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Event Notification Report for May 6, 1999

                    U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
                              Operations Center

                              Event Reports For
                           05/05/1999 - 05/06/1999

                              ** EVENT NUMBERS **

35395  35438  35605  35645  35650  35675  35676  35677  35678  35679  35680  35681 


!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35395       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BIG ROCK POINT           REGION:  3  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/23/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:35[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-1                             |EVENT DATE:        02/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        09:51[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  MIKE BOURASSA                |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  JOHN MacKINNON               +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |BRUCE JORGENSEN      R3      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |CHRIS GRIMES, EO     NRR     |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v)      OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP   |FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION TELEPHONE LINES AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DUE |
| TO LOSS OF A SUBSTATION.  TRYING TO REGAIN DOSE ASSESSMENT.  (Big Rock Point |
| is permanently shut down with the core offloaded to the spent fuel pool.)    |
|                                                                              |
| At 0951 EST, the licensee lost power from its substation which caused a loss |
| of offsite power.  The main emergency diesel generator was started, and the  |
| licensee at this time is loading the emergency diesel generator.  A regional |
| crew is currently troubleshooting the substation and trying to restore       |
| offsite power to the site.  Spent fuel pool cooling was lost due to the loss |
| of offsite power.  The current temperature of the spent fuel pool is 60F.   |
| Spent fuel has been in the spent fuel pool for at least 540 days.  The       |
| licensee said that it would take 14 days for the spent fuel pool to heat up  |
| to 150F.  Per the technical specifications, the licensee has 24 hours to    |
| restore an alternate method of cooling the spent fuel pool.  The licensee    |
| said that they have a fire hose available to be used to supply cooling water |
| to the spent fuel pool.  The licensee said that the emergency diesel         |
| generator will be used to supply power so fire hose water can be supplied to |
| the spent fuel pool if needed.  The spent fuel pool temperature must heat up |
| to 140F before the licensee must declare an Unusual Event.  The licensee    |
| has standby diesel if it is needed.  The licensee said that they have lost   |
| power to their dose assessment equipment.  The licensee is running power     |
| lines so the dose assessment can be re-energized.                            |
|                                                                              |
| All emergency notification telephone lines are dead at this time.  The       |
| licensee called the event in on a commercial telephone line.  The licensee   |
| can be called via commercial telephone numbers which were supplied to the    |
| NRC Headquarters Operation Center by the licensee.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1629 EST ON 02/23/99 FROM MIKE BOURASSA TO FANGIE JONES * *  |
| *                                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| Offsite power was restored at 1335 EST.  All emergency notification          |
| telephone lines have been restored to service.  Offsite power was out for    |
| about 3.5 hours.  It was lost due to a momentary undervoltage condition due  |
| to substation switching in the area.  All systems have been returned to      |
| normal operations.                                                           |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jorgensen), NRR EO (Hannon),   |
| and IRO (Congel).                                                            |
|                                                                              |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1118 ON 05/05/99 FROM MICHAEL BOURASSA TO     |
| TROCINE ********************                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On February 23, 1999, at 1140, the NRC Operations Center was notified that  |
| the Big Rock Point Restoration Project (BRPRS) dedicated [emergency          |
| notification system (ENS)] line in the monitoring station was inoperable due |
| to a loss of offsite power.  This event was reported under                   |
| [10CFR]50.72(b)(1)(v), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability.  (Big Rock |
| Point is in the DECON mode of decommissioning).  The loss of offsite power   |
| event in itself was not reportable because of the status of the facility."   |
|                                                                              |
| "After reviewing this event, the BRPRS staff has concluded that this event   |
| is not reportable.  The NRC Operations Center was notified of the loss of    |
| the ENS line by a backup commercial telephone line.  Commercial telephone    |
| lines, dedicated telephone lines to the State and County, and Health Physics |
| Network lines were not affected.  Only the dedicated ENS line in the         |
| monitoring station was inoperable for a brief period of time.  Therefore, a  |
| major loss of communications capability was never really experienced, and    |
| emergency preparedness capability was never compromised."                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Phillips), NRR EO (Grimes),    |
| and IRO (Congel).                                                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35438       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:15[EST]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        03/04/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        00:28[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  BILL RUDD                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CAUDLE JULIAN        R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B)  OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS   |                             |
|NLCO                     TECH SPEC LCO A/S      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW FOUND SUSPECT SURVEILLANCE.          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee identified a suspect surveillance during a programmatic review  |
| of  Improved Technical Specifications Surveillances.  The surveillance       |
| involved the timers for the hydrogen skimmer suction isolation valves.  The  |
| acceptance criteria in the surveillance procedure was higher than allowed by |
| the acceptance criteria of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 7-15.  |
| The licensee entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both trains being out of tolerance.    |
| The licensee exited LCO 3.0.3 at 0059 EST after one of the timers was        |
| recalibrated and that train was declared operable.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee also verified that the Unit 1 hydrogen skimmer suction valve    |
| timers were in specification.  One of Unit 1's valves was out of             |
