United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated With Events > Event Notification Reports > 1999

Event Notification Report for September 24, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           09/23/1999 - 09/24/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36079  36082  36188  36189  36211  36215  36216  36217  36218  36219  36220  36221 


+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36079       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUSQUEHANNA              REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 06:48[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        08/27/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        06:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DAVE WALSH                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |KATHLEEN MODES       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADATION (ONLY ONE OF FOUR PUMPS           |
| OPERABLE)                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 08/26/99, Susquehanna Unit 1 and Unit 2 were operating at 100% power     |
| with the 'B' loop of emergency service water [(ESW)] out of service for      |
| scheduled maintenance.  During testing on the ESW system, with all ESW pumps |
| in service, it was identified that the 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps' discharge      |
| check valves were closed.  The ESW flow surveillance was performed, and the  |
| 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps failed to achieve the required flow and were declared  |
| inoperable.  Concurrently, the 'B' loop of ESW was returned to service.      |
| During the time the 'B' ESW loop was inoperable, the 'A' ESW pump was the    |
| only one operable ESW pump.  This constitutes a serious degradation of the   |
| plant in that it is a condition which is outside of design basis and,        |
| therefore, reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii) requiring a 1-hour ENS    |
| notification."                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE 1453EDT ON 9/3/99 FROM GRANT FERNSLER TO S. SANDIN * * *        |
|                                                                              |
| "This Notification is a retraction of a previous ENS Notification made       |
| 8/27/99 (Event # 36079)."                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequent evaluation by Engineering has concluded that the plant had at    |
| least two Emergency Service                                                  |
| Water pumps capable of performing their specified safety function at all     |
| times.  As such, the plant was not                                           |
| in a condition outside of its design basis and the report previously made    |
| pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(1)(ii)                                             |
| is hereby retracted."                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.  Notified R1DO(Rogge).     |
|                                                                              |
| * * *UPDATE 0316EDT ON 09/23/99 FROM MIKE PEAL TAKEN BY MACKINNON* * *       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is Retracting the Retraction they called in on 09/03/99 at      |
| 1453EDT.                                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "On 09/22/99 at 2230, an Engineering evaluation concluded that the           |
| operability determination associated with the above stated event was not     |
| adequate, specifically relating to the potential for pump interaction to     |
| create low flow conditions. "                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The Engineering evaluation was being performed in response to an anomaly    |
| identified on 09/20/99 during the run of 'D' Diesel Generator.  During the   |
| preparation of the operability statement for the 09/20/99 anomaly,           |
| engineering personnel realized that incorrect assumptions were used in the   |
| previous operability statement.  The 'C' and 'D' ESW pumps were declared     |
| inoperable at 2230 on 09/22/99.  Evaluation continues to determine if other  |
| combinations of equipment out of service times result in additional          |
| reportable conditions."  R1DO (Bob Summers) notified.                        |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the Retraction to the         |
| Retraction of this event by the licensee.                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|General Information or Other                     |Event Number:   36082       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  INOVISION                            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/27/1999|
|LICENSEE:  AMPHENOL                             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:58[EDT]|
|    CITY:  CLEVELAND                REGION:  3  |EVENT DATE:        08/27/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  OH |EVENT TIME:             [EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |MELVYN LEACH         R3      |
|                                                |KATHLEEN MODES       R1      |
+------------------------------------------------+SCOTT SPARKS         R2      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JANICE BROWNLEE/FAX          |CHARLES CAIN         R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |VERN HODGE (FAX)     NRR     |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 NOTIFICATION INVOLVING UNACCEPTABLE RETENTION CAPABILITY FOR BNC     |
| CONNECTORS                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "In accordance with the requirements for basic components regulated by the   |
| Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as specified in 10 CFR 21.21, I am providing  |
| this notification.  In June 1999, the reliability engineer with the 'systems |
| group' department of our company sent me a memo that suggested we might have |
| accepted an unacceptable part for the 30-4 connector, which is a regulated   |
