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Event Notification Report for February 18, 2000

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           02/17/2000 - 02/18/2000

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36604  36663  36701  36702  36703  36704  36705  36706  

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36604       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: COMANCHE PEAK            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/19/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:46[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        01/19/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        14:24[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DON CERNY                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY THAT UNIT SPECIFIC LOADS WERE ON COMMON BUSES                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "FSAR section 1A(B) for compliance to [Regulatory] Guide 1.81 states that    |
| [the Comanche Peak] design complies with the provisions of Revision 1 of     |
| this [regulatory] guide.  Contrary to the above, unit specific [118-volt AC] |
| loads fed from common buses XEC1-1 and XEC2-1 were shared between two        |
| units."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that affected loads involve a lot of different equipment |
| and systems but did not specify which equipment or systems.  The licensee    |
| also stated that the units are not currently in any technical specification  |
| limiting conditions for operation as a result of this issue because the      |
| loads are now aligned to an alternate power supply.  Corrective actions have |
| not yet been determined.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| *************** UPDATE AT 1412 ON 02/17/00 FROM SCOTTY HARVEY TO LEIGH       |
| TROCINE ***************                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification based upon the following  |
| text, which is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:          |
|                                                                              |
| "After a further review of the condition (event #36604) reported on January  |
| 19, 2000, [the licensee] did not identify any deviation from the design      |
| basis requirements of the plant as defined in 10CFR50.2."                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The basic premise of the conservative reporting of this condition was that  |
| some unit specific DC [See note 1] and AC (118-volt AC) loads fed from       |
| common buses were shared between two units and that this condition may not   |
| be in compliance with the design basis of the plant.  Although, it was       |
| deemed that the statements in the FSAR may not be clear and that CPSES may   |
| not be in verbatim compliance with every aspect of Regulatory Guide 1.81.    |
| The plant's as-built configurations maintained their ability to perform      |
| their specified safety functions and were not in a condition outside of the  |
| design basis as defined in 10CFR50.2.  Therefore, this condition is not      |
| reportable under the auspices of 10CFR50.72/73.  Accordingly, this report    |
| described in event [#36604] is hereby retracted."                            |
|                                                                              |
| "[NOTE 1:  The licensee] believe[s] that the DC unit specific loads do not   |
| meet the specific requirements of the [regulatory guide (RG)].  However,     |
| [the licensee] believe[s] that this is technically [okay] and ... would      |
| justify this as an exception to the RG.  The AC loads do not meet the RG as  |
| well, but [the licensee is] proposing changing some of the power sources and |
| installation of an Automatic Bus Transfer as well."                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations        |
| officer notified the R4DO (Marschall).                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36663       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SOUTH TEXAS              REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/05/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  TX |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:54[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/04/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:59[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG JANAK                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CLAUDE JOHNSON       R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 2 TRAINS OF ESSENTIAL CHILLED WATER INOPERABLE                               |
|                                                                              |
| On 02/04/00 at 2059 CST, Essential Chiller 12C was declared inoperable due   |
| to tripping after being started at 2056 CST on 02/04/00.  This resulted in   |
| an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.14.  Investigation revealed that   |
| Essential Chiller 12C tripped on high condenser pressure which was caused by |
| not having cooling water flow properly aligned.  Found Essential Cooling     |
| Water valve EVV-3025 to be closed, when it's required position is throttled  |
| to maintain Essential Cooling Water flow.  The valve alignment was restored  |
| to normal and Essential Chiller 12C was declared operable at 2358 CST on     |
| 02/04/00.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The investigation revealed that EVV-3025 was closed at approximately 1121    |
| CST on 02/02/00 as indicated on integrated computer system trends.  At that  |
| time Essential Chilled Water Train "B" was inoperable for planned            |
| maintenance and remained inoperable until 1527 CST on 02/02/00.  This        |
| resulted in 2 trains of Essential Chilled Water being inoperable for 4 hours |
| and 6 minutes which placed the plant in Technical Specification 3.0.3 (did   |
| not require plant shutdown).                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| A Licensee Event Report will be submitted within 30 days.                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1708 ON 2/17/00, BY MORRIS RECEIVED BY WEAVER * * *          |
|                                                                              |
| Upon further evaluation, it has been determined that Train 'B' of Essential  |
