Event Notification Report for May 02, 2000

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL SKIN OVEREXPOSURE

A worker was extracting a small amount of Holmium 166 from a vial containing 400 millicuries per milliliter of solution. As the syringe needle was extracted from the vial septum, small droplets were sprayed into the worker's face. Initial estimate was 0.5 microcuries of contamination on forehead, cheeks and lips. The worker was wearing safetyglasses. The worker was decontaminated on site and residual contamination was noted on forehead and right cheek (0.6 millirem per hour), lips (0.3 millirem per hour), and left cheek (0.08 millirem per hour) . Possible internal contamination was indicated by nasal and saliva samples. Worker was sent to the University of Washington Nuclear Medicine department for further assessment. An on-site investigation by the state Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection will be conducted. Washington State incident number WA-00-016.

- 'A' TRAIN EMERGENCY SAFEGUARDS BUS UNEXPECTEDLY DEENERGIZED DURING MAINTENANCE -

At 0740 CDT on 05/02/00, while electrical bus maintenance was in progress, the 'A' train emergency safeguards bus unexpectedly deenergized. DEENERGIZING the bus initiated an ESF start signal for the associated 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG). At the time, the 'A' EDG had been removed from service for refueling outage scheduled maintenance and no EDG start occurred.

In response to the loss of power to the 'A' train safeguards bus, the licensee manually started the 'B' train residual heat removal pump to reestablish decay heat removal There was no temperature rise in the primary system.

The licensee is determining the cause of the bus deenergization.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 5/23/00 @ 1216 BY HARRINGTON TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION

"For the event that occurred on May 2, 2000, there was no actual ESF equipment (pumps, valves, etc.) actuated directly as a consequence of the event. Therefore, no ESF equipment operated to mitigate the event. As such, the event would not be reportable. However, there are implications that the reporting requirements apply equally to ESF signals that are generated as part of an event, regardless of whether the event caused equipment to operate or not. For instance, NUREG-1022 contains a paragraph that states, in part, that, " [t]he Statement of Considerations also indicates that "actuation" of multichannel ESF actuation systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the actuation logic." Accordingly, the May 2 event was evaluated in greater detail considering that the loss of power to the bus in itself could be understood to be an ESF actuation.

"At the time of the event, work on the emergency bus relays was in process. During the work the bus was unexpectedly de-energized when the breaker providing power to the bus from the off-site power source opened. From our investigation, it appears a relay which was not being directly worked on actuated. Since power was removed from the relay, the relay appears to have been bumped or jarred which manually actuated it. The relay that was actuated was a trip relay for the breakers providing power to the affected bus.

"The ESF function that could be interpreted to be actuated as a result of the relay being actuated is the loss of power to the safeguards bus start signal to the associated diesel. However, the diesel was tagged out of service and the bus voltage restoring control circuit was defeated as part of the bus work that was in progress.

"In order to defeat the voltage restoring circuit the bus voltage restoring control switch was placed in "manual," and the voltage restoring relays were de-energized. With the switch in manual, a voltage search signal is not generated. As a result, the diesel does not receive a start signal if a loss of power to the bus occurs. Additionally, as part of the voltage restoring circuit, once power is lost to the bus, a power search is initiated whereby the circuit electrically seeks an available off-site power source and then would seek the diesel if no off-site source were available. With the bus voltage restoring circuit in manual there was no power source search initiated. The bus power was not automatically restored, even though the power to the bus was available.

"Included in NUREG-1022 are a number of examples of situations where NRC has described reportable events. Of those that are described, all either involved equipment (pumps, valves, etc.) that actuated or the condition that generated a signal needed the ESF function to mitigate the event whether equipment actuated or not. In the event reported on May 2, no equipment operated and there was no reliance on any accident mitigation function as well as no need for any accident mitigation feature. Therefore, the event should not have been reported as an ESF actuation simply because the condition that occurred could have resulted in an ESF signal being actuated.

"According to the reporting criteria, if the actuation is invalid, and the system was properly removed from service a report need not be filed. According to NUREG-1022, "[v]alid ESF actuations are those that result from "valid signals" or from intentional manual initiation, unless it is part of a preplanned test. Valid signals are those signals that are initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for ESF initiation. Note this definition of "valid" requires that the initiation signal must be an ESF signal. This distinction eliminates actuations which are the result of non-ESF signals from the class of valid actuations. Invalid actuations are, by definition, those that do not meet the criteria for being valid. Thus invalid actuations include actuations that are not the result of valid signals and are not intentional manual actuations."

