Event Notification Report for January 24, 2000
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
01/21/2000 - 01/24/2000
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36610 36611 36612 36613 36614 36615 36616 36617
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36610 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: POINT BEACH REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:21[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:39[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JOHN SELL |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |DAVID HILLS R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 40 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 40% POWER DUE TO A DECREASING FOREBAY LEVEL |
| |
| "UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FROM 40% POWER AFTER AN ANTICIPATORY POWER |
| REDUCTION AT 0239CST DUE TO DECREASING LEVEL IN THE CIRC. WATER INLET |
| FOREBAY. DECREASING LEVEL WAS APPARENTLY DUE TO ICING OF THE INTAKE |
| STRUCTURE. UNIT 1 CIRC. WATER SYSTEM HAS BEEN SECURED AND FOREBAY LEVEL HAS |
| INCREASED. THE UNIT 1 CIRC. WATER SYSTEM WAS SECURED TO MAINTAIN |
| OPERABILITY OF THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. UNIT 2 REMAINS AT 100% POWER AND |
| IS STABLE." |
| |
| FOREBAY LEVEL HAD DECREASED TO -11 FT FROM THE NORMAL OPERATING -8 FT. THE |
| -11 FT CORRESPONDS TO THE MINIMUM DESIGN LIMIT FOR THE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM. |
| CURRENTLY, LEVEL IS -6 FT 4 INCHES. STEAM GENERATORS USING THE ATMOSPHERIC |
| DUMPS ARE PROVIDING THE HEAT SINK FOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SINCE THE CONDENSER |
| IS NOT IN SERVICE. ALL CONTROL RODS FULLY INSERTED FOLLOWING THE MANUAL |
| TRIP. |
| |
| THE LICENSEE WILL INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR. |
| |
| *** UPDATE ON 1/21/00 @ 1339 BY KRAUSE TO GOULD *** |
| |
| THE LICENSEE UPDATED THIS EVENT BY ALSO CLASSIFYING IT AS A RPS ACTUATION |
| DUE TO THE MANUAL REACTOR TRIP. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED. |
| |
| THE REG 3 RDO(HILLS) WAS NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36611 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/21/2000|
|LICENSEE: FEDERAL EXPRESS |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:17[EST]|
| CITY: SEATTLE REGION: 4 |EVENT DATE: 01/14/2000|
| COUNTY: STATE: WA |EVENT TIME: [PST]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: Y |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/21/2000|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |LINDA SMITH R4 |
| |WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TERRY FRAZEE (via e-mail) | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NAGR AGREEMENT STATE | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AGREEMENT STATE REPORT |
| |
| This is notification of an event in Washington state as investigated by the |
| WA Department of Health, Division of Radiation Protection. |
| |
| STATUS: new |
| |
| Reported By: Federal Express |
| City and state: Seattle, WA |
| License number: Not Applicable |
| Type of license: General license for Commercial Carrier |
| |
| Date of event: January 14, 2000 |
| Location of Event: Seattle-Tacoma International Airport |
| |
| ABSTRACT: During off-loading a plane early in the morning of January 14, |
| 2000, a two pound package containing 52 microcuries of I-125 labeled human |
| insulin fell off the ramp loader and came to rest un-noticed under the |
| extended ramp. The ramp was lowered after the unloading of the plane, |
| crushing the package. The crushed package was discovered later that day and |
| Federal Express procedures were followed. The package was noted to fall |
| apart as it was lowered into the barrel overpack. The state Division of |
| Radiation Protection was notified promptly via 206-NUCLEAR (the state's |
| radiation emergency line). Staff from the Division responded and determined |
| that neither the individual who had overpacked the package nor the ramp |
| loader were contaminated. The barrel overpack was opened long enough to |
| confirm the presence of removable contamination (approximately 2000 cpm per |
| 100 sq. cm. using low energy gamma scintillation probe). Direct survey |
| reading inside of the barrel showed 30,000 to 50,000 cpm. No contamination |
| was found on the outside of the barrel or the barrel's storage location. |
| |
| The package was a Type A container labeled Yellow II with a transport index |
| of 0.1 (UN2982, radioactive material, n.o.s.) shipped from Amersham |
| Pharmacia Biotech to a Seattle research lab licensed by the state. |
| |
| What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? Damaged package. |
| |
| Activity and isotope(s) involved: 52 microcuries of I-125. |
| |
| Overexposures? No individuals were exposed or contaminated as a result of |
