Plant License Renewal (Turkey Point) - March 13, 2002

 
 
 
 
Official Transcript of Proceedings 
 
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
 
Title: Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
 Plant License Renewal Subcommittee
 
Docket Number: (not applicable)
 
 
Location: Florida City, Florida
 
 
Date: Wednesday, March 13, 2002
 
 
 
 
Work Order No.: NRC-278 Pages 1-111
 
 

 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
 Court Reporters and Transcribers
 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20005
 (202) 234-4433 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 + + + + +
 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
 PLANT LICENSE RENEWAL SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
 (ACRS)
 + + + + +
 TURKEY POINT LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION
 + + + + +
 WEDNESDAY
 MARCH 13, 2002
 + + + + +
 FLORIDA CITY, FLORIDA
 + + + + + 
 The Subcommittee met in the Council
 Chambers, City Hall, 404 West Palm Drive, Florida 
 City, Florida, at 1:30 p.m., Dr. Mario V. Bonaca, 
 Chairman, presiding. 
 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
 DR. MARIO V. BONACA, Chairman
 DR. F. PETER FORD, Member
 DR. THOMAS S. KRESS, Member
 DR. WILLIAM J. SHACK, Member
 
 
 
 ALSO PRESENT:
 DR. JOHN BARTON, ACRS Consultant
 MR. NOEL F. DUDLEY, ACRS Staff Engineer
 
