Event Notification Report for May 30, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/26/2000 - 05/30/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
37032 37033 37034 37035 37036 37037 37038 37039 37040 37041 37042
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37032 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MCGUIRE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 21:47[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:46[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: H. M. HARRIS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN HANNON NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE RUNBACK TO 50% DUE TO LOSS OF A MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP FOLLOWED BY A |
| REACTOR TRIP ON LOW LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL. ONE AUXILIARY |
| FEEDWATER PUMP HAD TO BE MANUALLY STARTED. |
| |
| Reactor automatic trip occurred at 2046 ET. Initiating event was steam |
| generator low low water level on "C" steam generator. Prior to the trip |
| Channel 1 vital 120 volt AC power was lost due to the tripping open of EVIA |
| (DC/AC ) inverter AC output breaker. No testing was in progress at this |
| time and the cause of the AC breaker trip is under investigation. When the |
| AC output breaker opened it caused a loss of Channel 1 power. Main |
| feedwater pump "1A" control circuitry interfaces with Channel 1 120 volt AC |
| power and when Main Feedwater pump "1A" control circuitry power was lost |
| main feedwater pump "1A" turbine tripped. The loss of Main Feedwater pump |
| "1A" turbine initiated an automatic main turbine runback to 50% power. |
| After the main turbine runback to 50% power the reactor tripped on steam |
| generator "1C" low low water level. Only one of two motor driven auxiliary |
| feedwater pumps automatically started on steam generator "1C" low low water |
| level. Auxiliary feedwater pump "1A" was manually started approximately 2 |
| minutes after the automatic reactor trip. The licensee is investigating why |
| the "1A" auxiliary feedwater pump did not automatically start. All rods |
| fully inserted into the core and reactor coolant temperature is being |
| maintained at Tave no load condition of 557 degrees F. No PORVs or code |
| safety valves on either the primary or secondary side of the plant opened. |
| All the Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators |
| are fully operable if needed. Offsite electrical grid is stable. The |
| licensee's investigation into the initiating event is continuing. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/26/00 AT 1640 ET BY HEAFNER TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| Only the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and the Motor Driven |
| Auxiliary Feedwater Pump "1B" automatically started. The "1A" Motor |
| Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump did not automatically start since its |
| control circuitry is supplied electrical power from Channel 1 vital 120 volt |
| AC power, which was lost. As stated in the original event report, Auxiliary |
| Feedwater Pump "1A" was manually started approximately 2 minutes after the |
| automatic reactor trip. |
| |
| Two of three Primary side Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV) opened and |
| subsequently closed. No secondary side PORVs or code safety valves on |
| either the Primary or Secondary side of the plant opened. Investigation |
| into the event is continuing. R2DO (Tom Decker) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 37033 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/25/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:52[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/25/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM MCCLEERY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| The following is the faxed report from Portsmouth: |
| |
| On May 16, 2000, PORTS plant personnel initiated a review of an NRC event (# |
| 36993) submitted by Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), to assess |
| applicability at the Portsmouth sight. Errors associated with calibration |
| correction factors used to determine uranium masses were found to have not |
| occurred at the PORTS sight. |
| |
| On May 25, 2000, after further review by Nuclear Criticality Safety dept. |
| personnel, a violation of double contingency was identified when it was |
| determined that the independence of non-destructive assay (NDA) measurements |
| was not maintained. NCSA-PLANT013.A00 indicated that NDA measurements will |
| be maintained independent. However, calibration of instruments was not |
| maintained independent and therefore the resulting measurements were not |
| independent. As a result, the calibration process failed to ensure that a |
| single failure could not effect two independent mass measurements. Double |
| contingency was violated in cases where two independent uranium mass |
| measurements were required to establish double contingency. |
| |
| A review of NDA calibration data confirmed that no measurement errors |
| actually existed which would have affected the mass readings taken to |
| establish double contingency. This event is being reported because the |
| independence or mass measurement readings was not established and |
| maintained. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| The safety significance of this event is very low. All historical |
| calibrations were reviewed (Ref. POEF-38.340.00.086) and no discrepancies |
| were identified with historical measurements. Furthermore, ongoing |
| laboratory Quality Assurance programs and practices help ensure errors of |
| this nature remain sufficiently unlikely to be relied on as criticality |
