
| The licensee notified the local counties, Citrus and Levy, and intends to |
| notify the State Warning Point and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| ********** UPDATE AT 1525 ON 06/14/00 FROM SHAWN SIMON TO LEIGH TROCINE |
| ********** |
| |
| At 1510 on 06/14/00, the licensee was notified that the sirens were fully |
| operable. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector and plans to make a |
| courtesy notification to the state. The NRC operations officer notified the |
| R2DO (Bernhard). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37082 |
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| FACILITY: MAINE YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: ME |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN NILES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |EPA, DOT (via NRC) FAX |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Decommissioned |0 Decommissioned |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION REGARDING A 2-GALLON OIL SPILL INSIDE THE PROTECTED |
| AREA |
| |
| At 1430 on 06/14/00, the licensee notified the National Response Center of |
| an oil spill onsite. Approximately 5 to 10 gallons of hydraulic oil spilled |
| onto the ground near the shoreline of the Back River, and approximately 2 |
| gallons of this hydraulic oil subsequently entered the Back River (a body of |
| water located off of the Sheepscot River). |
| |
| The oil leaked from a hydraulic fitting on a tractor trailer (a heavy |
| hauler) located near the shore line inside the protected area. At the time |
| of the event, the tractor trailer was being utilized to load a pressurizer |
| onto a barge. The initial spill was reported to the control room at 1315, |
| and it was discovered that some of the oil entered the water at 1335. |
| |
| The leak has been stopped, booms have been placed into the water to contain |
| the oil, and clean up efforts are currently in progress. Oil pads have been |
| placed both on the surface of the water and on the ground to contain and |
| soak up the oil. The licensee has also called a local hazardous waste |
| response organization (Clean Harbors) and their estimated time of arrival is |
| approximately 1630. |
| |
| The unit is currently shutdown, and decommissioning is in progress. There |
| is no NRC resident inspector assigned to this site at this time. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37083 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:29[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/14/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:00[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |LARRY CAMPER NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEVIN BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE - FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE ESTABLISHED DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY INVOLVING THE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO CONTROLS (24-HOUR REPORT) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah |
| personnel: |
| |
| "The plant water hose containing valve W-10 on the C-400 cylinder wash stand |
| was long enough to allow a physical connection to the cylinder wash solution |
| tanks in violation of a safety-related item contained in NCSE.006.03. |
| Safety-related item 5.5.7 states that the hose shall not be long enough to |
| connect the plant water system to the cylinder wash tanks. This is to |
| prevent the potential for backflow of fissile solution into the plant water |
| system, which is not analyzed for fissile solution." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:" |
| |
| "The plant water hose was never connected to the cylinder wash tanks. The |
| normal plant water system pressure is well above the maximum pressure in the |
| cylinder wash tanks and would preclude backflow even if connected. In |
| addition, the connecting fittings on the plant water hose and on the |
| cylinder wash tanks were incompatible." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIOS) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:" |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, the hose would have to be |
| connected to the solution storage tanks, fissile solution would have to |
| backflow into the plant water system, and it would have to accumulate a |
| critical mass in an unsafe geometry." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, ETC):" |
| |
| "[The] double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing |
| two controls on mass." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):" |
| |
| "None. The C-400 cylinder wash was out of service at the time of discovery. |
| The plant water hose was never connected to the cylinder wash tanks when the |
| cylinder wash was in operation." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:" |
| |
| "[The] double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing |
| two controls on mass." |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is an administrative control, which |
| prohibits connecting the plant water hose directly to the cylinder wash |
| tanks. This control was not violated, and the first leg of double |
| contingency was maintained." |
| |
| "The second leg of [the] double contingency is a physical control on the |
| length of the plant water hose to prevent connection to the cylinder wash |
| tanks. The hose containing valve W-10 was physically long enough to connect |
| to the cylinder wash tank at air sparge valve A-22. This control was |
| violated, and [the] double contingency was not maintained." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED:" |
| |
| "This area is being controlled to ensure that the hose is not moved without |
| NCS approval. The corrective action will be to reduce the length of the |
| hose such that it is compliant with the safety-related item." |
| |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. |
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