Event Notification Report for February 22, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/18/2000 - 02/22/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36609 36697 36706 36707 36708 36709 36710 36711 36712 36713 36714 36715
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36609 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/20/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:05[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/20/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:17[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HYNES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |FELICIA HINSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INADEQUATE SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION ON CONTROL WIRING ASSOCIATED WITH THE |
| LINE STARTER FOR MAIN TURBINE DRAIN VALVES |
| |
| While performing a design analysis on Beaver Valley Unit 2 (BV-2) to confirm |
| adequate electrical fault protection, as follow-up to an Engineering fire |
| protection self-assessment completed in May 1999, it was determined that the |
| control wiring associated with the line starter for the nine main turbine |
| drain valves is not adequately protected from short circuits. This |
| protection inadequacy results from a lack of required fuse protection and/or |
| current limiting features described in Section 9.5.A.1.2.1.5(4) of the |
| Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. Due to this lack of adequate current |
| limiting protection, an electrical fault on this circuit could result in a |
| fire in multiple fire areas including the common Unit 1/2 Control Room, BV-2 |
| Service Building, BV-2 Cable Vault, BV-2 Cable Tunnel, and BV-2 Turbine |
| Building. The lack of current limiting protection for this circuitry |
| introduces the possibility of a potential fire in these multiple areas, |
| which is a violation of fire protection licensing basis commitments |
| regarding safe shutdown capability. |
| |
| The subject main turbine drain valves are non-safety related and not |
| required for safe shutdown. As an interim measure, the circuit has been |
| de-energized and will remain de-energized until adequate electrical |
| protection can be provided. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 2/19/00 @ 1105 BY MARACEK TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| Upon further review, it was determined that lack of adequate electrical |
| fault protection for cable 2SDSNNC001 did not constitute a condition outside |
| the design basis of the plant. The postulated fire event would be limited to |
| non-safety related cable trays in which cable 2SDSNNC001 is routed and |
| non-safety cables in the Control Room benchboard area. This determination |
| is based upon use of flame test qualified cables, adherence to Regulatory |
| Guide 1.75 separation criteria, and guidance provided by Generic Letter |
| 81-12, regarding associated circuits for common enclosures. This cable is |
| not routed in safety related Class 1E raceways. Review of cables in the |
| Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report indicates that the only safe shutdown |
| related cables in the non-Class 1E raceways are for the station air |
| compressors, which would already be assumed lost in the event of a fire in |
| the Unit 2 Turbine Building (TB-1). For a fire in TB-1, safe shutdown is |
| addressed in existing plant procedures to compensate for loss of equipment |
| due to a fire in this area. Therefore, a fire resulting from a fault of |
| cable 2SDSNNC001 would not have affected safety related circuits or the |
| ability to achieve safe shutdown. Therefore the licensee is retracting this |
| event. |
| |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Reg 1 RDO (Kinneman) was |
| notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36697 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/16/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: AR |NOTIFICATION TIME: 00:21[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 02/15/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:58[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PHILLIP REHM |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/18/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN PELLET R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FLAWED WELD DISCOVERED DURING PLANT OUTAGE |
| |
| "At 2058 CST on 2/15/2000, a flawed weld was identified on an instrument |
| connection to the Reactor Coolant System Loop 'A' Hot Leg Piping. The |
| subject flaw was identified by Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) at the |
| connection of Level Instrumentation to the RCS Hot Leg Piping. |
| |
| "Unit 1 was taken offline at 0010 on 2/5/2000 for scheduled maintenance. |
| Boron buildup was identified on 2/15/00 at the subject connection while the |
| plant was at cold shutdown condition. The accumulated boron indicates the |
| leakage through the weld flaw is classified as very small weepage. The |
| unidentified RCS leak rate prior to thc scheduled outage was 0.093 GPM. No |
| unexplainable changes in RCS leak rate exist for cycle 16 operation. Due to |
| the physical location of the connection, major scaffolding was required to |
| access the area. At 2058 on 2/15/2000, NDE was complete identifying the |
| reportable condition. Further investigation by Plant Staff is in-progress to |
| characterize the flaw morphology and cause. |
| |