| specification and will be reported as a 30-day written report.               |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTION AT 0931 ON 05/05/99 FROM RUDD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * *       |
|                                                                              |
| "After further review and evaluation, Engineering determined that the        |
| Hydrogen Skimmer System would have operated within the response time limits  |
| specified in the Technical Specifications and the Updated Final Safety       |
| Analysis Report.  As a result, both trains of the Unit 2 Hydrogen Skimmer    |
| System were operable, and the unit was never outside of its design basis.    |
| Therefore, Catawba is withdrawing the ENS notification for this event."      |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction.  The HOO    |
| notified the R2DO (Christensen).                                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35605       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:06[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        04/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG SOSSON                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  DICK JOLLIFFE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |MOHAMED SHANBAKY     R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|DDDD 73.71               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY REPORT -                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| Unescorted access was inappropriately granted to the plant protected area.   |
| Compensatory measures were taken immediately upon discovery.  (Contact the   |
| NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.)                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to inform the NRC Resident Inspector.                     |
|                                                                              |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1643 EDT ON 05/05/99 FROM BECKI DOLHANCZYK TO FANGIE      |
| JONES * * *                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| This event is retracted as it did not constitute a Regulatory Unauthorized   |
| Access, but a Limerick Generating Station administrative access deficiency.  |
| (Contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.)    |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector.  The NRC            |
| Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R1DO (James Linville).          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED  !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35645       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE           REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4                             |EVENT DATE:        04/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DENNIS MAY                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CLIFFORD ANDERSON    R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| During an I&C surveillance test of pressure switches associated with the     |
| High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line, one of four low steam     |
| line pressure switches failed its test.  The licensee closed both HPCI steam |
| isolation valves rendering HPCI inoperable.  The licensee has verified the   |
| operability of the Automatic Depressurization System as required by plant    |
| technical specifications.                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the     |
| licensee.                                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| *************** UPDATE AT 1106 ON 05/05/99 FROM ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO TROCINE |
| ***************                                                              |
|                                                                              |
| The HPCI system was taken out of service (isolated) because of an inoperable |
| pressure switch which was part of the primary containment isolation system   |
| (PCIS).  After further review, the licensee determined that the system was   |
| intentionally removed from service in accordance with the technical          |
| specifications for PCIS.  Therefore, the licensee believes that this event   |
| is not reportable and is retracting this event notification.                 |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector, and the licensee's  |
| Corporate Office may notify the state.  The NRC operations officer notified  |
| the R1DO (Linville).                                                         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35650       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        04/28/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        14:15[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |JOHN MADERA          R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |FREDERICK COMBS      NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  ERIC WALKER                  |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  BOB STRANSKY                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT                                            |
|                                                                              |
| The following is text from a facsimile submitted to the NRC Operations       |
| Center:                                                                      |
|                                                                              |
| "During a walkdown of C-710, room 6, a group of small chemical traps with    |
| tags indicating less than 5 pounds of uranium were discovered in violation   |
| of [the] NCSA GEN-10 two-foot spacing requirement for UH pieces of           |
| equipment. These items were improperly categorized as spacing exempt based   |
| on the size criteria of having dimensions in all directions greater than     |
| that of a 5.5 gallon drum. Fifty-three items would be required prior to      |
| exceeding the UH mass at 2.0 wt. % U235. Similar incidents involving the     |
| violation were also discovered in C-710, room 2, C-409, and C-720. GEN-10    |
| states that UH items must be spaced a minimum of two feet edge-to-edge from  |
| other UH items to preclude the accumulation of an unsafe uranium mass.       |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with       |
| Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criterion A4.a, and Bulletin 91-01,      |
| Supplement 1.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS:                                              |
|                                                                              |
| "Although the amount of Fissile material present is far below safe mass for  |
| each item, double contingency was not maintained because the items were not  |
| handled as UH and properly spaced.                                           |
|                                                                              |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW           |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR):                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than 104 of these items  |
| which contain less than 5 pounds of uranium each would need to be            |
| accumulated.                                                                 |
|                                                                              |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.):    |
