Event Notification Report for May 3, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/02/2000 - 05/03/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36946 36951 36952 36953 36954 36955 36956 36957 36958
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36946 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:58[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 04/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JERE FREEMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING FAILURE TO POST REQUIRED FIRE |
| WATCH DURING MAINTENANCE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR. |
| |
| "ON 4/28/2000 AT APPROXIMATELY 1000EDT, A REACTOR BUILDING 23 FOOT ELEVATION |
| FLOOR PLUG WAS REMOVED. AN HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AS |
| REQUIRED BY THE OYSTER CREEK FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM TECHNICAL |
| SPECIFICATIONS. THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS ESTABLISHED ON 4/30/2000 AT |
| 0900EDT WHEN THE CONDITION WAS REALIZED." |
| |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1040EDT ON 5/2/00 FROM DAVID PIETRUSKI TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS REPORT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING: |
| |
| "Management review has determined that this event is not reportable and is |
| retracting this notification. A. single missed fire tour is not an |
| indication of a programmatic failure, therefore, it does nor meet the |
| threshold for reporting." |
| |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. NOTIFIED R1DO(DELLA |
| GRECA). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36951 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:34[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING NUMEROUS NUCLEAR CRITICALITY |
| SAFETY ANALYSIS (NCSA) VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN X-705 BUILDING WALKDOWN |
| |
| "On 4/28/00, a manager reported (PR-PTS-00-02234) a potential adverse trend |
| with inadvertent containers (NCSA-705_076.A00) in the X-705 Building. All |
| fissile material operations were suspended in the X-705 operation area |
| pending assessment of PR-PTS-00-02234. |
| |
| "In response to PR-PTS-00-02234, a systematic walk down was performed 5/1/00 |
| for the presence of inadvertent containers in the X-705 Building. At 1034 |
| hours the first NCSA-705_076.A00 violation was identified. Further |
| violations were identified throughout the day for a total of seventeen (17). |
| All were immediately corrected with Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) |
| engineer guidance. These violations could have resulted in the potential |
| accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution had a leak developed with |
| nearby uranium bearing systems. |
| |
| "Twelve (12) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #2 which |
| states, 'inadvertent containers (with internal diameters greater than 5 |
| inches) shall be controlled such that any uranium-bearing liquid that could |
| be collected is geometrically favorable.' Some examples of these violations |
| are: |
| |
| 1. Several drums had deep lids (>1.5") such that solution could accumulate |
| in the lipped area. |
| 2. A tray (>1.5") had no drainage holes. |
| 3. A drain pan (>1.5") had a plugged drainage hole. |
| 4. A section of ventilation duct was bowed inward which could allow solution |
| collection (>1.5"). |
| |
| "This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency |
| principle for each violation. The second control (physical Integrity of |
| nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| "One (1) violation was with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #3 which states, |
| 'Flexible materials (such as plastic sheeting) shall be configured or |
| secured such that they can not be deformed into an inadvertent container.' A |
| rack contained several bagged items. The bagged items were oriented such |
| that an unsafe volume could accumulate if a leak developed. This is a loss |
| of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency principle. The |
| second control (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| "Four (4) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #4 which states |
| in part, 'Absorbent materials shall be covered so that they cannot absorb |
| uranium bearing liquids or modified such that any uranium bearing liquid |
| could be collected is geometrically favorable.' Cheese cloth rolls and mop |
| heads were located near areas if a leak developed could absorb solution |
| containing uranium. This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the |
| double contingency principle for each violation. The second control |
| (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained |
| throughout this event. No uranium bearing material was involved in any of |
| the violations. |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "All of the identified problems involved the loss of geometry or volume of |
| the inadvertent container. No uranium bearing material was involved in any |
| of the identified problems since the remaining barrier to criticality (the |
| physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing systems) was maintained. |
| Therefore, the safety significance of this event is low. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "If a large leak developed in a nearby uranium bearing system, the |
| identified inadvertent containers could have accumulated an unsafe |
| volume/geometry of material. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.); |
| |
| "The parameters controlled were geometry, volume and the physical integrity |
| of nearby uranium bearing systems. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "No uranium bearing material was involved with these problems. The nearby |
| uranium bearing systems had various concentrations. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "The inadvertent containers identified were not configured, oriented, or |
| modified to preclude an unsafe volume/geometry from accumulating. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "Fissile material operations in the affected area have been suspended |
| pending further investigation and subsequent corrective actions." |
| |
