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Event Notification Report for June 9, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/08/2000 - 06/09/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37021  37067  37068  37069  37070  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37021       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK               REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/23/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:44[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        05/23/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        05:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ART BREADY                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/08/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAN HOLODY           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       4        Startup          |4        Startup          |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| - HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO STUCK OPEN CHECK  |
| VALVE -                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 0505 on 05/23/00, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was   |
| determined to be inoperable as a result of the discharge check valve being   |
| stuck partially open.  This condition was discovered during investigation of |
| a low injection header pressure alarm, and subsequent attempts to fill and   |
| vent the discharge header were unsuccessful.  It is believed that the check  |
| valve stuck partially open when the system was secured after a low pressure  |
| surveillance test at about 0305.  The discharge check valve was mechanically |
| agitated at 0700, and reseated as evidenced by an audible sound and rise in  |
| injection header pressure.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| At the time of discovery, the plant was in Operational Condition 2 with      |
| reactor power at 4% and reactor pressure at approximately 500 psig.  All     |
| other safety related equipment was operable at the tune of discovery, with   |
| the exception of the 'A' Residual Heat Removal Pump, which was aligned for   |
| suppression pool cooling mode of operation.  There was no significant impact |
| to overall plant safety as a result of this condition.                       |
|                                                                              |
| Plant maintenance and engineering personnel are currently evaluating the     |
| failure of the HPCI System discharge check valve.  injection header fill and |
| vent is in progress to determine the amount of air that is present and       |
| restore the system to an available condition.  This information will be used |
| to determine if the safety function of the HPCI System was unavailable as a  |
| result of the discharge check valve malfunction.                             |
|                                                                              |
| A root cause investigation team has been assembled, and evaluation of system |
| and personnel performance is in progress.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to notify local   |
| officials.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * *  UPDATE ON 6/8/00 @ 1219 BY CONICELLA TO GOULD * * *  RETRACTION       |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| As discussed in the notification. the HPCI low discharge header pressure     |
| alarm was received,  prompting an immediate investigation. The discharge     |
| check valve was mechanically agitated which resulted in the seating of the   |
| valve and clearing of the alarm.  Sticking of the discharge check Valve      |
| provided a leakage path thus preventing the keep fill system from achieving  |
| pressure sufficient to clear the alarm setpoint. The amount of mechanical    |
| agitation required was minimal.  HPCI was then removed from service to allow |
| maintenance troubleshooting on the valve.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| It is believed that the discharge check valve stuck in the partially open    |
| position following the low pressure response time surveillance testing which |
| had been completed approximately two hours prior to the event.  This was a   |
| result of the low delta P across the valve associated with that testing.     |
| Prior to the cited surveillance test, a different HPCl surveillance (HPCI    |
| Flowpath Verification) had been successfully completed and HPCI had been     |
| determined to be operable.  Investigation of the valve revealed very minor   |
| misalignment which may have been the cause at the slight binding. This       |
| condition would not prevent the safety function of HPCI from being           |
| performed.  Following the investigation HPCI was removed from service and    |
| the plant entered a 14 day LCO. The valve was repaired and HPCI was retested |
| and declared operable.  The keep fill system was always sufficient.          |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.   The Reg 1 RDO (Moslak) was    |
| notified.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37067       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:09[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/07/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:16[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICH DIBLER                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/08/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |TOM MOSLAK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|HFIT 26.73               FITNESS FOR DUTY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE EMPLOYEE TESTED POSITIVE FOR ALCOHOL DURING A RANDOM                |
| FITNESS-FOR-DUTY TEST (24-HOUR REPORT)                                       |
|                                                                              |
| A non-licensed employee tested positive for alcohol during a random          |
| fitness-for-duty test conducted on 06/07/00.  The individual has been        |
| relieved of duty and placed on indefinite suspension.  The individual's      |
