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Event Notification Report for May 6, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
Event Reports For
05/05/1999 - 05/06/1999
** EVENT NUMBERS **
35395 35438 35605 35645 35650 35675 35676 35677 35678 35679 35680 35681
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35395 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: BIG ROCK POINT REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/23/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:35[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-1 |EVENT DATE: 02/23/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:51[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE BOURASSA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |CHRIS GRIMES, EO NRR |
|AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP |FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION TELEPHONE LINES AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DUE |
| TO LOSS OF A SUBSTATION. TRYING TO REGAIN DOSE ASSESSMENT. (Big Rock Point |
| is permanently shut down with the core offloaded to the spent fuel pool.) |
| |
| At 0951 EST, the licensee lost power from its substation which caused a loss |
| of offsite power. The main emergency diesel generator was started, and the |
| licensee at this time is loading the emergency diesel generator. A regional |
| crew is currently troubleshooting the substation and trying to restore |
| offsite power to the site. Spent fuel pool cooling was lost due to the loss |
| of offsite power. The current temperature of the spent fuel pool is 60þF. |
| Spent fuel has been in the spent fuel pool for at least 540 days. The |
| licensee said that it would take 14 days for the spent fuel pool to heat up |
| to 150þF. Per the technical specifications, the licensee has 24 hours to |
| restore an alternate method of cooling the spent fuel pool. The licensee |
| said that they have a fire hose available to be used to supply cooling water |
| to the spent fuel pool. The licensee said that the emergency diesel |
| generator will be used to supply power so fire hose water can be supplied to |
| the spent fuel pool if needed. The spent fuel pool temperature must heat up |
| to 140þF before the licensee must declare an Unusual Event. The licensee |
| has standby diesel if it is needed. The licensee said that they have lost |
| power to their dose assessment equipment. The licensee is running power |
| lines so the dose assessment can be re-energized. |
| |
| All emergency notification telephone lines are dead at this time. The |
| licensee called the event in on a commercial telephone line. The licensee |
| can be called via commercial telephone numbers which were supplied to the |
| NRC Headquarters Operation Center by the licensee. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * UPDATE AT 1629 EST ON 02/23/99 FROM MIKE BOURASSA TO FANGIE JONES * * |
| * |
| |
| Offsite power was restored at 1335 EST. All emergency notification |
| telephone lines have been restored to service. Offsite power was out for |
| about 3.5 hours. It was lost due to a momentary undervoltage condition due |
| to substation switching in the area. All systems have been returned to |
| normal operations. |
| |
| The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jorgensen), NRR EO (Hannon), |
| and IRO (Congel). |
| |
| ******************** UPDATE AT 1118 ON 05/05/99 FROM MICHAEL BOURASSA TO |
| TROCINE ******************** |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On February 23, 1999, at 1140, the NRC Operations Center was notified that |
| the Big Rock Point Restoration Project (BRPRS) dedicated [emergency |
| notification system (ENS)] line in the monitoring station was inoperable due |
| to a loss of offsite power. This event was reported under |
| [10CFR]50.72(b)(1)(v), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability. (Big Rock |
| Point is in the DECON mode of decommissioning). The loss of offsite power |
| event in itself was not reportable because of the status of the facility." |
| |
| "After reviewing this event, the BRPRS staff has concluded that this event |
| is not reportable. The NRC Operations Center was notified of the loss of |
| the ENS line by a backup commercial telephone line. Commercial telephone |
| lines, dedicated telephone lines to the State and County, and Health Physics |
| Network lines were not affected. Only the dedicated ENS line in the |
| monitoring station was inoperable for a brief period of time. Therefore, a |
| major loss of communications capability was never really experienced, and |
| emergency preparedness capability was never compromised." |
| |
| The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Phillips), NRR EO (Grimes), |
| and IRO (Congel). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35438 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:15[EST]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/04/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:28[EST]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL RUDD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | |
|NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW FOUND SUSPECT SURVEILLANCE. |
| |
| The licensee identified a suspect surveillance during a programmatic review |
| of Improved Technical Specifications Surveillances. The surveillance |
| involved the timers for the hydrogen skimmer suction isolation valves. The |
| acceptance criteria in the surveillance procedure was higher than allowed by |
| the acceptance criteria of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 7-15. |
| The licensee entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both trains being out of tolerance. |
| The licensee exited LCO 3.0.3 at 0059 EST after one of the timers was |
| recalibrated and that train was declared operable. |
| |
| The licensee also verified that the Unit 1 hydrogen skimmer suction valve |
| timers were in specification. One of Unit 1's valves was out of |
| specification and will be reported as a 30-day written report. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTION AT 0931 ON 05/05/99 FROM RUDD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * |
| |
| "After further review and evaluation, Engineering determined that the |
| Hydrogen Skimmer System would have operated within the response time limits |
| specified in the Technical Specifications and the Updated Final Safety |
| Analysis Report. As a result, both trains of the Unit 2 Hydrogen Skimmer |
| System were operable, and the unit was never outside of its design basis. |
| Therefore, Catawba is withdrawing the ENS notification for this event." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. The HOO |
| notified the R2DO (Christensen). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35605 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:06[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG SOSSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| - PLANT SECURITY REPORT - |
| |
| Unescorted access was inappropriately granted to the plant protected area. |
| Compensatory measures were taken immediately upon discovery. (Contact the |
| NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.) |
| |
| The licensee plans to inform the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| |
| * * * RETRACTED AT 1643 EDT ON 05/05/99 FROM BECKI DOLHANCZYK TO FANGIE |
| JONES * * * |
| |
| This event is retracted as it did not constitute a Regulatory Unauthorized |
| Access, but a Limerick Generating Station administrative access deficiency. |
| (Contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.) |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC |
| Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R1DO (James Linville). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
!!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!!