| component.  He had connected an AMP BNC connector to a cable to determine    |
| its equivalency to the other qualified part from Amphenol p/n 31-2.  He      |
| found that when the wires were combed out as directed on the instructions    |
| that came with the AMP connector, it did not appear to perform correctly     |
| with respect to cable retention, and [he] asked if someone in QA could       |
| verify his preliminary testing.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Subsequently, our Quality Manager examined the connector and obtained       |
| instructions from the manufacturer that said the wires should be left        |
| braided, not combed out, and that if you left it braided, a stronger grip    |
| was achieved.  The reliability engineer tried the braided connection and did |
| find that the retention was improved.  However, in investigating the matter  |
| further with the manufacturer, it was found that the manufacturer did have   |
| conflicting instructions but said the drawing specifying a braided           |
| connection should be considered the official one since it was a controlled   |
| document.  It was also found that the part from AMP was not the originally   |
| qualified part number - 221552-1.  AMP had obsoleted that part in 1992 and   |
| substituted the 221265-0 in its place.  The new part, however, did not carry |
| a military specification for shock (MIL-Std. 202) and was not military type  |
| UG-88 like the previous one - conditions which provided assurance that it    |
| met certain criteria needed for Seismic Class 1 rating.  This information    |
| was presented at the company's Quality Review Meeting on August 12, 1999.  A |
| technical evaluation was conducted and reported in an abstract for the 30-4  |
| BNC Connector by the reliability engineer on August 26, 1999.                |
|                                                                              |
| "The connectors for part 30-4 that were in stock were inspected, and it was  |
| found that all of them were this incorrect AMP part number.  The connectors  |
| were subsequently put on hold by the Quality Manager, and correct connectors |
| have been ordered from Amphenol.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "One hundred pieces of the incorrect part (AMP 1-221265) were received at    |
| Victoreen (now a part of Inovision) in January 1997.  A search has been      |
| conducted to identify those parts, assemblies, and kits which list part 30-4 |
| as part of their bill of material.  From those, a review will be done to     |
| identify those that have been produced since the receipt of the incorrect    |
| part and, therefore, have the potential for being incorrect.  The customers  |
| who have received the identified products will be sent a notification within |
| 30 days.  If acceptable replacement parts can be obtained with that time     |
| frame, they will be sent with the notification.                              |
|                                                                              |
| "A notification was sent to the Plant Manager/Senior Executive and to the    |
| Chief Operating Officer of Inovision on August 26, 1999.  The Plant Manager  |
| has authorized me to submit this report by facsimile to the NRC Operations   |
| Center.  A written report containing the information specified at 10 CFR     |
| 21.21(d)(4) will be submitted to the NRC within 30 days."                    |
|                                                                              |
| (Call the NRC operations officer for contact telephone numbers.)             |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1609 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY DAVE SMITH TO FANGIE JONES * * *      |
|                                                                              |
| Inovision corrective actions are completed, the unacceptable parts were      |
| removed from stock and scrapped.  An investigation on part usage since       |
| January, 1997 (the date that the unacceptable part was received into stock)  |
| indicated that four (4) unacceptable parts may have been sent to Rochester   |
| Gas and Electric.  The utility has been notified by phone and certified      |
| mail.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| R1DO (Robert Summers), R3DO (Roger Lanksbury), and NRR (Vern Hodges) have    |
| been notified.                                                               |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36188       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SANTINI                      |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          N       0        Hot Shutdown     |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GREATER THAN 10% OF THE EMERGENCY SIRENS ARE INOPERABLE DUE TO TROPICAL      |
| STORM  FLOYD.  (See similar Indian Point Unit 3 event:  #36189.)             |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee was notified at 1050 EDT that 14 out of 77 emergency sirens in  |
| Westchester County were inoperable, 10 out of 10 emergency sirens in Putnam  |
| county are inoperable, 14 out of 16 emergency sirens in Orange county are    |
| inoperable,  and it is expected that a significant number of emergency       |
| sirens in Rockland county are inoperable.  Counties have initiated route     |
| alerting procedures.  The licensee is currently in the process of trying to  |
| restore the inoperable sirens.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1558 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY JOHN LAMB TO FANGIE JONES * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "This notification is a status update to the notification provided on        |
| September 17, 1999, (Log No. 36188) which reported that a recent storm       |
| (Hurricane Floyd) caused a loss of electric and telephone lines that         |
| resulted in greater than 10% of the emergency sirens (60 of 154) not being   |
| operational.  The emergency siren notification system remains degraded in    |
| one of the four counties covered by the emergency plan.  Orange County       |
