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Event Notification Report for March 10, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           03/09/2000 - 03/10/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36776  36777  36778  36779  36780  36781  36782  

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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36776       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:16[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:35[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL HILL                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - LOSS OF CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has two control room chillers.  The 'A' chiller tripped because |
| of low freon.  The 'B' chiller was started and then tripped on two           |
| occasions.  Based on the unreliability of the 'B' chiller,  the licensee     |
| considered both chillers inoperable and entered Tech Spec 3.0.3 as a result. |
| The licensee will start reducing power of all three units at 1 percent per   |
| hour at 1130.   However they expect that they will have one chiller back in  |
| service prior to reaching the 2235, the time the units need to be in mode    |
| 3.                                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 3/9/00 @ 1329 BY CLARKSON TO GOULD * * *                     |
|                                                                              |
| Actions were undertaken to restore the 'B' Chilled water train to operable   |
| status.  At 1246 hours, on March 9, 2000, the 'B' Chilled Water train was    |
| returned to operable status and Technical Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.7.16,   |
| Condition E were exited.  The shutdown of all three Oconee units was also    |
| halted at approximately 98% power and the units are being returned to 100%.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was informed.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The Reg 2 RDO (McAlpine) was notified.                                       |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36777       |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  INSPECTION SERVICES COMPANY          |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|LICENSEE:  INSPECTION SERVICES COMPANY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:40[EST]|
|    CITY:  PLYMOUTH                 REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MI |EVENT TIME:        10:30[EST]|
|LICENSE#:  21-26744-01           AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KRUZEL                       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i)    LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE                                                |
|                                                                              |
| INSPECTION SERVICES CO. REPORTED THAT A HUMBOLDT MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE      |
| MODEL 5001 SERIAL # 2996 WAS STOLEN FROM THEIR PICKUP TRUCK WHILE IT WAS     |
| PARKED IN THEIR FACILITY PARKING LOT IN PLYMOUTH, MI.  THE GAUGE WAS BOLTED  |
| TO THE TRUCK AT THE TIME OF THE THEFT.  THE DEVICE CONTAINED 8 MILLICURIES   |
| OF Cs-137 AND 40 MILLICURIES OF Am-241.  THE LOCAL POLICE WERE NOTIFIED.     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36778       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS CO.  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|LICENSEE:  BFGOODRICH COMPANY                   |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:15[EST]|
|    CITY:  HANCOCK'S BRIDGE         REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NJ |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |GREG CRANSTON        R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (via fax) NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SUE SIMPSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Replacement emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start motors were supplied  |
| to PSE&G with grease on the bendix drive shafts. This did not meet the       |
| requirements of the purchase order which stated: "Do not grease the bendix   |
| drive: as per the vendor manual this is to be lubricated with SAE 10 oil."   |
| Excessive grease on the bendix shaft could harden and prevent the drive      |
| pinion from engaging the ring gear on the EDG flywheel during starting.      |
|                                                                              |
| The air start motors were supplied by:                                       |
|                                                                              |
| BFGoodrich Company (formerly Coltec Industries)                              |
| Fairbanks Morse Engine Division                                              |
| 701 White Avenue                                                             |
| Beloit, WI 53511                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| Affected FMED Part #s: 21800136-1, 21800145, 21800146 and 21800147           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36779       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FT CALHOUN               REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NE |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:42[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:54[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERICK MATZKE                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTROL ROOM DOSE RATE EXCEEDS STANDARD REVIEW PLAN LIMIT                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The Fort Calhoun Station is in the process of revising and reanalyzing the  |
| radiological consequences analysis for the plant as a result of corrective   |
| actions for LERs 1998-012 and 1998-013. In the process it has been           |
| determined that some of the assumptions made when the plant was constructed  |
| in the early 1970s, about 30 years ago, need to be validated. An important   |
| assumption that was brought into question was that the Control Room has zero |
| (0) standard cubic feet per minute (SCFM) unfiltered inleakage. The control  |
| room envelope was recently tested and the unfiltered inleakage was           |
| determined to be very small at 8 SCFM. This level of leakage leads to a      |
| thyroid dose to the operators of about 32 rem. The Fort Calhoun Station USAR |
| commits the station to NRC Standard Review Plan (SRP) section 6.4 which      |
| states that the thyroid dose to the operators shall be no higher than 30     |
| rem. Higher thyroid doses have been approved for other plants and the dose   |
| projected certainly would not incapacitate an operator. The calculated dose  |
| is in excess of the current plant design basis.                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Plant actions to date have included putting in place an Safety Analysis for |
| Operability (SAO) (similar to a Justification for Continued Operation [JCO]) |
| to allow the plant to continue operating in this condition. The plant has    |
| been in communication with the NRC staff on the progress of this             |
| radiological consequences reanalysis."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this report by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36780       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:54[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:47[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN WARD                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |EDWARD MCALPINE      R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNITS OUTSIDE OF DESIGN BASIS DUE TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R ISSUE        |
