Event Notification Report for August 16, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           08/13/1999 - 08/16/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

36023  36025  36027  36028  36029  36030  36031  36032  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36023       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: INDIAN POINT             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 07:49[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/12/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:05[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROKES                        |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  CHAUNCEY GOULD               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PLANT HAD A REACTOR TRIP FROM 100% POWER DUE TO A LOW STEAM GENERATOR        |
| LEVEL.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| An automatic reactor trip occurred during a transient on the 34 instrument   |
| bus, which de-energized for unknown reasons.  This resulted in a turbine     |
| runback and loss of automatic control of steam generator level.  The reactor |
| trip was generated as a result of a low level on the 33 steam generator.     |
| Auxiliary feedwater automatically started as a result of the trip.   All     |
| rods fully inserted, and no ECCS injection occurred.  No primary relief      |
| valves lifted, but one steam generator relief valve lifted.  (They have no   |
| steam generator tube leaks.)                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with the heat sink being the condenser.  |
| The cause of the instrument bus transient is under investigation.            |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.                     |
|                                                                              |
| ******************* UPDATE AT 1306 ON 08/13/99 FROM NICK LIZZO RECEIVED BY   |
| TROCINE *******************                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "An [emergency notification system (ENS)] notification was made at 0750 on   |
| August 12, 1999, which identified [that] an automatic reactor trip occurred  |
| due to a transient on the 34 instrument bus.  In response to a question by   |
| the NRC contact in regard to whether any primary relief valves had lifted,   |
| we responded that no primary side relief valves had lifted but that one      |
| steam generator relief valve had lifted.  In fact, one pressurizer           |
| pilot-operated relief valve (PORV), PORV-PCV-455C, did lift and quickly      |
| [reseated] when the automatic reactor trip occurred.  This question was      |
| originally answered in the 0750 ENS notification in the context that it was  |
| known that a steam generator safety/relief valve had lifted and reseated but |
| that no primary safety valve had lifted.  The answer to the question was not |
| clarified as to the lifting of the pressurizer PORVs themselves as opposed   |
| to the primary or secondary side safety valves."                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The 0750 ENS notification is also updated to indicate that a media/press    |
| release was subsequently made concerning the automatic reactor trip on       |
| August 12, 1999, at approximately 1100 that same day."                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector.  The NRC operations |
| officer notified the R1DO (Gray).                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Hospital                                         |Event Number:   36025       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/12/1999|
|LICENSEE:  SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:11[EDT]|
|    CITY:  NORFOLK                  REGION:  2  |EVENT DATE:        08/06/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  VA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  N  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|                                                |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
+------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DOUGLAS BEATTY, RSO          |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax)   NMSS    |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i)      DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| PART 21 REPORT - DEFECT IN A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPHY UNIT                    |
|                                                                              |
| DOUGLAS BEATTY, RADIATION SAFETY OFFICER, THERATRONICS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED |
| IN KANATA, ONTARIO, CANADA, REPORTED THAT ON 08/06/99, AN Ir-192 SOURCE      |
| CABLE ON A GAMMAMED BRACHYTHERAPY UNIT, MODEL #12i, SERIAL #709, LOCATED AT  |
| SENTARA NORFOLK HOSPITAL IN NORFOLK, VA, FAILED TO RETRACT TO ITS SHIELDED   |
| POSITION.  THE SOURCE WAS MANUALLY RETURNED TO ITS SHIELDED POSITION BY A    |
| THERATRONICS SERVICE TECHNICIAN ON 08/06/99.                                 |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS PERFORMING AN INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE    |
| DEFECT AND PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN REPORT TO THE NRC.                      |
|                                                                              |
| NOTE:  REFER TO RELATED EVENT #35998.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1614 ON 08/13/99 BY JOLLIFFE * * *                           |
|                                                                              |
| On 08/12/99, MDS Nordion, Kanata, Ontario, Canada, the parent company of     |
| Theratronics International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB      |
| 99-01 as follows:                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Subject: Notice of Incident - GammaMed High Dose Remote (HDR) Afterloader    |
| Units                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| Units Affected: GammaMed Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Units operating |
| in the United States and Canada.                                             |
|                                                                              |
| We have recently been notified of four incidents involving GammaMed HDR      |
| Afterloader Units in which the source cable became separated from the        |
| driving mechanism.  In each of these incidents, the source remained in an    |
| exposed position, and required intervention to place the source into a       |
| shielded position.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| We have investigated these incidents, and have concluded that the cause is   |
