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Event Notification Report for June 5, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/02/2000 - 06/05/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36964  37046  37048  37049  37050  37051  37052  37053  37054  37055  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36964       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC           |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/03/2000|
|LICENSEE:  GEOTECH ENVIRONMENTAL, INC           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:24[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MAPLE SHADE              REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        05/03/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NJ |EVENT TIME:        08:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  29-28286-02           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/02/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
|                                                |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CARL DINICOLANTONIO          |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE                                        |
|                                                                              |
| On April 27, 2000, a technician was involved in an automobile accident in    |
| Philadelphia, PA.   At that time, the gauge was stored in the trunk of the   |
| vehicle.   When police arrived on the scene, the technician was arrested.    |
| The technician informed the police that the gauge was in the trunk and       |
| showed the gauge to the police officers.   After the technician was          |
| arrested, the vehicle was stolen.   The vehicle was recovered on April 29,   |
| 2000.  The gauge was not in the trunk when the vehicle was recovered.  The   |
| device contained 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241.                       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1402 ON 06/02/00 BY CLAIRE PANICO TO JOLLIFFE * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| The stolen Troxler moisture density gauge was found in a waste management    |
| recycling facility in Philadelphia.  The undamaged gauge has been returned   |
| to Geotech Environmental, Inc.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| George Pangburn, NRC Region 1 has been notified.  NRC Region 1 issued        |
| PNO-I-00-013A.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer Notified R1DO Dick Barkley and NMSS EO Brian      |
| Smith.                                                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37046       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/31/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:04[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        05/31/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:30[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  COVEYOU                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SHEAR           R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED A 7 DAY LCO DUE TO HPCS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE.             |
|                                                                              |
| While performing monthly surveillance start LOS-DG-M3, for the High-Pressure |
| Core Spray (HPCS) systems Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel             |
| automatically tripped off on an over-speed signal. The Diesel was being      |
| started from an idle condition while an operator was attempting to maintain  |
| speed between 400 and 500 rpm. The Diesel does not appear to have been       |
| damaged but remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of   |
| the failure. The High-Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available |
| from normal power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated   |
| and corrective actions will be performed.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2211 ON 06/01/00 BY SHANE MARIK TO JOLLIFFE * * *            |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee investigation has determined that the cause of the event was    |
| due to operator overcompensation of the engine governor during the start     |
| that resulted in the EDG accelerating to the overspeed setpoint and tripping |
| on overspeed.  The operator performing the slow (idle) start in accordance   |
| with the monthly Technical                                                   |
| Specification surveillance procedure was a trainee under supervision by a    |
| qualified operator.  The EDG was already inoperable for the performance of   |
| the monthly surveillance test that verifies operability of the EDG to start  |
| and carry full load for at least 60 minutes.  During inspection, no          |
| mechanical or electrical malfunctions were                                   |
| found associated with governor settings, the start circuitry, the engine     |
| fuel racks, or fuel injector linkages.  The fuel rack and associated fuel    |
| injector linkages were then verified to have freedom of movement without     |
| binding.  A subsequent fast start was performed (same as an automatic start) |
| that verified that the EDG did not have a malfunction that would cause it to |
| trip on overspeed.  The EDG would have satisfied its intended safety         |
| function when in standby (no operator interface is required for the          |
| governor/fuel rack control. except for surveillance testing).  Therefore,    |
| the overspeed trip of the High Pressure Core Spray System EDG is not         |
| reportable as a                                                              |
| condition that alone could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.  |
|                                                                              |
| Since the failure occurred after the EDG was inoperable due to not being     |
| lined up for standby operation (removed from service as part of a planned    |
| evolution in accordance with an approved procedure), the start  was a slow   |
| start controlled by an operator and restoration of the EDG was less than 12  |
| hours and well within the 14 day Technical Specification allowed outage      |
| time.  The licensee has determined that this event is not reportable to the  |