|                                                                              |
| Following is the abstract of an engineering document submitted to the NRC    |
| Operations Center:                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "As part of the continuing resolution of fire protection program issues      |
| identified during a Follow-up Fire Protection Functional Inspection at St.   |
| Lucie in December 1999, a detailed review of Appendix R circuit separation   |
| and protection for the Units 1 & 2 containment was performed. This review    |
| considered the design and licensing basis for these features as described in |
| the Unit 1 & 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports (UFSARs), associated    |
| NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (SERs), Appendix R requirements and guidance   |
| provided in Generic Letter 86-10. The review has identified a number of      |
| separation issues for various safe shutdown circuits and/or components       |
| credited for post-fire safe shutdown operations following a fire in          |
| containment. The affected equipment is hi/lo pressure interface equipment    |
| along with control and indication equipment associated with the reactor      |
| coolant system."                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The discrepancies noted in the report affect the power operated relief       |
| valves (PORVs), as well as pressurizer pressure and level instrumentation.   |
| The licensee has determined that the conditions do not affect operability of |
| the affected equipment due to the low combustible material loading inside    |
| the containment and the low probability that a fire would occur inside the   |
| containment. The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this report by  |
| the licensee.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36781       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:56[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:18[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHITWOOD                     |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KRISS KENNEDY        R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION PLACED IN PRESSURIZATION MODE DUE TO SMOKE          |
|                                                                              |
| At 0906 PST, rod drive motor/generator set 1-2 tripped due to overcurrent.   |
| Heavy smoke from burnt insulation was observed in the vicinity. In order to  |
| prevent the smoke from entering the control room, the shift foreman directed |
| operators to manually place the control room ventilation system in           |
| pressurization mode (mode 4).                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this report by the licensee.  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36782       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/09/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:04[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        03/09/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        03:32[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  03/09/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |THOMAS ESSIG         NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0332 hours on 03/09/2000, it was identified that an error had been made  |
| in connecting a cell calibration test buggy, covered by NCSA-PLANT069, at    |
| X-330 building cell 31-3-9. The cell was connected to the HI DAT (HI DATUM)  |
| port instead of the PROCESS inlet port. The NCSA identifies installed        |
| chemical traps on the test buggy as a passive design characteristic relied   |
| upon to prevent an accumulation of uranium in the vacuum pump oil. The       |
| installed traps are also a control contingency in preventing back flow of    |
| vacuum pump oil to the cell manifold. Connection of the process system to    |
| the HI DAT port bypassed these chemical traps and provided a direct flow     |
| path between the process gas system and vacuum pump.                         |
|                                                                              |
| "Establishing a connection between the vacuum pump and cell process gas      |
| manifold constitutes a loss of one control of the double contingency control |
| principle. The cell calibration buggy was disconnected and it was determined |
| that no oil from the vacuum pump had migrated through the buggy to the cell  |
| manifold. The potential for a criticality to occur is precluded based on the |
| amount of oil contained in the vacuum pump and by the assay of the material  |
| at that point of the cascade. Pull compliance with NCSA-PLANT069 was         |
| regained when the calibration buggy was disconnected from the cell           |
| manifold.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or                      |
| radioactive/radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.   |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "This event has a low safety significance. Due to operator error, the cell   |
| was connected to the wrong inlet port This allowed the possibility that      |
| process gas could bypass the chemical trap(s) and then collect in the oil    |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump. The oil reservoir (limited to <= one quart) is |
| sized such that it is safe for 100% enriched material. The process gas that  |
| may have entered the oil reservoir of the pump is approximately 2.25%        |
| enriched. There is insufficient oil In the vacuum pump for a criticality to  |
| occur. Additionally the test buggy has been disconnected from the cell.      |
| Thus, there is no possibility of adding additional uranium to the oil        |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "For a criticality to occur, sufficient UF6 would need to collect in the oil |
| reservoir of the vacuum pump and the vacuum pump would need to be replaced   |
| with a different model such that the oil reservoir is large enough (greater  |
| than 3 quarts) for a criticality to occur.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "This NCSA relied on preventing the accumulation of process gas from         |
| collecting in the vacuum pump oil by placing a chemical trap upstream of the |
| vacuum pump. This control was lost. The second control was to limit the      |
| amount of oil in the vacuum pump to less than 1 quart, which is less than    |
| the minimum volume of oil required for a criticality at 100% U235.           |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "At this time it is not known if any UF6 reached the oil reservoir for the   |
| vacuum pump. Enrichment in cell 31-3-9 is estimated to be 2.25% U-235. If    |
| process gas reached the oil reservoir, it would be in the form of UF4/oil    |
| mixture.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Nuclear criticality safety is maintained by two controls, the first Is the  |
| placement of chemical traps upstream of the vacuum pump. This control was    |
| lost. The second control was on the allowed volume of oil in the reservoir   |
| of the vacuum pump. This control was maintained throughout the event. Thus,  |
| one control relied on for double contingency was lost."                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+