| attributable to a specific lot of cable used by the source manufacturer in   |
| the production of these sources.  These sources have been installed only in  |
| the United States and Canada.                                                |
|                                                                              |
| We strongly recommend that your institution suspend use of your GammaMed     |
| Models 12i and 12it HDR Afterloader Unit until the source is replaced.  We   |
| are presently working with the source manufacturer to expedite replacement   |
| of these sources.  A representative of our service department will contact   |
| you shortly to schedule a date for replacement of the source in your         |
| GammaMed Unit.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| We, at MDS Nordion, believe that safety of the patient and hospital          |
| personnel is of the utmost importance.  We will strive to correct this       |
| situation as soon as possible.                                               |
|                                                                              |
| For further information, please contact Dave Marquez, Manager, Installation  |
| and Service, MDS Nordion.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Note:  Refer to Event #36027 for a related event.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Other Nuclear Material                           |Event Number:   36027       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| REP ORG:  MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM         |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
|LICENSEE:  CIS-US, INC                          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:14[EDT]|
|    CITY:  BEDFORD                  REGION:  1  |EVENT DATE:        08/13/1999|
|  COUNTY:                            STATE:  MA |EVENT TIME:        12:00[EDT]|
|LICENSE#:                        AGREEMENT:  Y  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/1999|
|  DOCKET:                                       |+----------------------------+
|                                                |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|                                                |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|                                                |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
+------------------------------------------------+BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL P. WHALEN            |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+KEVIN RAMSEY (fax)   NMSS    |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NAGR                     AGREEMENT STATE        |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - GammaMed HDR Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources are incapable of being        |
| retracted into their shielded position -                                     |
|                                                                              |
| On August 13, 1999, Tony Honnellio of CIS-US, Inc, Bedford, MA, reported to  |
| the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program that High Dose Remote (HDR)      |
| Afterloader Unit Ir-192 sources they supply for GammaMed devices have been   |
| incapable of being retracted into the shielded position.  CIS-US believes    |
| this problem may be due to the new wire shipment they recently received.     |
|                                                                              |
| In February, 1998, CIS-US changed their wire order so that they could        |
| purchase directly from the supplier, Gemo G. Moritz, instead of through the  |
| device manufacturer, Isotopen-Technik Dr. Sauerwein, GmbH; both German       |
| companies.  Mr Honnellio states that the sealed source and device sheet      |
| number NR-555-S-104-S stipulates that the wire for the 724 source assembly   |
| may be 1.09 �0.1 mm in diameter.  Recently, CIS-US received wire that was    |
| 2-3 one thousandth of an inch (0.0762 mm) smaller than 1.19 mm, but still    |
| within specifications.  CIS-US believes that this wire diameter may be the   |
| culprit, resulting in the wire slipping off the two wheels that              |
| protract/retract the source, but they are still investigating.               |
|                                                                              |
| On August 12, 1999, MDS Nordion, the parent company of Theratronics          |
| International Limited, issued GammaMed User Bulletin #GMUB 99-01 (MA         |
| Radiation Control Program Docket Number 08-1463) strongly recommending to    |
| all 34 of its customers not to use their GammaMed device until the           |
| wire/source assembly has been replaced.  (Refer to Event #36025). This       |
| action was due to four incidents of the source getting stuck in the          |
| unshielded position either due to the wire becoming kinked or falling off    |
| the two wheels that protract/retract the source.  Three of these incidents   |
| occurred during a quality control check and one instance involved a hospital |
| patient (there was no medical misadministration).  CIS-US estimates it will  |
| take one to two weeks to replace all the wire/source assemblies.             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36028       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BEAVER VALLEY            REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:27[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP                |EVENT DATE:        08/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:27[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  WALKER/WRIGHT                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY EVENT -                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM DEGRADATION RELATED TO MONITORING FUNCTIONS.  COMPENSATORY |
| MEASURES IMMEDIATELY TAKEN UPON DISCOVERY.  THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC    |
| RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  REFER TO THE HOO LOG FOR ADDITIONAL DETAILS.            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36029       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: OCONEE                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] [3]               STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:18[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-L|EVENT DATE:        08/13/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:28[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE HILL                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHARLES OGLE         R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JOSE CALVO           NRR     |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
