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Event Notification Report for December 9, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           12/08/1999 - 12/09/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35790  36392  36430  36495  

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|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35790       |
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| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/03/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 14:44[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/02/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        16:30[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/08/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |DAVID HILLS          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS WHITE                 |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|OCBA 76.120(c)(2)(i)     ACCID MT EQUIP FAILS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| THREE SPRINKLER SYSTEMS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO CORRODED HEADS (24-hour   |
| report)                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "On 06/02/99 at 1630 CDT, the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified  |
| that numerous sprinkler heads were corroded, affecting 16 sprinkler systems  |
| in C-337 and one system in C-333, such that the ability of the sprinklers to |
| flow sufficient water was called into question.  Subsequently, these         |
| sprinkler systems were declared inoperable, and TSR-required actions         |
| establishing roving fire patrols were initiated.  This deficiency was        |
| detected during scheduled system inspections conducted by Fire Protection    |
| personnel.  Currently, functionality of the sprinkler heads has not been     |
| fully evaluated by Fire Protection personnel, and the remaining cascade      |
| buildings are currently being inspected, and if necessary, this report will  |
| be updated to identify any additional areas.  It has been determined that    |
| this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which        |
| equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed."                     |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah        |
| personnel.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1022 EDT ON 06/04/99 FROM CAGE TO TROCINE * * *              |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-1 in C-337 and two sprinkler heads on       |
| system 27 in C-335 were identified to also be corroded.  These were          |
| identified to the PSS on 06/03/99 at 1600 CDT and 1601 CDT, respectively,    |
| and determined to require an update to this report by the PSS.  It has been  |
| determined that this event is reportable under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event |
| in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed."            |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Hills) and NMSS EO (Combs).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2152 EDT ON 06/17/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Three sprinkler heads on system C-15 and five sprinkler heads on system B-8 |
| in C-333 were identified to also be corroded.  The PSS was notified of this  |
| condition at 1300 CDT on 06/17/99 and determined that an update to this      |
| report was required.  It has been determined that this event is reportable   |
| under 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails  |
| to function as designed."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector of this update.  The   |
| NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera).                           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1440 EDT ON 06/18/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *  |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system C-15 and one sprinkler head on system B-8 in  |
| C-333 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of this       |
| condition at 1350 CDT on 06/18/99.  The area of the fire patrol for system   |
| C-15 was expanded to include the two heads identified as corroded.  The one  |
| head on system B-8 was in the area already being patrolled.  The PSS         |
| determined that an update to this report was required."                      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Madera).           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1315 EDT ON 06/25/1999 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on system D-8 and three sprinkler heads on system D-7   |
| in C-337 were identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the     |
| condition on system D-8 at 0125 CDT on 06/25/99 and at 1019 CDT on 06/25/99  |
| for system D-7.  Both systems were immediately declared inoperable and LCO   |
| fire patrol actions were implemented.  It was determined that an update to   |
| this report was required."                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan).           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2119 EDT ON 07/30/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Five sprinkler heads and one sprinkler piping tee on C-337 system D-7 were  |
| identified to have corrosion. The PSS was notified of these corroded system  |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0931 CDT on 07/30/99.  LCO       |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated.  The PSS          |
| determined that an update to this event report was required."                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Wright).           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1655 EDT ON 07/31/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 System D-1 were identified to have corrosion.  |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1155 CDT on 7/31/99.  LCO required fire patrols of the         |
| affected area were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this     |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Wright).           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1546 EDT ON 08/10/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "Two sprinkler heads on C-337 system C-15 were identified to have corrosion. |
| The PSS was notified of these corroded system parts and declared the system  |
| inoperable at 1130 CDT on 8/10/99.  LCO required fire patrols of the         |
| affected area were initiated.  The PSS determined that an update to this     |