|                                                                              |
| "Interaction and mass                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS    |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS):                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "Variable amount. 2.0 wt. % U235, in the form of UO2F2, with a process limit |
| of approximately 600 lbs. at 2.0 wt. % U235                                  |
|                                                                              |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION  |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES:                                             |
|                                                                              |
| "The two process conditions relied on in this scenario for double            |
| contingency are mass and interaction.                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting the mass of        |
| uranium at 2.0 wt. % U235 to 264 pounds of uranium. This is controlled by    |
| quantifying the mass of each item using independent NDAs/visual inspections. |
| Each individual item contains less than 5 pounds of uranium: therefore, this |
| control was not violated. The total mass of all the items placed together at |
| each location is less than the UH mass limit.                                |
|                                                                              |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on limiting interaction       |
| between UH items. This is controlled by maintaining minimum two-foot         |
| edge-to-edge spacing between UH items. Spacing was not maintained between    |
| the items: therefore, this requirement was violated and the process          |
| condition was lost,                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| "Since a control relied upon for double contingency was violated, double     |
| contingency was lost."                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification.           |
|                                                                              |
| * * * * * * * * * * UPDATE AT 1212 EDT ON 05/05/99 FROM TOM WHITE TO FANGIE  |
| JONES * * * * * * * * * *                                                    |
|                                                                              |
| "Plant walkdowns have revealed additional locations which are also           |
| inappropriately spaced under GEN-10 criteria.  These additional locations    |
| are:                                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| C-335, 15 pallets of valve parts, totaling less than 52 items                |
| C-400, 2 centrifugal pump casings                                            |
|                                                                              |
| "The amount of fissile material is far below the safe mass for each item and |
| is less than the number of items needed to be greater than a safe mass.  NCS |
| incident report NCS-INC-99-024 has been revised to encompass these new       |
| locations."                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update, and the onsite  |
| Department of Energy site representative will be notified by Paducah         |
| personnel.  The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Monte |
| Phillips), NMSS EO (Don Cool), and IRO (Frank Congel)                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35675       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK                 REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:38[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        02:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  GREG SOSSON                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     ESF ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION OF THE 'B' LOOP DRYWELL CHILLED WATER INBOARD SUPPLY AND RETURN    |
| VALVES DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SPECIAL PROCEDURE TO DEENERGIZE A SAFEGUARDS  |
| BUS                                                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "On 05/05/99 at 0200 hours, it was discovered that an [engineered safety     |
| feature] actuation occurred on the Unit 2 Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW)       |
| system.  This isolation occurred at approximately 2300 on 05/02/99 during    |
| performance of a special procedure to deenergize the D22 safeguards bus."    |
|                                                                              |
| "With Unit 2 in OPCON 5, the 'B' loop DWCW inboard supply and return valves  |
| HV-087-222 and HV-087-223 isolated when the power supply to an interposing   |
| relay was deenergized per a special procedure on 05/02/99.  This special     |
| procedure did not properly address the valve closure.  During this special   |
| procedure, power was later removed from both valves.  This removed control   |
| room indication of their position, and their closure was not immediately     |
| detected.  Later, station personnel observed increasing drywell              |
| temperatures. The follow-up investigation revealed the isolation valves were |
| closed by local verification."                                               |
|                                                                              |
| "Additional investigation found several containment atmosphere sample valves |
| and primary containment instrument gas [primary containment isolation        |
| valves] that also closed during the loss of power.  These conditions were    |
| also expected but not properly documented in the special procedure."         |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35676       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH                    REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:21[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4                    |EVENT DATE:        05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        07:48[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  EDWIN URQUHART               |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN    R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     A/R        Y       98       Power Operation  |0        Hot Shutdown     |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A GENERATOR TRIP FOR UNKNOWN REASONS RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP AND          |
| SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| At 0748, the main generator tripped for unknown reasons.  The generator trip |
| caused a main turbine trip on power load unbalance, and the turbine trip     |
| caused an automatic reactor scram from 98% power because the reactor was at  |
| a power level of greater than 30%.  All control rods fully inserted, and all |
| systems functioned as required.  Nine of eleven safety relief valves opened  |
| due to the expected high pressure when the main turbine tripped, and all of  |
| these valves properly reseated.  The recirculation pumps also tripped as     |
| expected based on opening of the EOC/RPT (end of cycle/recirculation pump    |
| trip) breakers because the unit was at a power level of greater than 30%.    |
| The main steam isolation valves remained open.  There were no emergency core |
| cooling system (ECCS) or engineered safety feature actuations, and none were |
| required.  Narrow range level decreased to +8 inches, and the first ECCS     |