| continues to have greater than 10% of its emergency sirens not operational   |
| due to power outages.  Three (3) in Harriman State Park of sixteen (16)      |
| emergency sirens total in Orange County are inoperable.  There are two (2)   |
| inoperable sirens in Rockland County and two (2) inoperable sirens in        |
| Westchester County.  All sirens in Putnam County are operational.  The       |
| emergency plan will continue to use route alerting and public radio          |
| announcements to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens.    |
| Restoration of the sirens will be coordinated with the restoration plans of  |
| the electric and telephone companies."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R1DO (Robert Summers) |
| was notified.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36189       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/17/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/17/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:50[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BRIAN ROKES                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |NIEL DELLA GRECA     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESS 50.72(b)(1)(v)      EMERGENCY SIREN INOP   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          N       0        Cold Shutdown    |0        Cold Shutdown    |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GREATER THAN 10% OF THEIR EMERGENCY SIRENS HAVE BECOME INOPERABLE DUE TO     |
| TROPICAL STORM FLOYD.  (See similar Indian Point Unit 2 event: # 36188.)     |
|                                                                              |
| At 1050 EDT, it was determined that the emergency siren notification system  |
| was degraded in each of the four counties (Orange County, Putnam County,     |
| Rockland County, and Westchester County).  A recent storm caused electric    |
| power line outages and telephone line outages in all four counties.  The     |
| loss of electric and telephone lines resulted in greater than 10% of the     |
| sirens not being operational in each county.  It is estimated that           |
| approximately 60 of the 154 sirens are not operational.  The emergency plan  |
| would utilize route alerting and public radio announcements to notify the    |
| public in lieu of the non-operating sirens.  Restoration of the sirens will  |
| be coordinated with the restoration plans of the electric companies and      |
| telephone companies.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector will be notified of this event by the licensee.   |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1609 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY BRIAN ROKES TO FANGIE JONES * * *     |
|                                                                              |
| "This notification is a status update to the notification provided on        |
| September 17, 1999, (Log No. 36189) which reported that a recent storm       |
| (Hurricane Floyd) caused a loss of electric and telephone lines that         |
| resulted in greater than 10% of the emergency sirens (60 of 154) not being   |
| operational.  The emergency siren notification system remains degraded in    |
| one of the four counties covered by the emergency plan.  Orange County       |
| continues to have greater than 10% of its emergency sirens not operational   |
| due to power outages.  Three (3) in Harriman State Park of sixteen (16)      |
| emergency sirens total in Orange County are inoperable.  There are two (2)   |
| inoperable sirens in Rockland County and two (2) inoperable sirens in        |
| Westchester County.  All sirens in Putnam County are operational.  The       |
| emergency plan will continue to use route alerting and public radio          |
| announcements to notify the public in lieu of the non-operational sirens.    |
| Restoration of the sirens will be coordinated with the restoration plans of  |
| the electric and telephone companies."                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R1DO (Robert Summers) |
| was notified.                                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36211       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CALVERT CLIFFS           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/22/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MD |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:40[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:08[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  THOMAS O'MEARA               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROBERT SUMMERS       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JIM LYONS            NRR     |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |JOSEPH GIITTER       IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     M/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| UNIT 1 WAS MANUALLY TRIPPED FOLLOWING THE LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER             |
|                                                                              |
| Planned maintenance was being performed on the feeder breaker to non-vital   |
| Motor Control Center # 116. While the feeder breaker was being worked on,    |
| Motor Control Centers # 116 and # 106 were tied together through one tie     |
| breaker.  The amps limits for the tie breaker were misinterpreted in the     |
| procedure and the feeder breaker that was  supplying Motor Control Centers # |
| 116 and # 106 tripped on overcurrent (The operators that performed the       |
| evolution verified that each Motor Control Center was less than 500 amps but |
| the total for both Motor Control Centers was greater than 500 amps). The     |
| normal feeder tripped open on the feed that was supplying both Motor Control |
| Centers.  The loss of power to the Motor Control Centers caused a loss of    |
| control oil to both Main Feedwater Pumps and a loss of oil to the Main       |
| Condenser air removal pumps.  The loss of both Main Feedwater pumps caused a |
| loss of feedwater to the both Steam Generators. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary  |