"The ESF signal of concern for the start of the diesel generator is that which is generated in response to a loss of off-site power to the affected bus. During the subject event, off-site power was not lost. Although the off-site power was not automatically restored according to normal system operational design, it remained available. Consequently, there was no need for the diesel to supply the bus and as such no valid signal was generated. Additionally, the power restoration circuit was properly removed from service during the event; the voltage restoring switch was in manual. Therefore, no ESF signal was generated.

"In summary, the event described is not reportable based on 1) there not being a need for any ESF feature to mitigate the event, and 2) the event not causing a valid (or any) ESF signal along with the related ESF equipment being properly removed from service."


The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Reg 3 RDO (Hiland) was informed.

- SMASHED 80 MICROCURIE Am-241 SOURCE DISCOVERED IN A SCRAP METAL YARD IN ST LOUIS, MO -

At 0900 CDT on 05/01/00, an employee at the Phillips Scrap Metal Yard, St Louis, MO, discovered two 80 microcurie Am-241 sources inside a scrap industrial air conditioning unit. One source was smashed and the other source was intact. The employee cordoned off the area and called Joe Koch, R. M. Wester & Associates, St Louis, MO, a radiation safety consulting firm possessing a general NRC license. Mr Koch responded to the scrap yard, about 34 miles away. Mr Koch leak tested the damaged source and measured 45.87 DPM (0.3 mR/hr on contact). Mr Koch packaged the sources and took possession of them and plans to send them to the manufacturer, Pyrotronics, Ceder Knolls, NJ. Phillips personnel are determining the previous owners of the air conditioning units. No persons were contaminated from these sources.

- CABLES FOR PZR PORVs & PORV BLOCK VALVES NOT SEPARATED IAW APPENDIX R EXEMPTIONS -

With Unit 2 in a refueling outage, the licensee discovered during an engineering evaluation, that cabling in the Unit 2 containment for the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) and opposite train PORV block valves are not separated in accordance with the requirements of existing Appendix R exemptions. Part of the bases for the existing Appendix R exemption for containment is that redundant equipment, except pressurizer level transmitters, is separated by a minimum of 20 feet. The PORV and block valve pairs are redundant equipment for Appendix R Safe Shutdown. Field measurements indicate that cable in the open tray associated with the A-Train PORV is separated from B-Train block valve cable by 13 feet and cable in the open tray associated with the B-Train PORV is separated from A-Train block valve cable by 18 feet. These cable routing deficiencies have been evaluated and found to represent a degraded but operable condition, although at this point in the outage, the equipment is not required to be operable.

This issue has been identified as Prairie Island Condition Report (CR) #20000832. An action for engineering to evaluate this issue for possible solutions has been assigned as part of CR #20000832. The licensee plans to resolve this condition prior to restarting Unit 2.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

- OFFSITE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS OUT OF SERVICE LONGER THAN ONE HOUR -

At about 0534 on 05/02/00, the emergency phone batteries were being removed from service for planned maintenance. During the removal, the backup power supply malfunctioned. This condition required the backup power supply to be isolated. Subsequent evaluation of the as-found condition determined that the loss of normal and backup power supplies resulted in the loss of the emergency notification siren initiation capability. Upon discovery of the loss of initiation capability at about 1100, power was immediately restored using a temporary power cord.

Since the siren system was out of service for longer than one hour, the licensee determined this event to be reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(v) at 1556.

The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

DEFECTIVE STEAM GENERATOR TUBES

Analysis of "B" steam generator eddy current results determined that more than 1% of the Westinghouse HEJ sleeve laser weld repaired tubes were classified as defective placing the "B" steam generator in the C-3 classification per the Kewaunee Technical Specifications. Two tubes of 59 inspected contained indications in the weld repaired region. There are 288 total tubes in this population. The licensee plans to increase the population size to 100%.

The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.


* * * UPDATE ON 05/09/00 AT 1153ET BY TOM WEBB TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

Analysis of "A" steam generator eddy current results determined that more than 1% of the tubes inspected in the hot leg tube sheet crevice region are classified as defective, placing steam generator "A" in the C3 category per Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specification. Fifteen tubes out of 833 inspected were characterized as defective.

No scope expansion is necessary as 100% of the tubes for the hot leg tubesheet crevice region have been inspected.

Corrective Action:

1. Plug or repair defective tubes prior to returning to operation.
2. Ensure plugging rate does not result in an unanalyzed condition.

NRC R3DO (Brent Clayton) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this update by the licensee.