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35645 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/28/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:30[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DENNIS MAY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE |
| |
| During an I&C surveillance test of pressure switches associated with the |
| High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line, one of four low steam |
| line pressure switches failed its test. The licensee closed both HPCI steam |
| isolation valves rendering HPCI inoperable. The licensee has verified the |
| operability of the Automatic Depressurization System as required by plant |
| technical specifications. |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the |
| licensee. |
| |
| *************** UPDATE AT 1106 ON 05/05/99 FROM ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO TROCINE |
| *************** |
| |
| The HPCI system was taken out of service (isolated) because of an inoperable |
| pressure switch which was part of the primary containment isolation system |
| (PCIS). After further review, the licensee determined that the system was |
| intentionally removed from service in accordance with the technical |
| specifications for PCIS. Therefore, the licensee believes that this event |
| is not reportable and is retracting this event notification. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector, and the licensee's |
| Corporate Office may notify the state. The NRC operations officer notified |
| the R1DO (Linville). |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35650 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:28[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/28/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:15[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JOHN MADERA R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |FREDERICK COMBS NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC WALKER | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT |
| |
| The following is text from a facsimile submitted to the NRC Operations |
| Center: |
| |
| "During a walkdown of C-710, room 6, a group of small chemical traps with |
| tags indicating less than 5 pounds of uranium were discovered in violation |
| of [the] NCSA GEN-10 two-foot spacing requirement for UH pieces of |
| equipment. These items were improperly categorized as spacing exempt based |
| on the size criteria of having dimensions in all directions greater than |
| that of a 5.5 gallon drum. Fifty-three items would be required prior to |
| exceeding the UH mass at 2.0 wt. % U235. Similar incidents involving the |
| violation were also discovered in C-710, room 2, C-409, and C-720. GEN-10 |
| states that UH items must be spaced a minimum of two feet edge-to-edge from |
| other UH items to preclude the accumulation of an unsafe uranium mass. |
| |
| "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with |
| Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criterion A4.a, and Bulletin 91-01, |
| Supplement 1. |
| |
| "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: |
| |
| "Although the amount of Fissile material present is far below safe mass for |
| each item, double contingency was not maintained because the items were not |
| handled as UH and properly spaced. |
| |
| "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW |
| CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): |
| |
| "In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than 104 of these items |
| which contain less than 5 pounds of uranium each would need to be |
| accumulated. |
| |
| "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): |
| |
| "Interaction and mass |
| |
| "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS |
| LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): |
| |
| "Variable amount. 2.0 wt. % U235, in the form of UO2F2, with a process limit |
| of approximately 600 lbs. at 2.0 wt. % U235 |
| |
| "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION |
| OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: |
| |
| "The two process conditions relied on in this scenario for double |
| contingency are mass and interaction. |
| |
| "The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting the mass of |
| uranium at 2.0 wt. % U235 to 264 pounds of uranium. This is controlled by |
| quantifying the mass of each item using independent NDAs/visual inspections. |
| Each individual item contains less than 5 pounds of uranium: therefore, this |
| control was not violated. The total mass of all the items placed together at |
| each location is less than the UH mass limit. |
| |
| "The second leg of double contingency is based on limiting interaction |
| between UH items. This is controlled by maintaining minimum two-foot |
| edge-to-edge spacing between UH items. Spacing was not maintained between |
| the items: therefore, this requirement was violated and the process |
| condition was lost, |
| |
| "Since a control relied upon for double contingency was violated, double |
| contingency was lost." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification. |
| |
| * * * * * * * * * * UPDATE AT 1212 EDT ON 05/05/99 FROM TOM WHITE TO FANGIE |
| JONES * * * * * * * * * * |
| |
| "Plant walkdowns have revealed additional locations which are also |
| inappropriately spaced under GEN-10 criteria. These additional locations |
| are: |
| |
| C-335, 15 pallets of valve parts, totaling less than 52 items |
| C-400, 2 centrifugal pump casings |
| |
| "The amount of fissile material is far below the safe mass for each item and |
| is less than the number of items needed to be greater than a safe mass. NCS |
| incident report NCS-INC-99-024 has been revised to encompass these new |
| locations." |
| |
| The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update, and the onsite |
| Department of Energy site representative will be notified by Paducah |
| personnel. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Monte |
| Phillips), NMSS EO (Don Cool), and IRO (Frank Congel) |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35675 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:38[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG SOSSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| ISOLATION OF THE 'B' LOOP DRYWELL CHILLED WATER INBOARD SUPPLY AND RETURN |