| Feedwater Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump started. The |
| licensee manually tripped the reactor before the reactor would have          |
| automatically tripped on low Steam Generator Water Level.  All rods fully    |
| inserted into the core. The loss of the oil pumps to the Main Condenser air  |
| removal pumps caused a loss of condenser vacuum.  The Main Steam Isolation   |
| Valves were closed due to the loss of condenser vacuum.  At the present      |
| time, the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps and the Steam Generator     |
| Atmospheric valves are maintaining the plant in Hot Standby.  The licensee   |
| said that they have a very small Steam Generator tube leak on Unit 1, but    |
| there is no detectable release.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are   |
| fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable. The licensee        |
| notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Calvert County of the reactor trip.  |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2026 EDT 0N 9/23/99 BY MONTY SECKENS TO FANGIE JONES * * *   |
|                                                                              |
| "Unit 1 is at normal operating temperature and pressure and being maintained |
| in hot stand-by.  Preliminary results are that the normal feeder breaker to  |
| non-vital Motor Control Center (MCC) 106 tripped.  MCC 116 was tied to MCC   |
| 106 for maintenance on MCC 116's feeder breaker.  The direct cause of the    |
| feeder breaker tripping was the actual current through the breaker was       |
| approximately 690 amps.  This value is sufficient to cause the amp detector  |
| long-time delay to start timing the circuit breaker function as designed.    |
| The reason the actual current was above the procedure limit of 500 amps was  |
| that the readings were taken incorrectly and only half the current was       |
| measured.  There are two conductors per phase feeding MCC's 116 and 106.  A  |
| technician used a clamp-on amp meter for the procedure but only measured one |
| of the two conductors.  The design curve specifies that the breaker should   |
| trip at 18 minutes at 690 amps and this is precisely what occurred.          |
|                                                                              |
| "Vacuum has been reestablished and the plant is back on main feedwater,      |
| therefore, aux feedwater is now in  stand-by.  At the present main feedwater |
| and turbine by-pass valves steaming to the condenser are maintaining the     |
| plant in hot stand-by.  Preparations for reactor start-up are in progress."  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  The R1DO (Robert      |
| Summers) has been informed.                                                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36215       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LASALLE                  REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  IL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 03:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5                    |EVENT DATE:        09/22/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        23:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  McLAUGHLIN                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       90       Power Operation  |90       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TRIPPED ON OVER SPEED DURING MONTHLY   |
| SURVEILLANCE TESTING.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| While performing monthly surveillance start of the High Pressure Core Spray  |
| system Emergency Diesel Generator, the Diesel automatically tripped off on   |
| an overspeed signal.  The diesel does not appear to have been damaged but    |
| remains shutdown and unavailable for on-going investigation of the failure.  |
| The High Pressure Core Spray system is inoperable but available from normal  |
| power source only. The failure mechanism is being investigated and           |
| corrective actions will be performed.   The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling   |
| pump and all other Emergency Core Cooling Systems are also fully operable.   |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36216       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:05[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:36[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RANDY TODD                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ADEG 50.72(b)(1)(ii)     DEGRAD COND DURING OP  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LICENSEE IDENTIFIED AN INADEQUATE RESPONSE BY THE EMERGENCY OPERATING        |
| PROCEDURE                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Oconee is currently conducting a special project to review and validate the |
| Oconee Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP). Part of this project includes an |
| assessment of procedural guidance to address design basis single failure     |
| scenarios. This assessment has accordingly identified that the way the EOP   |
| is written may                                                               |
| not be adequate to effectively mitigate certain single failure scenarios     |
| associated with the Low Pressure Injection (LPI) and High Pressure Injection |
| (HPI) systems.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "The specific issue found to date is a Small Break LOCA with a failure of    |
| one of the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) isolation valves to close. If   |
| Reactor Building pressure is less than approximately 12 PSIG, during the     |
| time that the Emergency Sump suction valves are opened, calculations predict |
| that the BWST will continue to drain until voids are drawn into the LPI and  |
| HPI Pumps. Either air voids or significantly decreased available NPSH could  |
| adversely affect pump performance. Although the EOP provides compensatory    |
| guidance to locally close a manual valve, the engineering evaluation         |
| concluded that the guidance did not assure that action could be completed    |