|3     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |99       Power Operation  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| -TS REQD SHUTDOWN OF ALL 3 UNITS DUE TO BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENT SYSTEM        |
| CHILLERS INOP                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOMS SHARE A COMMON VENTILATION SYSTEM; UNIT 3    |
| CONTROL ROOM HAS ITS OWN VENTILATION SYSTEM.  TWO CHILLERS SERVE THE         |
| VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR ALL THREE CONTROL ROOMS.                             |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1659 ON 08/13/99, THE 'B' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER TRIPPED DURING       |
| MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.  TECH SPEC 3.7.16 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO RESTORE   |
| THE INOPERABLE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS WITHIN 30 DAYS OR SHUT ALL THREE   |
| UNITS DOWN.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| AT 1728 ON 08/13/99, THE 'A' TRAIN CONTROL ROOM CHILLER ALSO TRIPPED DURING  |
| MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.  TECH SPEC 3.0.3 REQUIRES THE LICENSEE TO START      |
| SHUTTING ALL THREE UNITS DOWN WITHIN ONE HOUR AND PLACE ALL THREE UNITS IN   |
| MODE 3 WITHIN 12 HOURS WITH BOTH CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION SYSTEM CHILLERS    |
| INOPERABLE.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE IS REDUCING THE POWER OF ALL THREE UNITS AT THE RATE OF 1% PER  |
| HOUR AND IS ATTEMPTING TO RESTORE AT LEAST ONE CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS.   |
|                                                                              |
| THE LICENSEE INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 2336 ON 08/13/99 FROM SCOTT BATSON TO JOLLIFFE * * *         |
|                                                                              |
| AT 2240, THE LICENSEE RESTORED THE 'B' CHILLER TO OPERABLE STATUS USING THE  |
| 'A' PUMP AND EXITED TS 3.0.3.  TS 3.7.16 REMAINS IN EFFECT FOR THE 'A'       |
| CHILLER.  THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INCREASE POWER FROM A LOW LEVEL OF 87% AND   |
| HAS INFORMED THE NRC RESIDENT INSPECTOR.  THE NRC OPERATIONS OFFICER         |
| NOTIFIED THE R2DO CHUCK OGLE.                                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36030       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SIEMENS POWER CORPORATION            |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/13/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION             |NOTIFICATION TIME: 18:20[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 to UO2)          |EVENT DATE:        08/12/1999|
|           FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY         |EVENT TIME:        14:30[PDT]|
|           COMMERICAL LWR FUEL                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/13/1999|
|    CITY:  RICHLAND                 REGION:  4  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  BENTON                    STATE:  WA |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  SNM-1227              AGREEMENT:  Y  |DALE POWERS          R4      |
|  DOCKET:  07001257                             |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+LINDA HOWELL         R4      |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  LOREN MAAS                   |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01, 24 HOUR REPORT -                                         |
|                                                                              |
| The Mop Powder Dissolver Facility dissolves dirty Urania powder and uses a   |
| vacuum drum filter to separate the dissolved uranium from the dirt.          |
| Shavings from the vacuum drum filter (filter media, dirt, and a presumably   |
| small quantity of uranium) are collected in a 4-gallon container, sampled,   |
| and queued one foot apart.  When sample results are received, the contents   |
| of the 4-gallon containers are placed into a 55-gallon drum. The drum is     |
| then reverified to contain less than 100 grams U-235 by non-destructive      |
| assay (NDA).  After the second verification, the drum is then moved to the   |
| waste storage pad.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 1730 PDT on Tuesday, August 10, 1999, the Siemens Power     |
| Corporation (SPC) Laboratory Supervisor contacted an SPC Criticality Safety  |
| Specialist with evidence that the laboratory method normally used to analyze |
| the uranium content of these shavings may have been 30% low.  This           |
| information was based on the fact that a microwave dissolution process put   |
| all of the shavings into solution.  Subsequent analysis of the liquid        |
| yielded higher results. The SPC Criticality Safety Specialist determined     |
| that this relatively small error did not have immediate criticality safety   |
| concerns but requested SPC laboratory personnel to continue further          |
| investigation.                                                               |
|                                                                              |
| At approximately 1430 PDT on Thursday, August 12, 1999, the SPC Laboratory   |
| Supervisor reported to the Criticality Safety Specialist that microwave      |
| dissolution of sample material from a 4-gallon container had yielded uranium |
| results that exceeded those found using the normal dissolution method by a   |
| larger margin than previously reported.  Further evaluation of additional    |
| samples demonstrated that the microwave dissolution method provides uranium  |
| results that are three times higher than those indicated by NDA of the       |
| shavings.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Safety Significance of Event:                                                |
| Assuming the uranium content determined by NDA is low by a factor of three,  |
| the three drums with the highest uranium content, if stored in three-tier    |
| array, would exceed the allowed surface density by 23%.  (Hypothetical worst |
| case conditions are 49.4% of the minimum critical surface density.)          |
| Additionally, no drum contains greater than 60 grams U per liter.  The       |
| minimum critical concentration is greater than 280 grams U per liter at 5.0  |
| wt.% U-235.  Therefore, criticality was not possible with this material.     |
|                                                                              |
