Event Notification Report for June 15, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 06/14/1999 - 06/15/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 35819 35820 35821 35822 35823 +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35819 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:00[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 08:20[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MICHAEL EMPEY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIMI YEROKUN R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED AN NSS CABLE ROUTED THROUGH BOTH A SAFETY DIVISION I | | & II CABLE TRAY | | | | "DURING PREPARATION OF EDCR [ENGINEERING DESIGN CHANGE REQUEST] 99-402, | | DESIGN ENGINEERING IDENTIFIED A CABLE SEPARATION CONCERN CREATED BY EDCR | | 95-407. EDCR 95-407 INSTALLED 'EGS' QUICK DISCONNECT CONNECTIONS FOR A | | NUMBER OF MOVs , THE CONNECTORS ARE INSTALLED IN JUNCTION BOXES IN CLOSE | | PROXIMITY TO THE VALVES, FOR MOV 2-53A, WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH SEPARATION | | DIVISION SII, THE NEW BOX IS LABELED 'B-1279SII.' CABLE 1729G, A NNS CABLE | | WHICH SUPPORTS JET PUMP TOTAL FLOW LOGIC, PREVIOUSLY WAS ROUTED DIRECTLY TO | | V2-53. EDCR 95-407 REROUTED C1729G THROUGH B-1279SII AND THE ASSOCIATED EGS | | CONNECTOR. CABLE 1729G IS ROUTED THOUGH AN 'SI' CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND | | THE CIRCUIT CONTINUES VIA OTHER CABLE THROUGH "SI" TRAYS TO THE CONTROL | | ROOM. | | | | "C1729G IS THEREFORE ROUTED IN AN 'SII' RACEWAY AND AN 'SI' RACEWAY WHICH IS | | A VIOLATION OF VYS-027. | | | | "Operability Assessment | | | | "Electrical separation between redundant systems is maintained in order to | | provide confidence that a single failure in one division does not impact the | | safety function of the opposite division. For this installation, credible | | failure of cable C1729G cannot impact the safety function of two divisions | | or failure within one safety division cannot propagate to the other division | | through C1729G. | | | | "Cable C1729G supplies valve position logic signals to Recirculation Pump | | relays located in CRP 9-38. The relays are used to generate computer inputs | | and alarms. The relay circuit is fused at 3 amps. | | | | "Credible failures consisting of short circuits or open circuits can | | originate either in the SI raceway system, the SII raceway system or on | | cable C1729G which is installed between Box B-1279SII (near V2-53A) and Box | | B440SI (penetration X105A termination box). A failure within the division SI | | raceway system may impact SI equipment but the failure would not propagate | | from the SI raceway to the SII equipment through cable C1729G without | | blowing the 3 amp fuse which protects the cable. In order for a failure to | | propagate from the SI system to the SII system a damaging signal or voltage | | must be impressed on C1729G within the SI system. That signal must then be | | carried and transferred to the SII system within box B-1279SII. | | | | "Cable C1729G consists of a 4/C #14 Rockbestos FWIII control cable insulated | | at 600 V. It [is] routed to box B440SI, the inboard penetration termination | | box in a dedicated steel conduit. In the outboard box it connects to other | | cables which are routed in '300' series trays. These trays are dedicated to | | control circuits (120 V ac and 125 V dc or lower voltage). It is not | | credible that a failure within the 300 series SI trays would impress a | | signal or voltage on Cable C1729G which would cause damage to SII circuits | | within box B-1279SII or other equipment within the SII system. Possible | | voltages within the 300 series trays are 120 V ac or 125 V dc. The cable, | | rated at 600 V, will not break down when exposed to the maximum credible | | voltage. In addition the cable is protected by a 3 amp fuse which should | | interrupt the circuit before any short circuit current could affect adjacent | | cable. | | | | "Similar to the above, failure within the SII system would not affect the | | equipment in the SI system and failure of cable C1729G within the drywell | | will not affect both the SI and SII system. | | | | "Conclusion | | | | "The SI and SII electrical distribution systems are operable even though | | C1729G is routed in B-1279SII and B440SI." | | | | The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35820 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: WATERFORD REGION: 4 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999| | UNIT: [3] [] [] STATE: LA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:01[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [3] CE |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 13:07[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ROY PRADOS |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN PELLET R4 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |3 A/R Y 100 Power Operation |0 Hot Standby | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOSS OF THE '1A' 7KV ELECTRICAL BUS | | | | "While operating at 100% power, the plant experienced an automatic reactor | | trip at 1307 [CDT] due to the loss of the '1A' 7Kv electrical bus. In | | addition to other loads, this bus supplies power to two of the four Reactor | | Coolant Pumps (RCP). The loss of the two RCPs resulted in an uncomplicated | | trip of the reactor and turbine. The resulting secondary system transient | | initiated both channel of the Emergency Feedwater Actuation System, however | | no actual feeding of the steam generators occurred, nor was any necessary. | | The plant is currently stable in Hot Standby, Mode 3, at normal operating | | temperature and pressure. There is no safety significance to this event. | | In the near term, the plant will remain in Hot Standby and attempt to | | determine the cause of the loss of the '1A' 7Kv bus." | | | | During the transient the safeties and reliefs did not open. Normal | | feedwater was maintained for feeding the steam generators and excess energy | | is being dumped to the main condensers. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35821 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HOPE CREEK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NJ |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:14[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:55[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MARK SHAFFER |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JIMI YEROKUN R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NLTR LICENSEE 24 HR REPORT | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24 HOUR LICENSE REQUIREMENT | | | | "In Amendment 114 to the Hope Creek license, PSE&G was authorized to perform | | single cell charging of connected cell in OPERABLE Class 1E batteries as | | described in the license amendment application and supplemental | | correspondence and as evaluated in the NRC SER. The submittals and SEP | | specified the following as one of the equipment provisions with respect to | | use of the battery chargers. | | | | "At least two Class 1E properly rated fuses in series will be used on both | | the positive and negative leads between the battery charger and the cell(s) | | to protect the battery if a fault should develop in the charger. | | | | "Contrary to this requirement, on June 6, a charger was connected to an | | operable 125VDC Class 1E battery (1C-D-411) without fuse protection. The | | charger was subsequently disconnected following charging of a given cell and | | reconnected (again without fuse protection) to charge a second cell. The | | charger remained connected to the battery until the error was identified | | 0755 on June 14 at which time the charger was disconnected. No other Class | | 1E batteries were inoperable during the time that the charger was connected | | to the 1C-D-411 battery. | | | | "Amendment 114 included a license condition that required that single cell | | charging be performed in accordance with the provisions contained in the | | PSE&G letters and NRC SER. As a result, this is a license condition | | violation and is therefore reportable as a 24-hour report under Section 2.F | | of the Hope Creek operating license. | | | | "At the time of discovery of this condition, Hope Creek was in Operating | | Condition 1 at 100% power with the 'B' Station Service Water loop removed | | from service for a scheduled outage. This is a 72 hour action statement | | that commenced at 0000 on 6/14/99. This event had no impact on the Service | | Water loop outage or the associated LCO." | | | | The licensee is conducting a root cause investigation. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35822 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: KEWAUNEE REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/14/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: WI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 17:59[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 16:00[CDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: GARY HARRINGTON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/14/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JOHN MADERA R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AUNA 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(A) UNANALYZED COND OP | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 97 Power Operation |97 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | BOTH TRAINS OF SOME ESF EQUIPMENT OUT OF SERVICE AT THE SAME TIME | | | | "KNPP [Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant] recognized on 6/11/99 that the 'B' | | diesel generator governor control speed sensor was misadjusted on 6/2/99. | | The actual impact of the misadjusted switch is unknown. Nevertheless, KNPP | | is reporting this as though the condition resulted in the diesel generator | | being inoperable. The basis for reporting this event is that during the | | time between 6/2 and 6/11 while the control was misadjusted, the opposite | | train Shield Building Vent system was removed from service for maintenance | | on 6/3, and the opposite train Internal Containment Spray system was removed | | from service for maintenance on 6/10. Having both trains of ESF equipment | | out of service is reportable as being in an unanalyzed condition. | | | | "Currently all ESF equipment is operable. Corrective action program efforts | | need to determine why the operability/reportability assessment was not | | performed on 6/11. KNPP will also continue to pursue what the actual | | operability impact is from the misadjusted control." | | | | The licensee is also investigating the cause of the misadjustment that | | occurred on 6/2/99. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35823 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 06/15/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:02[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 06/14/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 17:56[EDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 06/15/1999| | CITY: PIKETON REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: PIKE STATE: OH |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-2 AGREEMENT: N |JOHN MADERA R3 | | DOCKET: 0707002 | | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC SPAETH | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: STEVE SANDIN | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR NRC 91-01 BULLETIN REPORT INVOLVING NCSA VIOLATION | | | | "On 6/14/99 at 1756 hrs the Plant Shift Superintendent's office was notified | | by operations personnel that a Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) | | was not being maintained in the X-333 process building. Operations | | personnel discovered that a converter classified as UH (uncomplicated | | handling) being stored on the cell floor had a cover missing from an | | opening. The Nuclear Criticality Safety Approval (NCSA) for this operation, | | PLANT062.A00, has a requirement which states in part, 'Openings/penetrations | | shall be covered to minimize the potential for moderator collection and | | moist air exposure.' | | | | "The Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) staff determined that this incident | | caused a loss of control such that only one double contingency control | | remained in place." | | | | Operations personnel will inform the DOE Site Representative and has | | informed the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 25, 2021