United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment
Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Reports Associated With Events > Event Notification Reports > 1999

Event Notification Report for June 15, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           06/14/1999 - 06/15/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35819  35820  35821  35822  35823  

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35819       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:00[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        08:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MICHAEL EMPEY                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIMI YEROKUN         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED AN NSS CABLE ROUTED THROUGH BOTH A SAFETY DIVISION I  |
| & II CABLE TRAY                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402,      |
| DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR     |
| 95-407.  EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS'  QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A     |
| NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE     |
| PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION  |
| DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.'  CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE  |
| WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO  |
| V2-53.  EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS |
| CONNECTOR.  CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND |
| THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL      |
| ROOM.                                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS |
| A VIOLATION OF VYS-027.                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Operability Assessment                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to   |
| provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the |
| safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible    |
| failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions   |
| or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division |
| through C1729G.                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump    |
| relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs  |
| and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps.                            |
|                                                                              |
| "Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can         |
| originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on      |
| cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box  |
| B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI |
| raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate   |
| from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without        |
| blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to   |
| propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage  |
| must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be   |
| carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII.              |
|                                                                              |
| "Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated |
| at 600 V. It  [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination |
| box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other   |
| cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to  |
| control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not         |
| credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a       |
| signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits   |
| within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible      |
| voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable,    |
| rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible     |
| voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should     |
| interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent |
| cable.                                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the    |
| equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell    |
| will not affect both the SI and SII system.                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "Conclusion                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though     |
| C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI."                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35820       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WATERFORD                REGION:  4  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [3] [] []                 STATE:  LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [3] CE                               |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        13:07[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ROY PRADOS                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN PELLET          R4      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3     A/R        Y       100      Power Operation  |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF THE '1A' 7KV ELECTRICAL BUS            |
|                                                                              |
| "While operating at 100% power, the plant experienced an automatic reactor   |
| trip at 1307 [CDT] due to the loss of the '1A'  7Kv electrical bus.  In      |
| addition to other loads, this bus supplies power to two of the four Reactor  |
| Coolant Pumps (RCP).  The loss of the two RCPs resulted in an uncomplicated  |
| trip of the reactor and turbine.  The resulting secondary system transient   |
| initiated both channel of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System, however  |
| no actual feeding of the steam generators occurred, nor was any necessary.   |
| The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby, Mode 3, at normal operating    |
| temperature and pressure.  There is no safety significance to this event.    |
| In the near term, the plant will remain in Hot Standby and attempt to        |
| determine the cause of the loss of the '1A' 7Kv bus."                        |
|                                                                              |
| During the transient the safeties and reliefs did not open.  Normal          |
| feedwater was maintained for feeding the steam generators and excess energy  |
| is being dumped to the main condensers.                                      |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35821       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK               REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:14[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:55[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MARK SHAFFER                 |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JIMI YEROKUN         R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NLTR                     LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR LICENSE REQUIREMENT                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "In Amendment 114 to the Hope Creek license, PSE&G was authorized to perform |
| single cell charging of connected cell in OPERABLE Class 1E batteries as     |
| described in the license amendment application and supplemental              |
| correspondence and as evaluated in the NRC SER.  The submittals and SEP      |
| specified the following as one of the equipment provisions with respect to   |
| use of the battery chargers.                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "At least two Class 1E properly rated fuses in series will be used on both   |
| the positive and negative leads between the battery charger and the cell(s)  |
| to protect the battery if a fault should develop in the charger.             |
|                                                                              |
| "Contrary to this requirement, on June 6, a charger was connected to an      |
| operable 125VDC Class 1E battery (1C-D-411) without fuse protection.  The    |
| charger was subsequently disconnected following charging of a given cell and |
| reconnected (again without fuse protection) to charge a second cell.  The    |
| charger remained connected to the battery until the error was identified     |
| 0755 on June 14 at which time the charger was disconnected.  No other Class  |
| 1E batteries were inoperable during the time that the charger was connected  |
| to the 1C-D-411 battery.                                                     |
|                                                                              |
| "Amendment 114 included a license condition that required that single cell   |
| charging be performed in accordance with the provisions contained in the     |
| PSE&G letters and NRC SER.  As a result, this is a license condition         |
| violation and is therefore reportable as a 24-hour report under Section 2.F  |
| of the Hope Creek operating license.                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "At the time of discovery of this condition, Hope Creek was in Operating     |
| Condition 1 at 100% power with the 'B' Station Service Water loop removed    |
| from service for a scheduled outage.  This is a 72 hour action statement     |
| that commenced at 0000 on 6/14/99.  This event had no impact on the Service  |
| Water loop outage or the associated LCO."                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation.                       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35822       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE                 REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        16:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GARY HARRINGTON              |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/14/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A)  UNANALYZED COND OP     |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |97       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH TRAINS OF SOME ESF EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE AT THE SAME TIME            |
|                                                                              |
| "KNPP [Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant] recognized on 6/11/99 that the 'B'      |
| diesel generator governor control speed sensor was misadjusted on 6/2/99.    |
| The actual impact of the misadjusted switch is unknown.  Nevertheless, KNPP  |
| is reporting this as though the condition resulted in the diesel generator   |
| being inoperable.  The basis for reporting this event is that during the     |
| time between 6/2 and 6/11 while the control was misadjusted, the opposite    |
| train Shield Building Vent system was removed from service for maintenance   |
| on 6/3, and the opposite train Internal Containment Spray system was removed |
| from service for maintenance on 6/10.  Having both trains of ESF equipment   |
| out of service is reportable as being in an unanalyzed condition.            |
|                                                                              |
| "Currently all ESF equipment is operable.  Corrective action program efforts |
| need to determine why the operability/reportability assessment was not       |
| performed on 6/11.  KNPP will also continue to pursue what the actual        |
| operability impact is from the misadjusted control."                         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee is also investigating the cause of the misadjustment that       |
| occurred on 6/2/99.                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35823       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT   |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        06/14/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        17:56[EDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  06/15/1999|
|    CITY:  PIKETON                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  PIKE                      STATE:  OH |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-2                 AGREEMENT:  N  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707002                              |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC SPAETH                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  STEVE SANDIN                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN  REPORT INVOLVING NCSA VIOLATION                  |
|                                                                              |
| "On 6/14/99 at 1756 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified |
| by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA)    |
| was not being maintained in the X-333 process building.  Operations          |
| personnel discovered that a converter classified as UH (uncomplicated        |
| handling) being stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an         |
| opening. The Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) for this operation,  |
| PLANT062.A00, has a requirement which states in part, 'Openings/penetrations |
| shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and      |
| moist air exposure.'                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff determined that this incident    |
| caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control       |
| remained in place."                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| Operations personnel will inform the DOE Site Representative and has         |
| informed the NRC Resident Inspector.                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+