| report was required."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Burgess).          |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1154 EDT ON 08/22/99 FROM WALKER TO POERTNER * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| Four adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-333 building System B-1 were          |
| identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of the corroded system   |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 0918 CDT on 08/22/99.  LCO       |
| required fire patrols were initiated.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified by Paducah personnel.  The NRC   |
| operations officer notified the R3DO (Clayton).                              |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2015 EDT ON 08/28/99 FROM W. F. GAGE TO S. SANDIN * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-11 were          |
| identified to have corrosion.  The PSS was notified of these corroded system |
| parts and declared the system inoperable at 1420 CDT on 08/28/99.   LCO      |
| required fire patrols of the affected area were initiated.                   |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2037 EDT ON 08/29/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-15 were          |
| identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at   |
| 0925 CDT on 08/29/99.  Also two adjacent heads on the C-337 building System  |
| D-10 were identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system       |
| inoperable at 1450 CDT.   LCO required fire patrols for both of the affected |
| areas were initiated in the time frame required by TSR.                      |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Leach) and NMSS EO (Piccone).                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0930 EDT ON 09/01/99  FROM ERIC WALKER TO FANGIE JONES * *   |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-14 were      |
| declared inoperable.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (David Hills) and NMSS EO (Robert Pierson).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1133 EDT ON 09/08/99  FROM TOM WHITE TO FANGIE JONES * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-331 building System 26 were        |
| declared inoperable at 2155 CDT on 09/07/99.  An LCO required fire patrol    |
| for the affected area was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.   |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations   |
| officer notified the R3DO (Monte Phillips) and NMSS EO (Josie Piccone).      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 0948 ON 09/30/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO DOUG WEAVER * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| Add two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-333 building System B-15 were      |
| identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at   |
| 0815 CDT on 9/30/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was  |
| initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.                             |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.   The NRC operations  |
| officer notified the R3DO (Vegel) and NMSS EO (Cool).                        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1600 ON 10/13/99 FROM WALKER TO GOULD * * *                  |
|                                                                              |
| Two adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-333 building System A-11 were          |
| identified to have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at   |
| 1307 CDT on 10/13/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was |
| initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.                             |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel informed the NRC resident inspector.   The NRC operations  |
| officer notified the R3DO (Madera) and NMSS EO (Moore).                      |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1520 ON 10/19/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| Six sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System D-16 were identified to     |
| have corrosion and the PSS declared the system inoperable at 1052 CDT on     |
| 10/19/99.  An LCO required fire patrol for the affected area was initiated   |
| in the time frame required by the TSR.                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jorgensen).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2140 ON 10/19/99 FROM WALKER TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| Seven sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System A-7 were identified to    |
| have corrosion, and another four had been painted over.  In addition, three  |
| adjacent sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System A-8 were identified to |
| have corrosion.  The PSS declared the systems inoperable at 1900 CDT on      |
| 10/19/99.  An LCO required fire patrols for the affected areas were          |
| initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.                             |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Wright).           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1713 ON 10/21/99 FROM CAGE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *           |
|                                                                              |
| Four sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System A-5, twelve sprinkler      |
| heads on the C-337 building System A-8, three sprinkler heads on the C-337   |
| building System A-9, and six sprinkler heads on the C-337 building System    |
| B-8 were identified to have corrosion.  On 10/21/99, the PSS declared        |
| Systems A-5 and A-9 inoperable at 1028 CDT, System A-8 inoperable at 1227    |
| CDT and System B-8 inoperable at 1406 CDT.   An LCO required fire patrol for |
| the affected areas was initiated in the time frame required by the TSR.      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen).  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2128 ON 10/22/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| At 1400 CDT on 10/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in the C-337 building on sprinkler systems   |
| B-1, B-3, B-5, B-6, B-7, B-11, and D-17.  Due to the number of systems       |
| called into question, the PSS declared all of the sprinkler systems in C-337 |
| on the cell floor (a total of 66 systems) inoperable and TSR required        |
| actions establishing roving fire patrols were initiated within the required  |