| injection setpoint is -35 inches narrow range.  Normal level is +37 inches   |
| narrow range.                                                                |
|                                                                              |
| The unit is currently stable in Hot Shutdown.  Condensate is supplying water |
| to the reactor vessel, and steam is being bypassed to the condenser.  The    |
| recirculation pumps have been restarted.  Containment parameters are normal. |
| Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators are operable |
| if needed.                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The cause of the main generator trip is currently under investigation.       |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35677       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUMMER                   REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  JEFF PEASE                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  LEIGH TROCINE                +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN    R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|CCCC 21.21               UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH  |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|                                                |BILL JONES           R4      |
|                                                |VERN HODGE (fax)     NRR     |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          N       0        Refueling        |0        Refueling        |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GENERIC CONCERNS REGARDING A COMMON MODE FAILURE FOR MAGNE-BLAST BREAKERS    |
|                                                                              |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee:   |
|                                                                              |
| "This is report is being made pursuant to 10CFR21.21 to identify a           |
| Substantial Safety Hazard with General Electric 7.2-kV Magne-Blast           |
| Breakers."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "On April 15, 1999, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station submitted a potential        |
| Substantial Safety Hazard report due to 7.2-kV breakers which failed to      |
| close.  After further investigation and testing, it has been determined that |
| a Substantial Safety Hazard could exist with this failure to close.  The     |
| identified problem deals with a cotter pin striking the latch check switch   |
| mounting bracket and bending it forward.  This removes the factory set       |
| clearance between the bracket and the switch actuating paddle.  This results |
| in the paddle, which is bolted to the trip shaft, rolling the trip shaft to  |
| the trip position when the breaker attempts to close.  The cotter pin        |
| problem is considered a defect in repair.  This condition represents a       |
| potential for a common mode failure for safety-related Magne-Blast           |
| breakers."                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "V.C. Summer Nuclear Station utilizes these breakers in many applications,   |
| including the 7.2-kV Emergency Diesel Generator electrical buses."           |
|                                                                              |
| "The function of the latch check switch is to enable rapid repeated breaker  |
| closures, which is not required in the V.C. Summer application of these      |
| breakers.  Engineering has determined that removal of the latch check        |
| switch, the latch switch mounting bracket, and the actuating paddle will     |
| prevent recurrence of this problem in the future."                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee stated that this action has already been taken on all of the    |
| safety-related Magne-Blast breakers.  However,  this action has not been     |
| taken for the non-safety-related Magne-Blast breakers located in the balance |
| of plant.  These breakers are normally closed and stay closed throughout the |
| cycle.  The licensee stated that these are not restart items.  All have been |
| done with the exception of four, which feed the transformers for the 480-V   |
| switchgear.                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35678       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA                  REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [] [2] []                 STATE:  SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:01[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP                |EVENT DATE:        05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        04:52[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CHRIS ORR                    |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN    R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A)   PLANT S/D REQD BY TS   |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|                                                   |                          |
|2     N          N       0        Hot Standby      |0        Hot Standby      |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER            |
| MAINTENANCE                                                                  |
|                                                                              |
| The plant is being shutdown to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) to perform maintenance  |
| on the assured source piping for the Auxiliary Feedwater System.  The piping |
| is biologically fouled and was reported in event notification #35670.  The   |
| maintenance required will be pipe cleaning which will necessitate the        |
| shutdown of each train.  Only one train will be done at a time, leaving only |
| one train available for operation which is only allowed per the technical    |
| specifications in Mode 4 or below.  The plant will remain in Mode 4 until    |
| the systems are restored to full operation.  Unit 1 is defueled at this      |
| time, so there is no impact on its present operation.                        |
|                                                                              |
| At 1130 EDT, the licensee determined that a 1-hour report had not been made  |
| earlier (within 1-hour of the determination of the required shutdown) and    |
| made this notification at 1201 EDT.                                          |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                            |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility                              |Event Number:   35679       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT      |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|   RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY          |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:08[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER                   |EVENT DATE:        05/04/1999|
|           6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE                 |EVENT TIME:        12:10[CDT]|
|           BETHESDA, MD 20817    (301)564-3200  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|    CITY:  PADUCAH                  REGION:  3  +-----------------------------+
|  COUNTY:  McCRACKEN                 STATE:  KY |PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#:  GDP-1                 AGREEMENT:  Y  |MONTE PHILLIPS       R3      |