| VALVES DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SPECIAL PROCEDURE TO DEENERGIZE A SAFEGUARDS |
| BUS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "On 05/05/99 at 0200 hours, it was discovered that an [engineered safety |
| feature] actuation occurred on the Unit 2 Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW) |
| system. This isolation occurred at approximately 2300 on 05/02/99 during |
| performance of a special procedure to deenergize the D22 safeguards bus." |
| |
| "With Unit 2 in OPCON 5, the 'B' loop DWCW inboard supply and return valves |
| HV-087-222 and HV-087-223 isolated when the power supply to an interposing |
| relay was deenergized per a special procedure on 05/02/99. This special |
| procedure did not properly address the valve closure. During this special |
| procedure, power was later removed from both valves. This removed control |
| room indication of their position, and their closure was not immediately |
| detected. Later, station personnel observed increasing drywell |
| temperatures. The follow-up investigation revealed the isolation valves were |
| closed by local verification." |
| |
| "Additional investigation found several containment atmosphere sample valves |
| and primary containment instrument gas [primary containment isolation |
| valves] that also closed during the loss of power. These conditions were |
| also expected but not properly documented in the special procedure." |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35676 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:21[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:48[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: EDWIN URQUHART |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 A/R Y 98 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| A GENERATOR TRIP FOR UNKNOWN REASONS RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP AND |
| SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM. |
| |
| At 0748, the main generator tripped for unknown reasons. The generator trip |
| caused a main turbine trip on power load unbalance, and the turbine trip |
| caused an automatic reactor scram from 98% power because the reactor was at |
| a power level of greater than 30%. All control rods fully inserted, and all |
| systems functioned as required. Nine of eleven safety relief valves opened |
| due to the expected high pressure when the main turbine tripped, and all of |
| these valves properly reseated. The recirculation pumps also tripped as |
| expected based on opening of the EOC/RPT (end of cycle/recirculation pump |
| trip) breakers because the unit was at a power level of greater than 30%. |
| The main steam isolation valves remained open. There were no emergency core |
| cooling system (ECCS) or engineered safety feature actuations, and none were |
| required. Narrow range level decreased to +8 inches, and the first ECCS |
| injection setpoint is -35 inches narrow range. Normal level is +37 inches |
| narrow range. |
| |
| The unit is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. Condensate is supplying water |
| to the reactor vessel, and steam is being bypassed to the condenser. The |
| recirculation pumps have been restarted. Containment parameters are normal. |
| Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators are operable |
| if needed. |
| |
| The cause of the main generator trip is currently under investigation. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35677 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SUMMER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/02/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:00[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF PEASE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| |BILL JONES R4 |
| |VERN HODGE (fax) NRR |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| GENERIC CONCERNS REGARDING A COMMON MODE FAILURE FOR MAGNE-BLAST BREAKERS |
| |
| The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: |
| |
| "This is report is being made pursuant to 10CFR21.21 to identify a |
| Substantial Safety Hazard with General Electric 7.2-kV Magne-Blast |
| Breakers." |
| |
| "On April 15, 1999, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station submitted a potential |
| Substantial Safety Hazard report due to 7.2-kV breakers which failed to |
| close. After further investigation and testing, it has been determined that |
| a Substantial Safety Hazard could exist with this failure to close. The |
| identified problem deals with a cotter pin striking the latch check switch |
| mounting bracket and bending it forward. This removes the factory set |
| clearance between the bracket and the switch actuating paddle. This results |
| in the paddle, which is bolted to the trip shaft, rolling the trip shaft to |
| the trip position when the breaker attempts to close. The cotter pin |
| problem is considered a defect in repair. This condition represents a |
| potential for a common mode failure for safety-related Magne-Blast |
| breakers." |
| |
| "V.C. Summer Nuclear Station utilizes these breakers in many applications, |
| including the 7.2-kV Emergency Diesel Generator electrical buses." |
| |
| "The function of the latch check switch is to enable rapid repeated breaker |
| closures, which is not required in the V.C. Summer application of these |
| breakers. Engineering has determined that removal of the latch check |
| switch, the latch switch mounting bracket, and the actuating paddle will |
| prevent recurrence of this problem in the future." |
| |
| The licensee stated that this action has already been taken on all of the |
| safety-related Magne-Blast breakers. However, this action has not been |
| taken for the non-safety-related Magne-Blast breakers located in the balance |
| of plant. These breakers are normally closed and stay closed throughout the |
| cycle. The licensee stated that these are not restart items. All have been |
| done with the exception of four, which feed the transformers for the 480-V |
| switchgear. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35678 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:01[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:52[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHRIS ORR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
| | |
|2 N N 0 Hot Standby |0 Hot Standby |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER |
| MAINTENANCE |
| |
| The plant is being shutdown to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) to perform maintenance |
| on the assured source piping for the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The piping |
| is biologically fouled and was reported in event notification #35670. The |
| maintenance required will be pipe cleaning which will necessitate the |
| shutdown of each train. Only one train will be done at a time, leaving only |
| one train available for operation which is only allowed per the technical |
| specifications in Mode 4 or below. The plant will remain in Mode 4 until |
| the systems are restored to full operation. Unit 1 is defueled at this |
| time, so there is no impact on its present operation. |
| |
| At 1130 EDT, the licensee determined that a 1-hour report had not been made |
| earlier (within 1-hour of the determination of the required shutdown) and |
| made this notification at 1201 EDT. |
| |
| The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35679 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:08[EDT]|
| COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/04/1999|
| 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:10[CDT]|
| BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+
| COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 |
| DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS |
+------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRO |
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WHITE | |
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | |
+------------------------------------------------+ |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24-HOUR REPORT, LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL |
| |
| "On 05/04/99 at 1210 CDT, while performing a walkdown of C-333 for GEN-10 |
| items, a 'square-to-round process pipe' was discovered which did not have an |
| NCS tagging, posting, or NCSA controls applied. It is believed that this |
| equipment has been exposed to process gas. If the square-to-round contains |
| fissile material, it should have been controlled under GEN-010 or NCSA |
| GEN-20/27. The controls provided in these NCSAs ensure compliance with the |
| double contingency principle. An Nondestructive Analysis has been performed |
| on this equipment with results indicating mass of uranium being much less |
| than the safe mass. However, no NCS controls were applied, double |
| contingency cannot be demonstrated for this equipment, and double |
| contingency was lost. |
| |
| "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with |
| Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a, and Bulletin 91-01, |
| Supplement 1 report. |
| |
| "PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-2568, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-034, |
| Event Worksheet 35679. |
| |
| "The NRC Senior resident inspector has been notified of this event." |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35680 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:17[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:33[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUG GOMEZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES LINVILLE R1 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 97 Power Operation |94 Power Operation |
| | |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| TURBINE POWER RUNBACK SIGNAL FROM REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM |
| |
| The unit received a runback signal from Overpower Delta T channels 3 and 4 |
| for 1.2 sec, during which time turbine reference power decreased from 90.7% |
| to 90.3%. Actual turbine load was manually reduced to lower reactor power |
| to 94% for increased margin to the runback. I&C personnel are investigating |
| why the signal actuated as there is no readily apparent reason. |
| |
| This report is required per the unit's procedures. |
| |
| The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public |
| Service Commission for the State of New York. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Power Reactor |Event Number: 35681 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999|
| UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:16[EDT]|
| RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999|
+------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:42[EDT]|
| NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN WARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999|
| HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+
+------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION |
|EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 |
|10 CFR SECTION: | |
|AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE |
+-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+
|1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
|2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation |
| | |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
EVENT TEXT
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
| SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DETERMINED TO BLOCK BOTH SIAS ACTUATION CHANNELS |
| |
| "During performance of a monthly surveillance of the Safety Injection |
| Actuation System (SIAS) circuitry at St. Lucie Unit 2, a licensed Senior |
| Operator questioned the acceptability of procedure steps which blocked both |
| actuation channel of SIAS. |
| |
| "The licensed Senior Operator ordered the surveillance testing secured |
| pending a plant technical review and verification of his conclusion that |
| both SIAS actuation channels were blocked simultaneously by the surveillance |
| procedure. Technical review of the procedure confirmed that both SIAS |
| actuation channels were simultaneously blocked for brief periods (less than |
| 1 minute) during the surveillance as currently written. |
| |
| "This surveillance has been performed in a similar manner for a long period |
| of time on both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. The surveillance procedure will be |
| revised such that only one SIAS channel will be blocked at any one time. |
| |
| "The SIAS actuation circuitry is currently operable on both St. Lucie Units |
| 1 and 2. " |
| |
| The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
+------------------------------------------------------------------------------+