Event Notification Report for February 3, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
02/02/2000 - 02/03/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36586 36638 36643 36653 36654
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36586 |
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| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/13/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:21[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/13/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:26[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JIM BURGESS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROBERT HAAG R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
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EVENT TEXT
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| ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 FOR 17 MINUTES DUE TO LOW DIFFERENTIAL |
| PRESSURE BETWEEN THE CONTROL ROOM AND THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. |
| |
| A LOW CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS DISCOVERED |
| WHILE A CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION |
| SYSTEM COMPENSATORY ACTION WAS IN EFFECT DUE TO AUXILIARY BUILDING |
| VENTILATION SYSTEM WORK. THE LICENSEE ENTERED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 |
| AT 0326 ET. AT 0333 ET, THE LICENSEE SECURED THE '2A' AUXILIARY BUILDING |
| VENTILATION FILTER EXHAUST FAN. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 WAS EXITED AT |
| 0343 ET AFTER CONTROL ROOM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE WAS VERIFIED ABOVE THE |
| MINIMUM LIMIT. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS EVENT BY THE LICENSEE. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 02/02/00 AT 1644 BY TRUESDALE TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| The determination to declare both trains of the control room area |
| ventilation system (CRAVS) inoperable on 01/13/00 was based on the data from |
| only one of the two CRAVS intakes. At the time this decision was made, the |
| 'A' train of the CRAVS was in operation. When the control room pressure was |
| checked, the only intake alignment that was tested was the Unit 2 intake |
| alignment. No test was performed using the Unit 1 intake for CRAVS. This |
| was done because of how the procedure was written for the control pressure |
| check. |
| |
| A licensee engineering evaluation was performed to review CRAVS test data |
| and alignment before, during and after the event. This evaluation |
| determined that the inability to pressurize the control room to technical |
| specification (TS) surveillance requirement required value of 0.125 inches |
| water gage using the Unit 2 intake caused one CRAVS train (but not both) to |
| be inoperable. The cause of the event was a failed auxiliary building |
| ventilation system supply damper. This supply damper prevented the |
| auxiliary building system from supplying adequate air into the auxiliary |
| building to compensate for the amount of air being exhausted by the |
| auxiliary building system unfiltered and filtered exhaust fans. TS 3.7.10, |
| Action A (restore CRAVS train to OPERABLE status within 7 days), not action |
| E (enter TS 3.0.3 for two CRAVS trains inoperable), should have been |
| followed. The inoperable train was restored to operable status by |
| realigning auxiliary building exhaust and supply fans which restored |
| auxiliary building pressure to normal. Thus, since only one train of CRAVS |
| was inoperable, neither unit was ever in TS LCO 3.0.3 for this event. |
| Therefore, this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(l)(ii)(B) and the |
| previous notification is being retracted. In addition, as a result of this |
| event notification retraction, licensee event reporting regarding this issue |
| is not required nor is planned. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations |
| Officer notified the R2DO (Kerry Landis). |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36638 |
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| FACILITY: QUAD CITIES REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/28/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:14[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3 |EVENT DATE: 01/28/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:40[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DARYL CLARK |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| BOTH EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS INOPERABLE DURING CORE ALTERATIONS. |
| |
| "On 1/28/00 at 0005 hrs, the U-2 Emergency Diesel Generator was found to be |
| inoperable due to the diesel generator room vent fan selector switch being |
| selected to the alternate feed. The 1/2 Emergency Diesel Generator was |
| inoperable due to Division I electrical system refuel outage work. Core |
| alterations were in progress. |
| |
| "Per Tech Spec 3.9.B, one diesel generator must be operable in Mode 5 and |
| when handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment. |
| |
| "The switch was aligned to the normal position, and vent fan operation was |
| verified within approximately 15 minutes to restore the U-2 diesel generator |
| to an operable status. An internal investigation is commencing. Although |
| both the 1/2 and U-2 EDGs were inoperable, both diesels remained available |
| for operation. |
| |
| "This event is being reported as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D), an |
| event which alone could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function |
| needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE ON 02/02/00 AT 1841 FROM HILL TO GOULD * * * RETRACTION |
| |
| The licensee has completed its evaluation and determined that the Unit 2 |
| Emergency Diesel Generator was able to meet its intended safety function |
| considering reasonable operator actions. Therefore, this event is not |
| reportable with respect to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) and is hereby |
| retracted. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC Operations |
| Officer notified R3DO (Tony Vegel). |
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+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36643 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/31/2000|
