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Event Notification Report for February 22, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/18/2000 - 02/22/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36609  36697  36706  36707  36708  36709  36710  36711  36712  36713  36714  36715 


!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36609       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/20/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:17[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  HYNES                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/19/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |FELICIA HINSON       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADEQUATE SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION ON CONTROL WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE    |
| LINE STARTER FOR MAIN TURBINE DRAIN VALVES                                   |
|                                                                              |
| While performing a design analysis on Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) to confirm |
| adequate electrical fault protection, as follow-up to an Engineering fire    |
| protection self-assessment completed in May 1999, it was determined that the |
| control wiring associated with the line starter for the nine main turbine    |
| drain valves is not adequately protected from short circuits. This           |
| protection inadequacy results from a lack of required fuse protection and/or |
| current limiting features described in Section 9.5.A.1.2.1.5(4) of the       |
| Updated Final Safety Analysis Report.  Due to this lack of adequate current  |
| limiting protection, an electrical fault on this circuit could result in a   |
| fire in multiple fire areas including the common Unit 1/2 Control Room, BV-2 |
| Service Building, BV-2 Cable Vault, BV-2 Cable Tunnel, and BV-2 Turbine      |
| Building.  The lack of current limiting protection for this circuitry        |
| introduces the possibility of a potential fire in these multiple areas,      |
| which is a violation of fire protection licensing basis commitments          |
| regarding safe shutdown capability.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The subject main turbine drain valves are non-safety related and not         |
| required for safe shutdown.  As an interim measure, the circuit has been     |
| de-energized and will remain de-energized until adequate electrical          |
| protection can be provided.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 2/19/00 @ 1105 BY MARACEK TO GOULD * * *  RETRACTION         |
|                                                                              |
| Upon further review, it was determined that lack of adequate electrical      |
| fault protection for cable 2SDSNNC001 did not constitute a condition outside |
| the design basis of the plant. The postulated fire event would be limited to |
| non-safety related cable trays in which cable 2SDSNNC001 is routed and       |
| non-safety cables in the Control Room benchboard area.  This determination   |
| is based upon use of flame test qualified cables, adherence to Regulatory    |
| Guide 1.75 separation criteria, and guidance provided by Generic Letter      |
| 81-12, regarding associated circuits for common enclosures.  This cable is   |
| not routed in safety related Class 1E raceways.  Review of cables in the     |
| Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report indicates that the only safe shutdown   |
| related cables in the non-Class 1E raceways are for the station air          |
| compressors, which would already be assumed lost in the event of a fire in   |
| the Unit 2 Turbine Building (TB-1).  For a fire in TB-1, safe shutdown is    |
| addressed in existing plant procedures to compensate for loss of equipment   |
| due to a fire in this area.  Therefore, a fire resulting from a fault of     |
| cable 2SDSNNC001 would not have affected safety related circuits or the      |
| ability to achieve safe shutdown.  Therefore the licensee is retracting this |
| event.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.  Reg 1 RDO (Kinneman) was       |
| notified.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36697       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR         REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  AR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:21[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE                  |EVENT DATE:        02/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:58[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHILLIP REHM                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/18/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FLAWED WELD DISCOVERED DURING PLANT OUTAGE                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "At 2058 CST on 2/15/2000, a flawed weld was identified on an instrument     |
| connection to the Reactor Coolant System Loop 'A' Hot Leg Piping. The        |
| subject flaw was identified by Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) at the      |
| connection of Level Instrumentation to the RCS Hot Leg Piping.               |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 was taken offline at 0010 on 2/5/2000 for scheduled maintenance.     |
| Boron buildup was identified on 2/15/00 at the subject connection while the  |
| plant was at cold shutdown condition. The accumulated boron indicates the    |
| leakage through the weld flaw is classified as very small weepage. The       |
| unidentified RCS leak rate prior to thc scheduled outage was 0.093 GPM. No   |
| unexplainable changes in RCS leak rate exist for cycle 16 operation. Due to  |
| the physical location of the connection, major scaffolding was required to   |
| access the area. At 2058 on 2/15/2000, NDE was complete identifying the      |
| reportable condition. Further investigation by Plant Staff is in-progress to |