 STAFF PRESENT:
 CHRIS GRIMES, NRR
 RAJ AULUCK
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 I-N-D-E-X
 AGENDA ITEM PAGE
 Opening Remarks by Subcommittee Chairman . . . . . 4
 Opening Remarks by C. Grimes . . . . . . . . . . . 9
 Safety Evaluation Report by R. Auluck, NRR . . . .10
 Discussion by Subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . .71
 Adjournment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
 (1:30 p.m.)
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Good afternoon. This
 is the meeting of the ACRS Subcommittee on Plant
 License Renewal. I am Mario Bonaca, Chairman of the
 Subcommittee. 
 The ACRS Members and consultants in
 attendance are Peter Ford, Thomas Kress, Jack Sieber,
 William Shack, and John Barton.
 The purpose of this meeting is to review
 the Staff Safety Evaluation Report related to the
 application for license renewal of the operating
 licenses for Units 3 and 4 of the Turkey Point Nuclear
 Plant.
 The Subcommittee reviewed the application
 and the associated safety evaluation report with open
 items on September 25, 2001. 
 The Subcommittee will gather information,
 analyze relevant issues and facts, and formulate the
 proposed positions and actions, as appropriate, for
 deliberation by the full committee. Noel Dudley is the
 Cognizant ACRS Staff engineer for this meeting.
 The rules for participation in today's
 meeting have been announced as part of the notice of
 this meeting previously published in the Federal
 Register on January 31st, 2002.
 A transcript of this meeting is being kept
 and will be made available a stated in the Federal
 Register Notice. It is requested that speakers first
 identify themselves and speak with sufficient clarity
 and volume so that they can be readily heard. 
 Before I proceed with this, I would like
 to point out that copies of this presentation for the
 afternoon are in the back of the room, as well as
 copies of the application of Turkey Point for a
 renewal license.
 We have received no requests for time to
 make oral statements from members of the public
 regarding today's meeting. However, we have received
 written comments from Mr. Mark Oncavage, a member of
 the public. I will now read his comments.
 "I live 14 miles from Turkey Point and I
 have safety concerns about the continued operation of
 Turkey Point through the license renewal period. I
 will not be able to attend the public meeting on March
 13th, 2002 as I will be out of the country. I request
 that you inform the members of the ACRS of my safety
 concerns."
 "One. In the early eighties the licensee
 replaced steam generator lower assemblies in Units 3
 and 4. The assemblies were too big to fit through the
 existing doors, and so the doorways were widened. 
 Voids, up to four feet in length, were discovered in
 the doorway."
 "All indications I have seen show that no
 further examinations for voids in the walls of the
 containment buildings were ever performed. I am
 concerned that thousands of voids in each building may
 exist."
 "These voids may accelerate age related
 degradation by increasing internal surface area which
 may be subject to oxidation, hydration, crumbling,
 microbiotic action, and faulting. This degradation
 could also weaken the tendons, reinforcement roads,
 and the steel liner."
 "As the plant ages, the structural
 strength of the buildings may be increasingly
 questionable in regard to an international terrorist
 air crash. Region II officials have been aware of the
 issue since June 2001 and have taken no action."
 "Two. An unconfirmed story states that
 Hurricane Andrew, 1992, isolated Turkey Point for
 days. Diesel fuel for station power was only a few
 hours away from being exhausted when help finally
 arrived. Hurricane Andrew was a category four storm,
 not a category five maximum hurricane."
 "I'm concerned that the single road
 servicing Turkey Point is easily blocked, a maximum
 storm could disable diesel generators, diesel storage
 tanks could be damaged, batteries could be
 insufficient or damaged, the electrical grid could be
 off-line, or the site could run out of fuel."
 "A category five hurricane would bring a
 higher storm surge, higher waves, and higher winds
 than those experienced in Andrew. Station blackout
 would be more likely."
 "Three. The Turkey Point site, on the
 shore of Biscayne Bay, has been raised to 18 feet
 above sea level. A category five hurricane is likely
 to produce an 18 to 20 foot storm surge with storm
 waves superimposed on top of the surge."
 "I'm concerned that hurricanes or
 terrorist air crashes could collapse the auxiliary
 building over the spent fuel pools. The concrete roof
 collapsing into the spent fuel pool would radically
 change the spent fuel geometry, possibly initiating
 uncontrollable criticality."
 "An intentional terrorist air crash could
 possibly destroy the auxiliary building and
 simultaneously damage the control room if the aircraft
 made its approach from the east."
 "Four. An issue the NRC staff and the
 licensee refuse to acknowledge is the safety of spent
 fuel after 2009. In that year both units 3 and 4 lose
 their ability to off-load a full core. Public safety
 has been put into a vacuum for the relicensing
 process."
 "All negative factors such as aging
 management, hurricanes, station blackout, and
 terrorist acts will be present, but no safety studies
 of spent fuel storage options have been performed."
 "As an informed citizen, I find the
 relicensing seriously deficient. I urge the Advisory
 Committee on Reactor Safeguards to refuse to meet on
 this matter until all safety issues have been
 satisfactorily resolved and an acceptable margin of
 safety has been provided."
 The staff will address these concerns as
 part of today's presentation. We will now proceed
 with the meeting, and I call upon Mr. Christopher
 Grimes, Program Director for the License Renewal
 Environmental Impacts, to begin.
 MR. DUDLEY: Mr. Chairman, before we
 begin, I would like to check to see if there is anyone
 of the speaker phone, and if they could let us know
 who is on the phone, and also let us know if you can
 hear us. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Is there anyone on the
 speaker phone?
 UNKNOWN VOICE: Yes, this is from
 headquarters.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Can you hear us?
 UNKNOWN VOICE: Yes.
 MR. DUDLEY: Okay. Fine. If there are
 questions, we will need to direct them to you, and
 then put the speaker phone closer to a mike so that
 the transcriber can hear you.
 UNKNOWN VOICE: Very good. Thanks. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Good.
 MR. GRIMES: Thank you, Dr. Bonaca. I am
 Chris Grimes, and I am the Program Director for
 License Renewal and Environmental Impacts. I think
 first and foremost I would like to thank the advisory
 committee on reactor safeguards, and particularly Dr.
 Bonaca for your support, and assistance as we develop
 the license renewal program. 
 As most of you have learned through the
 trade press by now, on April 7th, I will assume new
 responsibilities, and I think a large measure of the
 accomplishments of the license renewal program and the
 focus on effective aging management, and maintaining
 plant safety through a relicense period, was due in
 part to the excellent working relationship that the
 staff established with the advisory committee.
 As you said, Dr. Bonaca, the purpose of
 this meeting today is for the staff to describe the
 resolution of the open items in a safety evaluation
 report, and we are going to do that. I am going to
 introduce Raj Auluck, who is the senior project
 manager in charge of the Turkey Point license renewal
 review.
 And he is going to lead you through the
 resolution of those open items and address the issues
 raised by Mr. Oncavage. 
 MR. AULUCK: Good afternoon. I am Raj
 Auluck, and I am the project manager for the review of
 the Turkey Point License Renewal Application. The
 purpose of today's meeting is to present the staff's
 review of the Turkey Point License Renewal
 Application, and to describe the resolution of the
 open items, and the basis upon which we will move
 forward to make a recommendation.
 I would like to introduce two staff
 members, Jim Medoff who is on a rotational assignment
 from the Division of Engineering, and who will be
 assisting me in the presentation; and I also have
 Caudle Julian from Region II, who has been the lead
 inspector and team leader for all of the inspections
 performed by Region II for license renewal
 applications.
 We also have a telephone bridge set up
 with the headquarters, and staff members are available
 to support this meeting.
 Before we do that, I would like to make a
 comment on the letter to ACRS. If you read the
 letter, we can try to group these concerns into four
 bullets as shown on the slide. They are effects of
 voids on aging degradation rates and the structural
 integrity of concrete containment structures.
 The second one is the effect of design
 basis hurricane wind speeds and storm waves on safe
 operation of Turkey Point Nuclear Plant.
 The third one is the effect of terrorist
 air attacks on the safety and operability of the
 Turkey Point nuclear units. And the four one is the
 Turkey Point spent fuel capacity.
 These are all old issues, and have been
 raised by Mr. Oncavage in some form or another
 previously, and they have been addressed by the staff. 
 We will go into some more details later on in our
 presentation, but at this time I would like to go back
 to the review of the application.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So do you plan to
 address these?
 MR. AULUCK: Yes, we plan to come back to
 these.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: After you address the
 open items and the application?
 MR. AULUCK: Yes. The application was
 received a little over 18 months back, and this was
 the fifth application received by the NRC. Four
 applications have been approved so far, and this is
 the First Westinghouse PWR, and this is two unit site,
 and each unit is designed for 2300 megawatts thermal.
 The site is shared by two oil and gas
 fired generator units. The plant is located about 25
 miles from Miami. For the Unit 3, the license expires
 on July 19th, 2012; and for Unit 4, on April 10th,
 2013. This application is for a 20 year extension of
 the license.
 This slide is an update of what I
 presented in September of 2000. Items to note are
 that the SER was issued on August 17th, 2001, and
 final SER resolution of items, with open items, was
 issued on February 28th. 
 Final environmental impact statement
 related to the staff's complete optional final
 inspection was issued on January 15th of this year. 
 The next milestones are to complete the staff's
 presentations briefing the ACRS subcommittee and the
 full committee next month, and prepare a Commission
 paper with recommendations.
 Originally, the schedule, which was issued
 in October of 2000, was based on a 30 month schedule,
 and since there was no hearing, and a few open items,
 we were able to move up that schedule to this current
 schedule. 
 Now, let's just talk about the staff's
 review and the process Now, two sets of regulation
 requirements govern the review of license renewal
 applications. 
 First, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 54, the NRC
 staff conducts a technical review of the license
 renewal application to assure that the public safety
 requirements have been satisfied.
 The second, pursuant to 10 CFR Part 51,
 the NRC staff completes an environmental review of the
 license renewal, focusing upon potential impacts of at
 least 20 years of operation. 
 And as there many programs which routinely
 monitor and assess plant operations that our license
 renewal review focuses upon those potential damaging
 effects of aging that are not routinely addressed by
 the oversight programs.
 Part 54 requires renewal applicants to
 demonstrate how their programs will be affected in
 managing the effects of aging during the proposed
 period of extended operation. 
 This is a detailed assessment conducted by
 the competent structural level arrived at the systems
 level. The staff review consisted of a review of the
 applicant's scoping and screening methodology, and a
 review of the aging management programs, and a review
 of the time limited aging analysis identified by the
 applicant meeting the criteria of 10 CFR 54.3.
 These reviews are supplemented by site
 audits and inspections by the NRC staff. We will have
 a separate slide to summarize the results of the
 inspections.
 The scoping and screening methodology
 review was done in two parts; desk top review, which
 is basically an initial review of the application, and
 the supporting information. 
 The second is the on-site audit, where the
 staff, about 5 to 7 staff members, with support from
 Region II, went to the site and reviewed the LRA
 implementation process, and reviewed engineering
 reports, and engineering procedures, design
 documentation, and had an opportunity to discuss
 individually with the systems engineer or with people
 responsible in those areas.
 This site audit is completed early in the
 review process, and in the case of Turkey Point, it
 was completed in November of 2000, which is a little
 over two months after the application was received.
 The major audit findings indicated that
 the applicant's approach is consistent with 10 CDR
 50.4, and the scoping process was very defined, and
 proceduralized; and, third, the audit provided
 confirmation of the process implementation. 
 I would like to mention that it was during
 this audit early in the review process that the issue
 of interaction of non-safe piping versus safety piping
 was first raised, and then just became an open item.
 As you can see, 10 CFR 54.29 describes the
 standards which must be met before the Commission
 issues a new license. We have already talked about
 the first two items. The first one is the issue of
 safety, and the second one relates to a normal review.
 The third one I would like to make some
 comments on that. There was no hearing on this
 application, but there were two requests, five
 petitions to interview, and a request for a hearing.
 On January 18th, 2001, the Atomic Board
 and Licensing Panel held a prehearing conference in
 Homestead, Florida, to hear the petitioner's standing
 and admissibility on the contingents. 
 In their order issued on February 26th,
 2001, the board ruled that although both parties have
 standing to intervene, but neither petitioner
 proffered admissible contingents. 
 Their intervention petitions therefore
 must be denied. Most of the issues raised in Mr.
 Oncavage's letter to the ACRS was in some form or
 other filed with these contingents, and thus have been
 found to be inadmissible. 
 The Board also ruled that these
 contingents raised issues that fall beyond the scope
 of license renewal reviews, and in new proceedings on
 March 19th, 2001, Mr. Oncavage, one of the
 petitioners, appealed the Board's decision to the
 Commission. On July 19th, the Commission issued an
 order affirming both decisions. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I have a question. 
 During our subcommittee meeting of September 2001, we
 had presentations regarding scoping and screening, and
 the process broken down into five components that fall
 into the rule.
 And the impression that we got was that
 the application, the reviews of the application were
 pretty scrutable and clear. There were over 200
 requests for additional information that you raised I
 believe on this application.
 Is there any conflict between the two? I
