Event Notification Report for September 24, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
09/23/1999 - 09/24/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
36079 36082 36188 36189 36211 36215 36216 36217 36218 36219 36220 36221
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36079 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 08/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DAVE WALSH |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |KATHLEEN MODES R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS |
| OPERABLE) |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power |
| with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for |
| scheduled maintenance. During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps |
| in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge |
| check valves were closed. The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the |
| 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared |
| inoperable. Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service. |
| During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the |
| only one operable ESW pump. This constitutes a serious degradation of the |
| plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and, |
| therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS |
| notification." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * * |
| |
| "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made |
| 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)." |
| |
| "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at |
| least two Emergency Service |
| Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all |
| times. As such, the plant was not |
| in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii) |
| is hereby retracted." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO(Rogge). |
| |
| * * *UPDATE 0316EDT ON 09/23/99 FROM MIKE PEAL TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * * |
| |
| The licensee is Retracting the Retraction they called in on 09/03/99 at |
| 1453EDT. |
| |
| "On 09/22/99 at 2230, an Engineering evaluation concluded that the |
| operability determination associated with the above stated event was not |
| adequate, specifically relating to the potential for pump interaction to |
| create low flow conditions. " |
| |
| "The Engineering evaluation was being performed in response to an anomaly |
| identified on 09/20/99 during the run of 'D' Diesel Generator. During the |
| preparation of the operability statement for the 09/20/99 anomaly, |
| engineering personnel realized that incorrect assumptions were used in the |
| previous operability statement. The 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps were declared |
| inoperable at 2230 on 09/22/99. Evaluation continues to determine if other |
| combinations of equipment out of service times result in additional |
| reportable conditions." R1DO (Bob Summers) notified. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the Retraction to the |
| Retraction of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other |Event Number: 36082 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG: INOVISION |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
|LICENSEE: AMPHENOL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT]|
| CITY: CLEVELAND REGION: 3 |EVENT DATE: 08/27/1999|
| COUNTY: STATE: OH |EVENT TIME: [EDT]|
|LICENSE#: AGREEMENT: N |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| DOCKET: |+----------------------------+
| |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
| |MELVYN LEACH R3 |
| |KATHLEEN MODES R1 |
+------------------------------------------------+SCOTT SPARKS R2 |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JANICE BROWNLEE/FAX |CHARLES CAIN R4 |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE RETENTION CAPABILITY FOR BNC |
| CONNECTORS |
| |
| "In accordance with the requirements for basic components regulated by the |
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as specified in 10 CFR 21.21, I am providing |
| this notification. In June 1999, the reliability engineer with the 'systems |
| group' department of our company sent me a memo that suggested we might have |
| accepted an unacceptable part for the 30-4 connector, which is a regulated |
| component. He had connected an AMP BNC connector to a cable to determine |
| its equivalency to the other qualified part from Amphenol p/n 31-2. He |
| found that when the wires were combed out as directed on the instructions |
| that came with the AMP connector, it did not appear to perform correctly |
| with respect to cable retention, and [he] asked if someone in QA could |
| verify his preliminary testing. |
| |
| "Subsequently, our Quality Manager examined the connector and obtained |
| instructions from the manufacturer that said the wires should be left |
| braided, not combed out, and that if you left it braided, a stronger grip |
| was achieved. The reliability engineer tried the braided connection and did |
| find that the retention was improved. However, in investigating the matter |
| further with the manufacturer, it was found that the manufacturer did have |
| conflicting instructions but said the drawing specifying a braided |
| connection should be considered the official one since it was a controlled |
| document. It was also found that the part from AMP was not the originally |
| qualified part number - 221552-1. AMP had obsoleted that part in 1992 and |
| substituted the 221265-0 in its place. The new part, however, did not carry |
| a military specification for shock (MIL-Std. 202) and was not military type |
| UG-88 like the previous one - conditions which provided assurance that it |
| met certain criteria needed for Seismic Class 1 rating. This information |
| was presented at the company's Quality Review Meeting on August 12, 1999. A |
| technical evaluation was conducted and reported in an abstract for the 30-4 |