| The described violations are representative of the items identified. The |
| investigation is ongoing. Operations informed the NRC Resident Inspector |
| and DOE Site Representative. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2238 ON 05/02/00 TO PR-PTS-00-A2288 BY KURT SISLER TO |
| JOLLIFFE * * * |
| |
| On 05/2/00, five additional violations of NCSA-0705_076.A00 requirements |
| were identified while completing the X-705 facility Nuclear Criticality |
| Safety walkdowns. All fissile operations in the X-705 facility are still |
| suspended pending assessment and resolution of discrepancies identified |
| during the walkdowns. All five discrepancies were corrected at the time of |
| initial discovery. |
| |
| Four violations were with NCSA-0705_076.A00 requirement #2 as stated above. |
| The violations consisted of situations in which equipment or material was |
| oriented such that it could accumulate uranium-bearing solution or liquid in |
| a geometrically unfavorable configuration. This constituted the loss of one |
| control of the double control contingency (geometry/volume). The second |
| control (physical integrity of the nearby uranium bearing systems) was |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| One of the violations was with NCSA-0705_076.A00 requirement #4 as stated |
| above. A large string mop was discovered to not be controlled as required |
| in the NCSA. This also constituted the loss of one control |
| (geometry/volume) of the double contingency principle. The second control |
| (physical integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained |
| throughout this event. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative were notified of |
| this update. |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Burgess and NMSS EO Josie |
| Piccone (by fax). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36952 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:58[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:58[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |BRIAN SMITH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| "At 1458, on 5/1/00, The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that |
| the C-360 building drain configuration was found to deviate from the |
| assumptions of Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 3972-11. The |
| NCSE credits the flow of water cut of the building drains during a fissile |
| material release to be precluded from backing up and washing large |
| quantities of uranium into the elevator and scale pits. Contrary to this |
| assumption, a valve in the drain system closes automatically, as part of the |
| building containment system in response to the release. This allows water |
| supplied to an Instrument cooler to accumulate in the basement and |
| potentially wash uranium into unfavorable geometry pits. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "The conductivity cell drain system is not configured as credited for double |
| contingency. No release has occurred and the operation has been shutdown to |
| preclude further fissile materiel operations pending resolution of this |
| issue. The design of the drain system as credited for double contingency is |
| in error. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, a large release or multiple |
| small releases, resulting In an unsafe mass of fissile material, would have |
| to occur. |
| |
| "Additionally upon building containment, this material would have to be |
| washed in sufficient quantity and concentration into an unfavorable geometry |
| pit. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.: |
| |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing mass |
| and geometry controls. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "There has been no release of UF6. No licensed material Is present in the |
| unfavorable geometry pits. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency relies on system integrity to ensure |
| that a large release or multiple concurrent small releases of fissile |
| material are unlikely. This control was not violated and the first leg of |
| double contingency was maintained. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency Is based on precluding the transport |
| and accumulation of large quantities of uranium into the 0.360 scale and |
| elevator pits, This control Is Implemented through reliance on the design of |
| the drain system. Credit is taken for the sanitary water draining directly |
| to the elevator pit instead of backing up on the basement floor which |
| prevents large amounts of uranium from washing into the unfavorable geometry |
| pits. Contrary to this assumption sanitary water from the autoclave |
| conductivity cell will overflow tile normal drain lines and flow directly to |
| the basement floor following building containment. Therefore, the condition |
| required to assure safe geometry was not maintained. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS |
| IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "Cylinder sampling and transfer operations in C-360 have been discontinued |
| until deficiencies are corrected." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36953 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WEBB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECTIVE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES |
| |
| Analysis of "B" steam generator eddy current results determined that more |
| than 1% of the Westinghouse HEJ sleeve laser weld repaired tubes were |
| classified as defective placing the "B" steam generator in the C-3 |
| classification per the Kewaunee Technical Specifications. Two tubes of 59 |
| inspected contained indications in the weld repaired region. There are 288 |
| total tubes in this population. The licensee plans to increase the |
| population size to 100%. |
| |
| The NRC Resident inspector has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36954 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: MONTANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|LICENSEE: MONTANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:32[EDT]|
| CITY: MISSOULA REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MT |EVENT TIME: 12:02[MDT]|
|LICENSE#: 25-11498-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