 mean, why did you have so many requests for additional
 information? Was it mostly because you were just --
 MR. AULUCK: As I go later on, there were
 about 215 requests for additional information on this
 application, which was substantially lower than the
 one before it, which was in the high three hundreds.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay.
 MR. AULUCK: And I assumed that the next
 applications, you know, that they should be much less. 
 And because most of the time the applicants learned
 from each other, they go and review the previous
 applications, and they review the RAIs issued by the
 staff. 
 So they are familiar with what the staff
 is looking for than specific areas. So that is my
 expectation. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And so this application
 in your judgment confirms a trend which you were
 pointing out that lessons learned are being utilized,
 and I think the impression that I had was that this
 plant has utilized lessons learned.
 MR. AULUCK: If my memory is correct, I
 think one of the earliest applications had RAIs in the
 range of 400, and then 300, and then 200. So the
 trend is definitely going down.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Also, you had a
 substantial amount of inspection time on this
 application. I believe probably more than what others
 have seen before, and that probably was also due --
 MR. AULUCK: Yes. We had some additional
 interaction with the applicant prior to sending RAIs. 
 One was in a meeting to clarify the application, and
 go walk through what they had in mind when they
 prepared the application and to help us navigate the
 issues and problems in different sections.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: You will talk about
 inspections later, right?
 MR. AULUCK: Yes, we have a separate slide
 on the inspections.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Thank you.
 MR. AULUCK: So of the slides repeat some
 of the September presentation. The applicant
 participated in several industry groups or license
 renewals, including the Westinghouse Owners Group
 effort that developed a series of generic technical
 reports intended to demonstrate that aging effects on
 the reactor coolant components would be adequately
 managed through the period of extended operation.
 The four Westinghouse reports specifically
 were submitted for the staff's review. Usually the
 staff's safety evaluation of the topical reports is
 intended to be stand alone documents, and in this
 application these reports were not incorporated by
 reference because the staff review was not completed
 by the time that the application was submitted.
 But the applicant addressed the
 applicability of these reports to their application,
 and conformed whenever an SER was issued, or there are
 any other changes.
 In addition, the applicant prepared many
 internal license renewal documents under the QA
 program for use in the preparation of the application,
 and training of their staff members.
 If I remember last time, there was a
 question raised on the training of their internal
 staff members, and how the knowledge would be imparted
 to other staff members on an on-site audit, and
 conformed that to -- well, there is a substantial
 amount of documentation on the scoping and screening,
 and design basis documents, that is available.
 And they used that in the training for the
 training of classes.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: This WCAPS being
 reviewed as an SER?
 MR. AULUCK: All of these documents are
 final now, and the SER has been issued, and I think
 the dates are on the slide. 
 The staff reviewed selected portions of
 the (inaudible) documents and scoping documents, and
 AMR inspection documents, and based on our discussions
 with the applicant, apparently as I mentioned earlier,
 prior to preparing their application they had visits
 to other applicants.
 They had a peer review, and so they took
 some advantage of some experience in the industry. We
 have already talked about the number of open items,
 but at the end of our review, during the draft, and
 when we issued a draft SER, there were four open
 items.
 And we had gone over those items during
 our meeting of September of last year. Here is a list
 of those four open items. The first one is scoping
 for Seismic II over I, and the reality interaction of
 non-safety piping and competence with the safety
 related systems and components.
 The second one was the acceptance criteria
 for Field Erected Tanks Internal Inspection, Aging
 Management Program; and the third is the scope of the
 reactor vessel head alloy 600 penetration inspection
 program.
 And the last one was the reactor pressure
 vessel underclad cracking. The first one as I
 mentioned, it was noted when we did the scoping
 inspection, and at that time the staff did not agree
 with the applicant's scoping criteria for Seismic II
 over I piping.
 The staff's position has always been that
 Seismic II over I piping systems, whose failures could
 prevent safety related systems and structures for
 completing their intended function should be included
 within the scope of license renewal. 
 This was the same issue which was under
 discussion with another applicant at that time, and so
 we requested that the applicant, Turkey Point Power
 Plant, to wait until the issue is resolved on the
 other application.
 And that was the October time frame, and
 so once that was resolved and the staff's position was
 agreed upon, Florida Power and Light responded on
 their number one on our RAI on this issue.
 The major concerns that the staff had was
 that because of age degradation non-safety related
 piping could fail anywhere along the land, and not at
 postulated break locations.
 So with that in mind, Florida Power and
 Light reviewed the areas, and they had used the area
 based approach in identifying II over I issues, and
 there were nine areas, and based on the supplemental
 review, they found that they had to make changes, and
 add other extra piping into the scope in five of those
 areas.
 And this was in the auxiliary building,
 the control building, the turbine building, and yard
 structures. And to manage the aging effect, the
 applicant using the chemistry controlled program, flow
 executed corrosion, and systems and structures
 management program as applicable, to manage the of
 effects of aging.
 The staff finds this response acceptable
 and therefore this open item is closed. Any
 questions?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, for the record, it
 is not that some elements, such as no safety related
 piping had not been included already. The issue was
 that the piping, or the issues at hand were really the
 corrosion or erosion of piping, and not other issues,
 as for example, a hemorrhage line or break locations
 that would cause additional piping to possibly fail in
 that system interaction.
 That was really --
 MR. AULUCK: Yes, sir.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So that is the
 clarification that really made the additional scope.
 MR. AULUCK: Yes. The next one is
 acceptance --
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: We, by the way, had a
 presentation of the subject this morning from the site
 during our walk down and I don't know if there are any
 further questions from the members regarding these
 issues of 2 over I?
 DR. BARTON: I think the questions that I
 had on II over I have been resolved based on a
 discussion that we had at the plant site this morning.
 MR. DUDLEY: Mr. Barton, you may want to
 for the public explain what you heard at the site that
 allowed you to reach that conclusion.
 DR. BARTON: Well, Seismic II over I, I
 think, has been an issue with every application that
 I have been involved in reviewing, and so I guess it
 has been generic with every application.
 And what I heard today which was a little
 different, and which helped clarify for me, was that
 maybe it is not just Seismic II over I, but it is
 really what failures of non-safety related systems or
 components, based on the failure of that system or
 component, could impact a safety related system. 
 And that to me is broader than just
 seismic II over I, and I think this applicant has
 understood that and addressed it, and I think that
 some of the other applicants have not really got the
 word yet, or got the picture on this thing.
 And what I would suggest the staff do is
 to kind of clarify this issue, because unless they do,
 I think it is going to continue to be an issue, an
 open issue in every application that comes down the
 pipe.
 MEMBER KRESS: And the question that I
 have about that, John, is that when you look at the
 impacts of the non-safety and safety, you have to do
 something, and I have not seen criteria for what they
 do to determine that impact.
 And that needs to be clarified to me, and
 I don't know how the staff reviewed that part of it.
 MEMBER SHACK: The area of method where
 they looked at what was impacted?
 MEMBER KRESS: Yes.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I think that is a
 program that would have to be established to deal with
 those things.
 MEMBER SHACK: But I think one of the
 clarifications at least is that the staff is not
 asking anybody to postulate failures in the system. 
 They are really looking for systems where failure
 mechanisms have been observed, or applaudable, or
 expected in fact.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right.
 MEMBER SHACK: And to then deal with that
 experience, and so it is not a postulated failure. It
 really is an experience-based argument for selecting
 the systems that need to be addressed, which I think
 is a risk-informed, performance-based kind of approach
 to it.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And for the record by
 the way, we have seen significant guidance from the
 NRC on a previous application, and I think the latest
 one we saw was Hatch. And for that, we recommended in
 fact the guidance that we provided to all the
 licensees, because the guidance was very clear.
 I mean, the first time it was a document
 where the logic used by the staff was very, very,
 clearly stated, and the concern was that until now any
 time you had an evaluation of impact, it had to be
 Seismic II over I, or was original line break, for
 example, which suggests specific locations where
 stresses may be.
 This has to do with the aging of the
 piping, and so therefore maybe corrosion or erosion
 effects, which may cause failure of segments in
 different locations, and those are realized under
 original line break or Seismic II over I.
 So that's it is introduced at other
 locations now. Now, insofar as the specifics, I
 believe the point that Dr. Shack is making that the
 license has included those segments in their
 inspection program, and monitoring programs, so that
 they can essentially track those segments, and prevent
 those kinds of failures from occurring.
 And should they occur, of course there is
 going to be an impact on certain electrical components
 that Dr. Kress is bringing up here, and I am sure that
 they will be -- well, they must have been evaluated
 for the potential for the -- or otherwise you would
 not have put that piece of piping into the problem.
 MR. AULUCK: I think that the staff has
 prepared a position paper and it has been shared with
 NAI, and it may not be final yet, but I think there
 has been substantial progress made on it.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I think that is a
 question, and hopefully it will be the last time that
 it comes up. 
 DR. SIEBER: I guess I would like to ask
 a question just to clarify something in my own mind. 
 Seismic II over I has to do with having a non-safety
 system in a seismic situation above a safety system
 where its failure of collapse would disable the safety
 system.
 And it also includes pipe width, and jet
 impingement. The one thing that I did not see is if
 you have a Seismic Class II failure that doesn't have
 jet impingement, and does not have pipe whipping, but
 does flood the room where it is at, was that included
 in your classification, the internal approach?
 MR. AULUCK: Yes, flooding is included.
 MR. GRIMES: This is Chris Grimes. I
 would like to clarify that the reason that we used the
 term, Seismic II over I, is that it stimulated this
 issue about non-safety system failures that could
 affect safety related equipment.
 Actually, the memory tool that I use is
 safety interaction with non-safety are SINS. The SINS
 of the design are that there were postulated pipe
 breaks that were based on stress. 
 The design of this Seismic Category II
 piping presumed that so long as you held it up that it
 would not fall down in an earthquake.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Right.
 MR. GRIMES: But the criteria for license
 renewal says that evaluate failures of non-safety
 systems, irrespective of the design basis. And the
 staff evaluation and the guidance that we are
 developing based on this experience, hopefully is
 going to clarify what we consider to be credible age
 related piping failures like Seismic Category II
 piping that simply cracks, or breaks, or leaks, or
 whatever.
 And as FP&L said, it was not our intent to
 change the design basis so much as it was to have them
 reflect on what credible failures there are in these
 systems, and that you need to provide for credit for
 the aging management programs. 
 During your tour this morning, you
 understood that Florida Power and Light has
 substantial aging management programs that they
 conduct as a prudent measure to maintain the plant to
 protect their investment.
 At the heart of the issue here is which
 ones of those need to be credited on a licensing basis
 so that they now come under a regulatory control for
 future changes to those programs and commitments.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Thank you.
 MR. AULUCK: The next open is the
 acceptance criteria for Field Erected Tanks Internal
 Inspection. This is a new program, and at the time
 that the draft SER was issued, the applicant had not
 developed the program fully. That's why it became an
 open item.
 So once the program was completely
 developed, the staff reviewed it and found it
 acceptable. And here the main issues were acceptance
 criteria for a one-time inspection of the tanks.
 The acceptance criteria should also state
 the task at which additional inspections will be
 implemented. And the applicant to describe any
 provisions, if any, for additional volumetric or
 surface examinations on one-time inspections to read
 extensive loss of material.
 And lastly the applicant justified a one-
 time inspection program rather than a periodic
 inspection for each of the tanks. 
 In response the applicant stated that the
 acceptance criteria will be the design conclusion
 allowance, any loss of material greater than the tank
 corrosion allows will require corrective action to
 ensure that the tanks intended functions are
 maintained under all design commissions.
 The time at which additional inspections
 will be implemented will be the corrosion of the steel
 tank. With respect to the one-time inspection program
 rather than the periodic inspection for each of the
 tanks, the applicant stated that currently none of the
 tanks is inspected periodically.
 These tanks are fabricated from carbon
 steel, and services are required to reduce corrosion. 
 Each of these tanks contain treated water with an
 allotment of air and gas. 
 A one-time inspection will utilize a
 direct or diverse, or remote t.v. cameras, or other