| time frame.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen).  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1239 ON 10/24/99 FROM TOM WHITE TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| At 1200 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads were discovered in the C-337 building on sprinkler systems   |
| B-13 and B-14 on the ground floor,  The PSS declared these systems           |
| inoperable and TSR required actions establishing roving fire patrols were    |
| initiated within the required time frame.  At 1600 CDT on 10/23/99, the PSS  |
| was notified that numerous corroded sprinkler heads were discovered in the   |
| C-337 building on sprinkler systems A-16, B-12, C-8, C-12, C-15, D-5, and    |
| D-8 on the cell floor,  These systems have already been declared inoperable  |
| and fire patrols are already being performed.                                |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Bruce Jorgensen).  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1117 ON 10/25/99 FROM W. F. CAGE TAKEN BY SANDIN * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| At 1940 CDT on 10/24/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water Systems C-4, |
| C-5, C-6 and C-8, located in the C-337 building.  These systems had          |
| previously been declared inoperable and fire patrols were already being      |
| performed at the time of discovery.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Lanksbury) and     |
| NMSS EO (Brain Smith).                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2235 ON 10/27/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| At 1517 CDT on 10/27/99, the PSS was notified that nine corroded sprinkler   |
| heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water System A-12 located in |
| the C-333 building.  This system has been declared inoperable and fire       |
| patrols have been initiated.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan) and NMSS   |
| EO (Hickey).                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2150 ON 10/30/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| At 1950 CDT on 10/30/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water Systems A-5, |
| A-9, A-11, C-5, and C-7 in the C-333 building.  Reference ATR-1 1999-6699    |
| and 6702.  These systems have been declared inoperable and fire patrols have |
| been initiated.  Also, due to the number of inoperable sprinkler heads, the  |
| remaining systems on the cell floor of C-333 were called into question and   |
| declared inoperable.  Fire patrols for the entire cell floor have been       |
| initialed.  The PSS determined that an update to this report was required.   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan) and NMSS   |
| EO (Hickey).                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2111 ON 10/31/99 FROM UNDERWOOD TAKEN BY WEAVER * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| At 1412 CDT on 10/31/99, the PSS was notified that five corroded sprinkler   |
| heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water System 9 in the C-335  |
| building.  There were two adjacent corroded heads discovered in two separate |
| locations and a third individual head at a different location.  The system   |
| was declared inoperable and fire patrols were initiated.  The corroded heads |
| have since been replaced and the system returned to operable status.         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this update by Paducah personnel. |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jordan) and NMSS EO (Hickey).  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2121 ON 11/01/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 0930 CST on 11/01/99, the PSS was notified that three corroded sprinkler  |
| heads had been discovered on the High Pressure Fire Water System B-4 in the  |
| C-337 building.  Two of these sprinkler heads are adjacent.  Two adjacent    |
| corroded sprinkler heads were also discovered on the High Pressure Fire      |
| Water System B-5 in the C-337 building.  These systems were declared         |
| inoperable and fire patrols were initiated.  Work has been initiated to      |
| replace the corroded heads.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jim Creed).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2143 ON 11/02/99 FROM KEVIN BEASLEY TAKEN BY JOLLIFFE * * *  |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| At 1400 CST on 11/02/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water Systems C-8  |
| and D-7 in the C-333 building.  These systems had been previously declared   |
| inoperable and fire patrols were being performed at the time of discovery.   |
| Work has been initiated to replace the corroded heads.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update by Paducah       |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jim Creed).        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2110 EST ON 11/04/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO S. SANDIN * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1700 [CST] on 11/04/99, the [PSS] was notified that numerous corroded    |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water systems      |
| A-16, C-17, D-12, and D-16 in the C-333 building.  These systems had been    |
| previously declared inoperable, and fire patrols were being performed at the |
| time of discovery.  Work his been initiated to replace the corroded heads.   |
| The PSS determined that an update to this report was required."              |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified of this event by Paducah |
| personnel.  The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Creed) and NMSS EO |
| (Hodges).                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2328 EST ON 11/23/99 FROM WHITE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| At 2240 CST on 11/22/99, the PSS was notified that numerous corroded         |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water System B-7   |
| and B-8 in the C-337 building.  These systems were declared inoperable, and  |
| fire patrols were initiated at the time of discovery.  The PSS determined    |
| that an update to this report was required.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified of this update by the certificate    |
| holder.  The R3DO (Ron Gardner) and NMSS EO (Joe Holonich) were notified by  |
| the NRC operations officer.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1017 ON 11/24/99 FROM ERIC WALKER TO LEIGH    |
