Event Notification Report for February 22, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/21/2000 - 02/22/2000
General Information or Other
Event Number: 36716
Rep Org: NC DIV OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: SRB TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 2
City: WINSTON-SALEM State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEE COX
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Licensee: SRB TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 2
City: WINSTON-SALEM State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LEE COX
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/22/2000
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2000
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2000
Notification Time: 12:16 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2000
Event Time: 10:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
CHARLES OGLE (R2)
DON COOL (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
- UPS is searching for an overdue shipment of a box of 10 fire exit signs which contain tritium gas -
At 1015 on 02/22/00, Lee Cox, North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection (NC DRP), was notified that 1 of 10 cardboard boxes of fire exit signs did not arrive at the intended destination. The missing box contains 10 model #B-100 fire exit signs; each sign contains 17 curies of tritium gas. The signs were shipped via UPS from SRB Technologies Company (NC Licensee), Winston-Salem, NC on 01/27/00 and were scheduled to arrive at DMA Company, Salt Lake City, UT on 02/03/00. On 02/07/00, the shipper, SRB Technologies Company, was notified by the receiver, DMA Company, that 1 of the 10 boxes of signs had not arrived in Salt Lake City. On 02/22/00, the shipper notified NC DRP of the missing box of signs and that UPS is searching for the missing box of signs.
At 1015 on 02/22/00, Lee Cox, North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection (NC DRP), was notified that 1 of 10 cardboard boxes of fire exit signs did not arrive at the intended destination. The missing box contains 10 model #B-100 fire exit signs; each sign contains 17 curies of tritium gas. The signs were shipped via UPS from SRB Technologies Company (NC Licensee), Winston-Salem, NC on 01/27/00 and were scheduled to arrive at DMA Company, Salt Lake City, UT on 02/03/00. On 02/07/00, the shipper, SRB Technologies Company, was notified by the receiver, DMA Company, that 1 of the 10 boxes of signs had not arrived in Salt Lake City. On 02/22/00, the shipper notified NC DRP of the missing box of signs and that UPS is searching for the missing box of signs.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 36717
Facility: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: RICK LARSON
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/22/2000
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2000
Notification Time: 15:54 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2000
Event Time: 12:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
JAMES CREED (R3)
BRIAN SMITH (NMSS)
JOSEPH GIITTER (IRO)
NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT -
At 1200 on 02/22/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by the Nuclear Criticality Safety staff that there was a Fissile Material Operation (FMO) for which no Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) existed. While reviewing NCSAs to determine the requirements for moving cylinders into the X-710 laboratory building, it was discovered that the transportation or movement of a five inch diameter cylinder in the X-710 laboratory building hallways was not addressed in any current NCSA.
Activities involving the use of five inch diameter cylinders in the X-710 laboratory are addressed by NCSA-0710-006 (Uranium Sampling Laboratory). The laboratory extracts samples from process sampling cylinders, empties, decontaminates and prepares cylinders for reuse in the process facilities. NCSA-0710-006 failed to specifically identify and analyze the movement of five inch diameter cylinders in the X-710 building hallway as an activity to be evaluated.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Since there is an issue of non-coverage of an FMO, this event is being reported as a Level 2 event - Loss of all double contingency controls applicable to an FMO. However, in practice, the requirements of NCSA-0710-006 are followed. The only time a five inch diameter cylinder is moved out of the Uranium Sampling Laboratory (and into the hallway) is to load them into a PLANT043 transport vehicle. There are also spacing requirements associated with this NCSA. All of the spacing requirements have been met while transporting five inch diameter cylinders through the X-710 building hallway. Therefore, the safety significance is very low.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICAUTY COULD OCCUR]:
If a cylinder was not spaced 24 inches from other uranium-bearing material, the chance of a criticality would be increased. Since the cylinders from the Uranium Sampling Laboratory are limited to 5% U-235 enrichment, multiple cylinder spacing upsets would be required before a criticality would be possible (since the evaluation performed in PLANT043 considers two eight inch diameter cylinders in contact at 97.65% U-235 and determines that they would be subcritical).
