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Event Notification Report for May 2, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/01/2000 - 05/02/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36932  36947  36948  36949  36950  36951  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36932       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/26/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        04/26/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:42[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVID LOHMAN                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES CREED          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUXILIARY BUILDING SPECIAL VENTILATION AND CONTROL ROOM POST ACCIDENT        |
| RECIRCULATION ACTUATED DUE TO A STEAM EXCLUSION SIGNAL.                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1342 CDT on 04/26/00, the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and      |
| Control Room Post Accident Recirculation Systems actuated due to a steam     |
| exclusion signal.   Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation and Control Room  |
| Post Accident Recirculation are Engineered Safety Features Systems.  The     |
| steam exclusion signal was due to the rupture disk on Boric Acid Recovery    |
| System rupturing.  Steam to the Boric Acid Recovery System was isolated.  At |
| 1425 CDT, steam exclusion was reset and the Auxiliary Building Special       |
| Ventilation and Control Room Post Accident Recirculation Systems were        |
| shutdown.  All equipment operated as designed.  There was no radiological    |
| release.  The licensee is currently investigating why the rupture disc       |
| ruptured.  Nobody was injured.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event  by the licensee.      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1009EDT ON 5/1/00 FROM GARY HARRINGTON TO S. SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:               |
|                                                                              |
| "After reviewing NUREG-1022, we have identified that the steam exclusion     |
| system and the initiating signal that caused the ESF actuations is a         |
| non-valid signal.  Consequently, since the signal is not valid and the       |
| ventilation systems that were affected [special ventilation system and       |
| control room post accident recirc] are those which are excluded from         |
| reporting on inadvertent actuations, we are retracting this report."         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R3DO(Burgess).   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36947       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:55[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        03:07[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CARL RICH                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES NOGGLE         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     A/R        Y       92       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO A TURBINE               |
| TRIP/GENERATOR LOCKOUT ON ELECTRICAL FAULT                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0307, Unit 1 Reactor automatically shutdown from 92% power. The shutdown |
| was the result of a Turbine Trip/Generator Lockout caused by an electrical   |
| fault on the '1C' Main Transformer.  All Rods fully inserted (RPS), and the  |
| plant is in Hot Shutdown (opcon 3).  Level is currently at normal operating  |
| level. The following isolations were received; Main Steam and Rx Sample      |
| (1B), Reactor Water Clean-Up (3), Primary Containment Purge Supply and       |
| Exhaust (6a), Primary Containment Exhaust to REECE (6b), Drywell Sump,       |
| Suppression Pool Cleanup, and Tips (8b), and Reactor Enclosure HVAC.  The    |
| isolations were received due to a NSSSS 'Reactor Level 2 - Low Low' signal   |
| during the event.  All plant systems operated as designed. The cause of this |
| event is currently being investigated by plant staff."                       |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 will remain in Opcon 3 pending the results of the investigation. No   |
| SRVs cycled during the transient.  Offsite power and EDGs are available.     |
| The extent of repairs to the main transformer has not been determined.  A    |
| preliminary inspection shows a bus bar connection missing.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed state/local authorities and the NRC Resident           |
| Inspector.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36948       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NORTH ANNA               REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK WESLAY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BOB HAAG             R2DO    |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - SAFEGUARDS EXHAUST VENTILATION SYSTEM UNABLE TO FULFILL ITS SAFETY         |
| FUNCTION -                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| While reviewing the test results of the newly revised safeguards exhaust     |
| ventilation (SEV) System discharge damper seismic air flask leakage          |
| surveillance test [1(2)-PT-77.12A(B)], the licensee determined that the test |
| results indicate that the SEV System was in a condition that alone could     |
| have prevented the system from fulfilling its safety function.  The seismic  |
| air flask equipment and damper degradations, coupled with a loss of          |
| instrument air during a loss of coolant accident, could have prevented the   |
| control of leakage of radioactive material from safeguards equipment, as     |
| well as cooling for the recirculation spray and low head safety injection    |
| pumps located in the safeguards building (residual heat removal capability). |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Currently, the systems have been repaired and are fully operable.  JCO       |
| #00-01 has been prepared and implemented to provide additional guidance on   |
| appropriate operator actions to restore air to the seismic air flasks to     |
| assure continued system operation.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The new test techniques and requirements were the result of an ongoing       |
| in-depth licensee engineering review of the North Anna plant ventilation     |
| systems.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36949       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:34[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:40[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/01/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOE HOLONICH         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL, 4 HOUR REPORT -                      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1340 on 05/01/00, it was discovered that an NCSA-0705-076.A00 control was |
| not in place.  Insulation on non-uranium bearing pipes in the vicinity of    |
| uranium bearing solution piping and systems was not sealed.  The insulation  |
| could accumulate uranium bearing solution in an unfavorable geometry in the  |
| event the integrity of the nearby uranium bearing solution lines was to be   |
| lost.  Geometry control specified in NCSA-0705-076.A00 was not maintained in |
| reference to the piping insulation.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The control cannot be restored within a 4 hour time frame and is therefore   |
| being submitted as a 4 hour reportable event.  Operations/solution           |
| processing in the area has been secured.  All fissile material operations    |
| are suspended in the X-705 operation area pending corrective actions.        |
|                                                                              |
| The loss of this control resulted in a condition in which only one control   |
| of the double control contingency was maintained.                            |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT:                                                |
| The insulation in use covers non-uranium bearing lines (water & steam).  In  |
| addition, the insulation forms an annulus, which does not have complete      |
| cross section as compared to a cylinder.  None of the nearby systems         |
| experienced a leak which could have resulted in solution entering the        |
| absorbent material.  Therefore, the safety significance of this event is     |
| low.                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:                                                    |