| within the required time frame.                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Because the LPI and HPI systems are required to perform their intended      |
| safety function with a single failure, Oconee concluded at 1536 hours today  |
| that this EOP adequacy issue placed Oconee in a condition outside its design |
| basis and is therefore reportable.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "This is a procedural adequacy issue that does not affect current            |
| operability. No event has occurred, no equipment has been declared           |
| inoperable, and no Tech Spec action statements have been entered due to this |
| issue. Interim guidance will be provided to the Operators for this           |
| deficiency. Additionally, prompt corrective actions are underway to          |
| implement formal procedural changes.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The review is continuing. An LER will be submitted to address the details   |
| of the current issue and any similar reportable deficiencies associated with |
| this review found prior to the LER submittal."                               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36217       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: FERMI                    REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [2] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:47[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  SENJEEV ARAB                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |ROGER LANKSBURY      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|2     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |91       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PRIMARY CONTAINMENT VALVE FAILED THE LOCAL LEAK RATE TESTING                 |
|                                                                              |
| "On 09/22/99 at 1345 a primary containment valve T4803F601, [Drywell] DW     |
| Inlet Isolation Valve, failed the Local Leakage Rate Testing (LLRT) ,        |
| measured leakage rate exceeded the limit of 0.05 La when pressurized to Pa.  |
| Immediate action was to enter Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.8, Drywell  |
| and Suppression Chamber Purge System, action 'b', and declare T4803F601      |
| valve inoperable and effected penetration was isolated by closing and        |
| deactivating the valves T4800F407, DW Air Inlet Isolation valve and          |
| T4800F408, DW Nitrogen Inlet Isolation valve in accordance with TS 3.6.3     |
| action 'a' which was completed at 1447 on 09/22/99.                          |
|                                                                              |
| "T4803F601 is a supply purge valve with resilient seal (24 inch), TS 3.6.1.8 |
| action 'b' gives 24 hrs to restore the                                       |
| valve to operable status or be in hot shutdown in next 12 hrs and cold       |
| shutdown in next 24 hrs. The reason for valve T4803F601 failing LLRT is      |
| likely due to seal failure.                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Plant shutdown commenced at 1600 on 09/23/99 in order to meet TS 3.6.1.8    |
| action 'b'."                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1825 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY SENJEEV ARAB TO FANGIE JONES * * *    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has received approval of Notice of Enforcement Discretion from  |
| NRC/NRR and the shutdown has been terminated.  Power will be restored to     |
| 97%.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.  R3DO (Roger         |
| Lanksbury) has been notified.                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36218       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUMMER                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:08[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        08/06/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        10:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL ZACCONE              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |VERN HODGE (FAX)     NRR     |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10 CFR PART 21 REPORT - ABB K-LINE BREAKER DEFECT AFTER REPAIR               |
|                                                                              |
| "This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR21.21 to identify a Substantial  |
| Safety Hazard with an ABB K-line Breaker.                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "On August 6,1999, Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) determined that  |
| a Substantial Safety Hazard could exist with ABB K-line breakers failing to  |
| trip, Improper routing/support of the shunt trip wires during refurbishment  |
| caused interference with the red, trip shaft paddle on the left side of the  |
| breaker. This condition was found on a breaker installed in safety-related   |
| switchgear at VCSNS. This breaker condition-was compared to several other    |
| ABB K-line breakers at the plant site. The other breakers were found to have |
| the wires routed in a different direction, precluding interference with the  |
| red, trip shaft paddle.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "VCSNS utilizes these breakers in many applications, including the 480 VAC,  |
| safety related electrical buses. The shunt trip wiring problem is considered |
| a defect in repair. This condition represents a potential for a              |
| common mode failure for safety-related K-line breakers.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "The vendor has been notified of the shunt trip wiring problem and has       |
| agreed to modify the procedure for the refurbishment of these breakers.      |
| VCSNS Engineering has determined that vendor procedure changes               |