| NRC, and desires to retract this event notification.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Jorgensen.                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   37048       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TRI STATE CONSULTANTS                |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
|LICENSEE:  TRI STATE CONSULTANTS                |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:26[EDT]|
|    CITY:  FLINT                    REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        06/01/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MI |EVENT TIME:        14:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  37-19640-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/02/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAT DURKIN                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|IBBF 30.50(b)(2)(ii)     EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|IBAE 30.50(b)(1)(iii)    ACCESS DENIED OTHER    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SOURCE ASSEMBLY, CONTAINING 24 CURIES OF IRIDIUM-192, BECAME DETACHED FROM   |
| ITS DRIVE ASSEMBLY                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| While checking a radiographic exposure device manufactured by AEA            |
| Technology, the source assembly became detached from its drive mechanism.    |
| The licensee was checking the swage end, the locking mechanism, of the       |
| exposure assemble when the assembly failed. The swage connection had a crack |
| and this caused the swage connection to fail, becoming detached.   The       |
| Assistant Radiation Safety Officer (ARSO) cleared the room and made several  |
| trips into the room to place lead shielding over the source assembly.  After |
| the source assembly was covered with lead, the ARSO took radiation surveys   |
| around the room to make sure radiation levels were within acceptable limits. |
| The ARSO spent the night guarding the entrance to the room to prevent anyone |
| from entering.  AEA Technology was notified of this event on 06/01/00 and    |
| they are sending a retrieval team out on 06/02/00 to retrieve the source.    |
| The source model number is 424-9.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The ARSO was the only one to be exposed and he received 78 millirems as      |
| indicated by his pocket dosimeter.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The source, Iridium-192,  was originally manufactured on 12/17/99 with a     |
| strength of 114.5 curies. The present strength of the Iridium-192 source is  |
| 24 curies (half life of Iridium-192 is 74.2 days).                           |
|                                                                              |
| Tri State Consultants' main office is located in Pittsburgh, PA.             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37049       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALLAWAY                 REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MO |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:57[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:15[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PAT McKENNA                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii)     DEGRAD COND DURING OP  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE INOPERABLE DUE TO INCOMPLETE PLANT       |
| MODIFICATION                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| At 0415 CDT on 06/02/00, I&C technicians began to perform tech spec          |
| surveillance test #ISF-SB-OA30A to test the operability of 'A' train steam   |
| line isolation valve slave relay #K-634.  In establishing the initial        |
| conditions at step 4.2 of the test procedure, solid state protection system  |
| white light #26 was not illuminated as required by the procedure.  The       |
| procedure was exited at that time and the control room crew was informed of  |
| the finding.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The control room crew replaced the light bulb and the light still did not    |
| illuminate.  Another light bulb, known to be good, was then installed in the |
| light socket.  The light still did not illuminate.  The Shift Supervisor     |
| contacted the System Engineer at approximately 0530 CDT when the engineer    |
| arrived onsite, and requested that the engineer investigate what the white   |
| light indicated when the light was not illuminated.                          |
|                                                                              |
| After review of the system schematics, the engineer found that there was the |
| possibility of outside containment isolation valve #EGHV-0061 being          |
| INOPERABLE if relay #K-802 did not function properly.  (Reference electrical |
| drawing #E-23EG09A.)  This situation was reported to the control room crew.  |
|                                                                              |
| The Shift Supervisor declared valve #EGHV-0061 INOPERABLE using the time of  |
| discovery at 0415 CDT and closed the valve and deenergized power to the      |
| valve per Tech Spec action statement 3.6.3.A at 0800 CDT. Equipment out of   |
| service log entry #7986 was made.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| I&C technicians were dispatched to support troubleshooting efforts.  After   |
| some initial troubleshooting, some results did not agree with the drawing.   |
| The engineer noted the drawing showed that the circuitry had recently been   |
| changed by Plant Modification #CMP 98-1020.  The drawing had been updated on |
| 04/07/00.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The engineer called the Construction Supervisor of the plant modification    |
| installation.  The supervisor reviewed the modification package and found a  |
| connection between a terminal block at the motor control center for valve    |
| #EGHV-0061 and the solid state protection system cabinet #SB030A had not     |
| been performed.  This made containment isolation valve #EGHV-0061 INOPERABLE |
| because it would not close on a phase B containment isolation signal.   The  |
| control room crew was notified of this finding.  This finding meant that the |
| valve had been INOPERABLE since the installation of the plant modification   |