 instruments, to observe the inside surfaces. In
 addition, the applicant plans to use the chemistry
 control program to monitor the condition of the
 treated water in each of these tanks.
 The application also stated that although
 these tanks are not currently inspected on a periodic
 basis, the water tank was recently inspected as part
 of the pre-inspection and performed prior to the
 installation of a floating tower inside the tank.
 And they did not see any defects or any
 degradation of the coatings, and the applicant's
 position is that other tanks will be just like that
 and show little or no degradation.
 Therefore, one-time field tanks internal
 inspection will provide the confirmation that no aging
 effects require management for these tanks. If in
 this one-time inspection, if they do find something,
 they will put it in their corrective action program,
 and take appropriate action.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: For this one did they
 enter the renewal period?
 MR. AULUCK: Yes.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And they will be
 affecting all the tanks?
 MR. AULUCK: All the three tanks.
 MEMBER FORD: Could I just ask another
 question on this? Do I understand that the internals
 of the tank have been inspected once and no
 degradation has been seen?
 MR. AULUCK: Only two of the three tanks. 
 MEMBER FORD: Only two of the three tanks
 have been inspected once, and no degradation?
 MR. AULUCK: No, one was on the storage
 tank that they did find degradation, and they were
 recoated and that was because of inferior coating done
 earlier.
 MEMBER FORD: Okay. Is there any other
 industry, and not particularly the nuclear industry,
 but any other industry experience to indicate that the
 particular coating systems that you are using and in
 the environment that you are using them in, that it is
 justifiable to go forever without inspecting. Well,
 forever is a long time.
 MR. AULUCK: I am sure in every industry
 that they will do some inspection, an exterior
 inspection, and that will indicate or provide some
 indication that they will have to have some
 inspections. It may not be interior; external surface
 inspections.
 MEMBER FORD: This makes me feel a bit
 uncomfortable in the area of corrosion, because you
 are going to take it as a given, and that you will
 inspect it once in time, or maybe twice in time, and
 make the assumption that for another 20 years nothing
 is going to happen.
 MR. AULUCK: But the very purpose of one-
 time inspection is that you are not expecting any
 corrosion.
 MEMBER FORD: Well, that is precisely my
 point. This is a reactive technology, and generally
 we don't know about it until we forgot it, and that is
 why I asked if there is any experience in other
 industries to back up that presumption.
 MR. AULUCK: I do not know, but I do not
 think that the experience is not on a given site. I
 am sure if any on any site a degradation is found that
 information will be passed to the other members and a
 generic action will be proposed, or some action will
 be taken. It is a sharing of information.
 MR. GRIMES: I will respond first, and
 then I will also ask Dr. Shack to see whether or not
 there is a squeak from under your chair, and if there
 is anybody on the phone that wants to contribute to
 this. 
 But my observation is that we no longer
 have the benefit of Dr. Davis' corrosion experience,
 but the standards that were established for the
 coating program were intended to provide a system that
 would inhibit corrosion in tanks or other receptacles
 like tanks, so that they did not need to be inspected,
 and so that they would be protected against the
 corrosion.
 And it is not so much that we have
 confidence that we can simply let them sit there and
 never expect to have any experience, or any reason to
 inspect them.
 What we concluded is that there is no need
 for a special periodic routine specified inspection
 activity with acceptance criteria, and that that kind
 of level of inspection is necessary.
 A one time inspection will verify our
 presumption that the coating program either works as
 intended, or it will direct us to a specific kind of
 maintenance activity.
 We have done that in a variety of areas,
 and we have explained how we are confident that the
 reliance on one-time inspections to verify certain
 assumptions about the lack of evidence of an aging
 effect that would effect the safety function can be
 confirmed by a one-time inspection.
 And then also rely on the feedback systems
 from operating experience, including insights that are
 brought into our industry from other industries, like
 the NACE programs, the Petroleum Institutes.
 Those contributed to this insight and 
 this conclusion. So we are confident that that the
 one time inspection, as supplemented by that ongoing
 experience feedback to identify whether or not
 something needs to be done beyond this conclusion and
 this one-time inspection, that safety can rely on that
 basis. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Steve.
 MR. HALE: Yes, I just wanted to clarify
 -- oh, I'm sorry, Steve Hale, Florida Power and Light. 
 There are five tanks that are within the scope of this
 program. There are two RWTs, and the two condensate
 storage tanks, and a demineralized water storage tank.
 We have been in three of them, and we plan
 as part of our commitment to go in those three before
 our license expires, as well as the two RWTs. So we
 are not going down the path of not doing inspection at
 all, but we will be in all the tanks before our
 license expires, and we have been in 3 of the 5
 already.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: The question that I have
 is that you did experience degradation in the
 condensate storage tank, or one of the condensate
 storage tanks, and you had good reasons to explain why
 you had that, and you corrected that reason.
 What is the operating experience for other
 power plants in the country regarding this performance
 of CSTs? Do they have similar experience to what you
 have had, or they normally don't see degradation?
 MR. HALE: Typically, they have not seen
 degradation, and it is really a function of what you
 have exposed the tank to. Certainly that based on our
 review -- and we have not seen anything, because as
 part of our aging management reviews, we looked at
 industry experience. 
 We also drew on EPRI and some of the work
 that was done by the B&W owners group that all of the
 owners groups have bought into and utilized, in terms
 of aging effects and that sort of thing.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: But after you removed
 the causes of the degradation in the CST, you did not
 really go back and verify that in fact degradation is
 happening anymore did you?
 MR. HALE: No, we haven't gone back into
 the CSTs, but again we --
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And with a one-time
 inspection, that will give the conformation.
 MR. HALE: But we plan to go into it again
 before our license expires, and we are also looking
 externally. We are looking regularly externally. 
 So the failure that we had with the CST,
 or not failure, but the corrosion we saw in the CSTs
 was evident from the external surface as well.
 And we think that would be a leading
 indicator if indeed you were having problems.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now, for one previous
 application, we accepted a one-time inspection also on
 the basis that if felt that you would have degradation
 resulting in leakage that was visible, and actions
 could be taken really to maintain the plant safe as
 you repaired that. 
 So that was one of the reasons, but
 certainly it is a consideration, but what I am saying
 that as far as this CST, if you go back into the CST
 and you find that it has again degraded, in spite of
 all of your corrective actions, you would have to
 establish a programmatic initiative to inspect it on
 a certain specificity, right?
 MR. HALE: Yes, certainly, and that is
 what we clarified in the closure of the open item;
 that if indeed we found extensive material loss that
 we would utilize additional inspection methods, as
 well as establishing a periodic inspection as a result
 of those findings.
 DR. SIEBER: Let me attack this just a
 little bit more. When you get corrosion in tanks like
 that, it is typically pitting corrosion, which results
 in leakage. 
 And so I wonder from a safety standpoint
 what the impact of that is, for example, in a
 condensate storage tank, refueling water storage tank,
 demineralized water storage tank.
 You are going to see the leakage, and the
 reactor is not in danger at that point, and you may
 some day have to shut down so that you can repair
 degradation to a tank, but it is to my mind the
 consequence of having leakage from any one of these
 tanks other than the diesel tanks is something that
 can be dealt with in due course.
 And the diesel tanks to me are more of an
 environmental issue, and the detection of leakage
 there is much simpler since they are usually in a
 vault, where you can measure how much leaked out and
 capture it. Is that correct or incorrect from the
 staff's viewpoint?
 MR. SMILAN: My name is --
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: If you would introduce
 yourself, and speak in the microphone. Thank you.
 MR. SMILAN: Thank you. My name is Stan
 Smilan, and I was a Captain for United Airlines, and
 I flew for United Airlines for 36 years. We had
 corrosion problems with airplanes --
 DR. SIEBER: You sure did.
 MR. SMILAN: And if you will recall, we
 had an airline decompress, where they lost part of the
 fuselage, and had a stewardess who was sucked out of
 the airplane. 
 On United Airlines, we had a failure of a
 cargo door on a 747, and which resulted in the
 airplane having to abort, and make a return to
 Honolulu on two engines.
 To my mind, it seems to me that we are
 talking here about pressurized reactors. Now, are
 these pipes within a pressurized environment, and how
 an you compare a pressurized environment to a diesel
 tank that is not pressurized, and that wouldn't start
 to leak. That is my question.
 DR. SIEBER: All the tanks that we are
 talking about are static end tanks, and they are not
 pressurized, except for the hydrostatic head within
 them. 
 So we are not talking a situation like an
 aircraft fuselage that can decompress, and whose
 consequences are sometimes serious. These are less
 so.
 MR. SMILAN: This is not general
 knowledge, but at one time United Airlines was
 considering refurbishing 747 aircraft at their Oakland
 facility. They built an entire facility to do this to
 re-skin the airplanes.
 And after these decompressions took place,
 they realized that because of the corrosion this was
 a pretty bad idea, and they would not go forward with
 it. 
 Singapore Airlines, by contrast, never
 keeps an airplane more than seven years. And they
 sell the airplanes and they have the youngest fleet
 worldwide.
 And one of the reasons is that they are
 very much concerned about corrosion, and this
 particular plant was built for $285 million. By
 contrast, the Schorm facility out on Long Island, cost
 $6.5 billion dollars, and some estimates said it went
 to $7.2 billion. That plant never opened. 
 There was a different issue involved and
 it had to do with the evacuation of the plant. But
 just by virtue of the fact that this plant was built
 for $285 million, these two units, each $285 million
 each, they were very controversial at the time.
 The literature I read on the subject
 indicates that there was a split amongst the
 scientific community and within the Atomic Energy
 Commission, almost half of the scientists quit, and
 formed the Union of Concerned Scientists because they
 were so concerned about the design.
 And you have to contrast the fact that
 this plant was built for $285 million; whereas, to
 build a new plant today would run into the billions of
 dollars.
 And I am so concerned that there are no
 intervenors here to offer responsible rebuttal. And
 let me just make one more point, and this will
 constitute what my input would be as a public
 commentor.
 We had a concept that was introduced on
 the airlines that was called cockpit resource
 management procedures. The airlines were very
 concerned that the captain would make a decision and
 institute some sort of a procedure that could result
 in a loss of the airplane if he acted on his own.
 Now you people on this advisory committee
 I think are very much in the same context as a captain
 on an airplane. You have got to make these decisions.
 The captain is now charged with the
 responsibility of soliciting input from the rest of
 his crew. He has got to consult with the co-pilot,
 and the flight engineer, and reach out beyond the
 cockpit for additional resources, and even consult
 with the manufacturer. 
 He can have the manufacturer in Boeing, or
 McDonald Douglas on the radio to consult with them. 
 And the people who designed the system, and have them
 consult with him. 
 And the captain can't get off the hook by
 saying that nobody came forward to advocate. He has
 to solicit. You have communities here, and you have
 counties, and you have municipalities, and you have
 the State, that has not stepped forward to provide an
 intervenor at these proceedings.
 And they should be providing the funding
 for technical consultants. One very last final item. 
 At Schorm, I participated in the county hearings and
 their environmental committee. The county was the
 only effective intervenor in the Schorm proceedings,
 and that was Suffolk County, in New York.
 They hired independent counsel, provided
 that independent counsel with $50,000 to get technical
 consultants. The Long Island Lighting Company -- and
 I was furnished a letter that was circulated among the
 legislators, and I wrote an article for the New York
 Times.
 And the Long Island Lighting Company had
 the -- they lobbied to have the county legislature
 reduce the funding from $50,000 down to $18,000. They
 only could hire people who had no expertise whatsoever
 regarding the safety of the containment vessel. And
 that was a G.E. boiling water reactor.
 Now, at the licensing hearings, I stepped
 forward, and one of the things that I said was that it
 was if as the door had been locked, and the Long
 Island Lighting Company had tried to prohibit anyone
 from coming forward and offering responsible rebuttal
 to the presentations being made by the utility. 
 And I think the same thing is happening
 here, and one of the things that we really have to
 keep in mind is that in 30 years according to
 statistics being furnished by the South Florida Water
 Management District, the population of South Florida
 will grow to 15 million people.
 The State now has 15 million people, and
 the population in 30 years will double, and 15 million
 people will be located south of Fort Pierce.
 You have to consider what licensing extension you are
 going to get in the context of the increased
 population down here.
 And the fact that the Price Anderson Act
 right now will only reimburse losses of up to 6 or 10
 billion dollars, and the estimates that I have read in
 the paper was that losses down here from a
 catastrophic accident with this reactor could amount
 to 20 to 60 billion dollars.
 And I think that we are on very dangerous
 ground, and I would recommend that you people go
 slowly, solicit from the municipalities their input,
 and ask them to provide them with another opportunity
 to step forward as intervenors and to provide funding
 for technical consultants to come before you to
