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Event Notification Report for April 13, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           04/12/2000 - 04/13/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36757  36810  36881  36882  36883  36884  36885  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36757       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FITZPATRICK              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:05[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        03/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRY BELTZ                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIM TRAPP            R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF A REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) FLOW CONTROL            |
| IRREGULARITY DURING THE PERFORMANCE OF SURVEILLANCE TESTING                  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "A RCIC flow control irregularity was identified during quarterly RCIC       |
| surveillance testing.  Upon reaching the required flow rate of 400 gpm, RCIC |
| flow dipped to approximately 360 gpm for 1 - 2 minutes before stabilizing at |
| 400 gpm.  Engineering is evaluating this condition.  In the interim, the     |
| RCIC system has been declared inoperable.  The plant is in a 7-day           |
| [technical specification limiting condition for operation (LCO)]."           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1357 ON 4/12/00, BY ABRAMSKI RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| The plant's licensing department has reviewed this event and determined that |
| it is not reportable.  The RCIC system is not required by the plant accident |
| analysis.  The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                 |
| The operations center notified the R1DO (Reber).                             |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36810       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BRAIDWOOD                REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:52[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:15[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TERRENCE DORAZIO             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN JACOBSON        R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       66       Power Operation  |66       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AS-FOUND TEST VALUES FOR 8 OF 20 MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES WERE OUT OF        |
| TOLERANCE HIGH.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The preliminary results on the analysis of testing of the main steam safety  |
| valves indicates that the plant was operating outside the design bases.  A   |
| hypothetical turbine trip and loss of load accident would have exceeded the  |
| design limit for secondary side pressure.  The limit for pressure is 1318.5  |
| psig, and preliminary analysis shows a pressure of 1354 psig.  The main      |
| steam safety valves have since been set to within 1% of the tolerance of the |
| required setpoints for all 20 valves.  This action of resetting the valves   |
| returned the plant to within the design basis.                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1630 ON 4/12/00, BY  ROCHA  RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| Following the preliminary analysis, the Nuclear Fuel Management Department   |
| performed a detailed evaluation of LOCA Analyses and Non-LOCA and            |
| Containment Analyses using the test data from the MSSV testing.  The         |
| limiting event is the LOL/TT (Loss of Load/ Turbine Trip) event, which is    |
| part of the Non-LOCA Analyses.  For the LOL/TT event, the detailed           |
| evaluation utilized certain cycle specific parameters, uncertainty values    |
| and instrument response times in place of the conservative analysis of       |
| record assumptions. The results of each of the evaluations indicated the     |
| acceptance criteria for each of these events were not exceeded, with a       |
| calculated peak secondary side pressure of 1308.2 psia. The pressure limit   |
| is 1318.5 psia. Therefore, the plant was not outside of the design basis as  |
| a result of the high relief setpoints for the MSSVs.                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The operations center     |
| notified the R3DO(Hiland).                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36881       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ILLINOIS DEPT OF NUCLEAR SAFETY      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
|LICENSEE:  ILLINOIS ROOF CONSULTING ASSOCIATES, |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:36[EDT]|
|    CITY:  McHENRY                  REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        04/11/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  IL |EVENT TIME:        13:00[CDT]|
|LICENSE#:  IL-01713-01           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |PATRICK HILAND       R3      |
|                                                |JOSIE PICCONE        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOE KLINGER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER ROOF MOISTURE GAUGE                  |
|                                                                              |
| The Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety reported the theft of a Troxler    |
| roof moisture gauge, model # 3216 (serial # 140) from a state licensee.  It  |
| was stolen from a locked vehicle at 6929 S. Crandon in Chicago, Illinois.    |
| The gauge contains 40 mCi of Am-241/Be.  The licensee is in contact the      |
| Chicago police department.                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36882       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SALEM                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:58[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:54[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN KONOVALCHICK            |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ERIC REBER           R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       99       Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REACTOR TRIP                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1054, a manual reactor trip was performed due to a turbine runback due   |
| to the Valve Position Limiter (VPL) going down outside of the Operators'     |
| control.  The trip was performed when a previously identified limit on       |
| turbine load was reached.  An Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) card was being  |
| replaced at the time of the runback in accordance with SC.IC-GP.EHC.0002(Z), |
| General Troubleshooting for Main Turbine EHC System as an Infrequently       |
| Performed Test or Evolution (IPTE). This card was being replaced to fix a    |
| previously identified slow drift downward of the VPL. An Aux Feedwater (AFW) |
| Autostart signal was received due to low S/G level due to normal shrinkage   |
| of S/G levels for normal post trip response. All safety systems performed as |
| designed. Source Range Nuclear Instrument (SRNI) N-31 and 14 Service Water   |
| Pump were out of service prior to the trip, SRNI N-32 performed as designed. |
| At this time, the unit is stable in Mode 3."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| All control rods fully inserted following the trip.  The main condenser      |
| remains in service with decay heat being removed via the bypass valves.      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed Lower Alloways Creek (LAC) Township and the NRC        |
| Resident Inspector and will inform the state of New Jersey.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36883       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:57[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4           |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:10[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAY SWAFFORD                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN    R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINB 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(B) POT RHR INOP           |                             |
|AINC 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(C) POT UNCNTRL RAD REL    |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LEAK IN THE HPCI TEST RETURN HEADER TO THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK           |
|                                                                              |
| On 4/12/2000, at 14:10 while performing 2-SR-3.5.1 .7, HPCI Main and Booster |