| on 04/06/00.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The Construction Supervisor initiated field change notice #FCN-11 to plant   |
| modification package #MP 98-1020 and initiated work document #W657017 to     |
| correct the circuitry wiring.  Retest documents #R657017A and #R6S70173 was  |
| also initiated for post maintenance testing of the circuit.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee determined that this event was reportable to the NRC at 1030    |
| CDT.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37050       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
|LICENSEE:  ALLEN COUNTY HOSPITAL, IOLA, KS      |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:31[EDT]|
|    CITY:  IOLA                     REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        06/01/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  KS |EVENT TIME:        16:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  19-B366-01            AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/02/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GARY SANBORN         R4      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM CONLEY                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|LADM 35.33(a)            MED MISADMINISTRATION  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| I-131 OVERDOSE - MEDICAL MISADMINISTRATION/AGREEMENT STATE EVENT -           |
|                                                                              |
| A female patient at Allen County Hospital, Iola, KS, was given 100           |
| microcuries of I-131 for an thyroid uptake measurement during a diagnostic   |
| study instead of the prescribed 50 microcuries.  The cause of this medical   |
| misadministration event was due to the hospital hot lab delivering two       |
| capsules of 50 microcuries each; one to be given to the patient and the      |
| other to be used as a standard.  The patient was mistakenly given both       |
| capsules.  This overdose poses no adverse medical effects to the patient.    |
| The patient's doctor has been informed.  The doctor plans to inform the      |
| patient.  The hospital is determining corrective actions.                    |
| (KS Case #KS-00-0011).                                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37051       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NINE MILE POINT          REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/02/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:24[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        06/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:21[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM CHWALEK                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO A FAULTY LEVEL       |
| SWITCH -                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| At 1721 on 06/02/00, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 received a Reactor Core          |
| Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System high point vent low level annunciator alarm. |
| This alarm came in and cleared repeatedly.  The licensee declared the RCIC   |
| System inoperable but functional and entered Technical Specification 3.7.4   |
| which requires the RCIC System to be restored to operable status within 14   |
| days.  The licensee closed the RCIC System turbine trip throttle valve,      |
| #2ICS*MOV150 in accordance with the annunciator response procedure.  The     |
| licensee then performed the RCIC System fill and vent procedure              |
| #N2-OSP-ICS-M001 satisfactorily with a solid stream of water being vented    |
| and no evidence of air in the system.  The high point vent low level         |
| annunciator alarm remained in solid following the fill and vent procedure.   |
| The licensee suspects that a  faulty high point vent level switch is the     |
| problem and prepared a Problem Identification to repair the switch.  The     |
| licensee has returned the RCIC System to available status (but still         |
| inoperable) and is reviewing compensatory actions for the faulty level       |
| switch to support the return of the RCIC System to operable status.          |
|                                                                              |
| This event has no effect on Unit 1 which is at 100% power.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37052       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/02/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/03/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |TONY VEGEL           R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |TED SHERR            NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING POTENTIAL LOSS OF CRITICALITY    |
| CONTROL IN SHUTDOWN CELLS                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "On 6/2/00 the Plant Shift superintendent was notified of a potential NCSA   |
| noncompliance. NCSAs 326_013, NCSA 330_004, and NCSA 333_015 require that    |
| cells that are shutdown and at a UF6 negative be buffered with dry air or    |
| nitrogen to maintain moderation control as part of double contingency. For   |
| cells that have less than a safe mass, procedure guidance allows the cell to |
| be maintained less than atmospheric pressure, when not at a UF6 negative.    |
| Various leaks (either from the dry air system or from wet atmospheric air)   |
| can enter the cell allowing pressure to increase. This pressure must then be |
| evacuated to maintain the cell less than atmospheric pressure. Repeated      |
| cycles of 'leak up' and evacuation will eventually achieve a UF6 negative    |
| unknown to operators since there are no periodic sampling requirements. The  |
| NCS requirement to buffer a cell within eight hours of achieving a UF6       |
| negative may then be violated because the state of a UF6 negative is not     |
| known.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Presently all cells that are shutdown that have less than a safe mass in    |
| them are at a UF6 negative, and there is currently no violation of this      |
| moderation control. However, it cannot be guaranteed that this control was   |
| not violated during past operations, and is being reported as a loss of one  |
| control.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. Only affected cells that when |
| shutdown have less than a safe mass of material in them. Failure to          |
