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Event Notification Report for May 30, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/26/2000 - 05/30/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

37032  37033  37034  37035  37036  37037  37038  37039  37040  37041  37042  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37032       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:46[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  H. M. HARRIS                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN HANNON          NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE RUNBACK TO 50% DUE TO LOSS OF A MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP FOLLOWED BY A    |
| REACTOR TRIP ON LOW LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL.  ONE AUXILIARY          |
| FEEDWATER PUMP HAD TO BE MANUALLY STARTED.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor automatic trip occurred at 2046 ET.  Initiating event was steam      |
| generator low low water level on "C" steam generator.  Prior to the trip     |
| Channel 1 vital 120 volt AC power was lost due to the tripping open of  EVIA |
| (DC/AC ) inverter AC output breaker.  No testing was in progress at this     |
| time and the cause of the AC breaker trip is under investigation.  When the  |
| AC output breaker opened it caused a loss of Channel 1 power.   Main         |
| feedwater pump "1A" control circuitry interfaces with Channel 1 120 volt AC  |
| power and when Main Feedwater pump "1A" control circuitry power was lost     |
| main feedwater pump "1A" turbine tripped.  The loss of Main Feedwater  pump  |
| "1A" turbine initiated an automatic main turbine runback to 50% power.       |
| After the main turbine runback to 50% power the reactor tripped on steam     |
| generator "1C" low low water level. Only one of two motor driven auxiliary   |
| feedwater pumps automatically started on steam generator "1C" low low water  |
| level.  Auxiliary feedwater pump "1A" was manually started approximately 2   |
| minutes after the automatic reactor trip. The licensee is investigating why  |
| the "1A" auxiliary feedwater pump did not automatically start.  All rods     |
| fully inserted into the core and reactor coolant temperature is being        |
| maintained at Tave no load condition of 557 degrees F.  No PORVs or code     |
| safety valves on either the primary or secondary side of the plant opened.   |
| All the Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators   |
| are fully operable if needed.  Offsite electrical grid is stable.    The     |
| licensee's investigation into the initiating event is continuing.            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/26/00 AT 1640 ET BY HEAFNER TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| Only the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Motor Driven        |
| Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "1B"  automatically started.  The "1A"  Motor       |
| Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump did not automatically start since its        |
| control circuitry is supplied electrical power from Channel 1 vital 120 volt |
| AC power, which was lost.  As stated in the original event report, Auxiliary |
| Feedwater Pump "1A" was manually started approximately 2 minutes after the   |
| automatic reactor trip.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| Two of three Primary side Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) opened and     |
| subsequently closed.  No secondary side PORVs or code safety valves on       |
| either the Primary or Secondary side of the plant opened.  Investigation     |
| into the event is continuing. R2DO (Tom Decker) notified.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   37033       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:52[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/25/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        18:00[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |WAYNE HODGES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JIM MCCLEERY                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following is the faxed report from Portsmouth:                           |
|                                                                              |
| On May 16, 2000, PORTS plant personnel initiated a review of an NRC event (# |
| 36993) submitted by Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), to assess        |
| applicability at the Portsmouth sight. Errors associated with calibration    |
| correction factors used to determine uranium masses were found to have not   |
| occurred at the PORTS sight.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| On May 25, 2000, after further review by Nuclear Criticality Safety dept.    |
| personnel, a violation of double contingency was identified when it was      |
| determined that the independence of non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements |
| was not maintained. NCSA-PLANT013.A00 indicated that NDA measurements will   |
| be maintained independent. However, calibration of instruments was not       |
| maintained independent and therefore the resulting measurements were not     |
| independent. As a result, the calibration process failed to ensure that a    |
| single failure could not effect two independent mass measurements. Double    |
| contingency was violated in cases where two independent uranium mass         |
| measurements were required to establish double contingency.                  |
|                                                                              |
| A review of NDA calibration data confirmed that no measurement errors        |
| actually existed which would have affected the mass readings taken to        |
| establish double contingency. This event is being reported because the       |
| independence or mass measurement readings was not established and            |
| maintained.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The safety significance of this event is very low. All historical            |
| calibrations were reviewed (Ref. POEF-38.340.00.086) and no discrepancies    |
| were identified with historical measurements. Furthermore, ongoing           |
| laboratory Quality Assurance programs and practices help ensure errors of    |
| this nature remain sufficiently unlikely to be relied on as criticality      |
| controls.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| An error in NDA measurements plus uncertainty would have to be low by        |
| greater than a factor of two or results in a critical mass of uranium going  |
| undetected. if this mass were then subject to the correct geometry,          |
| moderation and reflection conditions a criticality could error               |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Mass is the only controlled parameter. Two independent measurements of mass  |