| Chilled Water was operable prior to the point in time when Train 'C' of      |
| Essential Chilled Water was rendered inoperable, and thus the event is not   |
| reportable and therefore should be retracted.                                |
|                                                                              |
| Following maintenance, at 0814 CST hours on February 2, 2000, the 12B        |
| Essential Chiller was placed in service, and at 1100 CST hours               |
| post-maintenance testing was completed.  Also by this time, the 'B' Train of |
| Essential Cooling Water and the #12 ESF Diesel Generator had already been    |
| declared operable.  Additionally, although post-maintenance testing was not  |
| signed-off as complete until 1237 CST hours for the 'B' Train Essential      |
| Chilled Water air handling unit, the unit was in service and the             |
| post-maintenance testing (completed at approximately 1014 CST hours)         |
| verified that the air handling unit had been capable of performing its       |
| function since the completion of its associated maintenance work.  In        |
| summary, although the 12B Essential Chiller was not administratively         |
| considered operable until 1527 CST hours on February 2, 2000, following      |
| final paperwork close-out, it was fully capable of performing its intended   |
| design function at 1100 CST hours.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| Thus, when the 12C Essential Chiller was rendered inoperable at 1121 CST     |
| hours, the 'B' train of Essential Chilled Water (including necessary support |
| equipment) was fully capable of performing its design function (i.e..        |
| operable).  Since the 'B' train of Essential Chilled Water was therefore     |
| operable when the 'C' train was made inoperable, only one train of Essential |
| Chilled Water was inoperable at a time, and Technical Specification 3.0.3    |
| was not entered.                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC resident inspector of this event retraction.   |
| The Operations Center notified the R4DO(Tapia).                              |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36701       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:19[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/16/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RICK LARSON                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "On 2/16/00 at 1200 Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a loss  |
| of one control spacing, in NCSA-0710_006.A01 for the X-710 laboratory        |
| facility. During a walk down of proposed revision to the NCSA laboratory     |
| personnel discovered that a vertical spacing requirement for storage racks   |
| was not being maintained. This was a violation of one control of the double  |
| contingency controls established by this NCSA. The other control geometry    |
| was maintained through. To regain compliance the containers stored in the    |
| affected storage racks were removed and the storage racks were tagged out of |
| service by 1530 hrs.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety significance of this event is very low. The smallest actual      |
| spacing between storage clusters was approximately 11.25 inches. Since each  |
| storage bin is 5"x 5", and the tallest arrangement of containers in a bin is |
| approximately 4 inches, the extra inch gap results in adequate spacing       |
| between the containers. Also, the enrichment of the containers stored in the |
| bins is limited by PORTS certification to less than 20% versus the 100%      |
| enrichment analyzed in the NCSE.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "If all the bins were over loaded with containers and the bins were adjacent |
| and all the containers were filled with the analyzed limit of 100% enriched  |
| material, a spacing violation with a person carrying a polybottle might      |
| cause a criticality.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Geometry and Spacing were the controlled parameters. The spacing control    |
| was lost when the vertical distance between storage bins was found to be     |
| less than 12 inches.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST):                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "The amount of material is variable depending on whether 2S, 1S or 990 cold  |
| traps are considered. The enrichment is analyzed to 100%, although the       |
| PORTS' operating certificate limits the cascade to 20%. The form of the      |
| material in the containers is UF6. The percent worst case of critical mass   |
| is not known, however, at 100% enrichment a single 2S cylinder can contain   |
| more than the minimum critical mass. In reality, at 5% enrichment, it would  |
| require over 20 25 cylinders to have more than minimum critical mass.        |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "Geometry and spacing were controlled. The spacing control was lost because  |
| the storage bins were not the correct vertical distance apart.               |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1530 hrs, all controls were regained."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this event.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   36702       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  U.S. ARMY                            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|LICENSEE:  U.S. ARMY                            |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:48[EST]|
|    CITY:  CAMP LE JEUNE            REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        02/02/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:  12-00722-06           AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|                                                |SCOTT MOORE          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+KENNETH BARR         R2      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF HAVENNER                |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|BAB2 20.2201(a)(1)(ii)   LOST/STOLEN LNM>10X    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF SEALED SOURCE CONTAINING 30 mCi OF TRITIUM                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee reported the loss of a small tritium source from a mortar       |
| system assigned to the U.S. Marine Corps School of Infantry at Camp Le       |