| this event. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36612 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:17[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 01/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:48[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GLENN HUTTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |FELICIA HINSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 65 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM PER PROCEDURE FOLLOWING TRIP OF ALL RECIRCULATION |
| PUMPS |
| |
| During the performance of a surveillance, with a half scram signal inserted, |
| a spurious trip signal from the other system initiated a trip of all the |
| reactor coolant system recirculation pumps. The operators manually scrammed |
| the reactor per procedure, all rods fully inserted. Heat removal is via the |
| main condenser with main feedwater feeding the reactor. All systems |
| functioned as designed and the plant is proceeding to cold shutdown. A trip |
| review will be performed by the licensee. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36613 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OYSTER CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:26[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-2 |EVENT DATE: 01/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 12:00[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BROWNE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |FELICIA HINSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|APRE 50.72(b)(2)(vi) OFFSITE NOTIFICATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| THE LICENSEE NOTIFIED THE NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION |
| OF A FISH KILL. |
| |
| THERE WAS A FISH KILL IN THE DISCHARGE CANAL OF MORE THAN 100 FISH (SEVERAL |
| SPECIES) DUE TO COLD STRESS. THIS OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE REACTOR SCRAM WHEN |
| COOLER WATER WAS DISCHARGED TO THE CANAL DECREASING ITS TEMPERATURE. |
| |
| THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR WILL BE NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36614 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/21/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:05[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 19:45[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CAHILL R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INSUFFICIENT GUIDANCE FOR ENSURING THAT A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM WAS |
| OPERATING DURING A LOCA |
| |
| During the evaluation of a separate Condition Report concerning a Technical |
| Specification 3.0.3 entry involving the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) |
| Unit 1 Supplemental Leak Collection & Release System (SLCRS), it was |
| discovered that the operators did not have sufficient guidance for ensuring |
| that this safety related system was operating following an accident. |
| |
| BVPS Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications 3/4.7.8 Bases states "System |
| operation was assumed in that portion of the design basis accident LOCA |
| analysis which addressed ESF leakage following the LOCA Based on the |
| results of the analyses, the SLCRS must be OPERABLE to ensure that ESF |
| leakage following the postulated DBA LOCA will not exceed 10CFR 100 |
| limits." ESF leakage is a concern during a LOCA following a Safety |
| Injection Transfer to Recirculation. |
| |
| The BVPS Unit 1 and 2 operators did not have sufficient guidance to ensure |
| that a SLCRS fan is operating during a LOCA after Transfer to Recirculation |
| occurs. Thus, the SLCRS may not operate as assumed and credited in LOCA |
| safety analyses. SLCRS also provides cooling air flow to the emergency core |
| cooling pumps motors. The need for SLCRS for maintaining the qualification |
| of emergency core cooling pumps motors is proportional to the ambient |
| outdoor air temperatures. Current guidance does not ensure SLCRS would be |
| available in all conditions where SLCRS flow is required to maintain the |
| qualification of the emergency core cooling pump motors. |
| |
| This condition is an unanalyzed condition and is reportable pursuant to |
| 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii). |
| |
| Verbal guidance has been provided to the BVPS Unit 1 and 2 operating crews |
| to ensure a SLCRS fan is running in the event of a reactor trip or safety |
| injection. This guidance is currently being formalized. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36615 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: MILLSTONE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/21/2000|
| UNIT: [] [] [3] STATE: CT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 23:33[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 01/21/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:13[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JAMES V. GROGAN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/21/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CAHILL R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
