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Event Notification Report for May 3, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/02/2000 - 05/03/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36946  36951  36952  36953  36954  36955  36956  36957  36958  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36946       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/30/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:58[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-2                             |EVENT DATE:        04/30/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JERE FREEMAN                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT INVOLVING FAILURE TO POST REQUIRED FIRE  |
| WATCH DURING MAINTENANCE DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR.                             |
|                                                                              |
| "ON 4/28/2000 AT APPROXIMATELY 1000EDT, A REACTOR BUILDING 23 FOOT ELEVATION |
| FLOOR PLUG WAS REMOVED.  AN HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS NOT ESTABLISHED AS         |
| REQUIRED BY THE OYSTER CREEK FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM TECHNICAL               |
| SPECIFICATIONS.  THE HOURLY FIRE WATCH WAS  ESTABLISHED ON 4/30/2000 AT      |
| 0900EDT WHEN THE CONDITION WAS REALIZED."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1040EDT ON 5/2/00 FROM DAVID PIETRUSKI TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS RETRACTING THIS REPORT BASED ON THE FOLLOWING:               |
|                                                                              |
| "Management review has determined that this event is not reportable and is   |
| retracting this notification.  A. single missed fire tour is not an          |
| indication of a programmatic failure, therefore, it does nor meet the        |
| threshold for reporting."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  NOTIFIED R1DO(DELLA    |
| GRECA).                                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36951       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:34[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING NUMEROUS NUCLEAR CRITICALITY     |
| SAFETY ANALYSIS (NCSA) VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN X-705 BUILDING WALKDOWN      |
|                                                                              |
| "On 4/28/00, a manager reported (PR-PTS-00-02234) a potential adverse trend  |
| with inadvertent containers (NCSA-705_076.A00) in the X-705 Building.  All   |
| fissile material operations were suspended in the X-705 operation area       |
| pending assessment of PR-PTS-00-02234.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "In response to PR-PTS-00-02234, a systematic walk down was performed 5/1/00 |
| for the presence of inadvertent containers in the X-705 Building.  At 1034   |
| hours the first NCSA-705_076.A00 violation was identified. Further           |
| violations were identified throughout the day for a total of seventeen (17). |
| All were immediately corrected with Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)         |
| engineer guidance. These violations could have resulted in the potential     |
| accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution had a leak developed with       |
| nearby uranium bearing systems.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Twelve (12) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #2 which      |
| states, 'inadvertent containers (with internal diameters greater than 5      |
| inches) shall be controlled such that any uranium-bearing liquid that could  |
| be collected is geometrically favorable.'  Some examples of these violations |
| are:                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| 1. Several drums had deep lids (>1.5") such that solution could accumulate   |
| in the lipped area.                                                          |
| 2. A tray (>1.5") had no drainage holes.                                     |
| 3. A drain pan (>1.5") had a plugged drainage hole.                          |
| 4. A section of ventilation duct was bowed inward which could allow solution |
| collection (>1.5").                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency  |
| principle for each violation. The second control (physical Integrity of      |
| nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained throughout this event.         |
|                                                                              |
| "One (1) violation was with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #3 which states,    |
| 'Flexible materials (such as plastic sheeting) shall be configured or        |
| secured such that they can not be deformed into an inadvertent container.' A |
| rack contained several bagged items. The bagged items were oriented such     |
| that an unsafe volume could accumulate if a leak developed. This is a loss   |
| of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency principle. The    |
| second control (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was     |
| maintained throughout this event.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Four (4) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #4 which states  |
| in part, 'Absorbent materials shall be covered so that they cannot absorb    |
| uranium bearing liquids or modified such that any uranium bearing liquid     |
| could be collected is geometrically favorable.' Cheese cloth rolls and mop   |
| heads were located near areas if a leak developed could absorb solution      |
| containing uranium. This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the  |
| double contingency principle for each violation. The second control          |
| (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained         |
| throughout this event. No uranium bearing material was involved in any of    |
| the violations.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is low.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "All of the identified problems involved the loss of geometry or volume of   |
| the inadvertent container. No uranium bearing material was involved in any   |
| of the identified problems since the remaining barrier to criticality (the   |
| physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing systems) was maintained.        |
| Therefore, the safety significance of this event is low.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "If a large leak developed in a nearby uranium bearing system, the           |
| identified inadvertent containers could have accumulated an unsafe           |
| volume/geometry of material.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.);    |
|                                                                              |
| "The parameters controlled were geometry, volume and the physical integrity  |
| of nearby uranium bearing systems.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "No uranium bearing material was involved with these problems. The nearby    |
| uranium bearing systems had various concentrations.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The inadvertent containers identified were not configured, oriented, or     |
| modified to preclude an unsafe volume/geometry from accumulating.            |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "Fissile material operations in the affected area have been suspended        |