| BNC Connector by the reliability engineer on August 26, 1999. |
| |
| "The connectors for part 30-4 that were in stock were inspected, and it was |
| found that all of them were this incorrect AMP part number. The connectors |
| were subsequently put on hold by the Quality Manager, and correct connectors |
| have been ordered from Amphenol. |
| |
| "One hundred pieces of the incorrect part (AMP 1-221265) were received at |
| Victoreen (now a part of Inovision) in January 1997. A search has been |
| conducted to identify those parts, assemblies, and kits which list part 30-4 |
| as part of their bill of material. From those, a review will be done to |
| identify those that have been produced since the receipt of the incorrect |
| part and, therefore, have the potential for being incorrect. The customers |
| who have received the identified products will be sent a notification within |
| 30 days. If acceptable replacement parts can be obtained with that time |
| frame, they will be sent with the notification. |
| |
| "A notification was sent to the Plant Manager/Senior Executive and to the |
| Chief Operating Officer of Inovision on August 26, 1999. The Plant Manager |
| has authorized me to submit this report by facsimile to the NRC Operations |
| Center. A written report containing the information specified at 10 CFR |
| 21.21(d)(4) will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days." |
| |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact telephone numbers.) |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1609 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY DAVE SMITH TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| Inovision corrective actions are completed, the unacceptable parts were |
| removed from stock and scrapped. An investigation on part usage since |
| January, 1997 (the date that the unacceptable part was received into stock) |
| indicated that four (4) unacceptable parts may have been sent to Rochester |
| Gas and Electric. The utility has been notified by phone and certified |
| mail. |
| |
| R1DO (Robert Summers), R3DO (Roger Lanksbury), and NRR (Vern Hodges) have |
| been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36188 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/17/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:38[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SANTINI |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N N 0 Hot Shutdown |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GREATER THAN 10% OF THE EMERGENCY SIRENS ARE INOPERABLE DUE TO TROPICAL |
| STORM FLOYD. (See similar Indian Point Unit 3 event: #36189.) |
| |
| The licensee was notified at 1050 EDT that 14 out of 77 emergency sirens in |
| Westchester County were inoperable, 10 out of 10 emergency sirens in Putnam |
| county are inoperable, 14 out of 16 emergency sirens in Orange county are |
| inoperable, and it is expected that a significant number of emergency |
| sirens in Rockland county are inoperable. Counties have initiated route |
| alerting procedures. The licensee is currently in the process of trying to |
| restore the inoperable sirens. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1558 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY JOHN LAMB TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| "This notification is a status update to the notification provided on |
| September 17, 1999, (Log No. 36188) which reported that a recent storm |
| (Hurricane Floyd) caused a loss of electric and telephone lines that |
| resulted in greater than 10% of the emergency sirens (60 of 154) not being |
| operational. The emergency siren notification system remains degraded in |
| one of the four counties covered by the emergency plan. Orange County |
| continues to have greater than 10% of its emergency sirens not operational |
| due to power outages. Three (3) in Harriman State Park of sixteen (16) |
| emergency sirens total in Orange County are inoperable. There are two (2) |
| inoperable sirens in Rockland County and two (2) inoperable sirens in |
| Westchester County. All sirens in Putnam County are operational. The |
| emergency plan will continue to use route alerting and public radio |
| announcements to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens. |
| Restoration of the sirens will be coordinated with the restoration plans of |
| the electric and telephone companies." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Robert Summers) |
| was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36189 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/17/1999|
| UNIT: [] [3] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BRIAN ROKES |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |NIEL DELLA GRECA R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v) EMERGENCY SIREN INOP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|3 N N 0 Cold Shutdown |0 Cold Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GREATER THAN 10% OF THEIR EMERGENCY SIRENS HAVE BECOME INOPERABLE DUE TO |
| TROPICAL STORM FLOYD. (See similar Indian Point Unit 2 event: # 36188.) |
| |
| At 1050 EDT, it was determined that the emergency siren notification system |
| was degraded in each of the four counties (Orange County, Putnam County, |
| Rockland County, and Westchester County). A recent storm caused electric |
| power line outages and telephone line outages in all four counties. The |
| loss of electric and telephone lines resulted in greater than 10% of the |
| sirens not being operational in each county. It is estimated that |
| approximately 60 of the 154 sirens are not operational. The emergency plan |
| would utilize route alerting and public radio announcements to notify the |
| public in lieu of the non-operating sirens. Restoration of the sirens will |
| be coordinated with the restoration plans of the electric companies and |