| | |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ULTIMATE HEAT SINK (UHS) BELOW MINIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE LIMIT OF 33 |
| DEGREES F (CONCERN IS SERVICE WATER TEMPERATURE). |
| |
| Below is the Basis for Initial Reasonable Expectation of Continued |
| Operability performed by Engineering: |
| |
| CCI is Closed Cooling for Safety Injection, CCE is Closed Cooling for |
| Charging, SW is Service Water, and Hx is Heat Exchanger |
| |
| "The concerns with low UHS temperature are pipe stress calculations and |
| possible freezing of stagnant loops such as CCI and CCE. Other portions of |
| the SW system are not vulnerable to small changes in UHS temp due to |
| constant flows and large heat sinks. Additionally, the 33 degree F limit is |
| the design basis of the plant per the FSAR and therefore is reportable if |
| exceeded. |
| |
| "CCL and CCE freezing: |
| |
| "A review of the thermodynamic characteristics of the CCI and CCE heat |
| exchangers, assuming UHS of 31 degrees F, shows that the temperature |
| gradient of the process fluid, due to the high conductivity of the copper |
| nickel pipe and room temperatures, results in CCI and CCE bulk fluid |
| temperatures remaining above freezing for an extended period of time, |
| although the bulk temperature of the shell side of the CCI heat exchangers |
| is only 32.5 degrees F. To assure operability of the SI pumps, the CCI |
| system should be started at a SWP temperature of 33 degrees F decreasing to |
| move the water through the system. The historical UHS temperature dips |
| below 33 degrees F have been for a short duration of hours followed by |
| longer warming periods. Design calculations show that CCI/SIH operate |
| properly with the entire bulk temperature at 32 degrees F. This is |
| conservative as the majority of the CCI system will remain at ambient room |
| temperature in the standby mode. Once operating, there is additional heat |
| input from the SIH pump. Therefore, there is no limit to UHS temperature |
| which would render CCI/SIH inoperable even over several hours. |
| |
| "A similar argument applies for the CCE/CHS system. The temperature |
| gradient and bulk temperature characteristics are identical. Additionally, |
| the CCE system utilizes a temperature control valve to maintain proper |
| temperatures. The failed position of this valve (LOP) is to maximum flow |
| through the SW Hx and has a position limiter designed for proper Charging |
| lube oil temperature with a 33 degrees F UHS. The supporting calculation |
| demonstrates that a 41.9 degrees F CCE inlet temperature at the lube oil |
| cooler results in a 55 degrees F lube oil temperature (minimum required |
| temperature for charging pump operability). If a service water temperature |
| of 30 degrees F is used in the LMTD equation for the CCE HX, and the delta-T |
| on both the SW & CCE sides are assumed to remain unchanged, the calculated |
| CCE inlet temperature at the lube oil cooler is 42.2 degrees F, which is > |
| 41.9 degrees F needed for the 55 degrees F lube oil temperature. |
| |
| "To prevent potential freezing of the shell side fluid in the CCI heal |
| exchangers and assure the Operability of the Safety Injection pumps, the CCL |
| pumps should be started at a SWP temperature of 33 degrees F decreasing. |
| |
| "Piping Stress: |
| |
| "The Service Water System piping, supports and equipment have been analyzed |
| to meet Code stress limits at a minimum temperature of 33 degrees F as |
| described in OD MP3-213-96. Lower temperatures will have no affect on the |
| qualification status of the piping analysis since thermal expansion induced |
| pipe stress is secondary, and is not evaluated under GL 91-18 Operability |
| rules. |
| |
| "Increases in loads for pipe supports, equipment nozzles and equipment |
| anchorage for temperatures below 33 degrees F are judged to be negligible |
| and also have no affect on the operability of these components. ERC |
| MP3-DE-96-059 revision 1 transmitted Technical Report TR-89014-1, revision |
| 2, which evaluated low temperature piping at Millstone Unit 3. This report |
| concludes that systems where the maximum operating temperature does not |
| exceed 200 degrees F, and the temperature range does not exceed 200 degrees |
| F, satisfy ASME Code requirements for thermal expansion loads. The Service |
| Water maximum temperature range is well below 200 degrees F. |
| |
| "Therefore, Service Water temperatures below 33 degrees F (to the freezing |
| point of sea water 27.5 degrees F) will have no effect on the operability of |
| Service Water piping, supports, equipment nozzles, and equipment anchorage, |
| from a stress standpoint. No compensatory action are required. |