 provide responsible rebuttal.
 These people are all well-meaning here,
 but it is an adversarial procedure, and there are no
 adversaries coming forward. Thank you. Incidentally,
 I am running for the State Senate.
 MR. GRIMES: Getting back to your
 question, Mr. Sieber, these are low pressure systems. 
 They are tanks, and essentially holding tanks. We are
 going to get into a couple of issues after this where
 we are going to talk about primary cooling, pressure
 boundary, and how different that circumstance is.
 But I believe your characterization that
 because these are essentially pools and that are water
 sources that are drawn on by the reactor systems,
 that's why we feel that the coating systems, along
 with the experience thus far, that we have not seen
 catastrophic failures, that we would expect to see
 leaks before we would see failures in the tanks.
 So there is a high degree of confidence
 that these water sources are going to be available
 when they are needed, and any action to deal with
 corrosion on these tanks.
 And we now have in addition to several
 hundred years worth of reactor experience, we have
 drawn on the experience from these other industries to
 tell us that these kinds of tanks don't require the
 same level of an inspection and maintenance that other
 systems do.
 DR. SIEBER: Thank you.
 MR. AULUCK: Moving to the third item. 
 Jim Medoff will talk about these next three items.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Before we proceed, I
 would like to make a comment regarding previous
 comments by citizens here. That is exactly why we
 came on site. We have no requirement to come locally,
 and to have this open meeting. 
 So personally I appreciate your comments;
 and second, this is just a subcommittee meeting, and
 we are going to meet on this matter in April in
 Washington, and you are absolutely welcome to be
 there, and to present your points of view. With that,
 I thank you again for your observations.
 MR. MEDOFF: Good afternoon. My name is
 Jim Medoff, and I am a materials engineer with the
 materials and chemical engineering branch of NRR. I
 am currently on a rotation to the license renewal and
 environmental impact program of NRR.
 I am here to address two open items, the
 first one being on the Alloy 600 inspection program,
 and the second open item that I will deal with will
 deal with the issue of unclad cracking of the reactor
 vessel.
 And lastly I would like to briefly talk
 about Mr. Oncavage's concerns as addressed in his
 recent letter to us. Regarding the open item on the
 Alloy 600 program, the USNRC has been investigating
 the issue of primary water stress corrosion cracking
 of Alloy 600 penetration nozzles since 1990, when one
 of the French plants experienced cracking in one of
 their vessel head nozzles.
 Following the cracking of that in France,
 the agency had initial dialogues with the industry
 owners groups to find out what whether their plants
 were inspecting the vessel heads of U.S. pressurized
 water reactors. 
 Industry came back to us in 1991 and 1992
 with a series of safety evaluations and basically
 concluded that it was not an issue for their plants at
 the time, and that it was more of an economic issue.
 We took a look at their assessments and
 wrote a safety evaluation in 1993, and basically
 concluded that based on the amount of time that the
 plants were operating that the issue of stress
 corrosion cracking in these nozzles was not an
 immediate safety issue, but we differed from the
 industry and concluded that it might be an issue in
 the long term since the phenomena was really dependent
 on time and temperature.
 We had a number of dialogues with the
 industry and basically the industry agreed to perform
 a number of volumetric inspections at a number of
 plants, where they had projected to have the most
 susceptible nozzles in the industry. 
 And during one of these exams, they found
 a number of cracks at D.C. Cook, at the plant during
 a fueling outage, and the plant had shut down, and
 repaired the cracks in accordance with the regulatory
 requirements prior to bringing the unit back to power.
 But since the industry had recorded some
 degradation in their nozzles in 1997, we issued a
 generic letter and asked the industry what their plans
 were for inspecting the vessel heads of the remaining
 plants in the industry.
 Basically what happened is that the
 industry came back to the NRC and added a number of
 plants to their volume inspection list, and a number
 of them included one of the facilities at the Oconee
 Nuclear Plant.
 They did their volumetrics, and recorded
 the occurrence of some very shallow cracks at that
 unit, but they were not deep enough to be a safety
 concern at the time.
 In addition the industry only proposed
 that they were going to proposed that they would
 continue to perform visual inspections of the vessel
 heads at each refueling outage for teach plant.
 In 1999, the Oconee Unit One plant was
 down for a refueling outage, and performed a visual
 inspection of its head, and recorded the occurrence of
 leakage on the vessel head, and did follow-up
 volumetric inspections, and visual inspections to
 ascertain how deep the problem was, and determined
 that they did have some circumferential cracks in the
 vessel head.
 Excuse me, let me step back for a second. 
 For Oconee I, they did record some axial cracks, but
 they did not record any circumferential cracks. 
 Later on, in February of the following
 year, in the year 2000, the Oconee Unit III went down
 for its refueling outage, and performed the same sort
 of visual examination, and also detected leakage in a
 number of the penetration nozzles, and did its follow-
 up exams.
 And during these follow-up inspections the
 utility for the plant did record some occurrence of
 circumferential cracking in a couple of the nozzles.
 Now, circumferential cracking is
 considered by the staff to be very safety significant,
 because if it grows to a large enough size, it can
 rupture the nozzle and lead to a failure, and lead to
 a small loss of coolant accident for the plant.
 Sine the cracking of Oconee Unit III was
 so safety significant, the NRC continued its dialogue
 with the industry, and asked the industry what its
 plans were to perform more stringent inspections of
 the remaining PWRs in the industry. 
 The industry came back with some safety
 assessments, but the NRC did not quite concur with all
 the conclusions in the safety assessment. So in
 August of the year 2001, they issued a bulletin on the
 issue, and requested what the plants were going to do
 to inspect their heads, including volumetric
 inspections of the nozzles, and the associated
 attachment models.
 As well as a visual examinations of the
 vessel heads without any insulation on the heads. All
 the utilities in the industry responded to the issue,
 including Florida Power and Light, in September or
 October of 2001.
 And in Florida Power and Light's response
 to the bulletin, it provided its program for
 inspecting the vessel heads of the Turkey Point units
 and the St. Lucie units. 
 Now we get to the relationship of the
 bulletin to the application. Florida Power and Light
 submitted their application for NRC review prior to
 the issuance of the bulletin.
 And since we had not come to our final
 conclusions of the impact of the Oconee data on the
 industry, we left an open item in the application
 regarding taking our integrated program committed to
 the industry's commitments on how to inspect the heads
 to bring it up to speed with the latest reports
 submitted by the industry, and with the NRC
 recommendations in the NRC bulletin for inspecting the
 vessel heads.
 When the applicant responded to the open
 items, they referred to the bulletin response as their
 current basis of the program, and their bulletin
 response indicated to us that they were going to
 continue to participate in the industry program, and
 update as necessary based on current future potential
 events that would occur in the industry.
 They provided a revised susceptibility
 ranking for their vessel heads, and they also provided
 their schedule for timely enhanced visual inspections
 of the vessel heads on bare surfaces of the heads.
 And in the response they also did an
 analysis of the nozzles to determine whether if they
 had cracking through the associated J-groove and
 whether they would have leakage to the top of the
 heads.
 In their response to the bulletin, they
 indicated that there was enough of a gap in the nozzle
 designs that if they had a crack through the weld that
 we could definitely be able to migrate to the top of
 the heads, and leakage would be able to be detected.
 Based on our review of the bulletin
 response, and of the applicant's response to the open
 item, we concluded that the aging management program
 for the Alloy 600 penetration nozzles to the vessel
 head would provide a sufficient basis for monitoring
 and controlling stress corrosion in the muzzles.
 And therefore we had included that was a
 sufficient response, and continued to provide health
 and safety to the public, and we decided that the open
 issue was resolved.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now, one of the units
 was inspected recently.
 MR. MEDOFF: Right. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And the other one is
 going to be inspected now.
 MR. MEDOFF: Right.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So the inspection will
 start when?
 MR. MEDOFF: In a week, I guess.
 DR. SIEBER: It might be good if the
 applicant desires to tell us what the results of the
 inspection was, and what unit it was.
 MR. HALE: Yes. As Jim had mentioned, we
 did a full qualified visual, and where we inspected
 every penetration, and there was no evidence of
 leakage. 
 And this is documented in quite detail as
 each individual penetration. We are also planning to
 do the same type of inspection, a qualified visual, on
 Unit 4 during the refueling outage coming up in a week
 or so.
 DR. SIEBER: Thank you.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Now, I would like to ask
 a question. What are the next steps? What is the NEI
 program foreseen for plants that are inspected, and
 have no findings?
 MR. COLLARD: My name is Steve Collard,
 and I am the supervisor of the Materials Programs
 Group in our engineering division up in Geno Beach. 
 Right now what we are anticipating doing is following
 the code. 
 The code is on this and -- the ASME code
 is working on a program of inspection schedules, and
 it looks like we will be doing something like that
 inspections like once period, three times in 10 years,
 and perhaps once every refueling outage, and that is
 undecided.
 We are doing some debating about that, and
 depending upon its susceptibility, and where you are
 you, and what material you have, and whether you have
 a new one or not.
 And that is how we are looking at the
 continued inspections. We are also starting to
 evaluate replacing the reactor vessel heads, but we
 are really early in that. However, we are following
 the industry, and following every inspection.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, several plants
 have already committed to replacement if I understand
 that correctly.
 MR. COLLARD: Yes.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So that is an option
 already chosen by some of the high susceptibility
 plants. I wold expect that you would be looking at
 the frequency of inspections, and addressing the --
 MS. ABBOTT: Yes. I think in summary --
 this is Liz Abbott from Florida Power and Light. Our
 commitment is to continue to follow issues as they
 develop, and we are performing the inspections, and
 obviously we have completed one unit.
 And the second unit will be taken off-
 light in about 9 or 10 days for its scheduled
 refueling outage, and we do have the same inspection
 plan for that unit. 
 We have not identified any issues on our
 heads that need to be addressed. So at this point, we
 are monitoring the developments from other members of
 the industry, and reviewing that data, and reaching
 the conclusion on what is most appropriate for our
 units. 
 I would also like to emphasize that we
 maintain very stringent controls for primary side
 leakage, and we do have extensive leaking inspections
 and a zero tolerance for evidence of leakage, which is
 normally seen through boric acid buildup, all on our
 primary side and non-soluble components.
 And I think we are probably in the upper
 echelon so to speak of the industry when it comes to
 our programs and acceptance criteria, and so forth,
 that we maintain as part of our maintenance programs,
 and are continued through our boric acid leakage
 identification program commitments under the renewal
 term industry-wide.
 So I think there is two aspects that you
 look at here, and I think you have to look at the
 commitment to both programs, both of which are
 included as part of our commitments under the renewed
 license.
 MR. GRIMES: This is Chris Grimes, and I
 will try and put a wrap around it. I would remind you
 that last year when we came to describe the results of
 our Arkansas license renewal review, at that time the
 results from the Oconee inspections were fresh, and
 caused a bit of a stir.
 That bit of a stir was a bulletin that
 caused all plants in response to Bulletin 2001-01, to
 go out on an accelerated basis and start gathering
 more information about nozzle cracks, and control rod
 drive nozzles, and their attachments, are the area of
 interest, in terms of where this cracking occurs.
 And the susceptibility -- and not just
 Alloy 600, and that is the name of the program, but it
 is also the associated weld materials. The results of
 those tests are still coming in, and as you know, and
 as you have seen in the notifications, there was some
 significant findings that now have to be folded into
 the NRC's assessment, and into our judgments about
 what additional changes are needed in the inspection
 and repair practices for vessel heads.
 This is not much different than evolutions
 that we have gone through in understanding the causes
 and inspection controls for steam generator tubes,
 which is another material problem that relates to the
 high temperature chemistry reactions in the reactor
 coolant system.
 So this is very much a process that --
 well, that the ongoing regulatory process, and the
 experienced feedback to identify how the maintenance
 and inspection activities need to be involved.
 And as James said, this is a program that
 is learning and evolving, and correcting as inspection
 findings come up. And we expect that it will continue
 to do so by virtue of the applicant's commitments to
 continuing to rely on those industry programs.
 And it was on that basis and it was that
 commitment that formed the basis for our conclusion
 about the adequacy of the aging management attributes.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, we may know
 something about these plants and the inspections when
 it comes up in the meeting in April. That will be
 interesting, and I am pleased to hear that the first
 inspections were negative.
 MR. MEDOFF: And I would like to point out
 that the industry does consider this integrated
 program to be a living program, and NEI has repeatedly
 talked to us, and told us, and informed us that NEI
 would update the program pending all cracking events
 and further studies that NEI or the materials
 reliability program would conduct.
 So based on that type of information, we
 considered this open item to be resolved. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Now, if I
