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Event Notification Report for May 6, 1999
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Reports For 05/05/1999 - 05/06/1999 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** 35395 35438 35605 35645 35650 35675 35676 35677 35678 35679 35680 35681 !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35395 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: BIG ROCK POINT REGION: 3 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 02/23/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: MI |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:35[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-1 |EVENT DATE: 02/23/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 09:51[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: MIKE BOURASSA |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: JOHN MacKINNON +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |BRUCE JORGENSEN R3 | |10 CFR SECTION: |CHRIS GRIMES, EO NRR | |AARC 50.72(b)(1)(v) OTHER ASMT/COMM INOP |FRANK CONGEL IRO | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | LOSS OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION TELEPHONE LINES AND LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER DUE | | TO LOSS OF A SUBSTATION. TRYING TO REGAIN DOSE ASSESSMENT. (Big Rock Point | | is permanently shut down with the core offloaded to the spent fuel pool.) | | | | At 0951 EST, the licensee lost power from its substation which caused a loss | | of offsite power. The main emergency diesel generator was started, and the | | licensee at this time is loading the emergency diesel generator. A regional | | crew is currently troubleshooting the substation and trying to restore | | offsite power to the site. Spent fuel pool cooling was lost due to the loss | | of offsite power. The current temperature of the spent fuel pool is 60þF. | | Spent fuel has been in the spent fuel pool for at least 540 days. The | | licensee said that it would take 14 days for the spent fuel pool to heat up | | to 150þF. Per the technical specifications, the licensee has 24 hours to | | restore an alternate method of cooling the spent fuel pool. The licensee | | said that they have a fire hose available to be used to supply cooling water | | to the spent fuel pool. The licensee said that the emergency diesel | | generator will be used to supply power so fire hose water can be supplied to | | the spent fuel pool if needed. The spent fuel pool temperature must heat up | | to 140þF before the licensee must declare an Unusual Event. The licensee | | has standby diesel if it is needed. The licensee said that they have lost | | power to their dose assessment equipment. The licensee is running power | | lines so the dose assessment can be re-energized. | | | | All emergency notification telephone lines are dead at this time. The | | licensee called the event in on a commercial telephone line. The licensee | | can be called via commercial telephone numbers which were supplied to the | | NRC Headquarters Operation Center by the licensee. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * * UPDATE AT 1629 EST ON 02/23/99 FROM MIKE BOURASSA TO FANGIE JONES * * | | * | | | | Offsite power was restored at 1335 EST. All emergency notification | | telephone lines have been restored to service. Offsite power was out for | | about 3.5 hours. It was lost due to a momentary undervoltage condition due | | to substation switching in the area. All systems have been returned to | | normal operations. | | | | The NRC operations officer notified the R3DO (Jorgensen), NRR EO (Hannon), | | and IRO (Congel). | | | | ******************** UPDATE AT 1118 ON 05/05/99 FROM MICHAEL BOURASSA TO | | TROCINE ******************** | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "On February 23, 1999, at 1140, the NRC Operations Center was notified that | | the Big Rock Point Restoration Project (BRPRS) dedicated [emergency | | notification system (ENS)] line in the monitoring station was inoperable due | | to a loss of offsite power. This event was reported under | | [10CFR]50.72(b)(1)(v), Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capability. (Big Rock | | Point is in the DECON mode of decommissioning). The loss of offsite power | | event in itself was not reportable because of the status of the facility." | | | | "After reviewing this event, the BRPRS staff has concluded that this event | | is not reportable. The NRC Operations Center was notified of the loss of | | the ENS line by a backup commercial telephone line. Commercial telephone | | lines, dedicated telephone lines to the State and County, and Health Physics | | Network lines were not affected. Only the dedicated ENS line in the | | monitoring station was inoperable for a brief period of time. Therefore, a | | major loss of communications capability was never really experienced, and | | emergency preparedness capability was never compromised." | | | | The NRC Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Phillips), NRR EO (Grimes), | | and IRO (Congel). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35438 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 03/04/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 01:15[EST]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 03/04/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 00:28[EST]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: BILL RUDD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CAUDLE JULIAN R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AOUT 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) OUTSIDE DESIGN BASIS | | |NLCO TECH SPEC LCO A/S | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | IMPROVED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVIEW FOUND SUSPECT SURVEILLANCE. | | | | The licensee identified a suspect surveillance during a programmatic review | | of Improved Technical Specifications Surveillances. The surveillance | | involved the timers for the hydrogen skimmer suction isolation valves. The | | acceptance criteria in the surveillance procedure was higher than allowed by | | the acceptance criteria of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Table 7-15. | | The licensee entered LCO 3.0.3 due to both trains being out of tolerance. | | The licensee exited LCO 3.0.3 at 0059 EST after one of the timers was | | recalibrated and that train was declared operable. | | | | The licensee also verified that the Unit 1 hydrogen skimmer suction valve | | timers were in specification. One of Unit 1's valves was out of | | specification and will be reported as a 30-day written report. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | | | | * * * RETRACTION AT 0931 ON 05/05/99 FROM RUDD TAKEN BY STRANSKY * * * | | | | "After further review and evaluation, Engineering determined that the | | Hydrogen Skimmer System would have operated within the response time limits | | specified in the Technical Specifications and the Updated Final Safety | | Analysis Report. As a result, both trains of the Unit 2 Hydrogen Skimmer | | System were operable, and the unit was never outside of its design basis. | | Therefore, Catawba is withdrawing the ENS notification for this event." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this retraction. The HOO | | notified the R2DO (Christensen). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35605 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/19/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 16:06[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/19/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:45[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG SOSSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |MOHAMED SHANBAKY R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |DDDD 73.71 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | - PLANT SECURITY REPORT - | | | | Unescorted access was inappropriately granted to the plant protected area. | | Compensatory measures were taken immediately upon discovery. (Contact the | | NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.) | | | | The licensee plans to inform the NRC Resident Inspector. | | | | * * * RETRACTED AT 1643 EDT ON 05/05/99 FROM BECKI DOLHANCZYK TO FANGIE | | JONES * * * | | | | This event is retracted as it did not constitute a Regulatory Unauthorized | | Access, but a Limerick Generating Station administrative access deficiency. | | (Contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.) | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The NRC | | Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R1DO (James Linville). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ !!!!!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!!! +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35645 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: VERMONT YANKEE REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/28/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: VT |NOTIFICATION TIME: 11:21[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 04/28/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:30[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DENNIS MAY |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CLIFFORD ANDERSON R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | HPCI SYSTEM INOPERABLE | | | | During an I&C surveillance test of pressure switches associated with the | | High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line, one of four low steam | | line pressure switches failed its test. The licensee closed both HPCI steam | | isolation valves rendering HPCI inoperable. The licensee has verified the | | operability of the Automatic Depressurization System as required by plant | | technical specifications. | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification by the | | licensee. | | | | *************** UPDATE AT 1106 ON 05/05/99 FROM ANDREW WISNIEWSKI TO TROCINE | | *************** | | | | The HPCI system was taken out of service (isolated) because of an inoperable | | pressure switch which was part of the primary containment isolation system | | (PCIS). After further review, the licensee determined that the system was | | intentionally removed from service in accordance with the technical | | specifications for PCIS. Therefore, the licensee believes that this event | | is not reportable and is retracting this event notification. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC resident inspector, and the licensee's | | Corporate Office may notify the state. The NRC operations officer notified | | the R1DO (Linville). | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35650 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 04/29/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 08:28[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 04/28/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 14:15[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |JOHN MADERA R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |FREDERICK COMBS NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+ | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: ERIC WALKER | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: BOB STRANSKY | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | 24-HOUR NRC BULLETIN 91-01 REPORT | | | | The following is text from a facsimile submitted to the NRC Operations | | Center: | | | | "During a walkdown of C-710, room 6, a group of small chemical traps with | | tags indicating less than 5 pounds of uranium were discovered in violation | | of [the] NCSA GEN-10 two-foot spacing requirement for UH pieces of | | equipment. These items were improperly categorized as spacing exempt based | | on the size criteria of having dimensions in all directions greater than | | that of a 5.5 gallon drum. Fifty-three items would be required prior to | | exceeding the UH mass at 2.0 wt. % U235. Similar incidents involving the | | violation were also discovered in C-710, room 2, C-409, and C-720. GEN-10 | | states that UH items must be spaced a minimum of two feet