| TROCINE ********************                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1045 [CST] on 11/23/99, the [PSS] was notified that more than five       |
| corroded sprinkler heads per system had been discovered on both High         |
| Pressure Fire Water systems B-3 and 8-4 in the C-337 building.  Per the      |
| Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), the discovery of five or more heads on  |
| one system renders the system inoperable.  These systems were declared       |
| inoperable, and actions were taken as required by the TSR.  The PSS          |
| determined that an update to this report was required."                      |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.  The R3DO (Gardner)   |
| and NMSS EO (Hickey) were notified by the NRC operations officer.            |
|                                                                              |
| ***************** UPDATE AT 2147 ON 12/08/99 FROM MIKE UNDERWOOD TO LEIGH    |
| TROCINE ****************                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from Paducah:        |
|                                                                              |
| "At 1000 [CST] on 12/08/99, the [PSS] was notified that five corroded        |
| sprinkler heads had been discovered on High Pressure Fire Water system B-1   |
| in the C-337 building.  Two heads are at column Y-X/4, two heads at column   |
| Wb-4, and one head at column Wa-4 on the ground floor.  Per the Authority    |
| Having Jurisdiction (AHJ), the discovery of five or more heads on the system |
| renders the system inoperable.  The system was declared inoperable, and      |
| actions were taken by the TSR.  The PSS determined that an update to this    |
| required."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "It has been determined that this event is reportable under                  |
| 10CFR76.120(c)(2) as an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to     |
| function as designed."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Paducah personnel notified the NRC resident inspector.  The R3DO (Hiland)    |
| and NMSS EO (Sherr) were notified by the NRC operations officer.             |
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!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
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|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36392       |
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| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/03/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [] [3]                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 15:09[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        11/03/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:30[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY TODD                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |AL BELISLE           R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - Low Pressure Injection System removed from Engineered Safeguards alignment |
| due to erroneous procedure -                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| At 0230 on 11/03/99, both trains of the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) System  |
| were removed from their normal Engineered Safeguards (ES) alignment due to   |
| an erroneous procedure.  Approximately 20 minutes later, the proper ES       |
| alignment was restored after the operators questioned the valve position     |
| specified by the procedure.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| Although this event was terminated at approximately 0250 on 11/03/99, the    |
| potential impact on system operability remained in question.  Engineering    |
| was notified and began evaluating operability.  This included discussions    |
| with Operations as to expected actions, alarm responses, etc.  It was        |
| concluded that operability could not be assured without a detailed analysis. |
| At 1330 on 11/03/99, Engineering and Operations concluded that there was no  |
| longer "reasonable expectation" of past operability.  Pending the results of |
| a full evaluation by Engineering, Duke Power decided that this was           |
| potentially a "Condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of  |
| the safety function...to...mitigate the consequences of an accident."        |
| Therefore, this event is considered reportable.                              |
|                                                                              |
| Impact on Postulated Accident:                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The valves that were opened were #3LP-92 and #3LP-93, the train 'A' and 'B'  |
| Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves.  As a result of the alignment, flow         |
| immediately after an accident could have been higher than expected.  This    |
| could affect the available NPSH to the LPI and Reactor Building Spray (RBS)  |
| System pumps.  Per the Emergency Operating Procedure, operators would have   |
| throttled the cooler outlet valves to establish the desired total flow.      |
|                                                                              |
| Later in the scenario, the Borated Water Storage Tank inventory would be     |
| depleted and operators would realign the LPI and RBS suctions to the Reactor |
| Building Emergency Sump.  Also, Low Pressure Service Water  would be aligned |
| to the decay heat coolers to cool the sump water.  With #3LP-92 and #3LP-93  |
| open, a large portion of the LPI System flow would bypass the coolers        |
| resulting in cooling flow at higher temperatures than expected.  Inadequate  |
| core cooling might result until the inappropriate alignment could be         |
| diagnosed and corrected.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| Cause:                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Operators were performing a periodic procedure "Tech Spec Flow Path          |
| Verification" which had recently been changed to include additional valves.  |
| They repositioned two of the newly added valves to "OPEN" as directed by the |
| procedure.  Subsequently, they questioned this action and verified from      |
| other procedures that the proper position for these valves is "CLOSED."  The |
| valves were reclosed within approximately 20 minutes.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The root cause for the inaccurate procedure change will be investigated.     |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective action:                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The proper positions of the valves were questioned, and the valves were      |