| "This report is being performed to comply with the requirements of |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i)." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1352 ON 2/18/2000, BY DAVENPORT RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| Unit 1 was taken off-line at 0010 CST on February 5, 2000, for scheduled |
| maintenance and is currently in a cold shutdown condition. Boron buildup was |
| identified at 5 additional level instrumentation connections on the RCS A |
| and B Hot Leg piping. The accumulated boron indicates the leakage through |
| the weld flaws is very small weepage. Due to the physical locations of the |
| connections, major scaffolding was required to access the areas. NDE was |
| performed to confirm the initial nozzle leak found on 2/15/2000. Due to |
| radiological conditions, as-found NDE will not be performed on the |
| remaining leaking nozzles as planned. The visual inspections already |
| performed are sufficient to determine past leakage. None of the identified |
| flaws are actively leaking with the reactor in cold shutdown. The |
| unidentified RCS leak rate prior to the scheduled outage was 0.093 gpm. No |
| unexplainable changes in the RCS leak rate existed for the Cycle 16 |
| operation. Further investigation by Plant Staff is in-progress to |
| characterize the flaw morphology and cause. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector, the Operations Center |
| notified the R4DO (Tapia). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36706 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:23[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/16/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 16:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/18/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOSIE PICCONE NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE MAY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth |
| personnel: |
| |
| "On 02/18/00 at 1600, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a |
| loss of one control parameter, geometry, in NCSA-0705_100.A01 for the X-705 |
| decontamination facility. During a boroscope inspection of the 'A' |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three tubes |
| were observed. Two tubes have sections missing below the tube sheet, and |
| one tube was crimped such that it did not make a seal against the tube |
| sheet. After discovery of the problem, the pre-evaporator condenser was |
| isolated for repair." |
| |
| "The second control parameter of NCSA-0705_100.A01, volume, was maintained |
| throughout the inspection." |
| |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event." |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: "During a boroscope inspection of the 'A' |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three of the |
| tubes was observed. Two of the tubes had sections missing below the tube |
| sheet, and one of the tubes was crimped such that it did not make contact |
| with (seal against) the tube sheet. Per discussion with the system |
| engineer, these failures indicate that the integrity of the tubes could no |
| longer be assured. This is a loss of passive barrier 2(PB2) counted upon in |
| NCSA-0705_100.AOI to maintain double contingency. Since there is no |
| indication that the verification of the cooling water flow was lost, any |
| intermixing of the solutions would have resulted in water entering the tube |
| side of the condenser and getting pumped with condensed solution to overhead |
| storage. Since the downstream components from the tube side of the |
| condenser are evaluated for uranium-bearing solutions, the addition of water |
| to the solution would be bounded by the original solution (i.e., the |
| original solution would be diluted by the water). Therefore, the safety |
| significance of the event is low." |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): Given the failure of the condenser tubes |
| integrity, if the pressure of the shell side had been lower (water not |
| valved in) the condensed gas (uranium-bearing solution) could have been |
| discharged along with the pathway that the process water normally takes. |
| This stream leads to the storm sewer system, which has not been analyzed for |
| an accumulation of uranium-bearing material. If the material had settled |
| out/been deposited in an unfavorable location in the sewer system, a |
| criticality could have resulted." |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| The parameters being controlled under this NCSA were geometry and volume. |
| By taking credit for the integrity of the condenser tubes and verifying the |
| flow of the cooling water on the shell side, the resulting condensed |
| uranium-bearing solution is maintained in a safe geometry environment. Loss |
| of condenser tube integrity meant only the pressure differential of the |
| cooling water prevented the uranium-bearing solution from entering a system |
| not designed for handling that material." |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST): The system is analyzed for up to 100 wt% U235. Since |
| the secondary control for keeping the uranium-bearing solution in a |
| geometrically favorable system was maintained, (the check on the cooling |
| water), no material was actually introduced into the storm sewer system." |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: Based on the visual inspection of the |
| tube/tube sheet interface, at least three tubes appear to have failed such |
| that intermixing of the solution is possible. This represents a loss of a |
| passive barrier (P82 in the NCSA) credited for meeting the double |
| contingency principle for the operation." |