| If a large leak developed in a nearby uranium-bearing system, the absorbent  |
| insulation could have accumulated a large amount of material in an unsafe    |
| geometry.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC):      |
| The controlled parameters were geometry and the physical integrity of the    |
| nearby uranium-bearing systems.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
| No uranium-bearing material was involved with this situation.  Some of the   |
| areas which involved the insulation handles highly concentrated solutions.   |
| The high-bay area currently has a uranium-bearing concentration of 69 ppm U  |
| based on prior sampling reports.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
| The absorbent material was not covered or modified such that the geometry    |
| was favorable.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:   |
| Fissile material operations in the affected area have been suspended pending |
| further investigation and subsequent corrective actions.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and the Site DOE Representative have been         |
| notified of this event.                                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36950       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAN ONOFRE               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/01/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 22:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE             |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:30[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CLAY WILLIAMS                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/01/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |WILLIAM JOHNSON      R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |FEMA, DOE, USDA, HHS FAX     |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |EPA, DOT (via NRC)   FAX     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - OFFSITE AGENCIES NOTIFIED OF FREON GAS RELEASE TO THE ATMOSPHERE FROM UNIT |
| 3 -                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the California Office of Emergency Services, San Diego |
| Department of Environmental Health and San Diego Air Pollution Control       |
| District that approximately 3000 pounds of freon gas had escaped into the    |
| atmosphere from a failed relief valve on a Unit 3 air conditioner            |
| (chiller).                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36951       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/02/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/01/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:34[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/02/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KURT SISLER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT INVOLVING NUMEROUS NUCLEAR CRITICALITY     |
| SAFETY ANALYSIS (NCSA) VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED IN X-705 BUILDING WALKDOWN      |
|                                                                              |
| "On 4/28/00, a manager reported (PR-PTS-00-02234) a potential adverse trend  |
| with inadvertent containers (NCSA-705_076.A00) in the X-705 Building.  All   |
| fissile material operations were suspended in the X-705 operation area       |
| pending assessment of PR-PTS-00-02234.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "In response to PR-PTS-00-02234, a systematic walk down was performed 5/1/00 |
| for the presence of inadvertent containers in the X-705 Building.  At 1034   |
| hours the first NCSA-705_076.A00 violation was identified. Further           |
| violations were identified throughout the day for a total of seventeen (17). |
| All were immediately corrected with Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)         |
| engineer guidance. These violations could have resulted in the potential     |
| accumulation of an unsafe volume of solution had a leak developed with       |
| nearby uranium bearing systems.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Twelve (12) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #2 which      |
| states, 'lnadvertent containers (with internal diameters greater than 5      |
| inches) shall be controlled such that any uranium-bearing liquid that could  |
| be collected is geometrically favorable.'  Some examples of these violations |
| are:                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| 1. Several drums had deep lids (>1.5") such that solution could accumulate   |
| in the lipped area.                                                          |
| 2. A tray (>1.5") had no drainage holes.                                     |
| 3. A drain pan (>1.5") had a plugged drainage hole.                          |
| 4. A section of ventilation duct was bowed inward which could allow solution |
| collection (>1.5").                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency  |
| principle for each violation. The second control (physical Integrity of      |
| nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained throughout this event.         |
|                                                                              |
| "One (1) violation was with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #3 which states,    |
| 'Flexible materials (such as plastic sheeting) shall be configured or        |
| secured such that they can not be deformed into an inadvertent container.' A |
| rack contained several bagged items. The bagged items were oriented such     |
| that an unsafe volume could accumulate if a leak developed. This is a loss   |
| of one control (volume/geometry) in the double contingency principle. The    |
| second control (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was     |
| maintained throughout this event.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Four (4) violations were with NCSA-705_076.A00 requirement #4 which states  |
| in part, 'Absorbent materials shall be covered so that they cannot absorb    |
| uranium bearing liquids or modified such that any uranium bearing liquid     |
| could be collected is geometrically favorable.' Cheese cloth rolls and mop   |
| heads were located near areas if a leak developed could absorb solution      |
| containing uranium. This was a loss of one control (volume/geometry) in the  |
| double contingency principle for each violation. The second control          |
| (physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing system) was maintained         |
| throughout this event. No uranium bearing material was involved in any of    |
| the violations.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is low.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "All of the identified problems involved the loss of geometry or volume of   |
| the inadvertent container. No uranium bearing material was involved in any   |
| of the identified problems since the remaining barrier to criticality (the   |
| physical integrity of nearby uranium bearing systems) was maintained.        |
| Therefore, the safety significance of this event is low.                     |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO[S] OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "If a large leak developed in a nearby uranium bearing system, the           |
| identified inadvertent containers could have accumulated an unsafe           |
| volume/geometry of material.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.);    |
|                                                                              |
| "The parameters controlled were geometry, volume and the physical integrity  |
| of nearby uranium bearing systems.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "No uranium bearing material was involved with these problems. The nearby    |
| uranium bearing systems had various concentrations.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The inadvertent containers identified were not configured, oriented, or     |
| modified to preclude an unsafe volume/geometry from accumulating.            |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "Fissile material operations in the affected area have been suspended        |
| pending further investigation and subsequent corrective actions."            |
|                                                                              |
| The described violations are representative of the items identified.  The    |
| investigation is ongoing.  Operations informed the NRC Resident Inspector    |
| and DOE Site Representative.                                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+