| pending further investigation and subsequent corrective actions."            |
|                                                                              |
| The described violations are representative of the items identified.  The    |
| investigation is ongoing.  Operations informed the NRC Resident Inspector    |
| and DOE Site Representative.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2238 ON 05/02/00 TO PR-PTS-00-A2288 BY KURT SISLER TO        |
| JOLLIFFE * * *                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| On 05/2/00, five additional violations of NCSA-0705_076.A00 requirements     |
| were identified while completing the X-705 facility Nuclear Criticality      |
| Safety walkdowns.  All fissile operations in the X-705 facility are still    |
| suspended pending assessment and resolution of discrepancies identified      |
| during the walkdowns.  All five discrepancies were corrected at the time of  |
| initial discovery.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| Four violations were with NCSA-0705_076.A00 requirement #2 as stated above.  |
| The violations consisted of situations in which equipment or material was    |
| oriented such that it could accumulate uranium-bearing solution or liquid in |
| a geometrically unfavorable configuration.  This constituted the loss of one |
| control of the double control contingency (geometry/volume).  The second     |
| control (physical integrity of the nearby uranium bearing systems) was       |
| maintained throughout this event.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| One of the violations was with NCSA-0705_076.A00 requirement #4 as stated    |
| above.  A large string mop was discovered to not be controlled as required   |
| in the NCSA.  This also constituted the loss of one control                  |
| (geometry/volume) of the double contingency principle.  The second control   |
| (physical integrity of nearby uranium-bearing systems) was maintained        |
| throughout this event.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative were notified of  |
| this update.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO Bruce Burgess and NMSS EO Josie |
| Piccone (by fax).                                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36952       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:58[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:58[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |BRIAN SMITH          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM WHITE                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1458, on 5/1/00, The Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that  |
| the C-360 building drain configuration was found to deviate from the         |
| assumptions of Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE) 3972-11. The     |
| NCSE credits the flow of water cut of the building drains during a fissile   |
| material release to be precluded from backing up and washing large           |
| quantities of uranium into the elevator and scale pits. Contrary to this     |
| assumption, a valve in the drain system closes automatically, as part of the |
| building containment system in response to the release. This allows water    |
| supplied to an Instrument cooler to accumulate in the basement and           |
| potentially wash uranium into unfavorable geometry pits.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The conductivity cell drain system is not configured as credited for double |
| contingency. No release has occurred and the operation has been shutdown to  |
| preclude further fissile materiel operations pending resolution of this      |
| issue. The design of the drain system as credited for double contingency is  |
| in error.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, a large release or multiple      |
| small releases, resulting In an unsafe mass of fissile material, would have  |
| to occur.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Additionally upon building containment, this material would have to be      |
| washed in sufficient quantity and concentration into an unfavorable geometry |
| pit.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.:     |
|                                                                              |
| "Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing mass    |
| and geometry controls.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "There has been no release of UF6. No licensed material Is present in the    |
| unfavorable geometry pits.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency relies on system integrity to ensure    |
| that a large release or multiple concurrent small releases of fissile        |
| material are unlikely. This control was not violated and the first leg of    |
| double contingency was maintained.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency Is based on precluding the transport   |
| and accumulation of large quantities of uranium into the 0.360 scale and     |
| elevator pits, This control Is Implemented through reliance on the design of |
| the drain system. Credit is taken for the sanitary water draining directly   |
| to the elevator pit instead of backing up on the basement floor which        |
| prevents large amounts of uranium from washing into the unfavorable geometry |
| pits. Contrary to this assumption sanitary water from the autoclave          |
| conductivity cell will overflow tile normal drain lines and flow directly to |
| the basement floor following building containment. Therefore, the condition  |
| required to assure safe geometry was not maintained.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS              |
| IMPLEMENTED:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Cylinder sampling and transfer operations in C-360 have been discontinued   |
| until deficiencies are corrected."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36953       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM WEBB                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECTIVE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Analysis of "B" steam generator eddy current results determined that more    |
| than 1% of the Westinghouse HEJ sleeve laser weld repaired tubes were        |
| classified as defective placing the "B" steam generator in the C-3           |
| classification per the Kewaunee Technical Specifications.   Two tubes of 59  |
| inspected contained indications in the weld repaired region.   There are 288 |
| total tubes in this population.   The licensee plans to increase the         |
| population size to 100%.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36954       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  MONTANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION       |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|LICENSEE:  MONTANA DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION       |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:32[EDT]|
|    CITY:  MISSOULA                 REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MT |EVENT TIME:        12:02[MDT]|
|LICENSE#:  25-11498-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |WILLIAM JOHNSON      R4      |