| Jeune, NC. A scale index lamp (a plastic arrow containing 30 mCi of tritium) |
| became detached from an M-64 mortar sight unit while the mortar unit was     |
| being used on a firing range. The source was discovered to be missing after  |
| the unit had been moved from the firing range. The licensee stated that the  |
| source could not be located. This source poses no threat to the public as    |
| access to the firing range is controlled.                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36703       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:39[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/16/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:59[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL CRAIG                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES MARSCHALL    R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE 24-HOUR REPORT DUE TO EXCEEDENCE OF LICENCED POWER LIMIT            |
|                                                                              |
| "On February 16, 2000, at 0759 PST Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) exceeded |
| the Operating License reactor core power of 3411 megawatts by greater than 2 |
| percent. At 0757 PST with Unit 2 at nominal full reactor power a load        |
| transient bypass (LTB) signal was initiated diverting main feedwater around  |
| the normal feedwater heaters into the steam generators. During the resultant |
| sudden temperature decrease, reactor power peaked at 103.8% and exceeded the |
| nominal full power for a total of six minutes.                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The transient was initiated by utility maintenance personnel during the     |
| scheduled performance of instrumentation calibration of circuits associated  |
| with the LTB. Technicians performing a calibration inadvertently disturbed   |
| an input circuit creating an invalid LTB initiate signal.                    |
|                                                                              |
| "The feedwater temperature was rapidly reduced approximately 45 to 50        |
| degrees F. The Final Safety Analysis Report Update Chapter 15, 'Accident     |
| Analyses,' Condition II, 'Faults of Moderate Frequency,' Section 15.2.11,    |
| 'Sudden Feedwater Temperature Reduction,' provides bounding analysis for     |
| this event. The FSAR Update concludes that for temperature drops of less     |
| than 73 degrees F that the reactor will remain in operation and the reactor  |
| will not go below the minimum DNBR. FSAR Update Section 15.2.11.1 analysis   |
| specifically identifies the inadvertent actuation of the LTB as an           |
| initiating event bound by the analysis.)                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "The DCPP Unit 2 Operating License DPR-82, Condition 2.C(1) authorizes PG&E  |
| to operate Unit 2 at reactor core power levels not in excess of 3411         |
| megawatts thermal (100% rated power). DPR-82, Condition 2.G, 'Reporting,'    |
| requires Emergency Notification System reporting within 24 hours and a       |
| written followup report within 30 day in accordance with the procedures      |
| described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e). This event will be reported as   |
| Licensee Event Report (LER) 2-00-001."                                       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   36704       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  NC DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|LICENSEE:  FROELING & ROBERTSON, INC.           |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:55[EST]|
|    CITY:  RALEIGH                  REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        02/04/2000|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  NC |EVENT TIME:             [EST]|
|LICENSE#:  092-0353-6            AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |KENNETH BARR         R2      |
|                                                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  J. MARION EADDY              |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE LOST DURING SHIPPING                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following information was submitted by the State of North Carolina via   |
| facsimile:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "Froeling & Robertson, Inc (F&R). (N.C. License No. 092-0353.6) shipped one  |
| Troxler Model 3411-B nuclear gauge (s/n 9220) from the Raleigh, NC office to |
| their Chesapeake, VA. Office (NRC License No. 45-08890-02) on 04 February    |
| 2000 via FedEx. As of today's date, the gauge has not been delivered to the  |
| Chesapeake office.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "FedEx is conducting a search of the Raleigh, NC, hub, as well as tracking   |
| the package at other FedEx hubs in the area. F&R has notified all of its     |
| branch offices of the occurrence.                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "North Carolina has assigned log number ICD-00-03 to this incident."         |
|                                                                              |
| *************** UPDATE AT 1341 ON 02/17/00 FROM J. MARION EADDY TO LEIGH     |
| TROCINE ***************                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the North       |
| Carolina Division of Radiation Protection:                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "UPDATE on Loss of a Troxler Model 3411-B Moisture/Density Gauge NC Log No.  |
| ICD-00-03."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "[The] North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection received a call from  |
| the Radiation Safety Officer for FedEx this afternoon. The gauge (Troxler    |
| Model 3411-B s/n 9220) was located at Troxler Electronic Laboratories        |
| Research Triangle Park Office."                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "North Carolina is continuing to investigate this incident."                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R2DO (Barr) and NMSS EO (Piccone).   |
|                                                                              |