| controls. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| An error in NDA measurements plus uncertainty would have to be low by |
| greater than a factor of two or results in a critical mass of uranium going |
| undetected. if this mass were then subject to the correct geometry, |
| moderation and reflection conditions a criticality could error |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Mass is the only controlled parameter. Two independent measurements of mass |
| are required to ensure double contingency. Since independence of NDA of NDA |
| mass measurements is called Into question, only one independent estimate of |
| mass is available. The absence of a second independent NDA mass measurement |
| represents a loss of one double contingency control. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| No uranium was involved in the event. NDA measurements are used to classify |
| cascade deposits as either greater than safe mass or less than safe mass. |
| (Safe Mass is 43.5% of minimum critical mass.) NDA measurements are also |
| used in batching operations to ensure the 235U mass in the final container |
| is less than 350 grams 235U which is less half the minimum critical mass at |
| 100% enrichment and optimum moderation, geometry and reflection conditions. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES |
| |
| Nuclear criticality safety controls include independent mass measurements of |
| 235U. Failure to ensure the calibration of the NDA instrumentation was |
| independent lead to a potential failure of the mass measurements. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| NDA measurements performed for criticality safety purposes have been |
| suspended until independent verification of calibration data requirements is |
| flown into applicable procedures and programs. |
| |
| The certificate holder notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify |
| the DOE representative. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/26/00 AT 2012 ET BY McCLEERY TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| Update 1, 5/26/00 The NCSE for the above NCSA failed to specifically address |
| failure in calibration or source checks as part of the contingency event |
| "erroneous uranium analysis or operator error." Therefore, this indicates |
| that the NCSE failed to analyze or bound a credible scenario that could lead |
| to a criticality. |
| |
| A review of past calibration data revealed no suspect calibration or |
| measurements. No known or suspected error in NDA measurements has been |
| discover DOI-344-00-02, Rev A was issued to ensure NDA measurements |
| supporting NCS activities were suspended until requirements for independent |
| verification of NDA calibration data and factors are flowed into applicable |
| procedures. |
| |
| R3DO (Monty Phillips) & NMSS EO (Hodges) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37034 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:29[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/25/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 22:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHRIS SERATA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 15 Power Operation |15 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FOUR FILTRATION RECIRCULATION AND VENTILATION FANS TRIPPED UNEXPECTEDLY |
| |
| "On 5/25/00 at 22:54 hours, four operating Filtration, Recirculation. and |
| Ventilation System (FRVS) recirculation fans (A, B, D, E) unexpectedly |
| tripped while they were running for a monthly surveillance. An FRVS |
| ventilation fan, that was also in service, continued to run. |
| |
| "The FRVS consists of two subsystems, the Recirculation System and the |
| Ventilation System. The FRVS Recirculation System is an Engineered Safety |
| Feature (ESF) System, located inside the Secondary Containment, that reduces |
| offsite doses significantly below 10CFR100 guidelines during a LOCA, |
| refueling accident, or high radioactivity in the Secondary Containment. Upon |
| a Secondary Containment isolation, the FRVS Recirculation System is actuated |
| and recirculates the Secondary Containment air through filters for cleanup. |
| This subsystem is the initial cleanup system before discharge is made via |
| the FRVS Ventilation subsystem to the outdoors. The FRVS Ventilation System |
| is an ESF system, located inside the Secondary Containment, that maintains |
| the building at a negative pressure with respect to the outdoors. The system |
| takes suction from the discharge duct of the FRVS Recirculation system and |
| discharges the air through filters to the outdoors. |
| |
| "Investigation into the cause of the fan trips has identified a manual |
| damper in the ventilation system ductwork that failed to the closed |
| position. This manual damper is normally open during power operation. This |
| damper is repositioned closed during refueling outages to redistribute |
| ventilation through the Secondary Containment. Immediate actions were taken |
| to return the damper to the open position. Recirculation fans have been |
| returned to service and are operating satisfactorily. |
| |
| "The ventilation system ductwork was reviewed to identify other manual |
| dampers that could have the same or similar affect on system operation. Two |
| other dampers were identified, their positions have been verified to be |
| correct. |
| |
| "Hope Creek is presently in Operational Condition 1 at 15% power with the |
| turbine/generator off-line awaiting replacement of the 'C' Main Power |
| Transformer. All safety related equipment is available." |
| |
| The fans had been operating about 10 hours before tripping, it is suspected |
| that the damper was not adequately secured in the open position when the |
| plant exited the refueling outage. The licensee is investigating. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the local township |