|                                                |DONALD COOL          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  REX HOY                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  WILLIAM POERTNER             |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NDAM                     DAMAGED GAUGE/DEVICE   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Montana Dept of Transportation reported a damaged Troxler moisture density   |
| gauge containing 8 mCi Cs-137 and 41 mCi Am- 241.  The gauge fell out of the |
| back of a truck and was retrieved.  The gauge case was cracked but the       |
| source was intact.  The area was surveyed and a wipe test was performed with |
| no leakage detected.  The licensee presently plans to repair the damaged     |
| gauge case.                                                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   36955       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  R. M. WESTER & ASSOCIATES            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|LICENSEE:  R. M. WESTER & ASSOCIATES            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:45[EDT]|
|    CITY:  ST. PETERS               REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        05/02/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MO |EVENT TIME:        09:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  24-20091-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE KOCH                     |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NMAT                     MATL IN UNCNTRL AREA   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SMASHED 80 MICROCURIE Am-241 SOURCE DISCOVERED IN A SCRAP METAL YARD IN ST |
| LOUIS, MO -                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| At 0900 CDT on 05/01/00, an employee at the Phillips Scrap Metal Yard, St    |
| Louis, MO, discovered two 80 microcurie Am-241 sources inside a scrap        |
| industrial air conditioning unit.  One source was smashed and the other      |
| source was intact.  The employee cordoned off the area and called Joe Koch,  |
| R. M. Wester & Associates, St Louis, MO, a radiation safety consulting firm  |
| possessing a general NRC license.  Mr Koch responded to the scrap yard,      |
| about 34 miles away.  Mr Koch leak tested the damaged source and measured    |
| 45.87 DPM (0.3 mR/hr on contact).  Mr Koch packaged the sources and took     |
| possession of them and plans to send them to the manufacturer, Pyrotronics,  |
| Ceder Knolls, NJ.  Phillips personnel are determining the previous owners of |
| the air conditioning units.  No persons were contaminated from these         |
| sources.                                                                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36956       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PRAIRIE ISLAND           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:12[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WARNER ANDREWS               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - CABLES FOR PZR PORVs & PORV BLOCK VALVES NOT SEPARATED IAW APPENDIX R      |
| EXEMPTIONS -                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| With Unit 2 in a refueling outage, the licensee discovered during an         |
| engineering evaluation, that cabling in the Unit 2 containment for the       |
| pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and opposite train PORV     |
| block valves are not separated in accordance with the requirements of        |
| existing Appendix R exemptions.  Part of the bases for the existing Appendix |
| R exemption for containment is that redundant equipment, except pressurizer  |
| level transmitters, is separated by a minimum of 20 feet.  The PORV and      |
| block valve pairs are redundant equipment for Appendix R Safe Shutdown.      |
| Field measurements indicate that cable in the open tray associated with the  |
| A-Train PORV is separated from B-Train block valve cable by 13 feet and      |
| cable in the open tray associated with the B-Train PORV is separated from    |
| A-Train block valve cable by 18 feet.  These cable routing deficiencies have |
| been evaluated and found to represent a degraded but operable condition,     |
| although at this point in the outage, the equipment is not required to be    |
| operable.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| This issue has been identified as Prairie Island Condition Report (CR)       |
| #20000832.  An action for engineering to evaluate this issue for possible    |
| solutions has been assigned as part of CR #20000832.  The licensee plans to  |
| resolve this condition prior to restarting Unit 2.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36957       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|    UNIT:  [2] [3] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:56[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHIL BREIDENBAUGH            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - OFFSITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE LONGER THAN ONE HOUR  |
| -                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| At about 0534 on 05/02/00, the emergency phone batteries were being removed  |
| from service for planned maintenance.  During the removal, the backup power  |
| supply malfunctioned.  This condition required the backup power supply to be |
| isolated.  Subsequent evaluation of the as-found condition determined that   |
| the loss of normal and backup power supplies resulted in the loss of the     |
| emergency notification siren initiation capability. Upon discovery of the    |
| loss of initiation capability at about 1100, power was immediately restored  |
| using a temporary power cord.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| Since the siren system was out of service for longer than one hour, the      |
| licensee determined this event to be  reportable to the NRC in accordance    |
| with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(v) at 1556.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36958       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:10[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:40[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GARY HARRINGTON              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 'A' TRAIN EMERGENCY SAFEGUARDS BUS UNEXPECTEDLY DEENERGIZED DURING         |
| MAINTENANCE -                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| At 0740 CDT on 05/02/00, while electrical bus maintenance was in progress,   |
| the 'A' train emergency safeguards bus unexpectedly deenergized.             |
| Deenergizing the bus initiated an ESF start signal for the associated 'A'    |
| emergency diesel generator (EDG).  At the time, the 'A' EDG had been removed |
| from service for refueling outage scheduled maintenance and no EDG start     |
| occurred.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| In response to the loss of power to the 'A' train safeguards bus, the        |
| licensee manually started the 'B' train residual heat removal pump to        |
| reestablish decay heat removal   There was no temperature rise in the        |
| primary system.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is determining the cause of the bus deenergization.             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+