Event Notification Report for May 15, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/12/2000 - 05/15/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36993 36994 36995 36996 36997 36998 36999 37000 37001
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36993 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:34[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/11/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:55[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION |
| |
| INSTRUMENT USED TO DETERMINE URANIUM MASSES WAS FOUND TO BE IN ERROR IN THE |
| NON-CONSERVATIVE DIRECTION. |
| |
| The calibration factor of an instrument used to determine uranium masses was |
| discovered to be in error. This error was in the non-conservative direction |
| (approximately 30% off) and resulted in the under reporting of uranium |
| masses, violating NCSA GEN-010, Requirement 3.1.3. The purpose of this |
| requirement is to ensure proper uncomplicated handling/planned expeditious |
| handling (UH/PEH) classification to ensure safe handling of the item. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| Both of the controls relied upon for double contingency are based on |
| determination of a uranium mass. Both of these controls were lost; |
| therefore, double contingency was not maintained. However, based on |
| Non-Destructive Analysis recalculation of the measured values using the |
| correct calibration factor, an unsafe mass of uranium was not involved. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED OF HOW CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, a critical mass of uranium would |
| be needed to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| independent controls on mass. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| Each item or group has been verified to be less than the always safe mass |
| and enrichment could be as much as 100%, in the form of uranyl fluoride. |
| The process limit of 400 grams is less than half of the worst case mass. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing two |
| controls on mass. |
| |
| Since the measurements were performed with an improperly calibrated |
| instrument, the reported masses could not be relied upon and double |
| contingency was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| Access to the identified items is being controlled with ropes and postings |
| until they can be retagged with the correct uranium masses. After the |
| uranium mass has been corrected, the ropes and postings may be removed. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the certificate |
| holder. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36994 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: JOHNSON CONTROLS |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/2000|
|LICENSEE: AMSTAT INDUSTRIES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:30[EDT]|
| CITY: HOLLAND REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/12/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MI |EVENT TIME: 10:30[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE MILBURN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| IN-LINE STATIC DE-IONIZATION GUN MISSING. |
| |
| Johnson Controls leased an in-line static de-ionization gun from Amstat |
| Industries on 04/0 9/99. While looking for the static de-ionization gun to |
| return it to Amstat Industries, Johnson Controls discovered that the static |
| de-ionization gun was missing. The in-line static de-ionization gun |
| contains 10 millicuries of Polonium-210 (alpha emitter). Johnson Controls |
| did not know when the in-line static de-ionization gun was last seen. The |
| in-line static de-ionization gun, model number P2021-8101 was made by NRD, |
| Grand Island, NY. The serial number of the source is 110700. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36995 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/2000|
|LICENSEE: U.S. AIR FORCE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:56[EDT]|
| CITY: ELMENDORF AFB REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 11/01/1998|
| COUNTY: STATE: AK |EVENT TIME: [YDT]|
|LICENSE#: 42-23539-01AF AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HICKS (BOLLING AFB) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE REPORTED POSSIBLE LOSS OF CHEMICAL AGENT MONITORS (CAM). |
| |
| THE LICENSEE WAS NOTIFIED AT 1030 ON 05/12/00 BY MAJ WISEMAN OF THE 3RD |
| AMDS/SGPB AT ELMENDORF AFB, ALASKA, OF A RECENT INSPECTION SHOWING A |
| DISCREPANCY IN DOCUMENTATION FOR THE TRANSFER OF EIGHT AUTOMATIC CHEMICAL |
| AGENT ALARMS (CONTAINING 250 MICROCURIES EACH OF AMERICIUM-241) IN |
| NOVEMBER, 1998. THE TRANSFER OF THESE EIGHT CHEMICAL AGENT DEVICES WAS TO |
| KELLY AFB, TEXAS, WHERE THE RETURNED PAPERWORK STATED THAT ONLY FIVE DEVICES |
| WERE RECEIVED. THE LICENSEE IS NOW TRYING TO DETERMINE IF ONLY FIVE DEVICES |
| INSTEAD OF EIGHT WERE RECEIVED AND THE NUMBER 5 WAS A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR ON |
| THE RECEIPT FORM. THE LICENSEE IS CONTINUING THE INVESTIGATION. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36996 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: COGEMA MINING INC |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/2000|
|LICENSEE: COGEMA MINING INC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:30[EDT]|
| CITY: MILLS REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/09/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: WY |EVENT TIME: [MDT]|
|LICENSE#: SUA-1341 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+MIKE LAYTON NMSS |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: VASELIN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NINF INFORMATION ONLY | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SAMPLES COLLECTED AT A MONITOR WELL EXCEEDED TWO OF ITS THREE UPPER CONTROL |
