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Event Notification Report for June 6, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/05/2000 - 06/06/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37056  37057  37058  37059  37060  

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|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37056       |
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| REP ORG:  NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2000|
|LICENSEE:  DURHAM VA HOSPITAL                   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:53[EDT]|
|    CITY:  DURHAM                   REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        06/04/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:        16:15[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/05/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|                                                |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ALBRIGHT                     |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| THE DURHAM, N.C. VA HOSPITAL SENT SOME RADIOACTIVE WASTE TO THE DURHAM WASTE |
| TRANSFER STATION.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| A WASTE INDUSTRIES TRUCK SETOFF THE PORTAL MONITOR AT THE DURHAM WASTE       |
| TRANSFER STATION.  THE TRUCK HAD PICKED UP A LOAD OF WASTE FROM THE DURHAM   |
| VA HOSPITAL.  THE WASTE WAS RETURNED TO THE HOSPITAL.  ONE BAG CONTAINED IN  |
| THE WASTE WAS MEASURING 150,000 CPM  AT ONE FOOT AND OFF SCALE AT THE BAG.   |
| A DIAPER IN THE BAG WAS DETERMINED TO BE THE SOURCE.  IT WAS DISCOVERED THE  |
| PATIENT WHO HAD WORN THE DIAPER HAD RECEIVED 20 MILLICURIES OF TECHNETIUM-99 |
| ON THAT MORNING.                                                             |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37057       |
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:22[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/05/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        09:27[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/05/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEITH VANDERPOOL             |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 4 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING LOSS OF 2 CONTROLS OF      |
| DOUBLE CONTINGENCY                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| ON 6/5/00 AT 0927 HOURS PLANT PERSONNEL WERE REMOVING INSULATION FROM THE    |
| X-705 PROCESS PIPING WHEN THEY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE OF A FAILURE OF THE       |
| INTEGRITY OF SAID PIPING (material residue visible on the insulation). THIS  |
| FAILURE VIOLATES NCSA-0705_076 WHICH TAKES CREDIT FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE   |
| PROCESS PIPING, THUS CONSTITUTING A LOSS OF ONE CONTROL. THE FACT THAT THE   |
| ENCAPSULATING INSULATION PHYSICALLY CAPTURED THE LEAKING MATERIAL MEETS THE  |
| DEFINITION FOR AN INADVERTENT CONTAINER THUS CONSTITUTING A LOSS OF ONE      |
| CONTROL AS DESCRIBED BY NCSA-0705_076 WHICH TAKES CREDIT FOR COVERING,       |
| MODIFICATION OR ELEVATION OF ABSORBENT MATERIALS TO PREVENT THE COLLECTION   |
| OF URANIUM BEARING LIQUID IN AN INADVERTENT CONTAINER.                       |
|                                                                              |
| IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER OR NOT THE TOTAL VOLUME OF   |
| MATERIAL INVOLVED WAS GREATER THAN THE ALLOWED SAFE VOLUME (4.8 Liters )     |
| CREDITED IN THE EVALUATION FOR ENSURING DOUBLE CONTINGENCY. BASED ON VISUAL  |
| INSPECTION OF THE MATERIAL PRESENT IN/ON THE INSULATION, IT IS ESTIMATED     |
| THAT THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF URANIUM BEARING MATERIAL IS LESS THAN 350 GRAMS.    |
| MORE RELIABLE ANALYSIS IS CURRENTLY BEING PERFORMED FOR MORE PRECISE         |
| DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL. SINCE THE FAILURE TIME OF THE       |
| PROCESS PIPING IS UNKNOWN, THE ENRICHMENT PERCENTAGE OF THE MATERIAL COULD   |
| BE (worst case) 100% wt. U-235. THE MATERIAL PROCESSED IN THE X-705 RECOVERY |
| AREA PRIMARILY INVOLVES URANYL NITRATE, ALTHOUGH SOME URANYL FLUORIDE MAY BE |
| PRESENT.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| THE PSS HAS SUSPENDED ALL WORK/PROCESS EVOLUTIONS IN THE AFFECTED AREA       |
| PENDING INVESTIGATION. CONTROLS WERE RE-ESTABLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF   |
| THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY STAFF AT 1156 HOURS THIS DATE.                |
|                                                                              |
| Safety Significance of Events:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| On June 5, 2000, it was discovered that the insulation around the A loop     |
| density pot was contaminated by uranium-bearing material. This insulation    |
| was approximately 1 to 3 inches in thickness and constructed out of an       |
| absorbent material. The density pot is 4-inch schedule 40 piping located     |
| below the A loop evaporator and is approximately                             |
| 24-inches in length. Clamp-on density transmitters are used for density      |
| control in the uranium-bearing feed solution to the extractor/strippers.     |
| After removal from the density pot, the insulation was observed to be coated |
| with a yellowish material, which, based on high count readings, appears to   |
| be uranium-bearing. The material appeared dry in nature. It is not clear     |
| when the material accumulated on/in the insulation or how much was present   |
| during that accumulation. This insulation represents a violation of          |
| NCSA-0705_076 in that the absorbent material (i.e., the insulation) was not  |
| covered or modified properly.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| In addition, there is a potential loss of control in the failure of the      |