| characterize the flaw morphology and cause.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being performed to comply with the requirements of           |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1352 ON 2/18/2000, BY DAVENPORT RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| Unit 1 was taken off-line at 0010 CST on February 5, 2000, for scheduled     |
| maintenance and is currently in a cold shutdown condition. Boron buildup was |
| identified at 5 additional level instrumentation connections on the RCS  A   |
| and  B  Hot Leg piping. The accumulated boron indicates the leakage through  |
| the weld flaws is very small weepage.  Due to the physical locations of the  |
| connections, major scaffolding was required to access the areas.  NDE was    |
| performed to confirm the initial nozzle leak found on 2/15/2000.  Due to     |
| radiological conditions,  as-found NDE will not be performed on the          |
| remaining leaking nozzles as planned. The visual inspections already         |
| performed are sufficient to determine past leakage. None of the identified   |
| flaws are actively leaking with the reactor in cold shutdown. The            |
| unidentified RCS leak rate prior to the scheduled outage was 0.093 gpm.  No  |
| unexplainable changes in the RCS leak rate existed for the Cycle 16          |
| operation. Further investigation by Plant Staff is in-progress to            |
| characterize the flaw morphology and cause.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the Operations Center      |
| notified the R4DO (Tapia).                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36706       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:23[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/16/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/18/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOSIE PICCONE        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MAY                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT)                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 02/18/00 at 1600, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a |
| loss of one control parameter, geometry, in NCSA-0705_100.A01 for the X-705  |
| decontamination facility.  During a boroscope inspection of the 'A'          |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three tubes   |
| were observed.  Two tubes have sections missing below the tube sheet, and    |
| one tube was crimped such that it did not make a seal against the tube       |
| sheet.  After discovery of the problem, the pre-evaporator condenser was     |
| isolated for repair."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The second control parameter of NCSA-0705_100.A01, volume, was maintained   |
| throughout the inspection."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive          |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."              |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  "During a boroscope inspection of the 'A'   |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three of the  |
| tubes was observed.  Two of the tubes had sections missing below the tube    |
| sheet, and one of the tubes was crimped such that it did not make contact    |
| with (seal against) the tube sheet.  Per discussion with the system          |
| engineer, these failures indicate that the integrity of the tubes could no   |
| longer be assured.  This is a loss of passive barrier 2(PB2) counted upon in |
| NCSA-0705_100.AOI to maintain double contingency.  Since there is no         |
| indication that the verification of the cooling water flow was lost, any     |
| intermixing of the solutions would have resulted in water entering the tube  |
| side of the condenser and getting pumped with condensed solution to overhead |
| storage.  Since the downstream components from the tube side of the          |
| condenser are evaluated for uranium-bearing solutions, the addition of water |
| to the solution would be bounded by the original solution (i.e., the         |
| original solution would be diluted by the water).  Therefore, the safety     |
| significance of the event is low."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  Given the failure of the condenser tubes          |
| integrity, if the pressure of the shell side had been lower (water not       |
| valved in) the condensed gas (uranium-bearing solution) could have been      |
| discharged along with the pathway that the process water normally takes.     |
| This stream leads to the storm sewer system, which has not been analyzed for |
| an accumulation of uranium-bearing material.  If the material had settled    |
| out/been deposited in an unfavorable location in the sewer system, a         |
| criticality could have resulted."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
| The parameters being controlled under this NCSA were geometry and volume.    |
| By taking credit for the integrity of the condenser tubes and verifying the  |
| flow of the cooling water on the shell side, the resulting condensed         |
| uranium-bearing solution is maintained in a safe geometry environment.  Loss |
| of condenser tube integrity meant only the pressure differential of the      |
| cooling water prevented the uranium-bearing solution from entering a system  |
| not designed for handling that material."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST):  The system is analyzed for up to 100 wt% U235.  Since   |
| the secondary control for keeping the uranium-bearing solution in a          |
| geometrically favorable system was maintained, (the check on the cooling     |
| water), no material was actually introduced into the storm sewer system."    |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  Based on the visual inspection of the      |
| tube/tube sheet interface, at least three tubes appear to have failed such   |
| that intermixing of the solution is possible.  This represents a loss of a   |
| passive barrier (P82 in the NCSA) credited for meeting the double            |
| contingency principle for the operation."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| At 1730, [the] A, B, and C post-evaporator condensers and 'A' pre-evaporator |
| condenser are tagged out of service.  Water and steam are isolated from the  |
| condensers."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of   |