| LIMITS. |
| |
| A routine quarterly water sample collected on 05/09/00 from monitor well #M2 |
| exceeded two of its three upper control limits (UCLs). A confirmation |
| sample was collected on 05/11/00, which also exceeded two UCLs. Monitor well |
| #M2 was then placed on excursion status as per license section 11.2 and its |
| sampling frequency increased to weekly. Well #M2 is a perimeter ore zone |
| monitor well located approximately 300 feet west of the restored Production |
| Unit 2 boundary, at the Irigaray Mine, Johnson County, Wyoming. The nearest |
| community is Linch, Wyoming, approximately 23 miles to the southeast. |
| |
| Analysis data: |
| |
| Date Chloride Conductivity |
| Alkalinity Uranium |
| Sampled mg/l �mhos/cm2 |
| mg/l mg/l U3O8 |
| ULC 18.0 UCL 685 UCL 131.1 |
| UCL none |
| 05/09/00 19.3 814 |
| 94.3 <0.4 |
| 05/11/00 19.3 799 |
| 96.6 <0.4 |
| |
| Health and Environmental Hazards: |
| None. |
| |
| Investigative Action: |
| Conduct further sampling to try to determine the extent and direction of the |
| excursion. |
| |
| Written Notification: |
| Written notification will be submitted to NRC Uranium Recovery Branch Chief. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36997 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NORTH CAROLINA DIV OF RAD PROTECT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/2000|
|LICENSEE: HUMBOLDT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:30[EDT]|
| CITY: RALEIGH REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 05/12/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: 09:15[EDT]|
|LICENSE#: 092-0750-1 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/12/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BRIAN BONSER R2 |
| |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+BRENT CLAYTON R3 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ACCATTATO | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HUMBOLDT NOTIFIED THE NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION OF A |
| MISSING MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE. |
| |
| A HUMBOLDT MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE, MODEL #5001C, SERIAL #1966, WAS SHIPPED |
| FROM THE MANUFACTURER IN RALEIGH, NC, TO COPLAY, PA, VIA THEIR CARRIER, |
| ROADWAY EXPRESS. AFTER FIVE DAYS THE CUSTOMER NOTIFIED HUMBOLDT THAT THEY |
| HAD NOT RECEIVED THE GAUGE. HUMBOLDT THEN CALLED ROADWAY AND FOUND OUT THAT |
| THE GAUGE WAS MISSING IN TRANSIT. A TRACE WAS PUT OUT BY ROADWAY FOR THE |
| GAUGE AND THEY BELIEVE IT MAY HAVE BEEN TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER TRAILER IN |
| WINSTON-SALEM, NC WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO GO TO INDIANAPOLIS, IN. THE |
| SUSPECTED TRAILER HAS BEEN LOCATED IN INDIANA, AND THEY WILL TAKE IT BACK TO |
| THEIR HUB IN INDIANAPOLIS TO UNLOAD IT TO VERIFY IF THE GAUGE IS THERE. THE |
| GAUGE CONTAINED 10 MILLICURIES OF CESIUM-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES |
| AMERICIUM/BERYLLIUM. THEY ARE ALSO CHECKING OTHER TRAILERS THAT LEFT FROM |
| THE WINSTON/SALEM, NC HUB. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 5/12/00 @ 2244 BY ACCATTATO TO GOULD * * * |
| |
| THE GAUGE WAS RECOVERED IN INDIANAPOLIS AND HAS BEEN REDIRECTED TO THE |
| ORIGINAL CUSTOMER. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36998 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/12/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:57[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 05/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DEMONCH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/13/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO THE ELECTROMATIC RELIEF |
| VALVES AND ASSOCIATED ADS BEING DECLARED INOPERABLE. |
| |
| While preparing a spare Electromatic Relief Valve for installation in the |
| upcoming refueling outage, Oyster Creek identified that the valve's |
| electrical (Patel) connector was not properly sealed. As such, the |
| Environmental Qualification of the electrical connectors for these valves |
| are questionable. Based on this discovery, Oyster Creek has declared all |
| the Electromatic Relief Valves (and associated Automatic Depressurization |
| System) inoperable. |
| |
| During a Small Break LOCA, these valves are required to function in order to |
| depressurize the reactor. In accordance with the plant's Technical |
| Specifications, Oyster Creek is in the process of shutting down. The plant |
| has 24 hours to be <110�F and be in Cold Shutdown Condition in the following |
| six hours. This condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) for |
| operation of the plant outside design basis. Testing is being conducted in |
| parallel with the shutdown in order to determine if the existing |
| configuration is acceptable for continued operation. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 05/13/00 AT 0836 EDT BY PIETRUSKI TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * * |
| |
| After a review of the Electromatic Relief Valve power connectors bench test |
| for EQ requirements, it has been concluded that there is reasonable |
| assurance that the Electromatic Relief Valves will perform their function as |
| designed. The Electromatic Relief Valves are considered operable, the |
| Limiting Condition of Operation has been exited, and shutdown has been |
| terminated at 0654 EDT. Reactor power is currently 75% and plans are to |