| are required to ensure double contingency. Since independence of NDA of NDA  |
| mass measurements is called Into question, only one independent estimate of  |
| mass is available. The absence of a second independent NDA mass measurement  |
| represents a loss of one double contingency control.                         |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| No uranium was involved in the event. NDA measurements are used to classify  |
| cascade deposits as either greater than safe mass or less than safe mass.    |
| (Safe Mass is 43.5% of minimum critical mass.) NDA measurements are also     |
| used in batching operations to ensure the 235U mass in the final container   |
| is less than 350 grams 235U which is less half the minimum critical mass at  |
| 100% enrichment and optimum moderation, geometry and reflection conditions.  |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Nuclear criticality safety controls include independent mass measurements of |
| 235U. Failure to ensure the calibration of the NDA instrumentation was       |
| independent lead to a potential failure of the mass measurements.            |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
|                                                                              |
| NDA measurements performed for criticality safety purposes have been         |
| suspended until independent verification of calibration data requirements is |
| flown into applicable procedures and programs.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The certificate holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify   |
| the DOE representative.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/26/00 AT 2012 ET BY McCLEERY TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| Update 1, 5/26/00 The NCSE for the above NCSA failed to specifically address |
| failure in calibration or source checks as part of the contingency event     |
| "erroneous uranium analysis or operator error." Therefore, this indicates    |
| that the NCSE failed to analyze or bound a credible scenario that could lead |
| to a criticality.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| A review of past calibration data revealed no suspect calibration or         |
| measurements. No known or suspected error in NDA measurements has been       |
| discover DOI-344-00-02, Rev A was issued to ensure NDA measurements          |
| supporting NCS activities were suspended until requirements for independent  |
| verification of NDA calibration data and factors are flowed into applicable  |
| procedures.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| R3DO (Monty Phillips) & NMSS EO (Hodges) notified.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate     |
| holder.                                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37034       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK               REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:29[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        05/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHRIS SERATA                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAN HOLODY           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       15       Power Operation  |15       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FOUR FILTRATION RECIRCULATION AND VENTILATION FANS TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY      |
|                                                                              |
| "On 5/25/00 at 22:54 hours, four operating Filtration, Recirculation. and    |
| Ventilation System (FRVS) recirculation fans (A, B, D, E) unexpectedly       |
| tripped while they were running for a monthly surveillance. An FRVS          |
| ventilation fan, that was also in service, continued to run.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "The FRVS consists of two subsystems, the Recirculation System and the       |
| Ventilation System. The FRVS Recirculation System is an Engineered Safety    |
| Feature (ESF) System, located inside the Secondary Containment, that reduces |
| offsite doses significantly below 10CFR100 guidelines during a LOCA,         |
| refueling accident, or high radioactivity in the Secondary Containment. Upon |
| a Secondary Containment isolation, the FRVS Recirculation System is actuated |
| and recirculates the Secondary Containment air through filters for cleanup.  |
| This subsystem is the initial cleanup system before discharge is made via    |
| the FRVS Ventilation subsystem to the outdoors. The FRVS Ventilation System  |
| is an ESF system, located inside the Secondary Containment, that maintains   |
| the building at a negative pressure with respect to the outdoors. The system |
| takes suction from the discharge duct of the FRVS Recirculation system and   |
| discharges the air through filters to the outdoors.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Investigation into the cause of the fan trips has identified a manual       |
| damper in the ventilation system ductwork that failed to the closed          |
| position. This manual damper is normally open during power operation. This   |
| damper is repositioned closed during refueling outages to redistribute       |
| ventilation through the Secondary Containment. Immediate actions were taken  |
| to return the damper to the open position. Recirculation fans have been      |
| returned to service and are operating satisfactorily.                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The ventilation system ductwork was reviewed to identify other manual       |
| dampers that could have the same or similar affect on system operation.  Two |
| other dampers were identified, their positions have been verified to be      |
| correct.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Hope Creek is presently in Operational Condition 1 at 15% power with the    |
| turbine/generator off-line awaiting replacement of the 'C' Main Power        |
| Transformer.  All safety related equipment is available."                    |
|                                                                              |
| The fans had been operating about 10 hours before tripping, it is suspected  |
| that the damper was not adequately secured in the open position when the     |
| plant exited the refueling outage.  The licensee is investigating.           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local township      |
| authorities.                                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   37035       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ANHEUSER-BUSCH                       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  ANHEUSER-BUSCH                       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:05[EDT]|
