Event Notification Report for April 19, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/18/2000 - 04/19/2000
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36905
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL LONG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSSELL LONG
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 04/19/2000
Notification Time: 17:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2000
Event Time: 14:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2000
Notification Time: 17:55 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2000
Event Time: 14:33 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(ii) - ESF ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INADVERTENT AFW ACTUATION FOLLOWING TESTING
"At about 1433 hours on 19 April 2000, there was an inadvertent actuation of 32 Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Pump (ABFP). The actuation occurred following the completion of the required monthly test of 32 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), when the diesel output breaker was opened. Normally the 'Non-SI Blackout Logic' circuitry prevents automatic starting of equipment until manually reset. For some reason, currently under investigation, this circuitry automatically reset when the EDG output breaker was opened. The cause of the automatic reset of the Non-SI Blackout Logic, and the automatic start of 32 ABFP is under investigation. 32 EDG was inoperable prior to this event for planned testing, and remains inoperable while the investigation continues. 32 EDG is currently available and aligned for automatic start. There were no plant conditions requiring operation of 32 ABFP and the automatic start sent no water to any steam generator (since this requires additional manual action). Immediate corrective action taken was to secure 32 ABFP."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
"At about 1433 hours on 19 April 2000, there was an inadvertent actuation of 32 Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Pump (ABFP). The actuation occurred following the completion of the required monthly test of 32 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG), when the diesel output breaker was opened. Normally the 'Non-SI Blackout Logic' circuitry prevents automatic starting of equipment until manually reset. For some reason, currently under investigation, this circuitry automatically reset when the EDG output breaker was opened. The cause of the automatic reset of the Non-SI Blackout Logic, and the automatic start of 32 ABFP is under investigation. 32 EDG was inoperable prior to this event for planned testing, and remains inoperable while the investigation continues. 32 EDG is currently available and aligned for automatic start. There were no plant conditions requiring operation of 32 ABFP and the automatic start sent no water to any steam generator (since this requires additional manual action). Immediate corrective action taken was to secure 32 ABFP."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36906
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETHE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: ERIC SPAETHE
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 04/19/2000
Notification Time: 19:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2000
Event Time: 15:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2000
Notification Time: 19:50 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2000
Event Time: 15:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
MARK RING (R3)
PATRICIA HOLAHAN (NMSS)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01 4 HOUR REPORT
"At 1555 hrs April 19, 2000, laboratory personnel were preparing samples when they discovered that 8 uranium bearing samples (16-40 ml vials) were in an Environmental Safety & Health (ES&H) Analytical Laboratory without having had a gamma scan performed to determine total uranium. NCSA-0710_015.A02 administrative control #1, states in part, "Any sample containers that are postulated to contain uranium contamination >=100 ppm uranium based on their origin shall be gamma scanned for total uranium." Control #1 of the NCSA was lost, leading to a possible error in the mass tally for the high concentration containers. The total volume of the containers was 640 ml, and the concentration of the containers was subsequently determined to be 500 ppm U-235. Mass control was lost for the high concentration containers. Mass control for low concentration containers and volume controls for process waste were maintained.
"At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1920 hrs compliance was regained by scanning the samples and properly logging them into the container mass inventory.
"At the direction of the PSS the X-710 management staff will conduct briefings with the respective personnel to prevent re-occurrence."
"At 1555 hrs April 19, 2000, laboratory personnel were preparing samples when they discovered that 8 uranium bearing samples (16-40 ml vials) were in an Environmental Safety & Health (ES&H) Analytical Laboratory without having had a gamma scan performed to determine total uranium. NCSA-0710_015.A02 administrative control #1, states in part, "Any sample containers that are postulated to contain uranium contamination >=100 ppm uranium based on their origin shall be gamma scanned for total uranium." Control #1 of the NCSA was lost, leading to a possible error in the mass tally for the high concentration containers. The total volume of the containers was 640 ml, and the concentration of the containers was subsequently determined to be 500 ppm U-235. Mass control was lost for the high concentration containers. Mass control for low concentration containers and volume controls for process waste were maintained.
"At the direction of the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) the requirements for an NCS anomalous condition were initiated. At 1920 hrs compliance was regained by scanning the samples and properly logging them into the container mass inventory.
"At the direction of the PSS the X-710 management staff will conduct briefings with the respective personnel to prevent re-occurrence."