| |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| At 1730, [the] A, B, and C post-evaporator condensers and 'A' pre-evaporator |
| condenser are tagged out of service. Water and steam are isolated from the |
| condensers." |
| |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of |
| Energy site representative. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1335 ON 2/18/2000, BY SPAETH RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * * |
| |
| This update is being provided to clarify the controlled parameter associated |
| with the NCSA applicable to this event. The NCS parameter being controlled |
| for this event is geometry. Although volume is a parameter identified in the |
| NCSA for this operation, volume is not relevant to this event. Two controls |
| are in place to maintain the geometry parameter, tube integrity and water |
| pressure differential. By taking credit for the integrity of the condenser |
| tubes and verifying the flow of the cooling water on the shell side, the |
| resulting condensed uranium-bearing solution is maintained in a safe |
| geometry environment. Loss of condenser tube integrity meant only the |
| pressure differential of the cooling water prevented the uranium bearing |
| solution from entering a system not designed for handling that material. |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. The operations center |
| notified the R3DO(Jorgensen) and NMSS EO (HICKEY). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36707 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:03[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/18/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/18/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NCFR NON CFR REPORT REQMNT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| At 1335 hours on 02/17/00 a see and flee emergency was initiated at the |
| X-330 building Tails position #1. The see and flee was Initiated as a result |
| of a process gas release from the pigtail on Tails position #1. The release |
| was large enough to exceed the capacity of portable mini-gulper staged In |
| the area. The mini-gulper is used to divert and contain any small releases |
| that may occur during pigtail connect/disconnect operations. The release of |
| process gas caused a valid actuation of the pyrotronics smokehead safety |
| system. The pyrotronics smokeheads and pigtail line isolation safety systems |
| operated as designed during this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36708 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: NINE MILE POINT UNIT TWO |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/18/2000|
|LICENSEE: STONE AND WEBSTER ENGINEERING CORPORA|NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:24[EST]|
| CITY: LYCOMING REGION: 1 |EVENT DATE: 12/17/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: NY |EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/18/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |FRANK COSTELLO R1 |
| |VERN HODGE NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE LEONARD | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 - NON-CONSERVATISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (EQ) CALCULATIONS |
| |
| 1-. Affected unit: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 |
| |
| 2- Components that contain defect/deviation: Miscellaneous components |
| (limitorque operators electrical cables etc.) in environmental qualification |
| (EQ) program |
| |
| 3- Firm supplying components/activity: Stone and Webster Engineering |
| Corporation (SWEC) |
| |
| 4- Nature of defect/deviation: non-conservatism in EQ calculations (lowest |
| expected ambient temperatures used instead of normal expected ambient |
| temperatures for winter periods). About 30 components will have qualified |
| lives reduced from greater than 40 years to less than 40 years, when |
| non-conservatism is removed. Several hundred other components will have |
| qualified lives reduced but not to less than 40 years. |
| |
| 5- Date on which information was obtained (discovery date): December 17. |
| 1999 |
| |
| 6- Number and location of components: potentially numerous components in |
| multiple systems at multiple locations. |
| |
| 7- Corrective actions: EQ calculations and Environmental Qualification |
| Engineering Design Criteria document, which was source of erroneous data for |
| the EQ calculations, will be corrected prior to expiration of actual |
| qualified lives of affected EQ components i.e., within a few years. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36709 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:52[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/18/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:25[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BEASLEY | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|OCBB 76.120(c)(2)(ii) EQUIP DISABLED/FAILS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION - FAILURE OF THE UF6 RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM |
| |
| At 1325 CST, on 2/18/00, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified |
| of an air leak on the C-310 Cylinder Valve Closure System. The function of |
| this system is to close the cylinder valve in the case of an actuation of |
| the UF6 Release Detection and Isolation System Low Voltage ("New") System at |
| the UF6 Withdrawal Stations. TSR 2.3.4.1 requires this system to be |
| operable while operating in mod 2. At the time the leak was discovered, |
| the air pressure on the Cylinder Valve Closure System was being maintained |
| within allowed parameters. However due to the size of the leak, it was |