|LICENSEE: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:34[EST]|
| CITY: CHERRY POINT REGION: 2 |EVENT DATE: 01/20/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: NC |EVENT TIME: [EST]|
|LICENSE#: 45TAC23645TAC AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/02/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
| |JOHN HICKEY NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HIGGINS | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|BAB1 20.2201(a)(1)(i) LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| U.S. NAVY REPORTED MISSING DROGUE LIGHTS AT THE MARINE CORP AIR STATION IN |
| CHERRY POINT, N.C. |
| |
| A DROGUE LIGHT (USED DURING NIGHT AIRCRAFT REFUELING) IS A BASKET ASSEMBLY |
| CONTAINING 6 ISOLITES WHICH CONTAIN 1 CURIE OF TRITIUM EACH FOR A TOTAL OF 6 |
| CURIES. THERE WAS A SECOND BASKET ASSEMBLY CONTAINING 5 ISOLITES WHICH ALSO |
| CONTAINED 1 CURIE EACH OF TRITIUM AND A 6th ISOLITE WHICH CONTAINED 25 |
| MILLICURIES OF KRYPTON-85. THEREFORE, THERE IS A TOTAL ACTIVITY OF 11 |
| CURIES OF TRITIUM AND 25 MILLICURIES OF KRYPTON-85 MISSING. THEY HAVE BEEN |
| SEARCHING FOR THESE SOURCES SINCE 01/20/00 WITH NO SUCCESS. ON 01/28/00, IT |
| WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS WAS A REPORTABLE EVENT. THEY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, |
| THAT THESE SOURCES WERE NOT STOLEN OR LOST BUT WERE RETURNED TO THE NAVY |
| SUPPLY SYSTEM AFTER THEY HAD BEEN REMOVED ON 12/14/99. THEY ARE HAVING A |
| NAVY JAG INVESTIGATION ON THIS INCIDENT. |
| |
| CALL THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER FOR A LICENSEE CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1033 ON 02/02/00 FROM HIGGINS TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| The licensee has recovered the sources. The lights had been mistaken for |
| surplus material, and had been installed on another aircraft. |
| |
| The licensee has already contacted NRC Region 2 regarding this update. The |
| NRC Operations Officer notified the R2DO (Kerry Landis). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36653 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WNP-2 REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/02/2000|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:51[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 02/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 11:34[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: HEDGES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLAUDE JOHNSON R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE DISCOVERED A CONDITION THAT IS OUTSIDE THE PLANT DESIGN BASIS |
| |
| At 1134 PST on 02/02/00, after discussions with General Electric Company |
| representatives, the licensee determined that the condition described below |
| was not known to be previously analyzed and was outside the design basis of |
| the plant and was reportable to the NRC.. The plant remains in Condition 1 |
| at 100% power with the condition yielding primary containment and reactor |
| coolant pressure boundary OPERABLE but nonconforming in accordance with NRC |
| Generic Letter 91-18, Revision 1. |
| |
| The WNP-2 UFSAR Section 7.4.1.1.2 and TMI response ll.K.1.22 state that the |
| Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System is designed to automatically |
| start if reactor water level decreases to the low level signal setpoint |
| (level 2), automatically stop at the high water level signal setpoint (level |
| 8), and restart if water level decreases again to low level signal setpoint |
| (level 2). The RCIC System is equipped with a "Keep-Fill" pump designed to |
| maintain the RCIC System full. However, the RCIC Keep-Fill pump is not |
| single failure proof. Therefore, during accident or transient scenarios |
| which include a sufficient decrease in reactor vessel water level, restart |
| of the RCIC System in conjunction with a failure of the Keep-Fill pump, |
| could create a water hammer in the RCIC System piping and potentially |
| jeopardize the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) or |
| primary containment (PC) isolation barriers associated with the RCIC |
| System. |
| |
| An operability assessment has determined that the RCPB and PC are OPERABLE |
| but nonconforming to single failure criteria, crediting existing |
| proceduralized operator actions. The RCIC System is equipped with low |
| pressure alarm annunciation in the main control room. To prevent water |
| hammer, plant procedures require operator action to inhibit RCIC pump starts |
| (except as directed by emergency operating procedures) upon receipt of this |
| low pressure alarm. |
| |
| WNP-2 is continuing to evaluate the significance of this postulated scenario |
| through engineering analysis. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36654 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/02/2000|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:50[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 02/02/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK SCHWIKER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 02/02/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |TONY DIMITRIADIS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| - LONG TERM ADS BACKUP NITROGEN SUPPLY HEADER MANUAL BLOCK VALVES FOUND |
| CLOSED - |
| |
| At 2105 on 02/02/00, a plant operator found one manual block valve to each |
| Long Term Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) backup nitrogen supply |
| header isolated. This would have prevented Unit 2's ability to establish |
| long term alternate decay heat removal capability in accordance with the |
| plant design basis. Tech Spec 3.5.1.d requires Unit 2 to be placed in hot |
| shutdown condition within 12 hours with these valves closed. |
| |
| At 2125 on 02/02/00, plant operators opened both ADS manual block valves |
| reestablishing long term backup nitrogen supply to the ADS valves and exited |
| Tech Spec 3.5.1.d. |
| |
| Normal ADS nitrogen supply header pressure was present with these valves in |
| the closed position. |
| |
| The licensee is investigating the cause of these valves being in the closed |
| position. |
| |
| At 2300 on 02/02/00, the licensee determined that this event was reportable |
| to the NRC. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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