| authorities. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37035 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: ANHEUSER-BUSCH |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: ANHEUSER-BUSCH |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:05[EDT]|
| CITY: WILLIAMSBURG REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 05/22/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: VA |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARISA BOOTA | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MISSING TRITIUM EXIT SIGN |
| |
| During the semiannual inspection, one Permx model P160 series tritium exit |
| sign was discovered missing. It is believed to have been destroyed during |
| demolition of a wall as part of an expansion of the plant. A search of the |
| plant was conducted and the contractors involved in the demolition were |
| questioned with no real findings. A written report will be submitted to the |
| NRC Region 2 office. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 37036 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: HOLTEC INTERNATIONAL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: NAC INTERNATIONAL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:59[EDT]|
| CITY: MARLTON REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 05/26/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NJ |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |DAN HOLODY R1 |
| |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (FAX) NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN GUTHERMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT |
| |
| An audit of the company's Holtite-A shielding material test qualification |
| and manufacturing program identified that a 10 CFR 21 report was not made |
| in the wake of the company's discovery of defective neutron shielding |
| material supplied under a safety significant procurement. The material, |
| NS-4-FR, used for dry cask storage use contained internal voids where solid |
| material was expected. The problem is lack of specific installation |
| procedure to eliminate voids in the poured samples. The samples were still |
| considered suitable for use in thermal stability testing. However, the |
| samples failed and together with the voids was considered unsuitable for |
| use. The firm supplying the basic component was NAC International of |
| Norcross, GA. The problem was originally noted in April 1998. NAC was not |
| informed, in part because Holtec was not aware of any installation in any |
| cask with significant heat loads. Holtec has no information on actual usage |
| or locations of use as they are not the supplier of the hardware with the |
| potential defect. |
| |
| Holtec has no NAC supplied NS-4-FR in any cask system supplied to its |
| customers. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37037 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 05/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GLEN HUTTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAN HOLODY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| "B" CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS |
| |
| The 'B' control room HVAC system has been determined to be outside design |
| basis per Generic Letter 91-18. There is a non-conforming condition in the |
| system. There is reasonable expectation that the HVAC system is Operable, |
| due to a new methodology, Acron 96, expected results indicate that the HVAC |
| system would be within the design basis. Some of the assumptions made in |
| the original calculations, when the system was installed, were determined to |
| be incorrect. |
| |
| The licensee intends to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Transportation |Event Number: 37038 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: TENNESSEE DIV OF RAD CONTROL |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: FRANK W. HAKE & ASSOCOATES, INC. |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:35[EDT]|
| CITY: MEMPHIS REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 05/26/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: TN |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: R-79171 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
| |WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SHAWN DRAKE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 300 MILLIREM/HR SPOT FOUND ON A B-25 CONTAINER. |
| |
| On 05/26/00, the Radiation Safety Officer at Frank W. Hake & Associates |
| notified the Memphis field office of the Division of Radiological Health of |
| a transportation event. The licensee received a shipment from GTS Duratek |
| in Oak Ridge, TN. One of the B-25 containers had a hot spot on the bottom |
| of the container that exceeded the limits in 49CFR173.441 for an uncovered |
| conveyance. The licensee offloaded the shipment to investigate. |
| |
| This event dose does not pose a risk to public health and safety. |
| |
| The State of Tennessee event report ID number for this event is TN-00-088. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 37039 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
|LICENSEE: CROW BUTTE RESOURCES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:37[EDT]|
| CITY: CRAWFORD REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/26/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NE |EVENT TIME: 12:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: SUA-1534 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 |
| |WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RHONDA GRANTHAM | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SULFATE AND CHLORIDE LIMITS EXCEEDED |
| |
| The licensee reported that their confirmatory samples that they received |