| questionable as to if the system could maintain enough air pressure to |
| perform its intended safety function, if it were called upon. After |
| discussing with the C-310 building System Engineer, the PSS could not be |
| provided with reasonable assurance of operability. The UF6 Release |
| detection System was declared inoperable by the PSS, and repair of the |
| system was initiated. TSR required LCO actions were implemented. Repair of |
| the air leak was completed, and the UF6 Release Detection System was |
| returned to Operable status at 1706 CST, on 2/18/00. |
| |
| This event is reportable under 10 CFR 7B.120(c)(2) as an event in which |
| equipment required by the TSR is disabled or fails to function as designed. |
| |
| The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been notified of this event and the |
| DOE on site representative was also informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36710 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DUANE ARNOLD REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/19/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:53[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:04[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SOUTH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/19/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DOUG WEAVER +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 0F A SMALL GASOLINE SPILL IN THE CEDAR RIVER |
| |
| The licensee notified the Iowa Department of Natural Resources, Linn County |
| Sheriff, and the US National Response Center of a reportable spill of |
| gasoline into the Cedar River. While clearing snow at the intake structure, |
| a snow blower fell into the river. During the recovery a small sheen was |
| observed on the river. The snow blower has been recovered. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36711 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:50[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:50[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRADLEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KENNETH BARR R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE DETERMINED A CONDITION OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS INVOLVING ECCS |
| LEAKAGE OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT. |
| |
| On February 21, 2000 plant personnel determined that a condition outside the |
| design basis of the plant has occurred on Unit 1 & Unit 2 due to defeating |
| part of a compensatory action for monitoring potential emergency core |
| cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment. This is reportable per 10 |
| CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). |
| |
| On February 10, 2000 Unit 1 Operations noted that no alarms were received |
| when the residual heat removal (RHR) and containment spray (CS) sump pumps |
| automatically started to pump down their respective sumps. Further |
| investigation determined that the computer point to initiate the alarms had |
| been deleted from processing on 8/30/99 for sump level switch work. This |
| computer point was part of a corrective action for an event reported in LER |
| 413-98-016. The LER dealt with an issue where leakage from ECCS components |
| outside containment may not be detected in the time frame specified in the |
| UFSAR for a LOCA. This was reported in the LER as a condition outside the |
| design basis of the plant. Upon discovery, the computer point was returned |
| to service. In addition the security level of the computer point has been |
| increased to require Operations permission prior to modifying the point in |
| any manner. |
| |
| On February 16, 2000, the same computer point was taken out of service |
| without Operations permission for maintenance work. Upon discovery the |
| computer point was returned to service. These events have been entered into |
| the plants corrective action program for determination of the cause of these |
| events and appropriate corrective actions. |
| |
| The cause of this event was due to personnel error. |
| |
| The Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| |
| HOO NOTE: SEE EVENT #34936 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36712 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:22[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 02/21/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 10:00[CST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2000|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |ROBERT PIERSON NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN PITTMAN | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
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| | |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 4 HOUR REPORT - |
| |
| Material storage areas transferred from DOE to USEC contain uncharacterized |
| potentially fissile material that does not comply with USEC NCS program |
| requirements. The stored material also does not meet DOE NCS requirements. |
| Responsibility for the storage areas was transferred to USEC for more rapid |
| remediation of the non-conforming conditions, in part to support the Seismic |
| Upgrade Project in C-331 and C-335, and to improve overall site safety. |
| |
| SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: The DOE material storage areas were located |
| within the boundaries of USEC leased space. Transfer to USEC control allows |
| more timely remediation to establish double contingency controls on the |
| material. Timely remediation will improve overall site safety. The |