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, etc):
The parameters controlled are the geometry of the five inch diameter cylinder, the enrichment of the cylinder, and spacing between uranium-bearing material and a five inch diameter cylinder. All controls on parameters were maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The five inch diameter cylinders have a favorable geometry for any enrichment, but are limited to 5% U-235 by an administrative control.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The NCS controls on cylinder geometry, enrichment, and spacing were maintained. A failure has occurred in that the boundaries for NCSAs are unclear as written in their process descriptions.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition were initiated. A "Stop Work Notice" was implemented with the following requirements: 1) No movement of five inch diameter cylinders in hallways of the X-710 building. 2) No movement of five inch diameter cylinders into or out of the X-710 building.
There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
PTS-2000- 018 PR-PTS-00-01046
At 1200 on 02/22/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified by the Nuclear Criticality Safety staff that there was a Fissile Material Operation (FMO) for which no Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) existed. While reviewing NCSAs to determine the requirements for moving cylinders into the X-710 laboratory building, it was discovered that the transportation or movement of a five inch diameter cylinder in the X-710 laboratory building hallways was not addressed in any current NCSA.
Activities involving the use of five inch diameter cylinders in the X-710 laboratory are addressed by NCSA-0710-006 (Uranium Sampling Laboratory). The laboratory extracts samples from process sampling cylinders, empties, decontaminates and prepares cylinders for reuse in the process facilities. NCSA-0710-006 failed to specifically identify and analyze the movement of five inch diameter cylinders in the X-710 building hallway as an activity to be evaluated.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:
Since there is an issue of non-coverage of an FMO, this event is being reported as a Level 2 event - Loss of all double contingency controls applicable to an FMO. However, in practice, the requirements of NCSA-0710-006 are followed. The only time a five inch diameter cylinder is moved out of the Uranium Sampling Laboratory (and into the hallway) is to load them into a PLANT043 transport vehicle. There are also spacing requirements associated with this NCSA. All of the spacing requirements have been met while transporting five inch diameter cylinders through the X-710 building hallway. Therefore, the safety significance is very low.
POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW CRITICAUTY COULD OCCUR]:
If a cylinder was not spaced 24 inches from other uranium-bearing material, the chance of a criticality would be increased. Since the cylinders from the Uranium Sampling Laboratory are limited to 5% U-235 enrichment, multiple cylinder spacing upsets would be required before a criticality would be possible (since the evaluation performed in PLANT043 considers two eight inch diameter cylinders in contact at 97.65% U-235 and determines that they would be subcritical).
CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, etc):
The parameters controlled are the geometry of the five inch diameter cylinder, the enrichment of the cylinder, and spacing between uranium-bearing material and a five inch diameter cylinder. All controls on parameters were maintained.
ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS LIMIT AND % WORST CASE OF CRITICAL MASS):
The five inch diameter cylinders have a favorable geometry for any enrichment, but are limited to 5% U-235 by an administrative control.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:
The NCS controls on cylinder geometry, enrichment, and spacing were maintained. A failure has occurred in that the boundaries for NCSAs are unclear as written in their process descriptions.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:
At the direction of the PSS, the requirements for an NCS Anomalous Condition were initiated. A "Stop Work Notice" was implemented with the following requirements: 1) No movement of five inch diameter cylinders in hallways of the X-710 building. 2) No movement of five inch diameter cylinders into or out of the X-710 building.
There was no loss of hazardous or radioactive material nor radioactive or radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
PTS-2000- 018 PR-PTS-00-01046
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 36718
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JEFF GROFF
HQ OPS Officer: DICK JOLLIFFE
Notification Date: 02/22/2000
Notification Time: 22:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2000
Event Time: 22:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2000
Notification Time: 22:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/22/2000
Event Time: 22:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/28/2000
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
10 CFR Section:
73.71(b)(1) - SAFEGUARDS REPORTS
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 97 | Power Operation | 97 | Power Operation |
Plant Physical Security Event -
Vital area door keys inadvertently removed from the site. Compensatory measures were not fully implemented in the required time but are now fully implemented. The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the NRC Operations Officer for additional details.
* * * UPDATE AT 1455 ON 2/28/2000 BY GROFF RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee retracted. The details are available from the NRC Operations Center. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the R3DO (Jordan).
Vital area door keys inadvertently removed from the site. Compensatory measures were not fully implemented in the required time but are now fully implemented. The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the NRC Operations Officer for additional details.
* * * UPDATE AT 1455 ON 2/28/2000 BY GROFF RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *
The licensee retracted. The details are available from the NRC Operations Center. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The HOO notified the R3DO (Jordan).