| |DONALD COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: REX HOY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: WILLIAM POERTNER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NDAM DAMAGED GAUGE/DEVICE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE |
| |
| Montana Dept of Transportation reported a damaged Troxler moisture density |
| gauge containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 41 mCi Am- 241. The gauge fell out of the |
| back of a truck and was retrieved. The gauge case was cracked but the |
| source was intact. The area was surveyed and a wipe test was performed with |
| no leakage detected. The licensee presently plans to repair the damaged |
| gauge case. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material |Event Number: 36955 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: R. M. WESTER & ASSOCIATES |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|LICENSEE: R. M. WESTER & ASSOCIATES |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:45[EDT]|
| CITY: ST. PETERS REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: MO |EVENT TIME: 09:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: 24-20091-01 AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| |SCOTT MOORE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE KOCH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NMAT MATL IN UNCNTRL AREA | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SMASHED 80 MICROCURIE Am-241 SOURCE DISCOVERED IN A SCRAP METAL YARD IN ST |
| LOUIS, MO - |
| |
| At 0900 CDT on 05/01/00, an employee at the Phillips Scrap Metal Yard, St |
| Louis, MO, discovered two 80 microcurie Am-241 sources inside a scrap |
| industrial air conditioning unit. One source was smashed and the other |
| source was intact. The employee cordoned off the area and called Joe Koch, |
| R. M. Wester & Associates, St Louis, MO, a radiation safety consulting firm |
| possessing a general NRC license. Mr Koch responded to the scrap yard, |
| about 34 miles away. Mr Koch leak tested the damaged source and measured |
| 45.87 DPM (0.3 mR/hr on contact). Mr Koch packaged the sources and took |
| possession of them and plans to send them to the manufacturer, Pyrotronics, |
| Ceder Knolls, NJ. Phillips personnel are determining the previous owners of |
| the air conditioning units. No persons were contaminated from these |
| sources. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36956 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:12[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: WARNER ANDREWS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - CABLES FOR PZR PORVs & PORV BLOCK VALVES NOT SEPARATED IAW APPENDIX R |
| EXEMPTIONS - |
| |
| With Unit 2 in a refueling outage, the licensee discovered during an |
| engineering evaluation, that cabling in the Unit 2 containment for the |
| pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and opposite train PORV |
| block valves are not separated in accordance with the requirements of |
| existing Appendix R exemptions. Part of the bases for the existing Appendix |
| R exemption for containment is that redundant equipment, except pressurizer |
| level transmitters, is separated by a minimum of 20 feet. The PORV and |
| block valve pairs are redundant equipment for Appendix R Safe Shutdown. |
| Field measurements indicate that cable in the open tray associated with the |
| A-Train PORV is separated from B-Train block valve cable by 13 feet and |
| cable in the open tray associated with the B-Train PORV is separated from |
| A-Train block valve cable by 18 feet. These cable routing deficiencies have |
| been evaluated and found to represent a degraded but operable condition, |
| although at this point in the outage, the equipment is not required to be |
| operable. |
| |
| This issue has been identified as Prairie Island Condition Report (CR) |
| #20000832. An action for engineering to evaluate this issue for possible |
| solutions has been assigned as part of CR #20000832. The licensee plans to |
| resolve this condition prior to restarting Unit 2. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36957 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [3] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:56[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PHIL BREIDENBAUGH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - OFFSITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE LONGER THAN ONE HOUR |
| - |
| |
| At about 0534 on 05/02/00, the emergency phone batteries were being removed |
| from service for planned maintenance. During the removal, the backup power |
| supply malfunctioned. This condition required the backup power supply to be |
| isolated. Subsequent evaluation of the as-found condition determined that |
| the loss of normal and backup power supplies resulted in the loss of the |
| emergency notification siren initiation capability. Upon discovery of the |
| loss of initiation capability at about 1100, power was immediately restored |
| using a temporary power cord. |
| |
| Since the siren system was out of service for longer than one hour, the |
| licensee determined this event to be reportable to the NRC in accordance |
| with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(v) at 1556. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36958 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY HARRINGTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 'A' TRAIN EMERGENCY SAFEGUARDS BUS UNEXPECTEDLY DEENERGIZED DURING |
| MAINTENANCE - |
| |
| At 0740 CDT on 05/02/00, while electrical bus maintenance was in progress, |
| the 'A' train emergency safeguards bus unexpectedly deenergized. |
| Deenergizing the bus initiated an ESF start signal for the associated 'A' |
| emergency diesel generator (EDG). At the time, the 'A' EDG had been removed |
| from service for refueling outage scheduled maintenance and no EDG start |
| occurred. |
| |
| In response to the loss of power to the 'A' train safeguards bus, the |
| licensee manually started the 'B' train residual heat removal pump to |
| reestablish decay heat removal There was no temperature rise in the |
| primary system. |
| |
| The licensee is determining the cause of the bus deenergization. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021