| material is in a stable condition and double contingency will be established |
| using USEC procedures. These procedures ensure that safety is not degraded |
| during the remediation actions. |
| |
| POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED [BRIEF SCEANARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR]: In order for a criticality to be possible, more |
| than a critical mass would need to be accumulated in an unsafe geometry. |
| The stored material is primarily equipment items in which the fissile |
| material is deposited in small quantities widely dispersed over large |
| surface areas. |
| |
| CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY CONCENTRATION, etc): |
| Since no NCS controls were applied to the equipment, double contingency can |
| not be demonstrated. |
| |
| ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITCAL MASS): Unknown due to DOE previously |
| controlling areas. |
| |
| NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: No NCS controls (other than providing 10 |
| feet buffer zone) where in place. |
| |
| CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEMS AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED: |
| Areas are to be remediated in accordance with NCS program requirements. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| |
| PGDP Problem Report No. ATRC-OO-1009: PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2000-017. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36713 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:16[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG JANAK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN PELLET R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 94 Power Operation |94 Power Operation |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 24 hour Report, Violation of Operating License, condition existing longer |
| than permitted by Plant Tech Specs - |
| |
| Carbon samples obtained from Fuel Handling Building Exhaust Filtration Unit |
| Train A failed laboratory tests. The Plant Technical Specification |
| 4.7.8.a.2 limit of less than 1% methyl iodide penetration was exceeded. The |
| as-found methyl iodide penetration results were 1.07%. This resulted in the |
| Train A Fuel Handling Exhaust Filtration Unit being inoperable since the |
| time that the carbon samples were obtained at 0900 CST on 02/17/00. This |
| results in the system being inoperable for longer than 7 days which is a |
| violation of Technical Specification 3.7.8. Action a. The sample results |
| were obtained at 0840 CST on 02/21/00. |
| |
| This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, |
| Section 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Plant Technical |
| Specifications. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36714 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:00[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 02/18/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 21:30[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: KEN TAPLETT |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN PELLET R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 96 Power Operation |96 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - 24-hour Report, Violation of Operating License, condition existing longer |
| than permitted by Plant Tech Specs - |
| |
| During Unit 1 plant coastdown operations in preparation for a refueling |
| outage, Charging Header Pressure - Low Channel [Plant Technical |
| Specification 3.3.2, Table 3.3.3.3.d.(2)] failed at 2130 CST on 02/18/00. |
| The licensee discovered the failure at 0600 CST on 02/19/00. The licensee |
| placed the instrument in a tripped condition at 0615 CST on 02/19/00 in |
| compliance with Action #16 of the Limiting Condition for Operation. LCO |
| Action #16 requires placing an inoperable Charging Header Pressure Channel |
| in the tripped condition within one hour. The Charging Header Pressure |
| Channel had been inoperable for 8 hours and 45 minutes before the licensee |
| placed it in a tripped condition. The licensee restored the channel to |
| operable status at 1431 CST on 02/19/00. |
| |
| This notification is being made pursuant to Operating License NPF-76, |
| Condition 2.G for operation or condition prohibited by Plant Technical |
| Specifications. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36715 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MONTICELLO REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MN |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:50[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 02/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ELLIS PFEFFER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADAS 50.72(b)(2)(i) DEG/UNANALYZED COND | |
| | |
| | |
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+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Condensate System HELB could disable Div 1 125-vdc breaker control power |
| in Div 1 4-kv switchgear room - |
| |
| Based on the results of a UFSAR review with the plant on cold shutdown |
| condition in a refueling outage, the licensee performed a reevaluation to |
| determine the effect of a high energy line break (HELB) in the condensate |
| system on the Division 1 switchgear. The licensee determined that the flood |
| level in the Division 1 4-kv switchgear room could rise high enough to |
| disable Division 1 125-vdc breaker control power; thus, the Division 1 4-kv |
| switchgear would have been inoperable for this HELB event. |
| |
| The licensee is determining corrective actions. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021