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Event Notification Report for March 13, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/10/2000 - 03/13/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36721  36782  36783  36784  36785  36786  36787  36788  36789  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36721       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/23/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:11[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/23/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        08:35[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/10/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JAMES CREED          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |WILLIAM BRACH        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Emergency response procedures implemented due to a smoke head alarm and    |
| high pressure vent actuation -                                               |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 0835 on 02/23/00, Portsmouth operations personnel received  |
| a smoke head alarm for extended range product (ERP) compressor W-3 in Area   |
| Control Room (ACR)-4.  At the same time, another operator in ACR-4 looked at |
| the TV monitor for the ERP compressors and saw a "puff" of smoke around      |
| compressor W-3.  The plant's "SEE & FLEE" emergency procedures were          |
| immediately implemented.  The ERP stations' high pressure vent actuated      |
| taking the station below atmospheric pressure.  Results of all surveys       |
| performed during the emergency response were less than minimum detectable    |
| activity.  At 0949, the emergency response was cancelled.  The ERP station   |
| was made inoperable to allow for testing of the system by operations and     |
| engineering personnel.  Portsmouth is reporting this alarm as a valid        |
| actuation of a "Q" Safety System.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| This event is reportable to the NRC as a valid actuation of a "Q" Safety     |
| System in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9 (24-HOUR       |
| REPORT).                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or    |
| radiological contamination exposure as result of this event.                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector and DOE site representative were notified of this |
| event.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| PTS-2000-020   PR-PTS-00-01079                                               |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION 1501 3/10/2000 FROM HALCOMB TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| "After further investigation, it has been determined that a 'Q' safety       |
| system actuation did not occur. The Pyrotronic smoke detectors and the ERP   |
| station high pressure vent are not classified as 'Q' safety systems. The     |
| CADP smokeheads, which are classified as 'Q' safety systems, did not         |
| actuate. Since there was no safety system actuation, this event has been     |
| determined to be not reportable to the NRC and is being retracted."          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. Notified    |
| R3DO (Lanksbury).                                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36782       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:04[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        03:32[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/11/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |THOMAS ESSIG         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0332 hours on 03/09/2000, it was identified that an error had been made  |
| in connecting a cell calibration test buggy, covered by NCSA-PLANT069, at    |
| X-330 building cell 31-3-9. The cell was connected to the HI DAT (HI DATUM)  |
| port instead of the PROCESS inlet port. The NCSA identifies installed        |
| chemical traps on the test buggy as a passive design characteristic relied   |
| upon to prevent an accumulation of uranium in the vacuum pump oil. The       |
| installed traps are also a control contingency in preventing back flow of    |
| vacuum pump oil to the cell manifold. Connection of the process system to    |
| the HI DAT port bypassed these chemical traps and provided a direct flow     |
| path between the process gas system and vacuum pump.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Establishing a connection between the vacuum pump and cell process gas      |
| manifold constitutes a loss of one control of the double contingency control |
| principle. The cell calibration buggy was disconnected and it was determined |
| that no oil from the vacuum pump had migrated through the buggy to the cell  |
| manifold. The potential for a criticality to occur is precluded based on the |
| amount of oil contained in the vacuum pump and by the assay of the material  |
| at that point of the cascade. Pull compliance with NCSA-PLANT069 was         |
| regained when the calibration buggy was disconnected from the cell           |
| manifold.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                      |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.   |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "This event has a low safety significance. Due to operator error, the cell   |
| was connected to the wrong inlet port This allowed the possibility that      |
| process gas could bypass the chemical trap(s) and then collect in the oil    |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump. The oil reservoir (limited to <= one quart) is |
| sized such that it is safe for 100% enriched material. The process gas that  |
| may have entered the oil reservoir of the pump is approximately 2.25%        |
| enriched. There is insufficient oil In the vacuum pump for a criticality to  |
| occur. Additionally the test buggy has been disconnected from the cell.      |
| Thus, there is no possibility of adding additional uranium to the oil        |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "For a criticality to occur, sufficient UF6 would need to collect in the oil |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump and the vacuum pump would need to be replaced   |
| with a different model such that the oil reservoir is large enough (greater  |
| than 3 quarts) for a criticality to occur.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "This NCSA relied on preventing the accumulation of process gas from         |
| collecting in the vacuum pump oil by placing a chemical trap upstream of the |
| vacuum pump. This control was lost. The second control was to limit the      |
| amount of oil in the vacuum pump to less than 1 quart, which is less than    |
| the minimum volume of oil required for a criticality at 100% U235.           |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "At this time it is not known if any UF6 reached the oil reservoir for the   |