| telephone companies. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1609 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY BRIAN ROKES TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| "This notification is a status update to the notification provided on |
| September 17, 1999, (Log No. 36189) which reported that a recent storm |
| (Hurricane Floyd) caused a loss of electric and telephone lines that |
| resulted in greater than 10% of the emergency sirens (60 of 154) not being |
| operational. The emergency siren notification system remains degraded in |
| one of the four counties covered by the emergency plan. Orange County |
| continues to have greater than 10% of its emergency sirens not operational |
| due to power outages. Three (3) in Harriman State Park of sixteen (16) |
| emergency sirens total in Orange County are inoperable. There are two (2) |
| inoperable sirens in Rockland County and two (2) inoperable sirens in |
| Westchester County. All sirens in Putnam County are operational. The |
| emergency plan will continue to use route alerting and public radio |
| announcements to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens. |
| Restoration of the sirens will be coordinated with the restoration plans of |
| the electric and telephone companies." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Robert Summers) |
| was notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36211 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:40[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: THOMAS O'MEARA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JIM LYONS NRR |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION |JOSEPH GIITTER IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER |
| |
| Planned maintenance was being performed on the feeder breaker to non-vital |
| Motor Control Center # 116. While the feeder breaker was being worked on, |
| Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 were tied together through one tie |
| breaker. The amps limits for the tie breaker were misinterpreted in the |
| procedure and the feeder breaker that was supplying Motor Control Centers # |
| 116 and # 106 tripped on overcurrent (The operators that performed the |
| evolution verified that each Motor Control Center was less than 500 amps but |
| the total for both Motor Control Centers was greater than 500 amps). The |
| normal feeder tripped open on the feed that was supplying both Motor Control |
| Centers. The loss of power to the Motor Control Centers caused a loss of |
| control oil to both Main Feedwater Pumps and a loss of oil to the Main |
| Condenser air removal pumps. The loss of both Main Feedwater pumps caused a |
| loss of feedwater to the both Steam Generators. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary |
| Feedwater Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started. The |
| licensee manually tripped the reactor before the reactor would have |
| automatically tripped on low Steam Generator Water Level. All rods fully |
| inserted into the core. The loss of the oil pumps to the Main Condenser air |
| removal pumps caused a loss of condenser vacuum. The Main Steam Isolation |
| Valves were closed due to the loss of condenser vacuum. At the present |
| time, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Steam Generator |
| Atmospheric valves are maintaining the plant in Hot Standby. The licensee |
| said that they have a very small Steam Generator tube leak on Unit 1, but |
| there is no detectable release. |
| |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are |
| fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee |
| notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Calvert County of the reactor trip. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2026 EDT 0N 9/23/99 BY MONTY SECKENS TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| "Unit 1 is at normal operating temperature and pressure and being maintained |
| in hot stand-by. Preliminary results are that the normal feeder breaker to |
| non-vital Motor Control Center (MCC) 106 tripped. MCC 116 was tied to MCC |
| 106 for maintenance on MCC 116's feeder breaker. The direct cause of the |
| feeder breaker tripping was the actual current through the breaker was |
| approximately 690 amps. This value is sufficient to cause the amp detector |
| long-time delay to start timing the circuit breaker function as designed. |
| The reason the actual current was above the procedure limit of 500 amps was |
| that the readings were taken incorrectly and only half the current was |
| measured. There are two conductors per phase feeding MCC's 116 and 106. A |
| technician used a clamp-on amp meter for the procedure but only measured one |
| of the two conductors. The design curve specifies that the breaker should |
| trip at 18 minutes at 690 amps and this is precisely what occurred. |
| |
| "Vacuum has been reestablished and the plant is back on main feedwater, |
| therefore, aux feedwater is now in stand-by. At the present main feedwater |
| and turbine by-pass valves steaming to the condenser are maintaining the |
| plant in hot stand-by. Preparations for reactor start-up are in progress." |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Robert |
| Summers) has been informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36215 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5 |EVENT DATE: 09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 23:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: McLAUGHLIN |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 90 Power Operation |90 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPPED ON OVER SPEED DURING MONTHLY |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING. |
| |
| While performing monthly surveillance start of the High Pressure Core Spray |
| system Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on |
| an overspeed signal. The diesel does not appear to have been damaged but |
| remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure. |