|    CITY:  WILLIAMSBURG             REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        05/22/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  VA |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARISA BOOTA                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| During the semiannual inspection, one Permx model P160 series tritium exit   |
| sign was discovered missing.  It is believed to have been destroyed during   |
| demolition of a wall as part of an expansion of the plant.  A search of the  |
| plant was conducted and the contractors involved in the demolition were      |
| questioned with no real findings.  A written report will be submitted to the |
| NRC Region 2 office.                                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   37036       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL                 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  NAC INTERNATIONAL                    |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:59[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MARLTON                  REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        05/26/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NJ |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |DAN HOLODY           R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (FAX)     NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX)   NMSS    |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN GUTHERMAN              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| An audit of the company's Holtite-A shielding material test qualification    |
| and manufacturing program identified that a 10 CFR  21 report was not made   |
| in the wake of the company's discovery of defective neutron shielding        |
| material supplied under a safety significant procurement.  The material,     |
| NS-4-FR, used for dry cask storage use contained internal voids where solid  |
| material was expected.  The problem is lack of specific installation         |
| procedure to eliminate voids in the poured samples.  The samples were still  |
| considered suitable for use in thermal stability testing.  However, the      |
| samples failed and together with the voids was considered unsuitable for     |
| use.  The firm supplying the basic component was NAC International of        |
| Norcross, GA.  The problem was originally noted in April 1998.  NAC was not  |
| informed, in part because Holtec was not aware of any installation in any    |
| cask with significant heat loads.  Holtec has no information on actual usage |
| or locations of use as they are not the supplier of the hardware with the    |
| potential defect.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Holtec has no NAC supplied NS-4-FR in any cask system supplied to its        |
| customers.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37037       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:03[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2                             |EVENT DATE:        05/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GLEN HUTTON                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAN HOLODY           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| "B" CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS                            |
|                                                                              |
| The 'B' control room HVAC system has been determined to be outside design    |
| basis per Generic Letter 91-18.  There is a non-conforming condition in the  |
| system.  There is reasonable expectation that the HVAC system is Operable,   |
| due to a new methodology, Acron 96, expected results indicate that the HVAC  |
| system would be within the design basis.  Some of the assumptions made in    |
| the original calculations, when the system was installed, were determined to |
| be incorrect.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Transportation                                   |Event Number:   37038       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD CONTROL         |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  FRANK W. HAKE & ASSOCOATES, INC.     |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:35[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MEMPHIS                  REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        05/26/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  TN |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:  R-79171               AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|                                                |WAYNE HODGES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SHAWN DRAKE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 300 MILLIREM/HR SPOT FOUND ON A B-25 CONTAINER.                              |
|                                                                              |
| On 05/26/00, the Radiation Safety Officer at Frank W. Hake & Associates      |
| notified the Memphis field office of the Division of Radiological Health of  |
| a transportation event.  The licensee received a shipment from GTS Duratek   |
| in Oak Ridge, TN.  One of the B-25 containers had a hot spot on the bottom   |
| of the container that exceeded the limits in 49CFR173.441 for an uncovered   |
| conveyance.  The licensee offloaded the shipment to investigate.             |
|                                                                              |
| This event dose does not pose a risk to public health and safety.            |
|                                                                              |
| The State of Tennessee event report ID number for this event is TN-00-088.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   37039       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  CROW BUTTE RESOURCES                 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE:  CROW BUTTE RESOURCES                 |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:37[EDT]|
|    CITY:  CRAWFORD                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        05/26/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NE |EVENT TIME:        12:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  SUA-1534              AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |CLAUDE JOHNSON       R4      |
|                                                |WAYNE HODGES         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RHONDA GRANTHAM              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SULFATE AND CHLORIDE LIMITS EXCEEDED                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported that their confirmatory samples that they received     |
| back today confirmed that monitor Well # SM 613 exceeded its sulfate limit   |