| Energy site representative.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1335 ON 2/18/2000, BY SPAETH RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| This update is being provided to clarify the controlled parameter associated |
| with the NCSA applicable to this event. The NCS parameter being controlled   |
| for this event is geometry. Although volume is a parameter identified in the |
| NCSA for this operation, volume is not relevant to this event. Two controls  |
| are in place to maintain the geometry parameter, tube integrity and water    |
| pressure differential. By taking credit for the integrity of the condenser   |
| tubes and verifying the flow of the cooling water on the shell side, the     |
| resulting condensed uranium-bearing solution is maintained in a safe         |
| geometry environment. Loss of condenser tube integrity meant only the        |
| pressure differential of the cooling water prevented the uranium bearing     |
| solution from entering a system not designed for handling that material.     |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The operations center     |
| notified the R3DO(Jorgensen) and NMSS EO (HICKEY).                           |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36707       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/18/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/18/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| At 1335 hours on 02/17/00 a see and flee emergency was initiated at the      |
| X-330 building Tails position #1. The see and flee was Initiated as a result |
| of a process gas release from the pigtail on Tails position #1. The release  |
| was large enough to exceed the capacity of portable mini-gulper staged In    |
| the area. The mini-gulper is used to divert and contain any small releases   |
| that may occur during pigtail connect/disconnect operations. The release of  |
| process gas caused a valid actuation of the pyrotronics smokehead safety     |
| system. The pyrotronics smokeheads and pigtail line isolation safety systems |
| operated as designed during this event.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36708       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NINE MILE POINT UNIT TWO             |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/2000|
|LICENSEE:  STONE AND WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORA|NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:24[EST]|
|    CITY:  LYCOMING                 REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        12/17/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NY |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/18/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |FRANK COSTELLO       R1      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE           NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE LEONARD                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 - NON-CONSERVATISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (EQ) CALCULATIONS  |
|                                                                              |
| 1-. Affected unit: Nine Mile Point Unit 2                                    |
|                                                                              |
| 2- Components that contain defect/deviation: Miscellaneous components        |
| (limitorque operators electrical cables etc.) in environmental qualification |
| (EQ) program                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| 3- Firm supplying components/activity: Stone and Webster Engineering         |
| Corporation (SWEC)                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| 4- Nature of defect/deviation: non-conservatism in EQ calculations (lowest   |
| expected ambient temperatures used instead of normal expected ambient        |
| temperatures for winter periods). About 30 components will have qualified    |
| lives reduced from greater than 40 years to less than 40 years, when         |
| non-conservatism is removed. Several hundred other components will have      |
| qualified lives reduced but not to less than 40 years.                       |
|                                                                              |
| 5- Date on which information was obtained (discovery date): December 17.     |
| 1999                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| 6- Number and location of components: potentially numerous components in     |
| multiple systems at multiple locations.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| 7- Corrective actions: EQ calculations and Environmental Qualification       |
| Engineering Design Criteria document, which was source of erroneous data for |
| the EQ calculations, will be corrected prior to expiration of actual         |
| qualified lives of affected EQ components i.e., within a few years.          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36709       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/18/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        13:25[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/19/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BEASLEY                      |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii)    EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION - FAILURE OF THE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM           |
|                                                                              |
| At 1325 CST, on 2/18/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified   |
| of an air leak on the C-310 Cylinder Valve Closure System.  The function of  |
| this system is to close the cylinder valve in the case of an actuation of    |
| the UF6 Release Detection and Isolation System Low Voltage ("New") System at |
| the UF6 Withdrawal Stations.  TSR 2.3.4.1 requires this system to be         |
| operable while operating in mod 2.   At the time the leak was discovered,    |
| the air pressure on the Cylinder Valve Closure System was being maintained   |
| within allowed parameters.  However due to the size of the leak, it was      |