| The High Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal |
| power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and |
| corrective actions will be performed. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling |
| pump and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are also fully operable. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36216 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE: 09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:36[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RANDY TODD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii) DEGRAD COND DURING OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE IDENTIFIED AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE BY THE EMERGENCY OPERATING |
| PROCEDURE |
| |
| "Oconee is currently conducting a special project to review and validate the |
| Oconee Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP). Part of this project includes an |
| assessment of procedural guidance to address design basis single failure |
| scenarios. This assessment has accordingly identified that the way the EOP |
| is written may |
| not be adequate to effectively mitigate certain single failure scenarios |
| associated with the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and High Pressure Injection |
| (HPI) systems. |
| |
| "The specific issue found to date is a Small Break LOCA with a failure of |
| one of the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) isolation valves to close. If |
| Reactor Building pressure is less than approximately 12 PSIG, during the |
| time that the Emergency Sump suction valves are opened, calculations predict |
| that the BWST will continue to drain until voids are drawn into the LPI and |
| HPI Pumps. Either air voids or significantly decreased available NPSH could |
| adversely affect pump performance. Although the EOP provides compensatory |
| guidance to locally close a manual valve, the engineering evaluation |
| concluded that the guidance did not assure that action could be completed |
| within the required time frame. |
| |
| "Because the LPI and HPI systems are required to perform their intended |
| safety function with a single failure, Oconee concluded at 1536 hours today |
| that this EOP adequacy issue placed Oconee in a condition outside its design |
| basis and is therefore reportable. |
| |
| "This is a procedural adequacy issue that does not affect current |
| operability. No event has occurred, no equipment has been declared |
| inoperable, and no Tech Spec action statements have been entered due to this |
| issue. Interim guidance will be provided to the Operators for this |
| deficiency. Additionally, prompt corrective actions are underway to |
| implement formal procedural changes. |
| |
| "The review is continuing. An LER will be submitted to address the details |
| of the current issue and any similar reportable deficiencies associated with |
| this review found prior to the LER submittal." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36217 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [2] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:47[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: SENJEEV ARAB |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |ROGER LANKSBURY R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2 N Y 97 Power Operation |91 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VALVE FAILED THE LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING |
| |
| "On 09/22/99 at 1345 a primary containment valve T4803F601, [Drywell] DW |
| Inlet Isolation Valve, failed the Local Leakage Rate Testing (LLRT) , |
| measured leakage rate exceeded the limit of 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa. |
| Immediate action was to enter Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.8, Drywell |
| and Suppression Chamber Purge System, action 'b', and declare T4803F601 |
| valve inoperable and effected penetration was isolated by closing and |
| deactivating the valves T4800F407, DW Air Inlet Isolation valve and |
| T4800F408, DW Nitrogen Inlet Isolation valve in accordance with TS 3.6.3 |
| action 'a' which was completed at 1447 on 09/22/99. |
| |
| "T4803F601 is a supply purge valve with resilient seal (24 inch), TS 3.6.1.8 |
| action 'b' gives 24 hrs to restore the |
| valve to operable status or be in hot shutdown in next 12 hrs and cold |
| shutdown in next 24 hrs. The reason for valve T4803F601 failing LLRT is |
| likely due to seal failure. |
| |
| "Plant shutdown commenced at 1600 on 09/23/99 in order to meet TS 3.6.1.8 |
| action 'b'." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1825 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY SENJEEV ARAB TO FANGIE JONES * * * |
| |
| The licensee has received approval of Notice of Enforcement Discretion from |
| NRC/NRR and the shutdown has been terminated. Power will be restored to |
| 97%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R3DO (Roger |
| Lanksbury) has been notified. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36218 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUMMER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:08[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 08/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL ZACCONE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |VERN HODGE (FAX) NRR |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - ABB K-LINE BREAKER DEFECT AFTER REPAIR |
| |
| "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR21.21 to identify a Substantial |
| Safety Hazard with an ABB K-line Breaker. |
| |
| "On August 6,1999, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) determined that |
| a Substantial Safety Hazard could exist with ABB K-line breakers failing to |
| trip, Improper routing/support of the shunt trip wires during refurbishment |
| caused interference with the red, trip shaft paddle on the left side of the |