| establish or maintain the buffer as required could result in wet air         |
| entering a shutdown cell. This would moderate a UO2F2 deposit due to the     |
| hygroscopic properties of UO2F2. If this unbuffered condition were permitted |
| to continue for longer periods, the H/U of the deposit could eventually      |
| reach a maximum of 4 (the maximum H/U ratio of a deposit exposed to ambient  |
| cascade building air is 4). However, due to being less than a safe mass, a   |
| criticality could not occur.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "For a criticality to occur the mass of the deposit would have to be greater |
| than a safe mass, moderation level would have to reach an H/U ratio of 4,    |
| the deposit would have to be reflected.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "The controlled parameters for this event are mass and moderation.           |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The highest possible enrichment for event is 20% and the material will be   |
| at or below a safe mass.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The failure in this case is the implementation of the control on            |
| moderation.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| [Not specified]."                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Department Operating Instructions (DOIs) have been issued pending procedural |
| revisions to address this deficiency. The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE     |
| Site Representative have been informed.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37053       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE                REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:28[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP           |EVENT DATE:        06/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:12[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE CICCONE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       65       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 2 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP ON TURBINE TRIP DURING SURVEILLANCE        |
| TESTING OF THE TURBINE                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| AT 0128 EDT ON 6/4/00 WHILE PERFORMING TURBINE SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE 2651T, |
| "POWER LOAD UNBALANCED PUSH-TO-TEST",  THE TURBINE TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY      |
| CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP.  ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED.  ALL SYSTEMS       |
| FUNCTIONED AS REQUIRED.  THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND MAIN CONDENSER REMAIN |
| IN SERVICE FOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL .  NO PRIMARY OR SECONDARY SAFETIES/PORVs  |
| LIFTED DURING THE TRANSIENT.  ELECTRICAL LOADS TRANSFERRED TO THE RSST       |
| TRANSFORMER WITH ALL EDGs AVAILABLE IF NEEDED.  THERE IS NO SAFETY EQUIPMENT |
| OUT OF SERVICE AT THIS TIME.  THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NRC RESIDENT         |
| INSPECTOR AND BOTH STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.  A PRESS RELEASE IS             |
| ANTICIPATED.                                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37054       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:42[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        05:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARIE GILLMAN                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     A/R        Y       22       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED A REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL         |
| FOLLOWING A TURBINE TRIP                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "[A] plant startup [was] in progress.  [The] main turbine generator [was]    |
| tied to [the] grid at 0452 [EDT].  Power was being raised to 30% power.      |
|                                                                              |
| "At 22% reactor power while feeding steam generators via manual control of   |
| [the] feedwater regulatory valves, '33' Steam Generator level reached a high |
| level trip point and tripped the turbine.  The subsequent shrink in steam    |
| generator '31' levels resulted in a reactor trip at 0554 [EDT].              |
|                                                                              |
| "All plant equipment functioned as required, no malfunctions noted at this   |
| time. [A] post trip review [is] in progress. ESF Actuation; '31' and '33'    |
| auxiliary feed pump[s] started."                                             |
|                                                                              |
| All rods fully inserted following the trip.  There is no safety equipment    |
| out of service at this time.  Offsite power is supplying electrical loads.   |
| The auxiliary feed pumps and main condenser are removing decay heat.         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press  |
| release.                                                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37055       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:45[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        06/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:15[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RON CARPINO                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/04/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |RICHARD BARKLEY      R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          N       0        Startup          |0        Startup          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NY STATE DEC TO BE NOTIFIED OF 5 - 15 GALLONS LUBE OIL SPILL INTO PLANT      |
| DISCHARGE CANAL -                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| At 1515 on 06/04/00, the licensee notified the DOT National Response Center  |
| and plans to notify the NY State Department of Environmental Conservation    |
| (DEC), local officials, and the NRC Resident Inspector that 5 to 15 gallons  |
| of lube oil had overflowed from the plant oil collection system into the     |
| plant discharge canal which drains into the Hudson River.                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+