| vacuum pump. Enrichment in cell 31-3-9 is estimated to be 2.25% U-235. If    |
| process gas reached the oil reservoir, it would be in the form of UF4/oil    |
| mixture.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear criticality safety is maintained by two controls, the first Is the  |
| placement of chemical traps upstream of the vacuum pump. This control was    |
| lost. The second control was on the allowed volume of oil in the reservoir   |
| of the vacuum pump. This control was maintained throughout the event. Thus,  |
| one control relied on for double contingency was lost."                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 03/11/00 AT 0128 ET FROM ERIC SPAETH TAKEN BY MACKINNON * *  |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| It was discovered that the internal volume of the oil reservoir in the       |
| vacuum pump was greater than the NCSA control limit of less than or equal to |
| one quart.    The actual volume of the reservoir is approximately one and    |
| one third quart  (The manufacturer recommends that the vacuum pump oil level |
| should be 1.33 quarts).  At the time of the initial notification, it was not |
| known that the oil reservoir was greater than the NCSA controlled limit.     |
| However, this volume is still within the three quart volume analyzed in the  |
| NCSE for the normal case condition.  Therefore, the safety significance of   |
| this event remains low. The Certificate holder said that the NCSA limit for  |
| oil will be increased.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):     |
|                                                                              |
| The second control parameter was also lost which was to limit the oil level  |
| in the vacuum pump to less than one quart.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The second control was lost (oil level greater than one quart) when it was   |
| discovered that the volume of the oil reservoir exceeded the allowed volume  |
| in the NCSA.  Even though the volume of the reservoir exceeded the allowed   |
| amount it was still within the three quart limit analyzed in the NCSE for    |
| the normal case condition.                                                   |
| R3DO (Roger Lanksbury) and NMSS (Tom Essig) notified.                        |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event update by the          |
| certificate holder.                                                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36783       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: NORTH ANNA               REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:01[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICHARD WESLEY               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NOTIFICATION TO FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)        |
| regarding the inoperability of the spillway diesel generator. The diesel     |
| generator was inoperable while batteries were being replaced. The diesel     |
| generator is now fully operable.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36784       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:58[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        22:57[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DON BRADLEY                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NINF                     INFORMATION ONLY       |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       95       Power Operation  |95       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| COURTESY NOTIFICATION REGARDING ONSITE FATALITY                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 2357 on 3/9/2000, a Duke temporary employee was pronounced dead at the    |
| Piedmont Medical Center. The individual had collapsed at the site, and       |
| attempts to resuscitate the individual were unsuccessful. The licensee made  |
| a courtesy notification to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration |
| (OSHA) regarding this occurrence.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36785       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:13[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        03/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:20[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM WEBB                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii)     DEGRAD COND DURING OP  |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION FILTER TRAIN FLOW OUTSIDE OF SPECIFICATION       |
|                                                                              |
| While performing an administrative review of the results of surveillance     |
| test SP 24-122, "Shield Building Vent Filter Testing," performed on          |
| 7/27/1999, the licensee determined that train "B" was outside of             |
| specification for fan flow rate. The required flow rate is 6200 SCFM +/-     |
| 10%, while measured flow was 5427 SCFM. The Updated Final Safety Analysis    |
| Report (UFSAR) assumes a flow rate of 5000 SCFM. Shield building vent train  |
| "B" was declared inoperable at 1620 on 3/10/2000, and the unit entered       |
| 7-day Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)         |
| 3.6.b.1. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the   |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36786       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CLINTON                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/10/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:05[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-6                             |EVENT DATE:        03/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:45[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARSHALL FUNKHOUSER          |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/10/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| POTENTIAL TO DAMAGE EDG WHEN PARALLELED TO OFFSITE POWER SOURCE              |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that there exists the potential for an unanalyzed    |
| interaction between the Static VAR Compensators and a diesel generator when  |
| paralleled with an offsite power source. This unintended interaction has     |
| been determined to constitute an event or condition during operation that    |
| results in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that is outside the  |
| design basis of the plant. This condition has been documented in a Condition |
| Report and entered into the plant corrective action program.                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Discussion:                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Static VAR compensators (SVCs) are installed on the secondary side of the   |