| access authorization has been suspended, and the licensee is currently       |
| reviewing the individual's activities.  (Call the NRC operations officer for |
| additional information.)                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37068       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOK                     REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:11[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:31[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DEPUYDT                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/08/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |ED GOODWIN           NRR     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |MICHAEL CASE         EDO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|2     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE PLANT HAD AUTOSTART OF THE EMERGENCY DIESELS ON BOTH UNITS               |
|                                                                              |
| On June 8, 2000, at 0931 hours, power was lost to the CD bus on each unit    |
| during switching operations involving the #4 and #5 transformers in the main |
| switchyard. During the switching operation a loss of offsite power occurred, |
| affecting one train of 4KV electrical power in each unit and causing the     |
| auto start of the CD EDGs on each unit. The EDGs started and loaded as       |
| expected.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 is currently defueled. When power was lost, the Spent Fuel Pool       |
| Cooling pump that was in service tripped. It was placed back in service 0953 |
| hours. The spent fuel pool temperature rose 1 degree from 84 to 85 during    |
| this time. Temperature is now stable at 85 degrees.                          |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 2 is currently in Mode 4. When power was lost to the CD bus, Reactor    |
| Coolant pumps (RCPs) #22 and #23 tripped.  Additionally, the 4 KV bus under  |
| frequency signal caused the #21 and #24 RCPs to trip as designed.  As a      |
| result, Unit 2 was in the natural circulation mode using the steam           |
| generators as a heat sink. RCS temperature at the time of loss of power was  |
| 335 degrees and cooled to approximately 315 degrees during the time the unit |
| was in natural circulation.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Offsite power was restored through TR5 at 1019 hours. #24 RCP was restarted  |
| at 1047 hours, restoring forced circulation, #23 RCP was restarted at 1159   |
| hours. RCPs #21and #22 are still currently secured. The unit is stable and   |
| equipment is being restored.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| An Event Response Team has been convened to assess the event, and develop    |
| recovery plans.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37069       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:26[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RUSSEL LONG                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/08/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |TOM MOSLAK           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS - CABLE SEPARATION ISSUE                                |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 1515 hours on June 8, 2000, operations determined that      |
| plant cable separation criteria had potentially been violated which would    |
| place the plant outside the design basis.  Two wires were routed from a test |
| jack in the control rod cabinets located in the cable spreading room to a    |
| terminal block in Rack C3 in the control room.  The routing of the wires     |
| takes them into cable trays in the cable spreading room that are carrying    |
| control cables for channels 1, 2 and 3.  This is in violation of the         |
| electrical separation criteria defined in the FSAR.  Corrective action is    |
| being taken to remove the wires from the cable trays.  A preliminary         |
| evaluation indicates the wires were used during testing of the control rod   |
| drive mechanism during initial plant startup. They are no longer in use.     |
| This event was identified during an extent of condition walkdown for the     |
| separation criteria violation identified in incident log 37043, dated May    |
| 26, 2000.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37070       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/08/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/08/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:45[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KATHLEEN WORK                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/08/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR REPORT - HIGH BATTERY ELECTROLYTE LEVEL                              |
|                                                                              |
| On May 15, 2000, a surveillance test was performed on the E1A11 battery.     |
| The electrolyte level in cell #18 was reported as +  inch above the high    |
| level line on the cell which exceeds the Tech spec limit of <  inch,  as    |
| stated in Tech Spec Table 4.8-2, Battery Surveillance Requirements for       |
| Category B.  This condition was not recognized during Maintenance review of  |
| the data.  Tech Spec Surveillance 4.8.2.1.b.1 which allows 7 days to restore |
| electrolyte level within the Category B limits or declare the battery        |
| inoperable was exceeded and the battery was considered inoperable.  The LCO  |
| for an inoperable battery, which is 2 hours to restore to operable or be in  |
| hot standby within 6 hours, was not met.  This was a violation of Tech Spec  |
| 3.8.2.1.a.  The condition was corrected on May 30, 2000.  There is no safety |
| significance to this event. The electrolyte level in cell 18 at no time      |
| compromised the ability of the E1A11 battery to perform its design           |
| function.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| 24-hour notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76,     |
| paragraph 2.G.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
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