| returned to the original positions, thus ending the event.                   |
|                                                                              |
| Because the impact on operability of the affected systems was not            |
| immediately apparent, and it did not become apparent until well after the    |
| termination of the event, no Tech Spec Action Statements were entered.       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1551 ON 12/08/99 FROM RANDY TODD TO LEIGH     |
| TROCINE ********************                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is retracting this event notification:  The following text is a |
| portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:                           |
|                                                                              |
| "Reasoning for retraction:"                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "After further review, Duke Power Company feels that this event does not     |
| meet the reportability requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D)."            |
|                                                                              |
| "On November 3, 1999, Unit 3 was operating at 100% power (Mode 1).  At       |
| approximately 0230 hours, Reactor Operators (RO) on shift opened the Low     |
| Pressure Injection (LPI) Train 'A' and 'B' Decay Heat Cooler By-pass valves  |
| in compliance with a newly revised procedure checklist.  At approximately    |
| 0250 hours on November 3, 1999, the valves were closed, which terminated the |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The safety function of the LPI system is to provide Emergency Core Cooling  |
| immediately following a LOCA (injection phase) and to provide long term core |
| cooling after being placed in the Reactor Building Emergency Sump            |
| recirculation alignment (recirculation phase).  It was questioned if flow    |
| through the LPI coolers would provide adequate cooling in recirculation      |
| phase with the by-pass valves open.  At 1330 hours Operations and            |
| Engineering concluded that LPI system operability during the event could not |
| be assured.  At 1509 hours, the NRC was notified."                           |
|                                                                              |
| "After completion of an engineering analysis and additional review, it has   |
| been concluded that LPI system remained operable and that this event was NOT |
| reportable."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "NUREG 1022 allows credit for 'Reasonable operator actions to correct minor  |
| problems.'"                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Oconee concluded that 1) the problem was minor, and 2) the operator actions |
| are reasonable."                                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The problem is minor in that the short duration of the inappropriate        |
| alignment (approximately 20 minutes) minimized the significance of this      |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The problem is also minor in that the consequences are much less than       |
| initially thought."                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "It was initially assumed that this alignment made the LPI system            |
| recirculation mode of core cooling unavailable.  With recirculation mode     |
| cooling assumed to be unavailable, the estimated change in PRA risk would be |
| 2.9E-8, well below the precursor threshold of 1E-6. "                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequently, Engineering analysis showed that the LPI system remained      |
| operable and LPI system flow rates were not affected.  Adequate NPSH would   |
| be available to all ES/ECCS systems taking suction from the BWST."           |
|                                                                              |
| "Emergency Core Cooling during the injection phase was not affected by this  |
| event."                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Post-LOCA analysis assumes that LPI coolers are not inservice until LPSW is |
| aligned to the LPI coolers 30 minutes after the system realignment to the    |
| RBES.  Furthermore, the engineering analysis for this event has shown that   |
| the LPI coolers were not needed for long-term cooling.  The evaluation       |
| concluded that LPI recirculation flow though the core was adequate to keep   |
| the core covered and to transfer the decay heat from the fuel to the LPI     |
| water, which would then flow out of the reactor coolant system into the RB   |
| Emergency Sump.  Therefore, core cooling would be assured."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "This mode of cooling could continue for an extended period of time.  Since  |
| core cooling is adequate, the discovery and response times for this          |
| condition are not time critical."                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "It is reasonably expected that the Operators, the Shift Technical Advisor,  |
| and/or Emergency Response Organization personnel would recognize any higher  |
| than expected temperatures while monitoring plant parameters.  Since the     |
| operators were well aware that they had just operated these valves, it is    |
| reasonably expected that they would immediately diagnose the cause."         |
|                                                                              |
| "Upon recognition of the problem, the operators would close the bypass       |
| valves.  It is reasonably expected that this action would be successful      |
| because the valves are operated from the control room, are pneumatic, and    |
| fail closed on loss of instrument air.  Since closure of either valve        |
| restores flow through one of the LPI coolers, one train would be fully       |
| restored even with a single failure."                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "Other considerations were:"                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "Even if the operator action were to be delayed, the analysis showed that    |
| the heat load would be transferred from the sump to the containment          |
| atmosphere.  An analysis showed that two Reactor Building Cooling Units      |
| (RBCU) could remove the resulting heat load (allowing for single failure of  |