| back today confirmed that monitor Well # SM 613 exceeded its sulfate limit |
| and monitor Well # SM 628 exceeded its sulfate and chloride limits. The |
| licensee has not started mining the site. |
| |
| Both the initial and confirmatory samples taken for monitor Well # SM 613 |
| showed a sulfate level of 25ppm. The multiple limit for sulfate is 18 ppm |
| and the single limit for sulfates is 21 ppm. |
| |
| Monitor Well # SM 628 initial sample indicated a chloride level of 7.7 ppm |
| and the confirmatory sample indicated a chloride level of 7.3 ppm. The |
| multiple parameter limit for chlorides is 7.0 ppm and the multiple parameter |
| limit is 7.3 ppm. Initial sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 46 |
| ppm and the confirmatory sulfate sample indicated a sulfate level of 43 ppm. |
| The multiple parameter limit for sulfates is 33 ppm and the single parameter |
| limit for sulfates is 39 ppm. |
| |
| Initial samples were taken on 05/25/00 and the confirmatory samples were |
| taken on 05/26/00. The licensee thinks that the base line water quality is |
| very clean and that they are seeing natural variations of the water. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37040 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:03[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WEBB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/26/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) HEAT EXCHANGER (HX) TO SAFETY INJECTION (SI) |
| PUMP MOTOR VALVES DO NOT MEET THEIR DESIGN BASIS. |
| |
| At 1610 on May 26,2000 it was determined that the as built condition of the |
| plant did not meet its design basis. The condition involves the RHR HX to |
| SI (low head injection) pump motor valves. These valves are interlocked |
| with a pressure signal from the RHR system. The signal that allows these |
| valves to open, was found not to meet the requirement of IEEE 279. The |
| pressure signal prevents the valves from opening when RHR pressure is |
| greater than the design pressure of the SI suction piping. This permissive |
| was designed to prevent the valves from being inadvertently opened when RHR |
| is in its cooldown line up. Its only function when the RHR system is in |
| its at power line up is to not malfunction and thus allowing the valves to |
| open. |
| |
| Original documentation from the plant construction and discussions with |
| Westinghouse, the NSSS vendor, indicates that the original design intent was |
| that this interlock did not need to meet IEEE 279. This was based on the |
| assumption that local manual action could be taken if the interlock |
| malfunctioned. However the USAR does not reflect this design philosophy. |
| The USAR appears to assume the valves can be positioned from the control |
| room and that no local manual action is required. |
| |
| A temporary change has been initiated to defeat the interlock while the |
| plant is at power. This will ensure the plant meets its design basis. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37041 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FARLEY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 05:47[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WESS CUMBEE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MARK LESSER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 4 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL FOLLOWING A LOSS |
| OF FEEDWATER DUE TO AN ELECTROHYDRAULIC CONTROL (EHC) MALFUNCTION |
| |
| Prior to this event, power on Unit 1 had been decreased to 14% and the |
| turbine had been taken off line for performance of a balance move due to |
| high vibration of bearing #9 after exiting a refueling outage. Subsequent |
| to this load reduction, an EHC malfunction caused a feedwater pump to roll |
| back, and this in turn resulted in a loss of feedwater. Operators attempted |
| to reduce power to 2% but were unable to restore the main feedwater pump. |
| Auxiliary feedwater was manually started, but the reactor automatically |
| tripped from approximately 4% power at 0547 CDT due to low steam generator |
| water level. All rods fully inserted. There were no emergency core cooling |
| system actuations, and none were required. The licensee stated that all |
| systems functioned as required in response to the reactor trip. |
| |
| The unit is currently stable in Mode 3 with the reactor coolant system at |
| normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor coolant pumps, |
| pressurizer heaters and sprays, and normal charging and letdown are being |
| utilized for primary system transport, pressure, and inventory control. |
| Secondary steam is being dumped to the main condenser, and auxiliary |
| feedwater is supplying water to the steam generators. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37042 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COOPER REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/28/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:52[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BART CROW |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/28/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 15 Power Operation |15 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ENTERED LIMITING CONDITION OF OPERATIONS (LCO) AFTER REACTOR CORE ISOLATION |
| COOLING (RCIC) DECLARED INOPERABLE. |
| |
| RCIC was declared inoperable during surveillance testing after RCIC minimum |
| flow isolation valve failed to open during testing. Technical Specification |
| 3.5.3, 14 day LCO , was entered after RCIC was declared inoperable. All |
| other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable if needed. Offsite electrical grid is stable. |
| |
| Startup testing is continuing. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021