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36907
Facility: SURRY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALLEN HARROW
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ALLEN HARROW
HQ OPS Officer: BOB STRANSKY
Notification Date: 04/19/2000
Notification Time: 21:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2000
Event Time: 18:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2000
Notification Time: 21:36 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2000
Event Time: 18:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/18/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANN BOLAND (R2)
ANN BOLAND (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FILTERED EXHAUST FANS CANNOT BE OPERATED IN PARALLEL
"Based on Unit 1H and 1J emergency bus logic testing performed on 4/18/00 and 4/19/00 in accordance with 1-OPT-ZZ-001 and 1-OPT-ZZ-002, it has been concluded that the Cat 1 Filtered Exhaust Fans, 1-VS-F-58A & B, will not operate in parallel without tripping one or both fans. As a result, an event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident exists for Surry Units 1 and 2. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii).
"Both fans have been tested by operating the fans individually. This testing has determined that operation and performance of each fan is entirely satisfactory when operated independently.
"The current system alignment is that one of the two fans is in the pull-to-lock position, and the other fan is in automatic stand-by. In this configuration, one fan is operable, and fully capable of performing its required functions. Unit 2 entered a 7 day Technical Specification 3.22.B action statement on 4/18/00 at 1240 hours as a result of this condition.
"The Surry Emergency Operating Procedures provide required directions to place a Cat 1 Filtered Exhaust Fan in service, if the fans fail to automatically start upon initiation of a Safety Injection. In the current configuration, if the operable Cat 1 Filtered Exhaust fan fails to start, the fan that is currently in PTL can be immediately placed in service."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/18/00 @ 1243 BY HARROW TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines for10CFR50.72 and 50.73. states that "Reasonable operator actions to correct minor problems may be considered; however, heroic actions and unusually perceptive diagnoses, particularly during stressful situations should not be assumed."
Both CAT 1 FiItered Exhaust Fans were proven to operate satisfactorily when tested individually, and only one fan is needed to meet the system design requirements. If both fans had tripped after automatically starting from a Safety Injection signal, the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) would direct that one fan be started. This is accomplished from the control room, and does not require unusual actions from the operator. The Surry DBA Dose Analysis assumes that filtration of ECCS leakage begins 30 minutes post-accident, which is ample time to perform the EOP action of starting a Filtered Exhaust Fan if none are running.
Based on the above review of the event and the information in NUREG 1022, it has been determined that this event was not immediately reportable, as existing Emergency Operating Procedures would ensure that at least one fan is running within the required time after a Safety Injection signal is received.
This notification is being made to retract the report made on 4/19/00 based on the above discussion.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified the Reg 2 RDO(Wert).
"Based on Unit 1H and 1J emergency bus logic testing performed on 4/18/00 and 4/19/00 in accordance with 1-OPT-ZZ-001 and 1-OPT-ZZ-002, it has been concluded that the Cat 1 Filtered Exhaust Fans, 1-VS-F-58A & B, will not operate in parallel without tripping one or both fans. As a result, an event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material, or mitigate the consequences of an accident exists for Surry Units 1 and 2. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii).
"Both fans have been tested by operating the fans individually. This testing has determined that operation and performance of each fan is entirely satisfactory when operated independently.
"The current system alignment is that one of the two fans is in the pull-to-lock position, and the other fan is in automatic stand-by. In this configuration, one fan is operable, and fully capable of performing its required functions. Unit 2 entered a 7 day Technical Specification 3.22.B action statement on 4/18/00 at 1240 hours as a result of this condition.
"The Surry Emergency Operating Procedures provide required directions to place a Cat 1 Filtered Exhaust Fan in service, if the fans fail to automatically start upon initiation of a Safety Injection. In the current configuration, if the operable Cat 1 Filtered Exhaust fan fails to start, the fan that is currently in PTL can be immediately placed in service."
The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE ON 5/18/00 @ 1243 BY HARROW TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION
NUREG 1022, Event Reporting Guidelines for10CFR50.72 and 50.73. states that "Reasonable operator actions to correct minor problems may be considered; however, heroic actions and unusually perceptive diagnoses, particularly during stressful situations should not be assumed."
Both CAT 1 FiItered Exhaust Fans were proven to operate satisfactorily when tested individually, and only one fan is needed to meet the system design requirements. If both fans had tripped after automatically starting from a Safety Injection signal, the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's) would direct that one fan be started. This is accomplished from the control room, and does not require unusual actions from the operator. The Surry DBA Dose Analysis assumes that filtration of ECCS leakage begins 30 minutes post-accident, which is ample time to perform the EOP action of starting a Filtered Exhaust Fan if none are running.
Based on the above review of the event and the information in NUREG 1022, it has been determined that this event was not immediately reportable, as existing Emergency Operating Procedures would ensure that at least one fan is running within the required time after a Safety Injection signal is received.
This notification is being made to retract the report made on 4/19/00 based on the above discussion.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified the Reg 2 RDO(Wert).