| return to 100% power. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R1DO (John Rogge). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36999 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/13/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:25[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/13/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:26[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BREADY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/13/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN ROGGE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| At 1325 on 05/13/00, a Reactor Protection System scram signal was received |
| due to a high Scram Discharge Volume level condition. |
| |
| The high Scram Discharge Volume level condition occurred as a result of an |
| Alternate Rod Insertion test signal that was initiated from the Redundant |
| Reactivity Control System during a planned valve testing activity. The |
| Alternate Rod Insertion test signal depressurized the scram air header, |
| causing all control rod scram inlet and outlet valves to open and Scram |
| Discharge Volume vent and drain valves to close as designed. Control room |
| personnel involved in the valve testing activity incorrectly believed that |
| manipulation of the Alternate Rod Insertion test switches for one second |
| would allow an Alternate Rod Insertion valve to be tested following planned |
| maintenance, without depressurizing the scram air header. Control Room |
| personnel reset the Redundant Reactivity Control and Reactor Protection |
| Scram signals in accordance with plant procedures at 1343, after initial |
| validation of the sequence of events. |
| |
| At the time of the event, reactor core reload was in progress in Operational |
| Condition 5. All control rods were previously verified to be fully inserted |
| in support of core alterations. 'B' and 'D' channel equipment are |
| considered protected for defense in depth, and planned maintenance is in |
| progress on 'A' and 'C' channel equipment. The 'B' Residual Heat Removal |
| pump remained in service in shutdown cooling throughout the event, and |
| reactor cavity level and temperature were unaffected. There was no impact to |
| overall plant safety as a result of this event. |
| |
| The response of the Alternate Rod Insertion valve that was to be tested is |
| currently being evaluated. A root cause investigation team has been |
| assembled, and evaluation of system and personnel performance is in |
| progress. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37000 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GRAND GULF REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/14/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 05/14/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:05[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HANKS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/14/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE DECLARED THE DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG) |
| INOPERABLE AND THE PLANT ENTERED AN LCO ACTION STATEMENT. |
| |
| THE DIVISION 3 EDG WAS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO THE SOAK BACK PUMP |
| (SUPPLIES LUBE OIL TO THE DIESEL SO THAT IT IS READY TO START) TRIP FAILURE. |
| THE CAUSE OF THE FAILURE IS A FAULTY RELAY FOR THE PUMP. THEY WILL REPLACE |
| THIS RELAY. THIS EDG SUPPORTS THE HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY (HPCS) SYSTEM |
| FOR SAFETY FUNCTIONS. THE HPCS SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN DECLARED INOPERABLE AND |
| THE DIVISION 3 EDG IS STILL FUNCTIONAL. THE PLANT HAS 12 HOURS TO BE IN |
| CONDITION 3 AND 36 HOURS TO BE IN CONDITION 4. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 37001 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/15/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:04[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:43[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE HACKLEMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/15/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOSE CALVO NRR |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I) EMERGENCY DECLARED |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |EACHES FEMA |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION |JOSEPH HIMES RCT |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER EXPLOSION & FIRE; LOSS OF OFFSITE |
| POWER - |
| |
| At 0043 PDT on 05/15/00, the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to |
| auxiliary transformer #1-1 exploding and catching on fire. This resulted in |
| the loss of offsite power and an automatic trip of Unit 1. The licensee |
| called the offsite fire department and they responded to the plant. |
| Auxiliary transformer #1-1 is located outside the turbine building (north |
| end). |
| |
| Three of three Unit 1 emergency diesel generators started and loaded and are |
| supplying emergency power to vital Unit 1 buses. Auxiliary transformer #1-1 |
| supplies backup power to Unit 1 emergency buses. The Unit 1 12 KV buses are |
| energized. Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps are running providing forced |
| circulation. |
| |
| Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power. All control rods inserted |
| completely. Steam is being dumped to the atmosphere. Unit 1 has no steam |
| generator tube leaks and no fuel leaks. The auxiliary feedwater system |
| automatically started, as expected. A #1-2 steam generator code safety |
| valve failed open for about 25 - 30 minutes about 30 minutes after the |
| reactor trip. The valve is now closed. There was no safety injection |
| actuation. |
| |
| Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). |
| |
| This event had no effect on Unit 2 which is stable at 100% power. |
| |
| The licensee notified state and local officials and the NRC Resident |
| Inspector. |
| |
| At 0143 PDT, the fire is out. No personnel were injured. |
| |
| At 0405 CDT, NRC Region 4 entered the Monitoring Phase of Normal NRC |
| Response Mode. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021