edge-to-edge from | | other UH items to preclude the accumulation of an unsafe uranium mass. | | | | "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with | | Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criterion A4.a, and Bulletin 91-01, | | Supplement 1. | | | | "SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: | | | | "Although the amount of Fissile material present is far below safe mass for | | each item, double contingency was not maintained because the items were not | | handled as UH and properly spaced. | | | | "POTENTIAL CRITICALITY PATHWAYS INVOLVED (BRIEF SCENARIO(S) OF HOW | | CRITICALITY COULD OCCUR): | | | | "In order for a criticality to be possible, greater than 104 of these items | | which contain less than 5 pounds of uranium each would need to be | | accumulated. | | | | "CONTROLLED PARAMETERS (MASS, MODERATION, GEOMETRY, CONCENTRATION, ETC.): | | | | "Interaction and mass | | | | "ESTIMATED AMOUNT, ENRICHMENT, FORM OF LICENSED MATERIAL (INCLUDE PROCESS | | LIMIT AND % WORST CASE CRITICAL MASS): | | | | "Variable amount. 2.0 wt. % U235, in the form of UO2F2, with a process limit | | of approximately 600 lbs. at 2.0 wt. % U235 | | | | "NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY CONTROL(S) OR CONTROL SYSTEM(S) AND DESCRIPTION | | OF THE FAILURES OR DEFICIENCIES: | | | | "The two process conditions relied on in this scenario for double | | contingency are mass and interaction. | | | | "The first leg of double contingency is based on limiting the mass of | | uranium at 2.0 wt. % U235 to 264 pounds of uranium. This is controlled by | | quantifying the mass of each item using independent NDAs/visual inspections. | | Each individual item contains less than 5 pounds of uranium: therefore, this | | control was not violated. The total mass of all the items placed together at | | each location is less than the UH mass limit. | | | | "The second leg of double contingency is based on limiting interaction | | between UH items. This is controlled by maintaining minimum two-foot | | edge-to-edge spacing between UH items. Spacing was not maintained between | | the items: therefore, this requirement was violated and the process | | condition was lost, | | | | "Since a control relied upon for double contingency was violated, double | | contingency was lost." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been informed of this notification. | | | | * * * * * * * * * * UPDATE AT 1212 EDT ON 05/05/99 FROM TOM WHITE TO FANGIE | | JONES * * * * * * * * * * | | | | "Plant walkdowns have revealed additional locations which are also | | inappropriately spaced under GEN-10 criteria. These additional locations | | are: | | | | C-335, 15 pallets of valve parts, totaling less than 52 items | | C-400, 2 centrifugal pump casings | | | | "The amount of fissile material is far below the safe mass for each item and | | is less than the number of items needed to be greater than a safe mass. NCS | | incident report NCS-INC-99-024 has been revised to encompass these new | | locations." | | | | The NRC resident inspector has been notified of this update, and the onsite | | Department of Energy site representative will be notified by Paducah | | personnel. The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer notified the R3DO (Monte | | Phillips), NMSS EO (Don Cool), and IRO (Frank Congel) | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35675 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: LIMERICK REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: PA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 04:38[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 02:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: GREG SOSSON |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES LINVILLE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AESF 50.72(b)(2)(ii) ESF ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | ISOLATION OF THE 'B' LOOP DRYWELL CHILLED WATER INBOARD SUPPLY AND RETURN | | VALVES DURING PERFORMANCE OF A SPECIAL PROCEDURE TO DEENERGIZE A SAFEGUARDS | | BUS | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "On 05/05/99 at 0200 hours, it was discovered that an [engineered safety | | feature] actuation occurred on the Unit 2 Drywell Chilled Water (DWCW) | | system. This isolation occurred at approximately 2300 on 05/02/99 during | | performance of a special procedure to deenergize the D22 safeguards bus." | | | | "With Unit 2 in OPCON 5, the 'B' loop DWCW inboard supply and return valves | | HV-087-222 and HV-087-223 isolated when the power supply to an interposing | | relay was deenergized per a special procedure on 05/02/99. This special | | procedure did not properly address the valve closure. During this special | | procedure, power was later removed from both valves. This removed control | | room indication of their position, and their closure was not immediately | | detected. Later, station personnel observed increasing drywell | | temperatures. The follow-up investigation revealed the isolation valves were | | closed by local verification." | | | | "Additional investigation found several containment atmosphere sample valves | | and primary containment instrument gas [primary containment isolation | | valves] that also closed during the loss of power. These conditions were | | also expected but not properly documented in the special procedure." | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35676 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: HATCH REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: GA |NOTIFICATION TIME: 09:21[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 07:48[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: EDWIN URQUHART |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 A/R Y 98 Power Operation |0 Hot Shutdown | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | A GENERATOR TRIP FOR UNKNOWN REASONS RESULTED IN A TURBINE TRIP AND | | SUBSEQUENT AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM. | | | | At 0748, the main generator tripped for unknown