| Pump Set Developed Head and Flow Rate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, the    |
| Unit Operator (UO)observed unstable HPCI suction pressure, followed by an    |
| auto swap of the suction from the Condensate Storage Supply to the           |
| Suppression Pool. The UO then observed annunciator, 'HPCI PUMP SUCT          |
| CONDENSATE HDR LEVEL LOW'.  HPCI was tripped and declared inoperable.        |
| Subsequently a leak was discovered on the HPCI Test Return header to the     |
| CST.  The leak has been isolated. Unit conditions are stable.                |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Research Reactor                                 |Event Number:   36884       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: UNIV OF MISSOURI-COLUMBIA            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/12/2000|
|   RXTYPE: 10000 KW TANK                        |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:46[EDT]|
| COMMENTS:                                      |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2000|
|                                                |EVENT TIME:        14:30[CDT]|
|                                                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/12/2000|
|    CITY:  COLUMBIA                 REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  BOONE                     STATE:  MO |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  R-103                 AGREEMENT:  N  |PATRICK HILAND       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  05000186                             |AL ADAMS             NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN ERNST                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAD1 20.2202(a)(1)       PERS OVEREXPOSURE      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN OVEREXPOSURE                                           |
|                                                                              |
| This report is based on the potential to cause an exposure in excess of 25   |
| REM.  No actual over-exposure occurred.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee moved fuel into the fuel pool.  This caused a high radiation    |
| alarm to be sounded in a room adjacent to the fuel pool.  The licensee       |
| investigated and determined that the cause of the alarm was that some        |
| concrete shielding had been removed from the side of the pool.  The          |
| shielding had been removed so that an inspection of the fuel pool liner      |
| could be performed.   A 2 foot by 2 foot piece of shielding was removed from |
| the wall, which is four feet thick.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| After verifying that the room was not occupied, the licensee moved the fuel  |
| to a safe portion of the pool  The licensee reported radiation measurements  |
| of 200 R/HR in the area where the shield was removed.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36885       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/13/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:08[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        04/12/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:47[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  04/13/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |PATRICK HILAND       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |SUSAN SHANKMAN       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN PITTMAN               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The following is quoted from the licensee's report:                          |
|                                                                              |
| 1-kg cylinders were discovered in the C-710 Isotopic Lab that violate the    |
| wall thickness design specification of NCSE 1493-03. The wall thickness      |
| credited in the NCSE is 0.109".  Wall thicknesses of some cylinders were     |
| discovered as low as 0.065". The wall thickness is credited in the           |
| criticality safety calculations to demonstrate double contingency.           |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| A design feature limitation credited to ensure double contingency was        |
| exceeded. Calculations demonstrate that greater than 240 cylinders using a   |
| wall thickness of 0.065" of optimally moderated UO2F2 solution are safe.     |
| There are a total of 95 1-kg cylinders in the three storage cabinets in the  |
| Isotopic Lab.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW            |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR:                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the batch limitation would have   |
| to be exceeded by more than a factor of three. Additionally, the 1-kg        |
| cylinders would have to be filled with optimally moderated UO2F2 solution    |
| instead of the existing UF6.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing          |
| interaction and geometry controls.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS     |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| There are 95 1-kg cylinders in C-710 only some of which have been determined |
| to have inadequate wall thickness. The assay of these cylinders varies from  |
| less than 1% U235 to approximately 4.6% U235. The material contained in      |
| these cylinders is UF6.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction control through    |
| the application of batch limits. This control was not violated and the first |
| leg of double contingency was maintained.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry control. This is   |
| controlled through implementation of design specifications for the 1-kg      |
| cylinder. The actual wall thickness was discovered to be less than that      |
| credited in the design features. Therefore, the geometry process parameter   |
| limit was exceeded.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The geometry process parameter was violated, therefore double contingency    |
| was not maintained.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| This area is being controlled to ensure that no fissile material is moved    |
| within two feet of this storage area. NCS is in the process of developing a  |
| remediation plan to correct this condition.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROLS INVOLVED AND THEIR IMPACT ON DOUBLE      |
| CONTINGENCY:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Double contingency for this scenario is established by implementing          |
| interaction and geometry controls.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The first leg of double contingency relies on interaction control through    |
| the application of batch limits. This control was not violated and the first |
| leg of double contingency was maintained.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The second leg of double contingency is based on geometry control, This is   |
| controlled through implementation of design specifications for the 1-kg      |
| cylinder. The actual wall thickness was discovered to be less than that      |
| credited in the design features. Therefore, the geometry process parameter   |
| limit was exceeded.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The geometry process parameter was violated therefore double contingency was |
| not maintained.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED;                                     |
|                                                                              |
| In order for a criticality to be possible, the batch limits would have to be |
| exceeded by more than a factor of three. Additionally, the 1-kg cylinders    |
| would have to be filled with optimally moderated UO2F2 solution instead of   |
| the existing UF6.                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF INCIDENT:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| A design feature limitation credited to ensure double contingency was        |
| exceeded. Calculations demonstrate that greater than 240 cylinders using a   |
| wall thickness of 0.065" of optimally moderated UO2F2 solution are safe.     |
| There are a total 95 1-kg cylinders in the three storage cabinets in the     |
| Isotopic Lab.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| EXCLUSION ZONE AND POSTINGS:                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Post the area as follows in accordance with CP2-EG-NS1031. Ensure all four   |
| sides including areas on opposite sides of adjacent walls less than 2-feet   |
| from the storage cabinets.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+