Event Notification Report for May 2, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/01/2000 - 05/02/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36932 36947 36948 36949 36950 36951
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36932 |
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| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/26/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:42[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVID LOHMAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/01/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES CREED R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL VENTILATION AND CONTROL ROOM POST ACCIDENT |
| RECIRCULATION ACTUATED DUE TO A STEAM EXCLUSION SIGNAL. |
| |
| At 1342 CDT on 04/26/00, the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and |
| Control Room Post Accident Recirculation Systems actuated due to a steam |
| exclusion signal. Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Control Room |
| Post Accident Recirculation are Engineered Safety Features Systems. The |
| steam exclusion signal was due to the rupture disk on Boric Acid Recovery |
| System rupturing. Steam to the Boric Acid Recovery System was isolated. At |
| 1425 CDT, steam exclusion was reset and the Auxiliary Building Special |
| Ventilation and Control Room Post Accident Recirculation Systems were |
| shutdown. All equipment operated as designed. There was no radiological |
| release. The licensee is currently investigating why the rupture disc |
| ruptured. Nobody was injured. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1009EDT ON 5/1/00 FROM GARY HARRINGTON TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: |
| |
| "After reviewing NUREG-1022, we have identified that the steam exclusion |
| system and the initiating signal that caused the ESF actuations is a |
| non-valid signal. Consequently, since the signal is not valid and the |
| ventilation systems that were affected [special ventilation system and |
| control room post accident recirc] are those which are excluded from |
| reporting on inadvertent actuations, we are retracting this report." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(Burgess). |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36947 |
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| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:55[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:07[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CARL RICH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/01/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES NOGGLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 A/R Y 92 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE |
| TRIP/GENERATOR LOCKOUT ON ELECTRICAL FAULT |
| |
| "At 0307, Unit 1 Reactor automatically shutdown from 92% power. The shutdown |
| was the result of a Turbine Trip/Generator Lockout caused by an electrical |
| fault on the '1C' Main Transformer. All Rods fully inserted (RPS), and the |
| plant is in Hot Shutdown (opcon 3). Level is currently at normal operating |
| level. The following isolations were received; Main Steam and Rx Sample |
| (1B), Reactor Water Clean-Up (3), Primary Containment Purge Supply and |
| Exhaust (6a), Primary Containment Exhaust to REECE (6b), Drywell Sump, |
| Suppression Pool Cleanup, and Tips (8b), and Reactor Enclosure HVAC. The |
| isolations were received due to a NSSSS 'Reactor Level 2 - Low Low' signal |
| during the event. All plant systems operated as designed. The cause of this |
| event is currently being investigated by plant staff." |
| |
| Unit 1 will remain in Opcon 3 pending the results of the investigation. No |
| SRVs cycled during the transient. Offsite power and EDGs are available. |
| The extent of repairs to the main transformer has not been determined. A |
| preliminary inspection shows a bus bar connection missing. |
| |
| The licensee informed state/local authorities and the NRC Resident |
| Inspector. |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36948 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: NORTH ANNA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:47[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RICK WESLAY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/01/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BOB HAAG R2DO |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| - SAFEGUARDS EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM UNABLE TO FULFILL ITS SAFETY |
| FUNCTION - |
| |
| While reviewing the test results of the newly revised safeguards exhaust |
| ventilation (SEV) System discharge damper seismic air flask leakage |
| surveillance test [1(2)-PT-77.12A(B)], the licensee determined that the test |
| results indicate that the SEV System was in a condition that alone could |
| have prevented the system from fulfilling its safety function. The seismic |
| air flask equipment and damper degradations, coupled with a loss of |
| instrument air during a loss of coolant accident, could have prevented the |
| control of leakage of radioactive material from safeguards equipment, as |
| well as cooling for the recirculation spray and low head safety injection |
| pumps located in the safeguards building (residual heat removal capability). |
| |
| |
| Currently, the systems have been repaired and are fully operable. JCO |
| #00-01 has been prepared and implemented to provide additional guidance on |
| appropriate operator actions to restore air to the seismic air flasks to |
| assure continued system operation. |
| |
| The new test techniques and requirements were the result of an ongoing |
| in-depth licensee engineering review of the North Anna plant ventilation |
| systems. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36949 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:34[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:40[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/01/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOE HOLONICH NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF CASTLE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL, 4 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| At 1340 on 05/01/00, it was discovered that an NCSA-0705-076.A00 control was |
| not in place. Insulation on non-uranium bearing pipes in the vicinity of |
| uranium bearing solution piping and systems was not sealed. The insulation |
| could accumulate uranium bearing solution in an unfavorable geometry in the |
| event the integrity of the nearby uranium bearing solution lines was to be |
| lost. Geometry control specified in NCSA-0705-076.A00 was not maintained in |
| reference to the piping insulation. |
| |
| The control cannot be restored within a 4 hour time frame and is therefore |
| being submitted as a 4 hour reportable event. Operations/solution |
| processing in the area has been secured. All fissile material operations |
| are suspended in the X-705 operation area pending corrective actions. |
| |
| The loss of this control resulted in a condition in which only one control |
| of the double control contingency was maintained. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: |
| The insulation in use covers non-uranium bearing lines (water & steam). In |
| addition, the insulation forms an annulus, which does not have complete |
| cross section as compared to a cylinder. None of the nearby systems |
