Event Notification Report for April 13, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
04/12/2000 - 04/13/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36757 36810 36881 36882 36883 36884 36885
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36757 |
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| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:05[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 03/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY BELTZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIM TRAPP R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| DISCOVERY OF A REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) FLOW CONTROL |
| IRREGULARITY DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TESTING |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "A RCIC flow control irregularity was identified during quarterly RCIC |
| surveillance testing. Upon reaching the required flow rate of 400 gpm, RCIC |
| flow dipped to approximately 360 gpm for 1 - 2 minutes before stabilizing at |
| 400 gpm. Engineering is evaluating this condition. In the interim, the |
| RCIC system has been declared inoperable. The plant is in a 7-day |
| [technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO)]." |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1357 ON 4/12/00, BY ABRAMSKI RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| The plant's licensing department has reviewed this event and determined that |
| it is not reportable. The RCIC system is not required by the plant accident |
| analysis. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| The operations center notified the R1DO (Reber). |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36810 |
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| FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:52[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:15[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRENCE DORAZIO |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN JACOBSON R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 66 Power Operation |66 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| AS-FOUND TEST VALUES FOR 8 OF 20 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES WERE OUT OF |
| TOLERANCE HIGH. |
| |
| The preliminary results on the analysis of testing of the main steam safety |
| valves indicates that the plant was operating outside the design bases. A |
| hypothetical turbine trip and loss of load accident would have exceeded the |
| design limit for secondary side pressure. The limit for pressure is 1318.5 |
| psig, and preliminary analysis shows a pressure of 1354 psig. The main |
| steam safety valves have since been set to within 1% of the tolerance of the |
| required setpoints for all 20 valves. This action of resetting the valves |
| returned the plant to within the design basis. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1630 ON 4/12/00, BY ROCHA RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| Following the preliminary analysis, the Nuclear Fuel Management Department |
| performed a detailed evaluation of LOCA Analyses and Non-LOCA and |
| Containment Analyses using the test data from the MSSV testing. The |
| limiting event is the LOL/TT (Loss of Load/ Turbine Trip) event, which is |
| part of the Non-LOCA Analyses. For the LOL/TT event, the detailed |
| evaluation utilized certain cycle specific parameters, uncertainty values |
| and instrument response times in place of the conservative analysis of |
| record assumptions. The results of each of the evaluations indicated the |
| acceptance criteria for each of these events were not exceeded, with a |
| calculated peak secondary side pressure of 1308.2 psia. The pressure limit |
| is 1318.5 psia. Therefore, the plant was not outside of the design basis as |
| a result of the high relief setpoints for the MSSVs. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center |
| notified the R3DO(Hiland). |
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|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36881 |
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| REP ORG: ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
|LICENSEE: ILLINOIS ROOF CONSULTING ASSOCIATES, |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:36[EDT]|
| CITY: McHENRY REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 04/11/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: IL |EVENT TIME: 13:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#: IL-01713-01 AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |PATRICK HILAND R3 |
| |JOSIE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOE KLINGER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER ROOF MOISTURE GAUGE |
| |
| The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety reported the theft of a Troxler |
| roof moisture gauge, model # 3216 (serial # 140) from a state licensee. It |
| was stolen from a locked vehicle at 6929 S. Crandon in Chicago, Illinois. |
| The gauge contains 40 mCi of Am-241/Be. The licensee is in contact the |
| Chicago police department. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36882 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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| FACILITY: SALEM REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:58[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 04/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN KONOVALCHICK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ERIC REBER R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 99 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| REACTOR TRIP |
| |
| "At 1054, a manual reactor trip was performed due to a turbine runback due |
| to the Valve Position Limiter (VPL) going down outside of the Operators' |
| control. The trip was performed when a previously identified limit on |
| turbine load was reached. An Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) card was being |
| replaced at the time of the runback in accordance with SC.IC-GP.EHC.0002(Z), |
| General Troubleshooting for Main Turbine EHC System as an Infrequently |
| Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE). This card was being replaced to fix a |
| previously identified slow drift downward of the VPL. An Aux Feedwater (AFW) |
| Autostart signal was received due to low S/G level due to normal shrinkage |
| of S/G levels for normal post trip response. All safety systems performed as |
| designed. Source Range Nuclear Instrument (SRNI) N-31 and 14 Service Water |
| Pump were out of service prior to the trip, SRNI N-32 performed as designed. |
| At this time, the unit is stable in Mode 3." |
| |
| All control rods fully inserted following the trip. The main condenser |
| remains in service with decay heat being removed via the bypass valves. |
| |
| The licensee informed Lower Alloways Creek (LAC) Township and the NRC |
| Resident Inspector and will inform the state of New Jersey. |
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36883 |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 14:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAY SWAFFORD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP | |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEAK IN THE HPCI TEST RETURN HEADER TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK |
| |
| On 4/12/2000, at 14:10 while performing 2-SR-3.5.1 .7, HPCI Main and Booster |
| Pump Set Developed Head and Flow Rate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, the |
| Unit Operator (UO)observed unstable HPCI suction pressure, followed by an |
| auto swap of the suction from the Condensate Storage Supply to the |
| Suppression Pool. The UO then observed annunciator, 'HPCI PUMP SUCT |
| CONDENSATE HDR LEVEL LOW'. HPCI was tripped and declared inoperable. |
| Subsequently a leak was discovered on the HPCI Test Return header to the |
| CST. The leak has been isolated. Unit conditions are stable. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor |Event Number: 36884 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: UNIV OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
| RXTYPE: 10000 KW TANK |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: |EVENT DATE: 04/12/2000|
| |EVENT TIME: 14:30[CDT]|
| |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/12/2000|
| CITY: COLUMBIA REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: BOONE STATE: MO |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: R-103 AGREEMENT: N |PATRICK HILAND R3 |
| DOCKET: 05000186 |AL ADAMS NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN ERNST | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAD1 20.2202(a)(1) PERS OVEREXPOSURE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN OVEREXPOSURE |
| |
| This report is based on the potential to cause an exposure in excess of 25 |
| REM. No actual over-exposure occurred. |
| |
| The licensee moved fuel into the fuel pool. This caused a high radiation |
| alarm to be sounded in a room adjacent to the fuel pool. The licensee |
| investigated and determined that the cause of the alarm was that some |
| concrete shielding had been removed from the side of the pool. The |
| shielding had been removed so that an inspection of the fuel pool liner |
| could be performed. A 2 foot by 2 foot piece of shielding was removed from |
| the wall, which is four feet thick. |
| |
| After verifying that the room was not occupied, the licensee moved the fuel |
| to a safe portion of the pool The licensee reported radiation measurements |
| of 200 R/HR in the area where the shield was removed. |
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|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36885 |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/13/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:08[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/12/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:47[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 04/13/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |PATRICK HILAND R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |SUSAN SHANKMAN NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT |
| |
| The following is quoted from the licensee's report: |
| |
| 1-kg cylinders were discovered in the C-710 Isotopic Lab that violate the |
| wall thickness design specification of NCSE 1493-03. The wall thickness |
| credited in the NCSE is 0.109". Wall thicknesses of some cylinders were |
| discovered as low as 0.065". The wall thickness is credited in the |
| criticality safety calculations to demonstrate double contingency. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| A design feature limitation credited to ensure double contingency was |
| exceeded. Calculations demonstrate that greater than 240 cylinders using a |
| wall thickness of 0.065" of optimally moderated UO2F2 solution are safe. |
| There are a total of 95 1-kg cylinders in the three storage cabinets in the |
| Isotopic Lab. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR: |
| |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the batch limitation would have |
| to be exceeded by more than a factor of three. Additionally, the 1-kg |
| cylinders would have to be filled with optimally moderated UO2F2 solution |
| instead of the existing UF6. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing |
| interaction and geometry controls. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| There are 95 1-kg cylinders in C-710 only some of which have been determined |
| to have inadequate wall thickness. The assay of these cylinders varies from |
| less than 1% U235 to approximately 4.6% U235. The material contained in |
| these cylinders is UF6. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction control through |
| the application of batch limits. This control was not violated and the first |
| leg of double contingency was maintained. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry control. This is |
| controlled through implementation of design specifications for the 1-kg |
| cylinder. The actual wall thickness was discovered to be less than that |
| credited in the design features. Therefore, the geometry process parameter |
| limit was exceeded. |
| |
| The geometry process parameter was violated, therefore double contingency |
| was not maintained. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| |
| This area is being controlled to ensure that no fissile material is moved |
| within two feet of this storage area. NCS is in the process of developing a |
| remediation plan to correct this condition. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE |
| CONTINGENCY: |
| |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing |
| interaction and geometry controls. |
| |
| The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction control through |
| the application of batch limits. This control was not violated and the first |
| leg of double contingency was maintained. |
| |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry control, This is |
| controlled through implementation of design specifications for the 1-kg |
| cylinder. The actual wall thickness was discovered to be less than that |
| credited in the design features. Therefore, the geometry process parameter |
| limit was exceeded. |
| |
| The geometry process parameter was violated therefore double contingency was |
| not maintained. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED; |
| |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the batch limits would have to be |
| exceeded by more than a factor of three. Additionally, the 1-kg cylinders |
| would have to be filled with optimally moderated UO2F2 solution instead of |
| the existing UF6. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF INCIDENT: |
| |
| A design feature limitation credited to ensure double contingency was |
| exceeded. Calculations demonstrate that greater than 240 cylinders using a |
| wall thickness of 0.065" of optimally moderated UO2F2 solution are safe. |
| There are a total 95 1-kg cylinders in the three storage cabinets in the |
| Isotopic Lab. |
| |
| EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS: |
| |
| Post the area as follows in accordance with CP2-EG-NS1031. Ensure all four |
| sides including areas on opposite sides of adjacent walls less than 2-feet |
| from the storage cabinets. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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