| questionable as to if the system could maintain enough air pressure to       |
| perform its intended safety function, if it were called upon.  After         |
| discussing with the C-310 building System Engineer, the PSS could not be     |
| provided with reasonable assurance of operability.  The UF6 Release          |
| detection System was declared inoperable by the PSS, and repair of the       |
| system was initiated.  TSR required LCO actions were implemented.  Repair of |
| the air leak was completed, and the UF6 Release Detection System was         |
| returned to Operable status at 1706 CST, on 2/18/00.                         |
|                                                                              |
| This event is reportable under 10 CFR 7B.120(c)(2) as an event in which      |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed.  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event and the    |
| DOE on site representative was also informed.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36710       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD             REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:53[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        02/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        12:04[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN SOUTH                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/19/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DOUG WEAVER                  +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi)     OFFSITE NOTIFICATION   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 0F A SMALL GASOLINE SPILL IN THE CEDAR RIVER            |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Linn County  |
| Sheriff, and the US National Response Center of a reportable spill of        |
| gasoline into the Cedar River.  While clearing snow at the intake structure, |
| a snow blower fell into the river.  During the recovery a small sheen was    |
| observed on the river.  The snow blower has been recovered.                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36711       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:50[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRADLEY                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KENNETH BARR         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE DETERMINED A CONDITION OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS INVOLVING ECCS      |
| LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| On February 21, 2000 plant personnel determined that a condition outside the |
| design basis of the plant has occurred on Unit 1 & Unit 2 due to defeating   |
| part of a compensatory action for monitoring potential emergency core        |
| cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment. This is reportable per 10 |
| CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B).                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| On February 10, 2000 Unit 1 Operations noted that no alarms were received    |
| when the residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) sump pumps   |
| automatically started to pump down their respective sumps. Further           |
| investigation determined that the computer point to initiate the alarms had  |
| been deleted from processing on 8/30/99 for sump level switch work. This     |
| computer point was part of a corrective action for an event reported in LER  |
| 413-98-016. The LER dealt with an issue where leakage from ECCS components   |
| outside containment may not be detected in the time frame specified in the   |
| UFSAR for a LOCA. This was reported in the LER as a condition outside the    |
| design basis of the plant.  Upon discovery, the computer point was returned  |
| to service.  In addition the security level of the computer point has been   |
| increased to require Operations permission prior to modifying the point in   |
| any manner.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| On February 16, 2000, the same computer point was taken out of service       |
| without Operations permission for maintenance work. Upon discovery the       |
| computer point was returned to service. These events have been entered into  |
| the plants corrective action program for determination of the cause of these |
| events and appropriate corrective actions.                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of this event was due to personnel error.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The Resident Inspector will be notified.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #34936                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36712       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:22[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/21/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        10:00[CST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2000|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |ROBERT PIERSON       NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN PITTMAN               |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT -                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Material storage areas transferred from DOE to USEC contain uncharacterized  |
| potentially fissile material that does not comply with USEC NCS program      |
| requirements. The stored material also does not meet DOE NCS requirements.   |
| Responsibility for the storage areas was transferred to USEC for more rapid  |
| remediation of the non-conforming conditions, in part to support the Seismic |
| Upgrade Project in C-331 and C-335, and to improve overall site safety.      |
|                                                                              |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  The DOE material storage areas were located  |
| within the boundaries of USEC leased space. Transfer to USEC control allows  |
| more timely remediation to establish double contingency controls on the      |
| material.  Timely remediation will improve overall site safety.  The         |
| material is in a stable condition and double contingency will be established |