| one of the three RBCUs).  The RBCUs are actuated by the Engineered           |
| Safeguards system as part of  the Containment Cooling System."               |
|                                                                              |
| "The transition between the injection mode and recirculation mode is         |
| performed manually by the operators.  No automatic actions are involved.     |
| Therefore, the actions to restore flow through the LPI coolers are not being |
| taken in lieu of automatic actions."                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "This condition would not have had any significant impact on any actions     |
| required during an actual event that may be time critical."                  |
|                                                                              |
| "All surveillance requirements could be met while the unit was in this       |
| configuration."                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations center |
| notified the R2DO (McAlpine).                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36430       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  ARIZONA RADIATION REG AGENCY         |NOTIFICATION DATE: 11/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  COLORADO ENGINEERING & INSTRUMENTATIO|NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:22[EST]|
|    CITY:  PHOENIX                  REGION:  4  |EVENT DATE:        11/11/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  AZ |EVENT TIME:        09:00[MST]|
|LICENSE#:  AZ 7-457              AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/08/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |LINDA SMITH          R4      |
|                                                |CATHERINE HANEY      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  AUBREY GODWIN (by fax)       |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| STOLEN MOISTURE/DENSITY GAUGE.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| On 11/11/99, the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency was notified by         |
| Colorado Engineering & Instrumentation Company that a Campbell Pacific MC    |
| series nuclear moisture/density gauge (Serial number MC-90204820) containing |
| 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241 was stolen from a work |
| site at 34th Street and Gelding in Phoenix, AZ.  The gauge was in its        |
| shipping container.  The Phoenix Police Department (Report number            |
| 1999-91880807) is investigating the theft.  The licensee is offering a       |
| $500.00 reward for the return of the gauge.  A press announcement of the     |
| reward will be made on 11/12/99.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| The Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency is investigating the radiation       |
| safety issues.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The FBI (Phoenix), Mexico, and the States of California, Colorado, Nevada,   |
| Utah, and New Mexico are being notified of this incident.                    |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact information.)                   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE ON 12/08/99 AT 1255 ET FROM LEVINE TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| On December 7, 1999, the Licensee reported that on November 29, 1999, the    |
| licensee recovered the gauge.  The gauge was found back in the truck with    |
| some associated equipment.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The Agency continues to investigate the circumstances regarding this event.  |
|                                                                              |
| The FBI, Mexico, and the States of California, Colorado, Nevada, Utah, and   |
| New Mexico are being notified of this incident.                              |
|                                                                              |
| NRC Region 4 Duty Officer (David Graves) and NMSS EO (Brain Smith) were      |
| notified by the NRC operations officer.                                      |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36495       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WASHINGTON NUCLEAR (WNP-2REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 12/08/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  WA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:01[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-5                             |EVENT DATE:        12/08/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:30[PST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN ADAMI                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  12/08/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOSEPH TAPIA         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AINA 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(A) POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD  |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| INOPERABILITY OF HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY DUE TO A POTENTIALLY               |
| NON-CONSERVATIVE CALCULATED DUTY LOAD CYCLE LOAD PROFILE FOR THE BATTERY     |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a 4-hour Non-Emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72       |
| (b)(2)(iii)(A) due to the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system being       |
| declared inoperable at 1330 hours PST on December 8, 1999.  The plant        |
| remains in Mode 1 as allowed by plant technical specifications with the      |
| Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system operable."                      |
|                                                                              |
| "HPCS was declared inoperable due to the HPCS battery being declared         |
| technically inoperable.  The battery was conservatively declared inoperable  |
| because the calculated duty cycle load profile that is used for the          |
| acceptance criteria in the surveillance for SR 3.8.4.7 appeared to be        |
| non-conservative.  It is likely that a lower than actual breaker spring      |
| charging motor inrush current was used in the calculation.  Charging motor   |
| current is being confirmed by the vendor[, General Electric]."               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that the unit is in a 14-day limiting condition for      |
| operation as a result of this issue.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+