 remember, the Alloy 600's nozzles are the only
 components having Alloy 600 in the Turkey Point Plant,
 right?
 MR. MEDOFF: Yes, this is a Westinghouse
 design, and the Alloy 600s are only on the head. In
 contrast to some of the CE and BMW plants that have
 Alloy 600 nozzles to either of the pressurizers or the
 steam generators, or the hotlegs.
 MEMBER SHACK: This is also an unusual
 Westinghouse plant that doesn't have any Alloy 182
 butter on the primary piping. They are a Framatone
 plant.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: That's good to know.
 MEMBER SHACK: Yes, they are like this. 
 They use stainless steel. The French have no Alloy
 182. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, that's good to
 know.
 MR. MEDOFF: If there are no further
 questions on the Alloy 600 program, I would like to
 continue with the open item on reactor pressure vessel
 underclad cracking.
 Thee is a potential issue with the PWR
 industry on developing cracking in the faradic portion
 of reactor pressure vessel at the interface where the
 faradic portion meets the austenitic stainless steel
 cladding. 
 Basically whether the issue is considered
 by the staff to be prevalent or not really depends on
 the fabrication practices on how they fabricated the
 vessel, and Regulatory Guide 1.43 really goes into
 detail on how the cracking could potentially develop.
 It talks about the fabrication practices
 that lead to it, and so therefore I am not going to
 get into the details on this, because the regulatory
 guide talks about it in sufficiency.
 However, since this is a potential issue,
 the staff issued an RAI on the issue to the applicant,
 and it must be stated that the Westinghouse Erector
 Company submitted a WCAP report that provided its
 analysis for potential underclad cracks to grow by a
 thermal fatigue mechanism and grow further into the
 portion of the vessel and to create a safety concern.
 Basically what the WCAP did was evaluate
 the plants based on their number of cycles, and their
 transients, and performed a fatigue analysis
 consistent with the code requirements.
 And made a general conclusion that it
 wasn't an issue, but since we didn't have any
 information on whether the plants applying for renewal
 would have -- whether their fatigue cycles that they
 have on record for the plant would bound the analysis
 set forth by Westinghouse.
 We issued a set of RAI open item
 combinations, and basically for three unit
 Westinghouse pressurized water reactors, of which
 Turkey Point is part of that type of design, we
 concluded that they would be bounded by the analysis
 of the report, and could conclude that growth by
 fatigue was not an issue if they could demonstrate
 that the number of cycles analyzed in their report
 were bounding for the plant.
 In addition, we issued an open item
 portion of that, and that once a response came back
 from an applicant to respond to the RAI, that they
 could show that their time limited aging analysis for
 this type of fatigue growth would be similarly
 described in the updated final safety analysis report
 for the plant.
 So basically we did that for Turkey Point,
 and we issued an RAI regarding the issue to them. 
 They responded to us and demonstrated that they were
 bounded by the reports. So we closed out the request
 for additional information on that portion of the
 item.
 And then we kept an open item to confirm
 that they were going to put the time limited aging
 analysis into the updated final safety analysis for
 the report. 
 This is really a record type of keeping
 type of open item. The applicant responded in kind
 and did confirm that they did put the time limited
 aging analysis into the updated final safety analysis.
 We considered this to be sufficient, and
 considered that the open item was resolved.
 DR. SIEBER: The in-service inspection
 requires that a licensee every 10 years do an in-
 service inspection using ultrasonic means for the
 reactor vessel, and it is done from the inside of the
 vessel through the clad and to the area in the faradic
 structure where these deep cracks would form. 
 My question is will the in-service
 inspection identify these fatigue cracks if in fact
 they do form over so many cycles, or so many thermal
 cycles?
 MR. MEDOFF: Not being the expert on this,
 I would like to have someone from Region One who is
 more familiar with the issue. 
 MR. GRIMES: Is there anybody on the phone
 who has an answer to that question?
 MR. ELLIOTT: This is Barry Elliott. The
 in-service inspection, the NEI inspection is an
 inspection of welds, and the concern here is not the
 for welds. The concern here is for the base material.
 The only area of the base material that
 would be inspected is like a half-an-inch or an inch
 on either side of the weld. And I just don't think
 that these flaw are going to be found. 
 These are very tiny flaws that are on the
 order of a tenth to three-sixteenths of an inch when
 they started. They don't grow very much, and the
 basis for our accepting this is not the ultrasonic
 inspection. 
 It is that the flaws grow only a very
 small amount and based on the side of the flaw, we
 don't really need to do any additional inspection. 
 The structural integrity is ensured by the analysis
 that the growth of the flow is strong enough that all
 the safety versions of the ASME code are still
 satisfied. This is Barry Elliott.
 DR. SIEBER: Thank you.
 MR. MEDOFF: That you, Barry. Are there
 any further questions on this issue?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I see the next issue is
 the last of the four issues raised by public citizens,
 and I would propose that we take a recess for 15
 minutes, and then we address these issues together
 after that.
 But before we do so, however, I would like
 to ask Mr. Smilan if he has any additional comments
 that he would like to make with regard to these open
 issues or open items?
 MR. SMILAN: Offhand, my concern stems
 from the fact that I am a member of the National
 Association of Atomic Veterans, and I am also a
 disabled veteran. 
 I was operated on for esophagal cancer a
 year ago, and there is a law on the books, and it is
 a Federal statute, and it is called the Radiation
 Exposed Veterans Compensation Act, which actually
 provides a presumption that if you were on-site at
 Bikini or Anyweektoch (phonetic), which I was back in
 1954, that exposure to the atmospheric tests there was
 the cause of 21 categories of cancer, and if you could
 track one of them, then you qualify.
 The law was amended two years ago, in
 2000, to include civilians, and that Act is now known
 as the Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, and that
 one is administered by the Department of Justice.
 And it provides compensation for people
 who are on-site when those tests at Yucca Flats and
 the Alusions, and people who were downwind of this, as
 far as Las Vegas, from the Yucca Flats tests.
 The reason that I am giving you this and
 how it relates to the FDL is this. The Act covers
 people who are engaged in mining uranium ore, loading
 it, and transporting it.
 Those workers are actually covered by a
 program administered by the Labor Department now. 
 Florida Power and Light has been disingenuous to say
 the least in the way that they presented nuclear power
 to the public in this area.
 At their St. Lucie plant up on Hutchinson
 Island, they have a museum there. I don't know if you
 people have visited it. Have you visited that museum?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I have not.
 MR. SMILAN: They bus school children in
 there and they portray to them people pushing shovels
 and mining yellow cake, uranium ore, with no
 protective clothing, and no protective breathing
 equipment.
 I spoke to a gentleman this morning who
 was in the Army at Yucca Flats, and he told me this
 morning that he had not been provided with protective
 clothing, or protective breathing equipment, and that
 the AEC people who were on site did have that kind of
 equipment.
 When I was at Bikini, and was detailed to
 run Jalapi Atoll, which was subjected to radioactive
 fallout, I was not furnished with protective gear or
 breathing equipment.
 Now, these children who were taken up to
 Hutchinson Island, school children, and shown this
 exhibit, see people mining uranium ore as if it were
 a totally safe material to handle.
 There was also an illustration -- and I am
 sure that the FDL is going to remove it just as
 quickly as they can, showing someone wearing a white
 three-quarter length coat, supposedly a technician,
 someone with a scientific background, holding a
 capsule with uranium pellets that are components of
 fuel rods, and holding it in their bare hand.
 And that is the misinformation that FDL
 has actually been giving out to the public here. I
 wonder if the people responsible for that realize what
 the significance of this type of propaganda is on
 children.
 Plutonium is supposed to be the most
 deadliest substance on the face of the earth, and I
 have read literature that says that one-one hundredth
 of the amount required to cover the head of a pin is
 sufficient to give you cancer.
 Now, I am told that I have a 40 percent
 chance of survival for five years, and there is a very
 good chance that my cancer is related to what I got as
 a result of that exposure. 
 And that is my motivation for coming here
 and for my having been involved in opposition to the
 opening of the Schorum Nuclear Power Plant, which as
 you know was never opened. 
 And I doubt that these people today could
 get a siting permit for this plant here in Homestead,
 22 miles south of Miami, especially with the
 geopolitical situation we have the terrorism on a
 rampage.
 And let me also mention this fact, because
 I think it is significant. The second largest Jewish
 population in the United States is situated here in
 South Florida, on the southeast coast.
 And it used to be Los Angeles, and now the
 second largest Jewish population is here. This is a
 very prime area for attack. And not to become
 paranoid about it, but FDL issued a press release in
 conjunction with FMG when they were supposed to
 consolidate their operations.
 And which would have made them the second
 largest operator of nuclear power plants in the
 country, and the largest generator of nuclear power in
 the country.
 And in that press release, they spoke of
 allowing a firm -- the name escapes me at the moment,
 but allowing a firm whose parent company was situated
 in South America, to handle their spent nuclear fuel
 roads, which is stored on-site as you know, and to
 transport them to Europe, where they would be
 reprocessed either in Belgium or in France. Cogema I
 think is the name of the firm.
 And just the mere fact of letting those
 spent fuel rods out of the country, and allowing
 foreign nationals to have access to it I think poses
 such a significant threat to this country.
 And I think the FDL was irresponsible in
 even making that type of a proposal. There was one
 Caribbean country that objected to spent nuclear fuel
 rods being transported from Japan through the
 Caribbean here to get to Europe so as to be
 reprocessed.
 And now as an airline pilot who has flown
 to South America, I can tell you that if you drop a
 plum line from Miami directly south, it hits the
 Panama Canal. 
 So to get those fuel rods from Japan to
 Europe, they are coming through the Panama Canal, and
 we are setting ourselves up for something really big
 here to happen.
 And as you know, these terrorist
 organizations met, and they are trying to get their
 hands on nuclear material to make their dirty nuclear
 bombs. 
 And we have got a real potential problem,
 especially with the influx of population that is going
 to gravitate down to this area. Hey, guys, I will
 tell you, be Americans and do the right thing here,
 and slow down, and get some responsible rebuttal in
 here.
 Because as I said before, I don't doubt
 the sincerity of people in this room. I have friends
 who hold degrees, one of them, in nuclear physics. 
 The guy is a doctor.
 And he told me that an airplane cannot fly
 in one of these things and destroy it. Well, we saw
 something a little different here with the World Trade
 Center, and when those planes hit that building in
 excess of 500 miles an hour.
 I used to fly 747s from San Francisco to
 Hong Kong, and to Seoul, and do you know that the
 airplane was 300,000 pounds lighter when it landed,
 because that is how much fuel we consumed. The fuel
 was kerosene.
 The reason that we used kerosene instead
 of gas was because it generates more btu's. So you
 have got the dynamite right there. And Florida, and
 down here in Miami, you have this International
 Airport that is looking to double the amount of
 international travel.
 And when those airplanes take off and
 going down to deep South America, two-thirds of the
 flight is over the Amazon, and those things are loaded
 to the gills with fuel.
 You have got a real hot spot down here,
 and you had better tread gently, and the credibility
 of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission I think is also
 at stake if you allow that plant to be relicensed and
 get an extension.
 And you don't have responsible intervenors
 in here, and just one last final though. I started
 out flying helicopters in the Air Force. I flew fixed
 wing helicopters, and they used to take the blades
 from the H-13s and throw them away after twelve
 hundred hours. 
 That was the service life of that, and it
 was 2,000 hours on the Corsica H-19, and they used to
 throw them away, and that is an expensive item. And
 the reason was that you flex those blades so many
 times that that metal is going to crystalize.
 And the same thing happens when you
 pressurize an airplane, and every time you pressurize
 it, and believe me when I say aviation is just replete
 with failures and nobody is flying old airplanes.
 You are not going to put your family on a
 747 that is 28 years old, or at least if you know
 about it, you are not going to do it. So I think
 these same concepts ought to apply to what we are
 doing here with nuclear power plants, because I think
 it is a bad scene. Thank you for your time.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Thank you for your
 comments.
 MR. GRIMES: Before you break for a
 recess, and this is Chris Grimes, I would like to ask
 if there are any specific questions about the
 technical matters that we addressed today? 
 I would like to take advantage of the
 staff that we have on the phone, and if there aren't
 going to be any more questions about the specific
 technical aspects of the issues that we have
 addressed, I would like to turn them loose and have
 them go back to work on other things.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Are there any questions
 regarding technical issues on these four items? 
 (No audible response.)
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, they will be
 presented again in April, and we don't have any
 additional clarification needed at this time. So we
 can let them go. And with that, let's take a recess,
 and come back at 3:25.
 (Brief recess.)
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: The meeting is called to
 order again, and we are now proceeding with a
 discussion by the staff of comments from the public
 citizens. All right. Please state your name.
 MR. MEDOFF: This is Jim Medoff with NRR
 once more, and right now we are going to discuss some
 of the comments that were submitted to us, and in Mr.
 Oncavage's letter that was recently submitted.