| should prevent recurrence of this problem."                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36219       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BROWNS FERRY             REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  AL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:50[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4           |EVENT DATE:        09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:55[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  RAY SWAFFORD                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |THOMAS DECKER        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SECURITY REPORT                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Discovery of compromise of safeguards information, compensatory measures not |
| fully implemented.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.        |
|                                                                              |
| Refer to the HOO Log for additional details.                                 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36220       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:15[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        20:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  PHIL CHASE                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/23/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          UNU                   |ROBERT SUMMERS       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOHN HANNON          NRR     |
|AAEC 50.72 (a) (1) (I)   EMERGENCY DECLARED     |CHARLES MILLER       IRO     |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |DAN RISHE            FEMA    |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT ENTERED AN UNUSUAL EVENT - TOXIC GAS DETECTED IN UNIT 2 TURBINE        |
| ENCLOSURE                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| An Unusual Event was declared due to readings of 65 ppm hydrogen sulfide     |
| (HS) and 115 ppm carbon monoxide (CO) in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure.       |
|                                                                              |
| The oncoming shift reported the smell of rotten eggs when they arrived on    |
| site.  Inspection around the site determined the only place toxic gas was    |
| detectable was in the Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure.  There were no detectable    |
| levels of any toxic gas existing anywhere else around the plant.             |
| Inspections are on going around the plant.  The Unit 2 Turbine Enclosure has |
| been evacuated after an inspection for a source of the gasses.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee isolated the control room by manually initiating chlorine       |
| isolation as a precaution at 1922 EDT, this is an Engineered Safety Feature  |
| activation and reportable as a 4-hour notification.                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state/local         |
| government agencies.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2321 EDT ON 9/23/99 BY TOM DOUGHERTY TO JOHN MacKINNON * *   |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The site de-escalated from the Unusual Event at 2312 EDT.  The toxic gas     |
| levels were verified to be nominal 0% in all areas inside and outside the    |
| power block.  The source of the toxic gas is still unknown and under         |
| investigation.  The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the     |
| state/local government agencies.  The R1DO (Robert Summers), NRR EO (John    |
| Hannon), IRO Manager (Charles Miller), and FEMA (Cegielski) have been        |
| informed.                                                                    |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36221       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: DIABLO CANYON            REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 09/24/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  CA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 02:13[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        09/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:52[PDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  STEVE WILSON                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  09/24/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOSEPH TAPIA         R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Hot Standby      |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A TRANSFER IN OFFSITE POWER SOURCES CAUSED THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY      |
| FEEDWATER PUMP TO AUTOMATICALLY START AND DISCHARGE WATER INTO THE STEAM     |
| GENERATORS.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| During restoration of relaying in the 500 kV switchyard an actuation caused  |
| the opening of the PCB breakers (Main Generator Breakers) supplying Unit 1   |
| from Auxiliary Power System).  Unit 1 power automatically transferred to the |
| Start-Up  power supply. The momentary loss of power during the transfer      |
| caused the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to start from an ESF      |
| actuation signal (12 kV Buses) and discharge into the Main Steam Generators. |
|                                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| Reactor Coolant Temperature decreased approximately 7 degrees F due to the   |
| operation of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Tave no load is    |
| 547 degrees F).  The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump operated for    |
| approximately 18 minutes before it was secured.  A Reactor Operator          |
| immediately closed the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater discharge valve(s) |
| to secure auxiliary feedwater to the Steam Generators, so there was very     |
| little discharge of auxiliary feedwater into the Steam Generators.  Reactor  |
| Coolant System cooldown was mainly due to the Turbine Driven Auxiliary       |
| Feedwater Turbine using the steam from the Steam Generators for its motive   |
| force.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed of this event by the licensee.   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+