reasons. The generator trip | | caused a main turbine trip on power load unbalance, and the turbine trip | | caused an automatic reactor scram from 98% power because the reactor was at | | a power level of greater than 30%. All control rods fully inserted, and all | | systems functioned as required. Nine of eleven safety relief valves opened | | due to the expected high pressure when the main turbine tripped, and all of | | these valves properly reseated. The recirculation pumps also tripped as | | expected based on opening of the EOC/RPT (end of cycle/recirculation pump | | trip) breakers because the unit was at a power level of greater than 30%. | | The main steam isolation valves remained open. There were no emergency core | | cooling system (ECCS) or engineered safety feature actuations, and none were | | required. Narrow range level decreased to +8 inches, and the first ECCS | | injection setpoint is -35 inches narrow range. Normal level is +37 inches | | narrow range. | | | | The unit is currently stable in Hot Shutdown. Condensate is supplying water | | to the reactor vessel, and steam is being bypassed to the condenser. The | | recirculation pumps have been restarted. Containment parameters are normal. | | Offsite power is available, and the emergency diesel generators are operable | | if needed. | | | | The cause of the main generator trip is currently under investigation. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35677 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SUMMER REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 10:17[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-3-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/02/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 18:00[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: JEFF PEASE |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: LEIGH TROCINE +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: |JAMES LINVILLE R1 | |CCCC 21.21 UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 | | |BILL JONES R4 | | |VERN HODGE (fax) NRR | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N N 0 Refueling |0 Refueling | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | GENERIC CONCERNS REGARDING A COMMON MODE FAILURE FOR MAGNE-BLAST BREAKERS | | | | The following text is a portion of a facsimile received from the licensee: | | | | "This is report is being made pursuant to 10CFR21.21 to identify a | | Substantial Safety Hazard with General Electric 7.2-kV Magne-Blast | | Breakers." | | | | "On April 15, 1999, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station submitted a potential | | Substantial Safety Hazard report due to 7.2-kV breakers which failed to | | close. After further investigation and testing, it has been determined that | | a Substantial Safety Hazard could exist with this failure to close. The | | identified problem deals with a cotter pin striking the latch check switch | | mounting bracket and bending it forward. This removes the factory set | | clearance between the bracket and the switch actuating paddle. This results | | in the paddle, which is bolted to the trip shaft, rolling the trip shaft to | | the trip position when the breaker attempts to close. The cotter pin | | problem is considered a defect in repair. This condition represents a | | potential for a common mode failure for safety-related Magne-Blast | | breakers." | | | | "V.C. Summer Nuclear Station utilizes these breakers in many applications, | | including the 7.2-kV Emergency Diesel Generator electrical buses." | | | | "The function of the latch check switch is to enable rapid repeated breaker | | closures, which is not required in the V.C. Summer application of these | | breakers. Engineering has determined that removal of the latch check | | switch, the latch switch mounting bracket, and the actuating paddle will | | prevent recurrence of this problem in the future." | | | | The licensee stated that this action has already been taken on all of the | | safety-related Magne-Blast breakers. However, this action has not been | | taken for the non-safety-related Magne-Blast breakers located in the balance | | of plant. These breakers are normally closed and stay closed throughout the | | cycle. The licensee stated that these are not restart items. All have been | | done with the exception of four, which feed the transformers for the 480-V | | switchgear. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35678 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: CATAWBA REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | UNIT: [] [2] [] STATE: SC |NOTIFICATION TIME: 12:01[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 04:52[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CHRIS ORR |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ASHU 50.72(b)(1)(i)(A) PLANT S/D REQD BY TS | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ | | | |2 N N 0 Hot Standby |0 Hot Standby | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN FOR AUXILIARY FEEDWATER | | MAINTENANCE | | | | The plant is being shutdown to Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) to perform maintenance | | on the assured source piping for the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The piping | | is biologically fouled and was reported in event notification #35670. The | | maintenance required will be pipe cleaning which will necessitate the | | shutdown of each train. Only one train will be done at a time, leaving only | | one train available for operation which is only allowed per the technical | | specifications in Mode 4 or below. The plant will remain in Mode 4 until | | the systems are restored to full operation. Unit 1 is defueled at this | | time, so there is no impact on its present operation. | | | | At 1130 EDT, the licensee determined that a 1-hour report had not been made | | earlier (within 1-hour of the determination of the required shutdown) and | | made this notification at 1201 EDT. | | | | The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Fuel Cycle Facility |Event