| reserve auxiliary transformer (RAT) and the emergency reserve auxiliary      |
| transformer (ERAT) to address potentially inadequate grid voltage conditions |
| assuming a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and unit trip. One SVC is         |
| installed on the secondary (4.16 kV) side of the RAT and one SVC is          |
| installed on the secondary side (4.16 kV) side of the ERAT. The RAT is       |
| associated with the offsite 345 kV transmission system and the BRAT is       |
| associated with the offsite 138 kV transmission system. These two            |
| transmission systems constitute the two required offsite electrical power    |
| sources for the plant's three Class 1E 4.16 kV buses, Each Class 1B 4.16 kV  |
| buses is also capable of being supplied by a dedicated diesel generator.     |
|                                                                              |
| "The design of the SVC is described in a Design Report that was included as  |
| Attachment 5 to the CPS license amendment submittal dated May 4, 1998        |
| (letter U602972). During parallel operations between the diesel generator    |
| and the offsite power source via either the RAT or the ERAT, the SVCs are    |
| designed to 'freeze' such that their design function of regulating voltage   |
| on the secondary side of the RAT and the BRAT does not result in detrimental |
| interaction between its control circuits and the control circuits of the     |
| diesel generator. The action of freezing the SVC control circuit ensures     |
| that the SVCs do not attempt to counter bus voltage transients inherent in   |
| the process of synchronizing the diesel generator to its respective Class    |
| 113 bus. The freeze signal is derived from auxiliary contacts on die diesel  |
| generator output breaker and the Class 1E bus feeder breakers.               |
|                                                                              |
| "During the root cause investigation into the damage incurred by the         |
| Division III diesel generator during a routine surveillance (apparently      |
| involving a synchronization attempt with an out-of-synchronization           |
| condition), it was determined that a small time delay inherent in the        |
| electrical interlock circuitry for the freeze signal allowed the SVC to      |
| detrimentally interact with the diesel generator since the SVC freeze        |
| condition is not immediately effected upon closure of the diesel generator   |
| output breaker. The damage to the Division III diesel generator was          |
| previously reported in event number 36736. Although the potential for        |
| interaction had been recognized and compensated for in the design, the       |
| effect of the longer than expected time delay had not been recognized.       |
| Therefore, the effects of the unanalyzed time delay introduced an increased  |
| probability of malfunction of equipment important to safety resulting in a   |
| design configuration that constitutes an unreviewed safety question as       |
| defined in 10 CFR 50.59.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "This configuration has been determined to constitute a condition that is    |
| outside the design basis of the plant. The design requirement for the SVCs   |
| is to assist in maintaining secondary side voltages on the RAT and ERAT      |
| within acceptable values consistent with the offsite source 'capacity and    |
| capability' requirements of General Design Criterion (GDC) 17. A second      |
| requirement was that the SVCs not negatively impact plant structures,        |
| systems, and components such that an increase in the probability of a        |
| malfunction of equipment important to safety exists. Contrary to the above   |
| requirements, the current design of thc SVC controls is such that during     |
| synchronization of the diesel generator to its Class 1E bus the potential    |
| exists for the SVC to negatively impact bus voltage. As a consequence of the |
| adverse voltage control during the diesel generator synchronization, the     |
| potential exists for the SVC response to degrade or impair the function of   |
| the diesel generator resulting in an increased probability of malfunction of |
| equipment important to safety.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "This design deficiency exists only under the limited circumstances during   |
| the conduct of diesel generator surveillances in which the diesel is         |
| paralleled with the offsite power source. The postulated duration of the     |
| unanalyzed condition is a fraction of a second following the closure of the  |
| diesel generator output breaker. This is the approximate length of time      |
| required for the SVC control circuits to enter the freeze mode after closure |
| of the diesel generator output breaker. Prior to the breaker closure and     |
| following the small time period of the unanalyzed condition, the diesel      |
| generators and the offsite power circuits are capable of performing their    |
| intended design functions during parallel operations. The Onsite AC Sources  |
| Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) specified in Technical               |
| Specifications 3.8.1 and 3.8.2 are satisfied.                                |
|                                                                              |
| "AmerGen is currently pursuing a plant modification to resolve this design   |
| deficiency as soon as possible to support testing of the diesel              |
| generators."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this notification by the      |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36787       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:24[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/10/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        11:48[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SCOTT HEAD                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |DAVID LOVELESS       R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ELECTRICAL SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS WERE VIOLATED                             |
|                                                                              |
| This event notification was called under License Condition 2.G. - 24 hour    |
| License Notification                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| On Monday, March 6, 2000 defueling operations were ongoing at South Texas    |
| Project Unit 1 to support the current refueling outage.  A temporary         |
| modification was installed on that date in a Safety Related "B" Train Load   |
| center to supply non-class power to one of the two spent fuel pumps.  This   |
| modification was installed to ensure "B" train related pump remained         |
