Event Notification Report for June 15, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
06/14/1999 - 06/15/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35819 35820 35821 35822 35823
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|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35819 |
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| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:00[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:20[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL EMPEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIMI YEROKUN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED AN NSS CABLE ROUTED THROUGH BOTH A SAFETY DIVISION I |
| & II CABLE TRAY |
| |
| "DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402, |
| DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR |
| 95-407. EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS' QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A |
| NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE |
| PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION |
| DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.' CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE |
| WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO |
| V2-53. EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS |
| CONNECTOR. CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND |
| THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL |
| ROOM. |
| |
| "C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS |
| A VIOLATION OF VYS-027. |
| |
| "Operability Assessment |
| |
| "Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to |
| provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the |
| safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible |
| failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions |
| or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division |
| through C1729G. |
| |
| "Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump |
| relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs |
| and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps. |
| |
| "Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can |
| originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on |
| cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box |
| B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI |
| raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate |
| from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without |
| blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to |
| propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage |
| must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be |
| carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII. |
| |
| "Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated |
| at 600 V. It [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination |
| box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other |
| cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to |
| control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not |
| credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a |
| signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits |
| within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible |
| voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable, |
| rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible |
| voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should |
| interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent |
| cable. |
| |
| "Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the |
| equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell |
| will not affect both the SI and SII system. |
| |
| "Conclusion |
| |
| "The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though |
| C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI." |
| |
| The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35820 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: WATERFORD REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
| UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [3] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:07[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROY PRADOS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN PELLET R4 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF THE '1A' 7KV ELECTRICAL BUS |
| |
| "While operating at 100% power, the plant experienced an automatic reactor |
| trip at 1307 [CDT] due to the loss of the '1A' 7Kv electrical bus. In |
| addition to other loads, this bus supplies power to two of the four Reactor |
| Coolant Pumps (RCP). The loss of the two RCPs resulted in an uncomplicated |
| trip of the reactor and turbine. The resulting secondary system transient |
| initiated both channel of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System, however |
| no actual feeding of the steam generators occurred, nor was any necessary. |
| The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby, Mode 3, at normal operating |
| temperature and pressure. There is no safety significance to this event. |
| In the near term, the plant will remain in Hot Standby and attempt to |
| determine the cause of the loss of the '1A' 7Kv bus." |
| |
| During the transient the safeties and reliefs did not open. Normal |
| feedwater was maintained for feeding the steam generators and excess energy |
| is being dumped to the main condensers. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35821 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:14[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:55[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK SHAFFER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIMI YEROKUN R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24 HOUR LICENSE REQUIREMENT |
| |
| "In Amendment 114 to the Hope Creek license, PSE&G was authorized to perform |
| single cell charging of connected cell in OPERABLE Class 1E batteries as |
| described in the license amendment application and supplemental |
| correspondence and as evaluated in the NRC SER. The submittals and SEP |
| specified the following as one of the equipment provisions with respect to |
| use of the battery chargers. |
| |
| "At least two Class 1E properly rated fuses in series will be used on both |
| the positive and negative leads between the battery charger and the cell(s) |
| to protect the battery if a fault should develop in the charger. |
| |
| "Contrary to this requirement, on June 6, a charger was connected to an |
| operable 125VDC Class 1E battery (1C-D-411) without fuse protection. The |
| charger was subsequently disconnected following charging of a given cell and |
| reconnected (again without fuse protection) to charge a second cell. The |
| charger remained connected to the battery until the error was identified |
| 0755 on June 14 at which time the charger was disconnected. No other Class |
| 1E batteries were inoperable during the time that the charger was connected |
| to the 1C-D-411 battery. |
| |
| "Amendment 114 included a license condition that required that single cell |
| charging be performed in accordance with the provisions contained in the |
| PSE&G letters and NRC SER. As a result, this is a license condition |
| violation and is therefore reportable as a 24-hour report under Section 2.F |
| of the Hope Creek operating license. |
| |
| "At the time of discovery of this condition, Hope Creek was in Operating |
| Condition 1 at 100% power with the 'B' Station Service Water loop removed |
| from service for a scheduled outage. This is a 72 hour action statement |
| that commenced at 0000 on 6/14/99. This event had no impact on the Service |
| Water loop outage or the associated LCO." |
| |
| The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35822 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY HARRINGTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 97 Power Operation |97 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| BOTH TRAINS OF SOME ESF EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE AT THE SAME TIME |
| |
| "KNPP [Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant] recognized on 6/11/99 that the 'B' |
| diesel generator governor control speed sensor was misadjusted on 6/2/99. |
| The actual impact of the misadjusted switch is unknown. Nevertheless, KNPP |
| is reporting this as though the condition resulted in the diesel generator |
| being inoperable. The basis for reporting this event is that during the |
| time between 6/2 and 6/11 while the control was misadjusted, the opposite |
| train Shield Building Vent system was removed from service for maintenance |
| on 6/3, and the opposite train Internal Containment Spray system was removed |
| from service for maintenance on 6/10. Having both trains of ESF equipment |
| out of service is reportable as being in an unanalyzed condition. |
| |
| "Currently all ESF equipment is operable. Corrective action program efforts |
| need to determine why the operability/reportability assessment was not |
| performed on 6/11. KNPP will also continue to pursue what the actual |
| operability impact is from the misadjusted control." |
| |
| The licensee is also investigating the cause of the misadjustment that |
| occurred on 6/2/99. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35823 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:02[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:56[EDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/15/1999|
| CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707002 | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
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| 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING NCSA VIOLATION |
| |
| "On 6/14/99 at 1756 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified |
| by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) |
| was not being maintained in the X-333 process building. Operations |
| personnel discovered that a converter classified as UH (uncomplicated |
| handling) being stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an |
| opening. The Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) for this operation, |
| PLANT062.A00, has a requirement which states in part, 'Openings/penetrations |
| shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and |
| moist air exposure.' |
| |
| "The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff determined that this incident |
| caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control |
| remained in place." |
| |
| Operations personnel will inform the DOE Site Representative and has |
| informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
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