| Call the NRC operations officer for a contact telephone number               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36705       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH              REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:30[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP                |EVENT DATE:        02/17/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JOHN SELL                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DISCOVERY OF CABLING NOT ROUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPENDIX 'R'              |
| REQUIREMENTS                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "During the Appendix 'R' rebaselining project, it was discovered that in     |
| both units' containment's redundant [safety-related] instrumentation cabling |
| was routed [within] 20 [feet] of each other.  This is not in accordance with |
| Appendix 'R' requirements as described in Section iii.g.2.  Due to strict    |
| administrative controls, there is minimal fire risk in these areas."         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36706       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/17/2000|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:23[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        02/16/2000|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:00[EST]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  02/17/2000|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOSIE PICCONE        NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE MAY                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 RESPONSE (24-HOUR REPORT)                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Portsmouth      |
| personnel:                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 02/18/00 at 1600, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified of a |
| loss of one control parameter, geometry, in NCSA-0705_100.A01 for the X-705  |
| decontamination facility.  During a boroscope inspection of the 'A'          |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three tubes   |
| were observed.  Two tubes have sections missing below the tube sheet, and    |
| one tube was crimped such that it did not make a seal against the tube       |
| sheet.  After discovery of the problem, the pre-evaporator condenser was     |
| isolated for repair."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The second control parameter of NCSA-0705_100.A01, volume, was maintained   |
| throughout the inspection."                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "There was no loss of hazardous/radioactive material or radioactive          |
| radiological contamination exposure as a result of this event."              |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:  "During a boroscope inspection of the 'A'   |
| pre-evaporator loop condenser/condenser tubing, a problem with three of the  |
| tubes was observed.  Two of the tubes had sections missing below the tube    |
| sheet, and one of the tubes was crimped such that it did not make contact    |
| with (seal against) the tube sheet.  Per discussion with the system          |
| engineer, these failures indicate that the integrity of the tubes could no   |
| longer be assured.  This is a loss of passive barrier 2(PB2) counted upon in |
| NCSA-0705_100.AOI to maintain double contingency.  Since there is no         |
| indication that the verification of the cooling water flow was lost, any     |
| intermixing of the solutions would have resulted in water entering the tube  |
| side of the condenser and getting pumped with condensed solution to overhead |
| storage.  Since the downstream components from the tube side of the          |
| condenser are evaluated for uranium-bearing solutions, the addition of water |
| to the solution would be bounded by the original solution (i.e., the         |
| original solution would be diluted by the water).  Therefore, the safety     |
| significance of the event is low."                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):  Given the failure of the condenser tubes          |
| integrity, if the pressure of the shell side had been lower (water not       |
| valved in) the condensed gas (uranium-bearing solution) could have been      |
| discharged along with the pathway that the process water normally takes.     |
| This stream leads to the storm sewer system, which has not been analyzed for |
| an accumulation of uranium-bearing material.  If the material had settled    |
| out/been deposited in an unfavorable location in the sewer system, a         |
| criticality could have resulted."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
| The parameters being controlled under this NCSA were geometry and volume.    |
| By taking credit for the integrity of the condenser tubes and verifying the  |
| flow of the cooling water on the shell side, the resulting condensed         |
| uranium-bearing solution is maintained in a safe geometry environment.  Loss |
| of condenser tube integrity meant only the pressure differential of the      |
| cooling water prevented the uranium-bearing solution from entering a system  |
| not designed for handling that material."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST):  The system is analyzed for up to 100 wt% U235.  Since   |
| the secondary control for keeping the uranium-bearing solution in a          |
| geometrically favorable system was maintained, (the check on the cooling     |
| water), no material was actually introduced into the storm sewer system."    |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:  Based on the visual inspection of the      |
| tube/tube sheet interface, at least three tubes appear to have failed such   |
| that intermixing of the solution is possible.  This represents a loss of a   |
| passive barrier (P82 in the NCSA) credited for meeting the double            |
| contingency principle for the operation."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO RESTORE SAFETY SYSTEM AND WHEN EACH WAS IMPLEMENTED:  |
| At 1730, [the] A, B, and C post-evaporator condensers and 'A' pre-evaporator |
| condenser are tagged out of service.  Water and steam are isolated from the  |
| condensers."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Portsmouth personnel notified the NRC resident inspector and Department of   |
| Energy site representative.                                                  |
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