| breaker. This condition was found on a breaker installed in safety-related |
| switchgear at VCSNS. This breaker condition-was compared to several other |
| ABB K-line breakers at the plant site. The other breakers were found to have |
| the wires routed in a different direction, precluding interference with the |
| red, trip shaft paddle. |
| |
| "VCSNS utilizes these breakers in many applications, including the 480 VAC, |
| safety related electrical buses. The shunt trip wiring problem is considered |
| a defect in repair. This condition represents a potential for a |
| common mode failure for safety-related K-line breakers. |
| |
| "The vendor has been notified of the shunt trip wiring problem and has |
| agreed to modify the procedure for the refurbishment of these breakers. |
| VCSNS Engineering has determined that vendor procedure changes |
| should prevent recurrence of this problem." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36219 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [3] STATE: AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:50[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: RAY SWAFFORD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |THOMAS DECKER R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|3 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY REPORT |
| |
| Discovery of compromise of safeguards information, compensatory measures not |
| fully implemented. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| Refer to the HOO Log for additional details. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36220 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:15[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 20:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: PHIL CHASE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/23/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: UNU |ROBERT SUMMERS R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JOHN HANNON NRR |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I) EMERGENCY DECLARED |CHARLES MILLER IRO |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION |DAN RISHE FEMA |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED AN UNUSUAL EVENT - TOXIC GAS DETECTED IN UNIT 2 TURBINE |
| ENCLOSURE |
| |
| An Unusual Event was declared due to readings of 65 ppm hydrogen sulfide |
| (HS) and 115 ppm carbon monoxide (CO) in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure. |
| |
| The oncoming shift reported the smell of rotten eggs when they arrived on |
| site. Inspection around the site determined the only place toxic gas was |
| detectable was in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure. There were no detectable |
| levels of any toxic gas existing anywhere else around the plant. |
| Inspections are on going around the plant. The Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure has |
| been evacuated after an inspection for a source of the gasses. |
| |
| The licensee isolated the control room by manually initiating chlorine |
| isolation as a precaution at 1922 EDT, this is an Engineered Safety Feature |
| activation and reportable as a 4-hour notification. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state/local |
| government agencies. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2321 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY TOM DOUGHERTY TO JOHN MacKINNON * * |
| * |
| |
| The site de-escalated from the Unusual Event at 2312 EDT. The toxic gas |
| levels were verified to be nominal 0% in all areas inside and outside the |
| power block. The source of the toxic gas is still unknown and under |
| investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the |
| state/local government agencies. The R1DO (Robert Summers), NRR EO (John |
| Hannon), IRO Manager (Charles Miller), and FEMA (Cegielski) have been |
| informed. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 36221 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/24/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:13[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:52[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: STEVE WILSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 09/24/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOSEPH TAPIA R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Hot Standby |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A TRANSFER IN OFFSITE POWER SOURCES CAUSED THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY |
| FEEDWATER PUMP TO AUTOMATICALLY START AND DISCHARGE WATER INTO THE STEAM |
| GENERATORS. |
| |
| During restoration of relaying in the 500 kV switchyard an actuation caused |
| the opening of the PCB breakers (Main Generator Breakers) supplying Unit 1 |
| from Auxiliary Power System). Unit 1 power automatically transferred to the |
| Start-Up power supply. The momentary loss of power during the transfer |
| caused the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to start from an ESF |
| actuation signal (12 kV Buses) and discharge into the Main Steam Generators. |
| |
| |
| Reactor Coolant Temperature decreased approximately 7 degrees F due to the |
| operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Tave no load is |
| 547 degrees F). The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump operated for |
| approximately 18 minutes before it was secured. A Reactor Operator |
| immediately closed the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater discharge valve(s) |
| to secure auxiliary feedwater to the Steam Generators, so there was very |
| little discharge of auxiliary feedwater into the Steam Generators. Reactor |
| Coolant System cooldown was mainly due to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary |
| Feedwater Turbine using the steam from the Steam Generators for its motive |
| force. |
| |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Wednesday, March 24, 2021