Number: 35679 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | RXTYPE: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 13:08[EDT]| | COMMENTS: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER |EVENT DATE: 05/04/1999| | 6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE |EVENT TIME: 12:10[CDT]| | BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200 |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | CITY: PADUCAH REGION: 3 +-----------------------------+ | COUNTY: McCRACKEN STATE: KY |PERSON ORGANIZATION | |LICENSE#: GDP-1 AGREEMENT: Y |MONTE PHILLIPS R3 | | DOCKET: 0707001 |DON COOL NMSS | +------------------------------------------------+FRANK CONGEL IRO | | NRC NOTIFIED BY: TOM WHITE | | | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES | | +------------------------------------------------+ | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A | | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |NBNL RESPONSE-BULLETIN | | | | | | | | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | NRC BULLETIN 91-01 24-HOUR REPORT, LOSS OF CRITICALITY CONTROL | | | | "On 05/04/99 at 1210 CDT, while performing a walkdown of C-333 for GEN-10 | | items, a 'square-to-round process pipe' was discovered which did not have an | | NCS tagging, posting, or NCSA controls applied. It is believed that this | | equipment has been exposed to process gas. If the square-to-round contains | | fissile material, it should have been controlled under GEN-010 or NCSA | | GEN-20/27. The controls provided in these NCSAs ensure compliance with the | | double contingency principle. An Nondestructive Analysis has been performed | | on this equipment with results indicating mass of uranium being much less | | than the safe mass. However, no NCS controls were applied, double | | contingency cannot be demonstrated for this equipment, and double | | contingency was lost. | | | | "This event is being categorized as a 24-hour event in accordance with | | Safety Analysis Report Table 6.9-1, Criteria A.4.a, and Bulletin 91-01, | | Supplement 1 report. | | | | "PGDP Problem Report No. ATR-99-2568, PGDP Event Report No. PAD-1999-034, | | Event Worksheet 35679. | | | | "The NRC Senior resident inspector has been notified of this event." | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35680 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: GINNA REGION: 1 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | UNIT: [1] [] [] STATE: NY |NOTIFICATION TIME: 19:17[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] W-2-LP |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 15:33[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: DOUG GOMEZ |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |JAMES LINVILLE R1 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |ARPS 50.72(b)(2)(ii) RPS ACTUATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 97 Power Operation |94 Power Operation | | | | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | TURBINE POWER RUNBACK SIGNAL FROM REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM | | | | The unit received a runback signal from Overpower Delta T channels 3 and 4 | | for 1.2 sec, during which time turbine reference power decreased from 90.7% | | to 90.3%. Actual turbine load was manually reduced to lower reactor power | | to 94% for increased margin to the runback. I&C personnel are investigating | | why the signal actuated as there is no readily apparent reason. | | | | This report is required per the unit's procedures. | | | | The licensee plans to notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public | | Service Commission for the State of New York. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ |Power Reactor |Event Number: 35681 | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | FACILITY: SAINT LUCIE REGION: 2 |NOTIFICATION DATE: 05/05/1999| | UNIT: [1] [2] [] STATE: FL |NOTIFICATION TIME: 20:16[EDT]| | RXTYPE: [1] CE,[2] CE |EVENT DATE: 05/05/1999| +------------------------------------------------+EVENT TIME: 17:42[EDT]| | NRC NOTIFIED BY: CALVIN WARD |LAST UPDATE DATE: 05/05/1999| | HQ OPS OFFICER: FANGIE JONES +-----------------------------+ +------------------------------------------------+PERSON ORGANIZATION | |EMERGENCY CLASS: N/A |CHRIS CHRISTENSEN R2 | |10 CFR SECTION: | | |AIND 50.72(b)(2)(iii)(D) ACCIDENT MITIGATION | | | | | | | | | | | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |UNIT |SCRAM CODE|RX CRIT|INIT PWR| INIT RX MODE |CURR PWR| CURR RX MODE | +-----+----------+-------+--------+-----------------+--------+-----------------+ |1 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | |2 N Y 100 Power Operation |100 Power Operation | | | | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ EVENT TEXT +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE DETERMINED TO BLOCK BOTH SIAS ACTUATION CHANNELS | | | | "During performance of a monthly surveillance of the Safety Injection | | Actuation System (SIAS) circuitry at St. Lucie Unit 2, a licensed Senior | | Operator questioned the acceptability of procedure steps which blocked both | | actuation channel of SIAS. | | | | "The licensed Senior Operator ordered the surveillance testing secured | | pending a plant technical review and verification of his conclusion that | | both SIAS actuation channels were blocked simultaneously by the surveillance | | procedure. Technical review of the procedure confirmed that both SIAS | | actuation channels were simultaneously blocked for brief periods (less than | | 1 minute) during the surveillance as currently written. | | | | "This surveillance has been performed in a similar manner for a long period | | of time on both St. Lucie Units 1 and 2. The surveillance procedure will be | | revised such that only one SIAS channel will be blocked at any one time. | | | | "The SIAS actuation circuitry is currently operable on both St. Lucie Units | | 1 and 2. " | | | | The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | +------------------------------------------------------------------------------+