 Basically, when we looked at the four
 concerns submitted by mr. Oncavage, we basically
 isolated them into four broad-based areas, the first
 being the effect of voids on aging degradation rates,
 and the structural integrity of containment
 structures.
 The second broad based category being the
 effect of design basis for hurricane wind speeds, and
 surges on safe operation of the facilities.
 The third being the effect of terrorist
 attacks on safe operation of the facilities, and the
 third regarding the Turkey Point Spent Fuel Capacity.
 In regard to the effects of voids on aging
 degradation rates, and the integrity of the concrete
 containment structures, we don't quite agree that the
 voids will have any effect on the aging rates.
 We consider them to be intrinsic thermal
 dynamic kinetic properties that are not a function of
 amount or volume, or surface area. While we do agree
 that if you have more voids for any given aging
 degradation rate, you might come to a certain level of
 degradation more quickly.
 We don't consider them to have any effect
 on the aging degradation rates. And with respect to
 the testing for the structural integrity of the
 concrete containment structures, Florida Power and
 Light has proposed an ASME Section IWL in-service
 inspection program to monitor for aging of the
 concrete structures.
 And they consider the concrete structure
 components to be within scope of license renewal. 
 This is the same IWL program that that NRC oversees 
 through Regulation 10 CFR 50.55(a), and that is
 referenced in your technical specification
 requirements.
 The applicant has periodic surveillance
 requirements for leak rate testing and structural
 integrity testing in accordance with the IWL program
 in their technical specifications.
 The technical specifications, and/or the
 IWL in-service inspection program, can dictate the
 frequency of these examinations, and that the
 applicant implements according to the specified
 frequencies.
 We consider that the safety of the public
 and safe operation of plants will continue to be
 assured through the implementation of the proper
 technical specification, and the proper ASME IWL
 service inspection program requirements.
 And we consider those to be sufficient to
 test further the integrity of the containment
 structures.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: This morning, there was
 an interpretation we had of the plant. I asked a
 question regarding the genetic implication to other
 designs, where the presence of rebar on the structure
 there that caused also voids in other similar plants.
 And the answer was not available because
 it would historical and it would now be 20 years old. 
 I would suggest that if you have any information on
 that that you would have it available for the April
 meeting.
 MR. MEDOFF: At that time, I will bring it
 up with the mechanical engineering branch of NRR, and
 determine whether they have any data on it, and
 whether they consider it to be a generic issue, and we
 can get back to you on it.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I would expect that the
 issue would be addressed then. So therefore it would
 be historical information to the committee, but I
 think it would be appropriate to just if you have any
 information on that.
 MR. MEDOFF: Okay. I will check with
 EMAD.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Thank you.
 MEMBER KRESS: I realize that it is mostly
 irrelevant for license renewal, but can I ask if there
 are any implications with respect to LERF?
 MR. MEDOFF: That is an area outside my
 expertise. So I would refrain from commenting on
 that. 
 MR. GRIMES: This is Chris Grimes. I will
 only comment to the extent that I am able to comment;
 that there is an aspect of -- you said LERF, and the
 release rates and the release probabilities include
 consideration of containment failure rates.
 And to the extent that there is implicit
 in the integrity of the containment and its failure
 some margin for construction defects or failures of
 the liner, I would say that there is an allowance
 there, but not an explicit consideration of this
 particular kind.
 MEMBER KRESS: Well, when one runs the
 PRA, you get a LERF, and it is better to use design
 pressure other than to say that the actual failure
 pressure is somewhat higher than that.
 And that somewhat higher is estimated, but
 you can estimate it based on some sort of hot element
 calculations if that can be done, or it is based on
 experience, or other things.
 But I think they assume in that estimate
 that the containment is fairly structurally sound, and
 I don't know if they used the right success criteria
 in the PRA to decide on when you get a LERF.
 MR. GRIMES: And all I can remember about
 the containment failure models is that there is a
 distribution about the failure of the containment that
 has an uncertainty associated with it. 
 So there is even a probability that the
 containment can fail at pressures below its design
 pressure.
 MEMBER KRESS: Yes.
 MR. GRIMES: Those are much smaller
 probabilities. The probability of containment failure
 goes up and reaches the median or the mean point, or
 whatever is statistically appropriate for LERF, the
 large early release frequency that has implicit in it
 this margin or uncertainty band that provides for all
 kinds of uncertainties.
 And those include structural capability or
 failures that were unanticipated because of
 construction defects.
 MEMBER KRESS: I am concerned about that
 whole distribution has shifted.
 MR. GRIMES: I understand.
 MR. MEDOFF: If you would like, we can
 talk to people that are more familiar with it, RAD
 protection and/or the PRA branches.
 MEMBER KRESS: I think this is a PRA.
 MR. MEDOFF: If there are no further
 questions on the structure integrity for the
 containment structures, I will go on to the next
 category, which is the effect of design basis on
 hurricane wind speeds and storm waves on safe
 operation of the Turkey Point facilities.
 Basically, I independently reviewed the
 design bases for the plants, and also contacted the
 NOAH of the U.S. Department of Commerce to get more
 familiar with the wind speeds and the height of the
 storm surges on the Atlantic Coast.
 Basically NOAH records that the maximum
 wind speeds and surge heights ever recorded for
 Atlantic Coast Category 5 hurricanes as been on the
 order of approximately 160 miles an hour, and that
 wind speed puts it into a Category 5 hurricane, and 20
 feet respectively.
 The highest wind speed was recorded for a
 Category 5 hurricane that occurred in 1935 in the
 Florida Keys, and the highest surge height that has
 been recorded for the recent hurricane, Hugo, which
 hit the North Atlantic Coast, and that was recorded at
 20 feet.
 The current licensing basis for Turkey
 Point indicates that structures housing safety related
 equipment Seismic I category structures are designed
 to withstand wind speeds and surge heights that were
 ever recorded for Category 4/5 hurricanes.
 So we consider it a less further technical
 information submitted to us that indicates otherwise,
 and we consider the current design basis for the
 facilities to be capable of handling the Category 5
 hurricane effects.
 MEMBER KRESS: One of the specific
 concerns was the spent fuel pool.
 MR. MEDOFF: Right. 
 MEMBER KRESS: Does that include the spent
 fuel pool?
 MR. MEDOFF: When I checked the design
 basis the spent fuel pools are in the auxiliary
 buildings, and they are classified as Seismic I
 structures. Any further questions on this issue? 
 If not, I am going to bypass the third one
 for the last item, the effect of terrorism, and I am
 going to talk about the spent fuel capacity. And the
 technical specifications for the plant require a
 minimum and specify a maximum allowable fuel for
 storage capacity for the spent fuel rods.
 I'm sorry, but I am getting ahead of
 myself. Let me talk about electrical system
 capability. One of his concerns dealt with emergency
 diesel generators storage capacities. I apologize.
 The technical specifications for Turkey
 Point require them to keep a minimum inventory in each
 of the refueling water -- not water, but diesel fuel
 storage tanks. 
 One of the concerns for Mr. Oncavage
 identified that the plant had been unavailable for
 further service from the outside during Hurricane
 Andrew, and he was concerned that the diesel fuel
 would be used up, and they wouldn't have any emergency
 diesel generator capability to mitigate the
 consequences of an accident.
 What I will say is that Turkey Point has
 the capability of delivering fuel on site if necessary
 by barge, or by airplane, or by airplane, or by
 alternate road routes, or highway routes, to the
 plant.
 And they consider that they are capable of
 maintaining emergency diesel generator fuel supplies
 for the plant so that they can maintain safety at the
 facilities.
 We feel that any technical specifications
 on the emergency diesel general fuel storage tanks and
 they capability to deliver fuel from off-site is
 capable to ensure the integrity of the plant.
 DR. BARTON: Did you say you have a
 committed supplier to deliver this fuel should you
 need it? 
 MR. MEDOFF: That I am not sure of. You
 would have to 
 DR. BARTON: I thought I heard that this
 morning.
 MS. ABBOTT: This is Liz Abbott from
 Florida Power and Light. As part of our hurricane
 preparations, we will normally top off our tanks or
 verify that they have been topped off recently.
 And we also typically contact our vendor
 and make sure that we are on their priority list for
 providing fuel, which is normally not an issue with
 them.
 So we do maintain contact with our regular
 fuel supplier and we are considered a priority
 customer for them.
 DR. BARTON: But my question was though is
 it possible if this vendor gets wiped out in a
 Category 5 hurricane?
 MS. ABBOTT: I am not familiar with their
 facility. Let's just postulate that it is.
 DR. BARTON: That's what I am getting at.
 MS. ABBOTT: And certainly a hurricane
 would affect a limited area, and there is no reason
 why we couldn't go outside of that area and go to the
 next supplier in line. 
 The fuel is not something that generally
 is not available, and it certainly is capable of
 fueling our diesel generators and having them perform
 acceptably.
 MR. MEDOFF: Any further questions?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I don't want to pursue
 that any further, but there is a tech spec
 requirement, right, on the diesel fuel supply?
 MR. MEDOFF: Yes.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And so that is a text
 book requirement that there will be a certain amount
 of fuel on-site anyway. 
 MR. GRIMES: This is Chris Grimes, and
 harkening back to a former life, there is provisions
 for the supply in the day tank, but also the reserve
 tank, and the quality of the fuel in the tanks. 
 The technical specifications include a
 number of tests to verify the quality of the fuel that
 is maintained on-site.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: And it seems to me that
 the tech specs specifically focus on a seven day
 supply.
 MR. MEDOFF: My recollection is that it is
 a seven day supply, a seven day supply for each
 diesel. I would have to go back and check, but I
 believe that it was for each diesel. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: So that can be extended
 quite a bit with appropriate monitoring.
 MR. MEDOFF: We feel they feel that they
 have enough time to get back on site so they can
 maintain operation on generators. I am going to
 bypass the terrorist concerns and discuss the spent
 fuel cooling system reliability for Mr. Oncavage. 
 The spent fuel pools and cooling system
 are housed in safety related structures that are
 designed to withstand the consequences of a category
 five hurricane. 
 The technical specification and design
 requirements control the amount of storage at the
 facilities, and they have to take action before they
 exceed the maximum storage limits.
 10 CFR Part 51 treats spent fuel issues as
 Category One issues and considers them to be current
 licensing issues, and therefore outside the scope of
 license renewal.
 We feel that the design basis, there
 really aren't from what we can see any safety issues
 with the spent fuel pool at this point. And then
 finally Mr. Oncavage, in two of his issues, brought up
 potential safety issues with terrorist attacks on the
 facilities.
 I have to state that right now the
 commission has assigned a special task group to look
 into this. It is classified material, and we were not
 even permitted to talk about it at the agency for
 those that are not dealing with it in their branch.
 But the Commission is definitely looking
 into the safety issues of terrorist attacks on the
 industry, and Florida Power and Light, and the Turkey
 Point and St. Lucie units will be part of that study.
 I'm sure when they declassify the
 information that the commission will make it available
 to the public for review. But they are looking into
 the generic safety issues with regard to terrorist
 attacks on the industry. 
 MR. GRIMES: This is Chris Grimes, and I
 would like to add that there is a theme throughout Mr.
 Oncovage's concerns that really get to the safety of
 the facility, irrespective of license renewal. 
 The questions about plant vulnerabilities
 and overall plant safety. We did struggle with trying
 to achieve public confidence in the process. 
 At the same time that we say we can go
 public with the license renewal decision, while we are
 dealing with some of these issues, like terrorist
 attacks, at the regulatory information conference, the
 commissioners talked about the anticipated changes in
 the design basis threat and the threshold that
 distinguishes between the plant's responsibility to
 defend against terrorists and the nation's
 responsibility to declare an act of war.
 That distinction between the
 responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
 and the Department of Defense have now come into play,
 and we expect that there will probably be legislation
 that will provide the NRC with guidance on the
 security issues.
 That is really the heart of the license
 renewal process; an ability to rely on the ongoing
 regulatory programs to decide what changes need to be
 made for safety standards today or tomorrow, or next
 year, or 20 years from now.
 And our ability to look outside of those
 issues and simply concentrate on aging effects, and
 the science of maintenance and inspection of the
 facility.
 And Mr. Oncavage was not satisfied with
 that explanation, and we can understand and appreciate
 that, but that was the basis upon which the Atomic
 Safety and Licensing Board, and the Commission
 concluded the hearings were not warranted on these
 issues because they are issues related to the adequacy
 of the plant safety.
 And not issues related to the scope of our
 review of aging management programs. 
 MR. MEDOFF: I am going to return the
 microphone to Dr. Auluck for further comments. 
 MR. AULUCK: The next item we will discuss
 is the inspection report, but before we do that, I
 would like to make a statement. The Commission in
 their order specifically stated that if Mr. Oncavage
 generally knows of a current safety problem resulting
 from a design of the Turkey Point facility, he should
 petition under 10 CFR 2.206 for action on that
 license.
 MR. JULIAN: My name is Caudle Julian with
 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and my first name
 is Caudle, C-A-U-D-L-E, and I am with the NRC out of
 Atlanta, Georgia.
 And I was the team leader for the
