Event Notification Report for June 09, 2000

REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY GENERATOR AND TURBINE TRIPS

"On June 9, 2000, at approximately 1311 hours, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an automatic turbine trip caused by a main generator trip. The main generator trip was caused by actuation of the generator 86 lockout relays due to a direct trip from the 345 KV Buchanan substation. All primary and secondary systems appear to have responded as required after the automatic reactor trip. The Auxiliary Feed Water system automatically started as result of this trip due to low row steam generator (S/G) level (8%) resulting from S/G water level shrink. The plant is stable in the hot shutdown condition. The cause of this main generator 86 lockout is under investigation. The NRC resident inspector was notified."

All control rods fully inserted during the reactor trip. The S/Gs are being fed by auxiliary feedwater and decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the main condenser. Reactor Coolant Pumps are running.

INFORMATION CALL - TRACTOR/TRAILER CARRYING TWO UF6 CYLINDERS STRUCK BY A CAR

At 1158 hours, the PORTS PSS was informed that a tractor/trailer carrying 2 empty 10 ton uranium hexaflouride (UF6) cylinders had been struck by a car approximately 10 miles North of Chillicothe, Ohio on State Route 104. The cylinders which contained only residual quantities of UF6 were not damaged and there was no release of radioactive materials. The accident generated media attention and the Ohio EPA was also notified of the incident by the Ohio highway patrol. The Trailer sustained minor damage and will be towed to the Portsmouth Site for repairs. The PORTS NRC Resident has been notified of this incident.

This incident is reportable in accordance with the Safety Analysis Report, Section 64 Criteria P, since the media and other government agencies have been notified of this event.

APPARENT LEAK IN AN EVAPORATION POND LINER.

The licensee detected an increase in the level in an evaporation pond underdrain. The level had increased from about 1 inch up to 5 inches. Tests on the water were conducted and the results suggest a leak in the inner pond liner. The outer pond liner is believed to be intact. The licensee intends to find and repair the leak. The pond's level may be reduced to aid in leak detection.

SAFEGUARD SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO THE VITAL AREA BOUNDARY. IMMEDIATE COMPENSATORY ACTIONS TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY. THE LICENSE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.

LICENSEE MAY HAVE EXCEEDED LICENSED THERMAL POWER LIMIT

While reviewing the plants thermal performance, Oyster Creek discovered that the plant was potentially operating above the Technical Specification licensed thermal limit. Based on a comparison of the various inputs to the plant's thermal heat balance, it appears that the total feedwater flow venturi is reading non-conservatively (lower than actual) in comparison to the summation of the individual feedwater strings flows. As a result of this disparity, the plant's Engineering Staff has tentatively concluded that the heat balance is non-conservatively calculating 5 MWth less than actual based on the lower flow reading.

The plant's Technical Specification steady-state thermal power limit is 1930 MWth. Oyster Creek has administratively limited thermal power to 1920 MWth until this situation can be fully analyzed. The plant's Engineering Staff is presently developing a plan to confirm this information and initiate the appropriate corrective actions to resolve this disparity.

This condition has been determined reportable under the plant's Technical Specifications Section 2.E (24 Hour Notification) which requires notification of the NRC for all Technical Specification violations. The plant's Technical Specifications require maintaining core thermal power less than 1930 MWth under steady-state conditions and the plant might have been operated for prolonged periods at as high as 1935 MWth. The safety significance of this discrepancy is minimal because the plant's licensing bases includes a 2% error margin which was never challenged.

* * * RETRACTION 1623 6/29/2000 FROM FULLER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *

"After further review, it has been determined that Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station did not operate above the licensed limit of 1930 MWt, and we are retracting the notification made on 6/9/00. We determined that the mismatch between the computer generated heat balance and the manual heat balance was due to a feedwater heater leak, and not due to degradation of the final feedwater venturi. The feedwater heater leak will be repaired at the earliest opportunity during the upcoming scheduled refueling outage. As a result, Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station has removed the administrative thermal power limit of 1915 MWt, and has returned to full power."

The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Rogge).

ESF ACTUATION - CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION ISOLATED DUE TO CHLORINE PROTECTION MODE

Control Building Ventilation isolated to the Chlorine Protection Mode during maintenance activities on the transfer line between the Chlorine Tank Car and the Chlorination Building. The isolation occurred when maintenance personnel loosened a fitting in the transfer line which allowed the release of residual chlorine. At the time of the isolation, the Chlorine Tank Car was isolated and under clearance. All systems functioned as expected. The Control Building Ventilation System was returned to normal lineup at 1814.

The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION -

Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i), Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., the licensee for Indian Point Unit No. 2 hereby provides initial notification of a defect determined to be reportable under 10 CFR Part 21. The reported condition involves a 2GN23 1800 Amp-hour battery produced by YUASA, Inc. These batteries are used in the 125V DC System, and provide a primary source of 125V DC power to safeguards equipment and logic circuitry at Indian Point. On June 9, 2000, during the performance of a battery load test (PT-R76B), 22 Battery failed its two-hour minimum voltage characteristic (110.2VDC). It also failed to satisfy its required amp-hour capacity (greater than 90%). Following initial troubleshooting activities, similar load capacity failures occurred on June 18 and July 18, 2000. Various load tests and destructive examinations of the battery cells were performed over the next several weeks. A visual examination of the plates and separators did not indicate any discrepancies. However, microscopic analysis of samples obtained from two different positive plates revealed cracks within the positive active material, small pores, and small particle size. This would result in higher internal cell resistance when charging and discharging a battery. These cracks appear to have been produced during the manufacturing operation.