| and monitor Well # SM 628 exceeded its sulfate and chloride limits.  The     |
| licensee has not started mining the site.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Both the initial and confirmatory samples taken for monitor Well # SM 613    |
| showed a sulfate level of 25ppm.  The multiple limit for sulfate is 18 ppm   |
| and the single limit for sulfates is 21 ppm.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Monitor Well # SM 628 initial sample indicated a chloride level of 7.7 ppm   |
| and the confirmatory sample indicated a chloride level of 7.3 ppm.  The      |
| multiple parameter limit for chlorides is 7.0 ppm and the multiple parameter |
| limit is 7.3 ppm.   Initial sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 46   |
| ppm and the confirmatory sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 43 ppm. |
| The multiple parameter limit for sulfates is 33 ppm and the single parameter |
| limit for sulfates is 39 ppm.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Initial samples were taken on 05/25/00 and the confirmatory samples were     |
| taken on 05/26/00.  The licensee thinks that the base line water quality is  |
| very clean and that they are seeing natural variations of the water.         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37040       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:03[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM WEBB                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/26/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii)     DEGRAD COND DURING OP  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR)  HEAT EXCHANGER (HX) TO SAFETY INJECTION (SI)    |
| PUMP MOTOR VALVES DO NOT MEET THEIR DESIGN BASIS.                            |
|                                                                              |
| At 1610 on May 26,2000 it was determined that the as built condition of the  |
| plant did not meet its design basis.  The condition involves the RHR HX to   |
| SI (low head injection) pump motor valves.  These valves are interlocked     |
| with a pressure signal from the RHR system.  The signal that allows these    |
| valves to open, was found not to meet the requirement of IEEE 279. The       |
| pressure signal prevents the valves from opening when RHR pressure is        |
| greater than the design pressure of the SI suction piping.  This permissive  |
| was designed to prevent the valves from being inadvertently opened when RHR  |
| is in its cooldown line up.  Its only function when the  RHR system is in    |
| its at power line up is to not malfunction and thus allowing the valves to   |
| open.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Original documentation from the plant construction and discussions with      |
| Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, indicates that the original design intent was |
| that this interlock did not need to meet IEEE 279.  This was based on the    |
| assumption that local manual action could be taken if the interlock          |
| malfunctioned.  However the USAR does not reflect this design philosophy.    |
| The USAR appears to assume the valves can be positioned from the control     |
| room and that no local manual action is required.                            |
|                                                                              |
| A temporary change has been initiated to defeat the interlock while the      |
| plant is at power.  This will ensure the plant meets its design basis.       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37041       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FARLEY                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        05:47[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WESS CUMBEE                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MARK LESSER          R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       4        Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING A LOSS   |
| OF FEEDWATER DUE TO AN ELECTROHYDRAULIC CONTROL (EHC) MALFUNCTION            |
|                                                                              |
| Prior to this event, power on Unit 1 had been decreased to 14% and the       |
| turbine had been taken off line for performance of a balance move due to     |
| high vibration of bearing #9 after exiting a refueling outage.  Subsequent   |
| to this load reduction, an EHC malfunction caused a feedwater pump to roll   |
| back, and this in turn resulted in a loss of feedwater.  Operators attempted |
| to reduce power to 2% but were unable to restore the main feedwater pump.    |
| Auxiliary feedwater was manually started, but the reactor automatically      |
| tripped from approximately 4% power at 0547 CDT due to low steam generator   |
| water level.  All rods fully inserted.  There were no emergency core cooling |
| system actuations, and none were required.  The licensee stated that all     |
| systems functioned as required in response to the reactor trip.              |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at    |
| normal operating temperature and pressure.  The reactor coolant pumps,       |
| pressurizer heaters and sprays, and normal charging and letdown are being    |
| utilized for primary system transport, pressure, and inventory control.      |
| Secondary steam is being dumped to the main condenser, and auxiliary         |
| feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   37042       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER                   REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/28/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        05/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:52[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BART CROW                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/28/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CLAUDE JOHNSON       R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       15       Power Operation  |15       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ENTERED LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATIONS (LCO)  AFTER REACTOR CORE ISOLATION |
| COOLING (RCIC) DECLARED INOPERABLE.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| RCIC was declared inoperable during surveillance testing after RCIC minimum  |
| flow isolation valve failed to open during testing.  Technical Specification |
| 3.5.3, 14 day LCO , was entered after RCIC was declared inoperable.  All     |
| other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable if needed.  Offsite electrical grid is stable.                |
|                                                                              |
| Startup testing is continuing.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+