| nearby system integrity. It is not clear when or exactly how the             |
| uranium-bearing material was transported such that it accumulated on/in the  |
| insulation. It should be noted that it is not clear whether or not the total |
| volume of material involved (i.e., which could /did accumulate on/in the     |
| insulation) was greater than the allowed (i.e., safe) volume credited in the |
| evaluation for ensuring double contingency. Thus, while the anomalous        |
| condition is being treated as a loss of both controls the most likely        |
| scenario is that the material involved less than a safe amount of material   |
| and so the safety significance of this event is low.                         |
|                                                                              |
| 2. Potential Criticality Pathways Involved;                                  |
|                                                                              |
| If a sufficient amount of uranium-bearing material had accumulated on/in the |
| insulation, an unsafe geometry could have resulted and if the leaking        |
| solution had contained a sufficient amount of uranium, the resulting         |
| configuration could have been sufficient for a criticality to occur. It      |
| should be noted that the allowed safe geometry and volume limits established |
| in NCSA-0705_076 are based on optimally moderated, UO2F2 and water solution  |
| which contains uranium enriched to 100 wt%.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| 3. Controlled Parameters:                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The parameter which was violated during this upset was the geometry of       |
| potential accumulation present on/in the insulation. In addition, the        |
| physical integrity of nearby piping was violated at some point in the past.  |
| As stated previously, the total amount of solution involved (i.e., the       |
| volume of solution which leaked onto the insulation and resulted in the      |
| uranium-bearing material being deposited on/in the insulation) is unknown,   |
| so it is conservatively being evaluated as though the volume was greater     |
| than the safe volume allowed. This represents the failure of both controls   |
| relied upon for ensuring double contingency.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| 4 Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material:                   |
|                                                                              |
| Based on visual inspection of the material present on/in the insulation, it  |
| is estimated that the total amount of uranium-bearing material is less than  |
| 350 grams. More reliable analysis is currently being performed for a more    |
| precise determination of the amount of material. Since the failure time is   |
| unknown, the enrichment of the material could be up to 100 wt% U-235. The    |
| material processed in the X-705 recovery primarily involves uranyl nitrates  |
| (U02(N03)2) , although some uranyl fluoride (UO2F2) may also be present.     |
|                                                                              |
| 5. Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or control system(s) and            |
| description of the failures or deficiencies:                                 |
|                                                                              |
| NCSA-0705_076.A00 takes credit for the physical integrity of systems which   |
| contain uranium-bearing material and that unsafe volume/geometry containers  |
| (including absorbent materials like the insulation) are either modified,     |
| covered, or oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration from resulting in    |
| the event of a leak. The absorbent material was not modified, covered, or    |
| oriented to prevent an unsafe configuration. In addition, there is evidence  |
| that at some time in the past a loss of nearby system integrity occurred     |
| such that the insulation was exposed to an uranium-bearing solution.         |
|                                                                              |
| 6. Corrective Actions to Restore Safety System and when each was             |
| Implemented:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Under the direction of the nuclear criticality safety staff NCSA controls    |
| were re-established at 1156 hours, with all maintenance work and process     |
| evolutions suspended pending the ongoing investigation by facility           |
| management and nuclear criticality safety staff personnel.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37058       |
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| FACILITY: VOGTLE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:52[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/05/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:40[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CECIL H. WILLIAMS            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/05/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE CLOSING.               |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1140 EDT the Unit One Control Room crew received a trouble alarm on Steam |
| Generator  Loop 4 Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV). The operators   |
| observed no light indication on the MSIV, a decreasing level in the Steam    |
| Generator, a large decrease in indicated steam flow, and control rods began  |
| inserting. The Shift Superintendent directed that the reactor be manually    |
| tripped. The reactor was manually tripped and all systems functioned as      |
| required with the exception of a non-1E 4160 V bus (loss steam dump bypass   |