| available while fuel was being loaded into the spent fuel pool.  The other   |
| pump was supplied with Class 1E power and was backed up by a diesel.         |
|                                                                              |
| The modification involved running non-class cables in and around the Class   |
| 1E load center.  On March 10th it was determined that since electrical       |
| separation requirements [class to non-class] were violated the load center   |
| was rendered inoperable as well as the electrically supported equipment.     |
| One component affected was the "B" Train containment isolation valve for     |
| normal purge.  If the valve is inoperable Technical Specification 3.9.9,     |
| Containment Ventilation Isolation System, requires that the normal purge     |
| penetration be closed during core alterations.                               |
|                                                                              |
| During the time frame that the valve was inoperable fuel movement took place |
| with the normal purge in operation (I.e., the penetration was open).  This   |
| is in violation of Technical Specification requirements.                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will notified of this event by the licensee.      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36788       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: TURKEY POINT             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/11/2000|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:07[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/11/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DEAL                         |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/11/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DEFECT DETECTED DURING EDDY CURRENT INSPECTION OF STEAM GENERATOR            |
|                                                                              |
| "Turkey Point is performing eddy current testing of the Unit 3 steam         |
| generators in accordance with Plant Technical Specifications and Industry    |
| Guidance. A 20% inspection was planned for the top of tubesheet expansion    |
| transition region in the hot leg of each steam generator. This total planned |
| sample was divided into 1st, 2nd and 3rd samples to address the progressive  |
| inspection process of the Technical Specifications Table 4.4-2. The 1st      |
| sample of 96 tubes in the 3B steam generator resulted in detection of 1      |
| defect near the top of the tubesheet. In accordance with Technical           |
| Specification 4.4.5.5c, this defect results in a C-3 Classification for the  |
| 1st sample.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "A small number of additional indications near the top of the tubesheet have |
| also been detected in this steam generator, and the inspection is ongoing.   |
| The inspection will be expanded to 100% of the tubes in the 3B steam         |
| generator.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Eddy current results indicate the defects are shallow volumetric or         |
| pit-like in nature. A preliminary structural evaluation indicates that all   |
| indications detected to date meet the structural and leakage integrity       |
| performance criteria of NEI 97-06, 'Steam Generator Program Guidelines.'"    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36789       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SURRY                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/12/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:41[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/12/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:49[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAWLEIGH DILLARD             |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/12/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       96       Power Operation  |93       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 COMMENCED A TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN AFTER DECLARING THE REFUELING |
| WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) INOPERABLE DUE TO THE INABILITY TO CLOSE A         |
| MANUALLY OPERATED RWST VALVE.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0230 hours, on 3/12/00, it was noted that a Surry Power Station Unit 1   |
| Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) suction valve (1-CS-27) that was being   |
| used for purification purposes, could not be closed. The valve had been      |
| opened under administrative control, as allowed by procedure. The Unit 1     |
| RWST was declared inoperable, and a 1 hour LCO was entered in accordance     |
| with Technical Specifications. The 1 hour LCO expired at 0330 hours on       |
| 3/12/00, and a 6 hour LCO to hot shutdown was entered in accordance with     |
| Technical Specifications.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0449 hours, Surry Power Station Unit 1 initiated a plant shutdown from   |
| 96% power as required by Technical Specifications, in order to meet the 6    |
| hour LCO. The ramp was stopped at 0459 hours at 93% power, after the valve   |
| was mechanically closed. An evaluation of the valve is currently being       |
| pursued.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(i)(A), Power Mode    |
| Reduction Required by Technical Specifications."                             |
|                                                                              |
| The valve involved is a manual grinnel diaphragm valve which appears to have |
| the spindle threads stripped.  Maintenance personnel closed the valve by     |
| jacking it shut. This particular valve is used for sampling and purification |
| of the RWST and does not interfere with the main suction path used for ECCS. |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 0945EST ON 3/12/00 FROM DARLENE BROCK TO S.SANDIN * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee provided the following information as an update:                |
|                                                                              |
| "This is an update to Event #36789.  At 0551 hours, on 3/12/00, 1-CS-27 was  |
| closed using a Jacking device. In addition, 1-CS-31 and 1 -CS-28 (suction    |
| isolation valves on the recirculation pumps) were closed.  At 0657 hours the |
| Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank was considered operable. The 6 hour LCO  |
| to hot shutdown was exited at 0657 hours on 3/12/00 with the Unit stable at  |
| 93% power.  Surry Power Station Unit 1 was ramped down from 96% power to 93% |
| power during the 6 hour LCO.  At 0900 hours, on 3/12/00, a ramp was          |
| commenced to return power on Unit 1 to 96%."                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector.  Notified R2DO (McAlpine). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+