| Potential Criticality Pathways Involved:                                     |
| A criticality accident is only possible if the concentration of uranium      |
| exceeds the minimum critical concentration, i.e., approximately 280 grams U  |
| per liter at 5.0 wt.% U-235.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| Controlled Parameters:                                                       |
| Surface density (mass per unit area, i.e., kgs U per square foot), and       |
| concentration control.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| Estimated Amount, Enrichment, Form of Licensed Material:                     |
| A total of 32 drums were stored in a three-tier array.  Assuming the NDA is  |
| off by a factor of three, the highest amount of uranium in any drum is less  |
| than 10 kgs and the total amount of uranium in the array is less than 209    |
| kgs.  The enrichment is less than 5.0 wt.% U-235.  The average enrichment is |
| expected to be 3.6 wt.% U-235.  The analytical data currently available      |
| shows enrichment between 2.98 and 3.75 wt.% U-235.                           |
|                                                                              |
| Nuclear Criticality Safety Control(s) or Control System(s) and Description   |
| of the Failures or Deficiencies:                                             |
| - Preprocessing of laboratory samples did not put all of the uranium solids  |
| into solution.                                                               |
| - The standard used to calibrate the NDA equipment did not adequately        |
| reflect the material and geometry of the shavings when they are counted.     |
|                                                                              |
| Corrective Actions to restore safety systems and when each was implemented:  |
| - The Mop Powder Dissolver has been shut down and tagged out and production  |
| of shavings has therefore been stopped, as has the processing of shavings    |
| now in 4-gallon containers.                                                  |
| - Drums of shavings currently on the storage pad were moved into a           |
| single-tier arrangement.                                                     |
| - Additional multi-drum samplings were initiated to verify the actual        |
| uranium content.                                                             |
| - Production and processing of shavings will remain shut down pending        |
| further investigation and completion of corrective actions.                  |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   36031       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PEACH BOTTOM             REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [3] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 05:35[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        08/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:35[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BOB BIRMINGHAM               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |HAROLD GRAY          R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|3     N          Y       95       Power Operation  |95       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO     |
| OSCILLATIONS IN PARAMETERS DISCOVERED DURING PLANNED TESTING.                |
|                                                                              |
| "HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO FLOW, PRESSURE AND SPEED OSCILLATIONS WHILE IN       |
| AUTOMATIC AND MANUAL.  IT WAS DISCOVERED DURING PLANNED HPCI TESTING.        |
| TROUBLESHOOTING IS IN PROGRESS AND REPAIR PLANS ARE BEING MADE."             |
|                                                                              |
| WITH THE HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE, UNIT 3 ENTERED THE 14 DAY LCO ACTION        |
| STATEMENT #99-3-625.  THE LICENSEE PLANS TO INFORM THE NRC RESIDENT          |
| INSPECTOR.                                                                   |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   36032       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 08/15/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:13[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        08/15/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        05:30[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  08/15/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |BRUCE BURGESS        R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |JOHN HICKEY          NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF CASTLE                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NCFR                     NON CFR REPORT REQMNT  |                             |
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                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
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| 24-HOUR NON-CFR REPORT INVOLVING A VALID ACTUATION OF A "Q" SAFETY SYSTEM    |
|                                                                              |
| "At 0530 hours on 08/15/99, Operations personnel responded to CADP           |
| Outleakage Detection System Smokehead SXE2783 alarm at the X-333 Low Assay   |
| Withdrawal (LAW) compressor area.  Operators responded per Alarm Response    |
| Procedures, checked for outleakage and observed smoke in the vicinity of the |
| LAW A/B compressor.  Operations immediately evacuated the area, called 911,  |
| and initiated a building recall. The CADP smokehead alarmed during           |
| compressor startup activities.  Initial investigation revealed that the      |
| smoke was from the LAW A/B compressor seal.   CADP smokehead SXE2783 reset   |
| and the outleakage was stopped when the LAW station was vented down below    |
| atmospheric pressure.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The Emergency Response Organization (ERO) responded and monitored air       |
| quality for Hydrogen Fluoride, airborne radioactivity and surveyed for       |
| surface contamination.   All sample results were less than minimum           |
| detectable activity.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "This is reportable to the NRC as a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System   |
| (CADP Smokehead) in accordance with Safety Analysis Report, Section 6.9      |
| (24-Hour Report).  PTS-1999- 067/PR-PTS-99-04619."                           |
|                                                                              |
| Operations notified the NRC Resident Inspector and DOE Site Representative.  |
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