| control  panel open/close indication) , which failed to auto transfer to     |
| it's startup power source. Auxiliary Feedwater System (both motor and the    |
| turbine driven pumps) actuated as expected on Steam Generator Lo-Lo levels.  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The Control Room crew has exited the Emergency Operating Procedures and the  |
| unit is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure.       |
|                                                                              |
| The 4160 V breaker which failed to close was racked out of it's cubicle,     |
| inspected and racked back into it's operating position, after which it was   |
| successfully closed by the Control room crew. This reenergized the           |
| non-1E 4160V bus and its associated loads.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Investigation into the cause of the MSIV closure is ongoing. An Event Review |
| Team is being formed, and a restart date will be decided upon following      |
| management review of the results of their investigation.                     |
|                                                                              |
| Steam Generator Atmospheric valve controller was reduced to its lowest       |
| setpoint and maintained the Reactor Coolant System at its  Tave no load      |
| condition (Steam Generator 1 & 4 Atmospheric valves opened/closed  a few     |
| times).  The Steam Dump Bypass Control System was fully operable and         |
| operated properly. Approximately one hour after the event non-1E 4160V bus   |
| was re-energized.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37059       |
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| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/05/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/05/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:37[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  K. PHILLIPS                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/05/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON HIGH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL                   |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Automatic reactor trip from 100% power due to a feedwater transient caused   |
| by a loss of control power to 2B main feedwater pump.  The feedwater         |
| transient resulted in a 2B steam generator high-high setpoint being reached  |
| which tripped both main feedwater pumps, caused a feedwater isolation        |
| signal, and tripped the main turbine which caused the reactor trip.  All     |
| rods fully inserted into the core. Steam generators levels are being         |
| maintained at normal level with auxiliary feedwater at this time.  The loss  |
| of control power has been attributed to water intrusion into the 2B          |
| feedwater pump control panel from extremely heavy rains and roof repairs     |
| being in progress.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are   |
| fully operable if needed.  The electrical grid is stable an Unit 1 was not   |
| affected by Unit 2's reactor trip.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37060       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD             REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/06/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:02[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        06/06/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:36[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN VAN SICKEL              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/06/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:                                |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO LOSS OF WATER SEAL CAUSED   |
| BY PIPE CORROSION                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "A 4 inch diameter floor drain outlet pipe inside the Standby Gas Treatment  |
| Sump was identified by Operating personnel to be corroded through near the   |
| wall of the sump. This piping is designed to act as a Secondary Containment  |
| boundary which is used to form a loop seal between the Reactor Building and  |
| the SBGT room. Normally, the piping would come out from the wall and make a  |
| 90 degree turn to near the bottom of the sump, and open under water.         |
| However, with the erosion occurring near the wall of the sump, a breech of   |
| secondary containment exists. Due to the amount of corrosion, the opening    |
| was estimated to be 12.57 square inches. Additionally, damaged seals on two  |
| other doors (#225 and #128) located on airlocks associated with Secondary    |
| Containment accounted for another 7 square inches, for a total of 19.57      |
| square inches. Openings in excess of 12.7 square inches in this              |
| configuration have not been tested/evaluated. Therefore, Secondary           |
| Containment was considered inoperable. Operations entered Technical          |
| Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, for Secondary Containment inoperable |
| in Mode 1 at 0236[CDT]. Required action A.1 is to restore Secondary          |
| Containment to operable status in 4 hours.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Operations took actions to prohibit access through the two seal damaged     |
| doors/airlocks by posting them to prevent access. Once administrative        |
| control of the doors was established, the known opening in secondary         |
| containment was reduced to the corroded pipe in the SBGT sump, or 12.57      |
| square inches. This is less than the 12.7 square inches allowed. Technical   |
| Specification LCO 3.6.4.1, condition A, was exited at 0258[CDT]."            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
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