|  DOCKET:  0707001                              |DON COOL             NMSS    |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL         IRO     |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  TOM WHITE                    |                             |
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 |                             |
+------------------------------------------------+                             |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |                             |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|NBNL                     RESPONSE-BULLETIN      |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24-HOUR REPORT, LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL               |
|                                                                              |
| "On 05/04/99 at 1210 CDT, while performing a walkdown of C-333 for GEN-10    |
| items, a 'square-to-round process pipe' was discovered which did not have an |
| NCS tagging, posting, or NCSA controls applied.  It is believed that this    |
| equipment has been exposed to process gas.  If the square-to-round contains  |
| fissile material, it should have been controlled under GEN-010 or NCSA       |
| GEN-20/27.  The controls provided in these NCSAs ensure compliance with the  |
| double contingency principle.  An Nondestructive Analysis has been performed |
| on this equipment with results indicating mass of uranium being much less    |
| than the safe mass.  However, no NCS controls were applied, double           |
| contingency cannot be demonstrated for this equipment, and double            |
| contingency was lost.                                                        |
|                                                                              |
| "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with       |
| Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a, and Bulletin 91-01,      |
| Supplement 1 report.                                                         |
|                                                                              |
| "PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-2568, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-034,    |
| Event Worksheet 35679.                                                       |
|                                                                              |
| "The NRC Senior resident inspector has been notified of this event."         |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35680       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA                    REGION:  1  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [] []                 STATE:  NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:17[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP                           |EVENT DATE:        05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        15:33[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  DOUG GOMEZ                   |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |JAMES LINVILLE       R1      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii)     RPS ACTUATION          |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       97       Power Operation  |94       Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE POWER RUNBACK SIGNAL FROM REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM                  |
|                                                                              |
| The unit received a runback signal from Overpower Delta T channels 3 and 4   |
| for 1.2 sec, during which time turbine reference power decreased from 90.7%  |
| to 90.3%.  Actual turbine load was manually reduced to lower reactor power   |
| to 94% for increased margin to the runback.  I&C personnel are investigating |
| why the signal actuated as there is no readily apparent reason.              |
|                                                                              |
| This report is required per the unit's procedures.                           |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public       |
| Service Commission for the State of New York.                                |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor                                    |Event Number:   35681       |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE              REGION:  2  |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
|    UNIT:  [1] [2] []                STATE:  FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:16[EDT]|
|   RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE                        |EVENT DATE:        05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME:        17:42[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY:  CALVIN WARD                  |LAST UPDATE DATE:  05/05/1999|
|  HQ OPS OFFICER:  FANGIE JONES                 +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON          ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS:          N/A                   |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN    R2      |
|10 CFR SECTION:                                 |                             |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION    |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
|                                                |                             |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR|   INIT RX MODE  |CURR PWR|  CURR RX MODE   |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|2     N          Y       100      Power Operation  |100      Power Operation  |
|                                                   |                          |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
                                   EVENT TEXT                                   
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DETERMINED TO BLOCK BOTH SIAS ACTUATION CHANNELS      |
|                                                                              |
| "During performance of a monthly surveillance of the Safety Injection        |
| Actuation System (SIAS) circuitry at St. Lucie Unit 2, a licensed Senior     |
| Operator questioned the acceptability of procedure steps which blocked both  |
| actuation channel of SIAS.                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| "The licensed Senior Operator ordered the surveillance testing secured       |
| pending a plant technical review and verification of his conclusion that     |
| both SIAS actuation channels were blocked simultaneously by the surveillance |
| procedure.  Technical review of the procedure confirmed that both SIAS       |
| actuation channels were simultaneously blocked for brief periods (less than  |
| 1 minute) during the surveillance as currently written.                      |
|                                                                              |
| "This surveillance has been performed in a similar manner for a long period  |
| of time on both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2.  The surveillance procedure will be |
| revised such that only one SIAS channel will be blocked at any one time.     |
|                                                                              |
| "The SIAS actuation circuitry is currently operable on both St. Lucie Units  |
| 1 and 2. "                                                                   |
|                                                                              |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.                        |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+