| |
| "An OD has been prepared to support continued operation of MP3 with a |
| Service Water temperature of 31 degrees F. This OD is stored on the MP3 |
| server at K:\DeptData\MacDeb\UHSOD. Scoping calculations to support this OD |
| have been completed and reviewed. This OD must be reviewed and PORC approved |
| as required by the SM, if SWP temperatures lower than 33 degrees F are |
| recorded." |
| |
| When the tide goes out the water temperature of the Ultimate Heat Sink |
| temperature decreases and when the tide comes back in the temperature of the |
| Ultimate Heat Sink increases. At the present time the tide is going out and |
| the water temperature is 32.7 degrees F. In a couple of hours the tide will |
| start coming back in and the water temperature of the Ultimate Heat sink |
| should increase to above 33 degrees F (37 to 38 degrees F). |
| |
| The licensee notified State and Local Counties of this event. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36616 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: RIVER BEND REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/22/2000|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:55[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-6 |EVENT DATE: 01/22/2000|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 03:20[CST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GEORGE D TURNER Jr. |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/22/2000|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |LINDA SMITH R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 31 Power Operation |31 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ESF ACTUATION OCCURRED WHEN REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) INBOARD |
| STEAM SUPPLY VALVE CLOSED DURING TESTING. |
| |
| During the performance of routine surveillance testing of RCIC |
| (STP-207-4538, "RCIC Isolation -RCIC Steam Supply Pressure Low Channel |
| Functional Test"), an isolation of the inboard steam supply valve |
| (E51-MOVF064) and the RCIC trip throttle valve (E51-C002) occurred. |
| |
| The Instrument and Controls Technician performing the test apparently |
| misread step 7.1.3 and "N/A'd" the next step (7.1.4). During the |
| performance of subsequent steps, the isolation occurred because the |
| isolation signal input from E31-N685A was not disabled. |
| |
| The isolation signal was reset, RCIC was restored to standby in accordance |
| with plant procedures. |
| |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems remained operable during the time period |
| RCIC was isolated. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 36617 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 01/22/2000|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EST]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 01/22/2000|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 13:00[EST]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 01/22/2000|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |DAVID HILLS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 |WAYNE HODGES NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: CHAUNCEY GOULD | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FOUR HOUR 91-01 BULLETIN - NO NCS CONTROLS IN PLACE FOR A FISSILE MATERIAL |
| OPERATION |
| |
| THE SHIFT SUPERINTENDENT'S OFFICE WAS NOTIFIED BY THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY |
| SAFETY STAFF THAT THEY HAD A FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATION FOR WHICH THERE WAS |
| NO NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY APPROVAL IN PLACE. THEY HAD A UF6 CYLINDER |
| STORAGE AREA IN THE X-344A THAT HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN MARKED AS A DOE |
| MATERIALS STORAGE AREA (DMSA). IN REVIEW OF THE DMSA, THEY DISCOVERED THAT |
| IT WAS NOT LISTED IN THE USEC/DOE LEASE AGREEMENT AS A DMSA. SINCE NO DMSA |
| WAS IDENTIFIED, USEC HAS THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AREA INCLUDING |
| RESPONSIBILITY FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY COVERAGE. THE AREA CONTAINED |
| MULTIPLE SMALL UF6 CYLINDERS GROUPED TOGETHER WHICH CONTAINED GREATER THAN |
| 15 GRAMS OF U-235 AT MORE THAN 1% ENRICHMENT. THEREFORE, THE STORAGE AREA |
| IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FISSILE MATERIAL OPERATION WITH NO NCSA IN PLACE TO |
| ANALYZE THE CONDITIONS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN NCS SAFETY. |
| |
| THIS AREA WAS THOUGHT TO BE REGULATED BY DOE, BUT IT WAS LATER DETERMINED TO |
| BE USEC'S RESPONSIBILITY AND USEC SHOULD HAVE HAD THE NCS INPLACE. |
| |
| THEY ARE NOT MOVING THE CYLINDERS, BUT THEY WILL BOUNDARY THE AREA OFF AND |
| DEVELOP THEIR NCS CONTROLS. |
| |
| THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR WAS NOTIFIED AND THE DOE REPRESENTATIVE WILL BE |
| NOTIFIED. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021