| experienced a leak which could have resulted in solution entering the |
| absorbent material. Therefore, the safety significance of this event is |
| low. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: |
| If a large leak developed in a nearby uranium-bearing system, the absorbent |
| insulation could have accumulated a large amount of material in an unsafe |
| geometry. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC): |
| The controlled parameters were geometry and the physical integrity of the |
| nearby uranium-bearing systems. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| No uranium-bearing material was involved with this situation. Some of the |
| areas which involved the insulation handles highly concentrated solutions. |
| The high-bay area currently has a uranium-bearing concentration of 69 ppm U |
| based on prior sampling reports. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| The absorbent material was not covered or modified such that the geometry |
| was favorable. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Fissile material operations in the affected area have been suspended pending |
| further investigation and subsequent corrective actions. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative have been |
| notified of this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36950 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:30[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CLAY WILLIAMS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/01/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |WILLIAM JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION |EPA, DOT (via NRC) FAX |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - OFFSITE AGENCIES NOTIFIED OF FREON GAS RELEASE TO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM UNIT |
| 3 - |
| |
| The licensee notified the California Office of Emergency Services, San Diego |
| Department of Environmental Health and San Diego Air Pollution Control |
| District that approximately 3000 pounds of freon gas had escaped into the |
| atmosphere from a failed relief valve on a Unit 3 air conditioner |
| (chiller). |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36951 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/01/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:34[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/02/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE BURGESS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KURT SISLER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING NUMEROUS NUCLEAR CRITICALITY |
| SAFETY ANALYSIS (NCSA) VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN X-705 BUILDING WALKDOWN |
| |
| "On 4/28/00, a manager reported (PR-PTS-00-02234) a potential adverse trend |
| with inadvertent containers (NCSA-705_076.A00) in the X-705 Building. All |
| fissile material operations were suspended in the X-705 operation area |
| pending assessment of PR-PTS-00-02234. |
| |
| "In response to PR-PTS-00-02234, a systematic walk down was performed 5/1/00 |
| for the presence of inadvertent containers in the X-705 Building. At 1034 |
| hours the first NCSA-705_076.A00 violation was identified. Further |
| violations were identified throughout the day for a total of seventeen (17). |
| All were immediately corrected with Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) |
| engineer guidance. These violations could have resulted in the potential |
| accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution had a leak developed with |
| nearby uranium bearing systems. |
| |
| "Twelve (12) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #2 which |
| states, 'lnadvertent containers (with internal diameters greater than 5 |
| inches) shall be controlled such that any uranium-bearing liquid that could |
| be collected is geometrically favorable.' Some examples of these violations |
| are: |
| |
| 1. Several drums had deep lids (>1.5") such that solution could accumulate |
| in the lipped area. |
| 2. A tray (>1.5") had no drainage holes. |
| 3. A drain pan (>1.5") had a plugged drainage hole. |
| 4. A section of ventilation duct was bowed inward which could allow solution |
| collection (>1.5"). |
| |
| "This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency |
| principle for each violation. The second control (physical Integrity of |
| nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| "One (1) violation was with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #3 which states, |
| 'Flexible materials (such as plastic sheeting) shall be configured or |
| secured such that they can not be deformed into an inadvertent container.' A |
| rack contained several bagged items. The bagged items were oriented such |
| that an unsafe volume could accumulate if a leak developed. This is a loss |
| of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency principle. The |
| second control (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was |
| maintained throughout this event. |
| |
| "Four (4) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #4 which states |
| in part, 'Absorbent materials shall be covered so that they cannot absorb |
| uranium bearing liquids or modified such that any uranium bearing liquid |
| could be collected is geometrically favorable.' Cheese cloth rolls and mop |
| heads were located near areas if a leak developed could absorb solution |
| containing uranium. This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the |
| double contingency principle for each violation. The second control |
| (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained |
| throughout this event. No uranium bearing material was involved in any of |
| the violations. |
| |
| "The safety significance of this event is low. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "All of the identified problems involved the loss of geometry or volume of |
| the inadvertent container. No uranium bearing material was involved in any |
| of the identified problems since the remaining barrier to criticality (the |
| physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing systems) was maintained. |
| Therefore, the safety significance of this event is low. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "If a large leak developed in a nearby uranium bearing system, the |
| identified inadvertent containers could have accumulated an unsafe |
| volume/geometry of material. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.); |
| |
| "The parameters controlled were geometry, volume and the physical integrity |
| of nearby uranium bearing systems. |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "No uranium bearing material was involved with these problems. The nearby |
| uranium bearing systems had various concentrations. |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "The inadvertent containers identified were not configured, oriented, or |
| modified to preclude an unsafe volume/geometry from accumulating. |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| "Fissile material operations in the affected area have been suspended |
| pending further investigation and subsequent corrective actions." |
| |
| The described violations are representative of the items identified. The |
| investigation is ongoing. Operations informed the NRC Resident Inspector |
| and DOE Site Representative. |
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021