| using USEC procedures.  These procedures ensure that safety is not degraded  |
| during the remediation actions.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]:  In order for a criticality to be possible, more   |
| than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry.     |
| The stored material is primarily equipment items in which the fissile        |
| material is deposited in small quantities widely dispersed over large        |
| surface areas.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, etc):       |
| Since no NCS controls were applied to the equipment, double contingency can  |
| not be demonstrated.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT,  ENRICHMENT,  FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS   |
| LIMIT AND %  WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS):  Unknown due to DOE previously        |
| controlling areas.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION   |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  No NCS controls (other than providing 10   |
| feet buffer zone) where in place.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| Areas are to be remediated in accordance with NCS program requirements.      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.                  |
|                                                                              |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-OO-1009:  PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-017.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36713       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:16[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG JANAK                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       94       Power Operation  |94       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 24 hour Report, Violation of Operating License, condition existing longer  |
| than permitted by Plant Tech Specs -                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Carbon samples obtained from Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filtration Unit  |
| Train A failed laboratory tests.  The Plant Technical Specification          |
| 4.7.8.a.2 limit of less than 1% methyl iodide penetration was exceeded.  The |
| as-found methyl iodide penetration results were 1.07%.  This resulted in the |
| Train A Fuel Handling Exhaust Filtration Unit being inoperable since the     |
| time that the carbon samples were obtained at 0900 CST on 02/17/00.  This    |
| results in the system being inoperable for longer than 7 days which is a     |
| violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. Action a.  The sample results    |
| were obtained at 0840 CST on 02/21/00.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76,        |
| Section 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Plant Technical         |
| Specifications.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36714       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:00[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        21:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  KEN TAPLETT                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       96       Power Operation  |96       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 24-hour Report, Violation of Operating License, condition existing longer  |
| than permitted by Plant Tech Specs -                                         |
|                                                                              |
| During Unit 1 plant coastdown operations in preparation for a refueling      |
| outage, Charging Header Pressure - Low Channel [Plant Technical              |
| Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.3.3.d.(2)] failed at 2130 CST on 02/18/00.    |
| The licensee discovered the failure at 0600 CST on 02/19/00.  The licensee   |
| placed the instrument in a tripped condition at 0615 CST on 02/19/00 in      |
| compliance with Action #16 of the Limiting Condition for Operation.  LCO     |
| Action #16 requires placing an inoperable Charging Header Pressure Channel   |
| in the tripped condition within one hour.  The Charging Header Pressure      |
| Channel had been inoperable for 8 hours and 45 minutes before the licensee   |
| placed it in a tripped condition.  The licensee restored the channel to      |
| operable status at 1431 CST on 02/19/00.                                     |
|                                                                              |
| This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76,        |
| Condition 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Plant Technical       |
| Specifications.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36715       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO               REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:50[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-3                             |EVENT DATE:        02/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ELLIS PFEFFER                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/21/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i)      DEG/UNANALYZED COND    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Condensate System HELB could disable Div 1 125-vdc breaker control power   |
| in Div 1 4-kv switchgear room -                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Based on the results of a UFSAR review with the plant on cold shutdown       |
| condition in a refueling outage, the licensee performed a reevaluation to    |
| determine the effect of a high energy line break (HELB) in the condensate    |
| system on the Division 1 switchgear.  The licensee determined that the flood |
| level in the Division 1 4-kv switchgear room could rise high enough to       |
| disable Division 1 125-vdc breaker control power; thus, the  Division 1 4-kv |
| switchgear would have been inoperable for this HELB event.                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is determining corrective actions.                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+