 inspections supporting license renewal at Turkey
 Point, and have been on several others before, and am
 continuing to do that work now. 
 At Turkey Point, our first inspection was
 what we call the scoping and screening inspection,
 where we are looking at the results of their efforts
 to determine what plant equipment needs to be
 considered for aging management measures.
 We reviewed their engineering basis
 documentation for the results that they have achieved,
 and they have got a lot of it. The documentation that
 we found was of good quality. It was detailed,
 thorough, and understandable.
 We examined a substantial portion of the
 plant safety related equipment, and our inspectors
 have assigned systems, and have them go out with the
 plant engineers and walk about the plant, and look at
 the examples of the plant safety related equipment,
 and see what condition it is in today.
 We concluded the material condition as we
 observed it was good of the plant overall, and had no
 significant negative findings in looking at plant
 equipment. 
 And in our inspection conclusions on the
 scoping and screening inspection, we are essentially
 consistent with the NRR audit that was performed
 earlier on the process for scoping and screening.
 So we moved on to the second inspection,
 which was of two weeks duration. The first one was
 one week. The second was of two weeks duration.
 And there we looked at aging management
 programs, and we reviewed the results of existing
 plant programs that are accredited as becoming aging
 management programs on downstream.
 We concluded that the existing aging
 management programs are being implemented as they
 described in their license renewal application, and as
 we reviewed the plans that they have for new aging
 management programs, and also for the enhancement of
 existing programs, and we concluded there that the
 plants are consistent with the commitments that they
 made in the license renewal application.
 During the second inspection, we looked at
 plant equipment to try to cover as much as we possibly
 could, and again had no negative conclusions. We
 thought that the plant equipment was in good
 condition.
 And after we had concluded the second
 inspections, we determined that we really didn't need
 a third open items inspection for this plant because
 everything was pretty much resolved and taken care of.
 FPL took extraordinary measures to respond
 to questions that we had, and we thought that
 cooperation and forthrightness was excellent. And
 after running these issues over with our management in
 the region, and our regional administrator, the
 regional administrator has signed the inspection
 completion letter on February 1st, 2002.
 So that letter concludes that Region Two
 is complete with our inspections, and satisfied with
 the results. Are there any questions?
 DR. SIEBER: I guess I would like to make
 a comment, in that I reviewed the documentation and
 particularly the drawings, which ended up in
 headquarters and available to us, and I thought that
 was an asset to us to be able to look in advance and
 understand what the licensee had done in these cases,
 and to look how the markups and the drawings, and the
 scoping generally went. And so I appreciate that
 myself.
 MEMBER KRESS: Are your inspectors trained
 in what to look for license renewal and do they have
 guidance documents?
 MR. JULIAN: Yes, they do. We have the
 inspection manual chapter, which is a high level
 document, Manual Chapter 25.16, and a more detailed
 inspection procedure, 7100.2, for doing license
 renewal. 
 But more and more I am using the same
 inspectors, and they are gaining experience on the job
 more and more, and so they know more and more what to
 look for at each plant that we go to.
 MR. GRIMES: I would like to add -- and
 this is Chris Grimes -- that for each plant this group
 of more and more experienced folks put together plant
 specific inspection plans, where they gather insights
 from the reviewers and headquarters about targets of
 opportunity, particular areas to inspect, and that
 plant specific inspection plan provides further
 guidance to the inspectors on how to achieve a good
 inspection.
 MEMBER KRESS: Do you guys review that
 plan?
 MR. GRIMES: Yes, sir. The inspection
 plan is actually issued jointly by headquarters and
 the region to the regional division director and me. 
 We get direction that is a cooperative effort between
 the technical review staff and the NRR and the region.
 MEMBER SHACK: When you read the license
 renewal application or even the updated FSAR, there is
 always this question of level of detail, and the one
 that I sort of focused on was looking at their leak
 before break analysis, where the description of it was
 perfectly reasonable. I didn't have any disagreements
 with it at all.
 The question was that with the aging of
 the casting, and the steel elbows, and components,
 whether that would affect the leak before break
 analysis that they did. 
 And so let's say they assumed the maximum
 possible aging thing, all the words were right, but
 there was no number anywhere, or no clue as to where
 they picked, or how they picked the fact for toughness
 for the aged cast stainless.
 Now, would that be something that would
 come out in the inspection that presumably somewhere
 back at the plant somebody had some data? Would that
 be expected?
 MR. JULIAN: Probably not. We don't get
 into that detail here in our inspections. We are
 trying to focus on the plant equipment and the aging
 management programs, and that is a review issue that
 would be handled by NRR technically.
 MR. GRIMES: And I will answer that
 question in two ways. The first way is probably not
 in the inspection, unless Barry Elliott thought that
 the inspectors could find it in a different place, and
 than he could draw it out during the course of the
 staff's review of the cast program.
 MEMBER SHACK: Well, even if there was a
 reference to the EPRI document, or something, but
 there was no reference in either the SER or the FSAR,
 or the license renewal application that I could find.
 MR. HALE: Steve Hale, Florida Power and
 Light. For something to be at the FPL, it has to be
 incorporated, and one of the criteria is that it has
 to be currently in your current licensing basis.
 And that means that it is in the SAR and
 it is in certain locations. So when it comes to leak
 before break, considering that it was part of our
 current licensing basis, there are -- there is
 information in the SAR relative to what was approved
 previously for leak before break. 
 Now, in terms of what we included in the
 application, we typically would include what we would
 include if we were submitting a SAR update to that
 existing analysis.
 So we basically -- so there is information
 in the SAR. I think if you went to the SAR, you would
 find a description, a more detailed description.
 MEMBER SHACK: Well, I got the update of
 the SAR and I went there.
 MR. HALE: That is the license renewal
 summary.
 MEMBER SHACK: So if I go to the full SAR.
 MR. HALE: In the SAR itself, you will
 find a summary of leak before break. What we were
 addressing in license renewal was one, the impact of
 extending the 20 years, and secondly, we don't collect
 all those things that we call TALAs in one location.
 So we put them all in one location so you
 know what we define as TALAs for the license renewal
 period.
 MR. GRIMES: That is a very important
 point that one of the reasons that the applications
 are now becoming packaged with the latest version of
 the updated plant and safety analysis report is that
 there are details in there that constitute a part of
 the maintained current licensing basis.
 And that are in some cases on the CD's
 hyperlink, and so you can go back and find additional
 details, but the FSAR supplement submitted with the
 license renewal application is only the additional
 commitment, or the additional detail of program
 descriptions that is going to be added to that current
 licensing basis to produce the new licensing basis.
 MEMBER SHACK: Well, it is a contrast. 
 When you do vessel embrittlement, everybody refers to
 Reg Guide 199 and we all know what numbers we are
 dealing with. 
 When they dealt with environmental effects
 on fatigue, they referred to NUREGs, and we all know
 that the NUREGs by heart by now. But when I came to
 CAS stainless, I couldn't find a reference to anything
 anywhere.
 MR. HALE: Part of that was a previous
 license amendment that we had submitted to incorporate
 leak before break into our current licensing basis. 
 So we were simply updating it for license
 renewal. Whereas, the existing analysis, like those
 kind of parameters and assumptions associated with
 them, were already there. I don't know if that helps.
 MEMBER SHACK: Well, I still think you
 need more detail. You tell me that you use DOR to
 calculate the neutron -- you know, I get all sorts of
 information on the vessel embrittlement, and this
 other one, you know, I get the post card. 
 And I have no real problems with it. I
 really know what data you use, because there is only
 really so many sources of data out there. But it just
 seemed like it called out for a reference.
 MS. ABBOTT: Just a little bit about --
 this is Liz Abbott from Florida Power and Light, but
 a little bit about the level of detail that is at the
 site, and part of the question was did the inspection
 team look at it.
 We did prepare internally a document that
 summarizes our determination of what constitutes time
 limited aging analyses, and a summary of how we
 address those TLAAs that generated the -- it is
 basically a source document that generated the
 application sections that you read.
 That document was made available to the
 inspection teams and the audit teams, and is a cross-
 reference document that they used occasionally for
 sample checks when they reviewed aging management
 reports.
 For instance, with the aging management
 report that they were reviewing was on the reactor
 coolant system, and if the reactor coolant system gad
 some TLAAs associated with it, there would be a
 summary of the TLAA in the aging management review
 report for that system.
 And it was up to the inspector if he chose
 to then pull the string on that, and go look at the
 TLAA report, which may then reference calculations and
 things like that.
 So I think maybe not categorically a
 hundred percent as to the inspection team, because
 typically you would not expect a hundred percent
 inspection from an inspection team.
 But I think you probably will find some
 examples where they did look at some areas and posed
 some questions. Whether it was that one in
 particular, I don't recall. 
 MEMBER SHACK: Well, I should also agree
 with Chris. I mean, I have full confidence that Barry
 Elliott is going to beat CAS stainless steel
 embrittlement to death. He just didn't document it.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: We had similar comments
 from Dr. Ford before regarding the difficulty it is
 for an independent reviewer like the ACRS to really
 get fully inside the implementation that we get, and
 we understand that. I mean, that is only a sample. 
 However, to the degree to which you can
 make available through references, we really
 appreciate it. It just that it is very important. 
 The other point that I wanted to make is something
 that I have been talking about for a while, but I
 can't go to the applicants to get it.
 But I can go to the NRC to see if we could
 get it, and again we have an application here that
 comes in with a number of problems, existing problems,
 and new problems, and that is really a snapshot in
 time of what this application is all about.
 Then comes the SER, and there we describe
 a lot of negotiations and issue, or let me call it not
 a negotiation, but simply a resolution of issues. 
 And added commitments that come to the
 site because of that. We as a committee are not privy
 to all the other information where these commitments
 are made, and so I typically have to go through first
 of all, all the commitments in the application.
 Then I go through the SER and try to sort
 out every additional commitment there is, and I cannot
 say that I feel that I am complete. I cannot read
 every single page and every single detail and point.
 So what I am saying is that there it would
 be worthwhile maybe in the SER, and at the end of it
 there would be many a couple of pages summarizing all
 of the added commitments coming as a result of the
 resolution of RAIs, or open items. 
 It may be actually half a page, and maybe
 just a third of a page, but I think it would be
 helpful for a reviewer to then at the end reflect on
 the application, and how it is modified by the
 additional commitments, and that is just a suggestion.
 I don't think it would be a great effort
 on the part of the SCR responsible project manager,
 but it is just a suggestion.
 MR. MEDOFF: This is Jim Medoff with the
 materials and chemical engineering branch currently on
 rotation to the license renewal and environment impact
 program.
 We have summarized the open items and
 confirmatory items in Chapter 1. The only thing that
 we have not summarized is the RAIs. So if that is
 what you are looking for --
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Well, again, I know that
 there are license conditions that are listed at the
 end and so that's there. 
 MR. MEDOFF: The other thing that we have
 is we have referenced the sequence of correspondence
 between the FPL and the NRC, and vice versa, in one of
 the appendices to the FCR. So you can see that they
 do make references to the RAI so you can get the
 appropriate documentation.
 MR. GRIMES: Dr. Bonaca, as my legacy, I
 will leave behind a suggestion to the staff, that as
 it looks at improvements in the style guides -- and by
 which we intended the safety evaluation report would
 be the compilation that you looked for.
 It is very difficult to digest, and it is
 not a stand alone document. It refers to the
 application, the updated final safety analysis report,
 the drawings, the inspection results, all of the
 correspondence that as Jim points out is enumerated in
 the appendix.
 It is a daunting task for anyone to try
 and digest all of that and have a real appreciation
 for, well, what does it mean. It is conceivable that
 there is a way as we look at streaming the safety
 evaluation and making it more scrutable.
 And also getting feedback from the ACRS
 and others on the optimum form and content of the
 application in a safety evaluation as it relates to
 incorporating the generic aging lessons learned, we
 will look for opportunities to find a place to sort of
 summarize what are all of the programs.
 I appreciate your vision, and we tried to
 put together a little catalog of existing and new
 programs. There are 30 some programs usually in total
 that constitute something on the order of 400 to 500
 procedures. 
 If there is a way to conveniently
 summarize them, but we are still going to be referring
 back to the updated final safety analysis report as
 the compendium of the commitments. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: That is a regulatory
 vehicle.
 MR. GRIMES: And beyond that, I think that
 it is not so important that you understand what
 commitments were proposed and what commitments did we
 end up with. 
 The process provided a means for us to
 identify what is the necessary and sufficient basis
 for the granting of a renewed license. And as I said,
 if there is a way to more conveniently summarize that
 to help the public appreciate what the result is, we
 will see what we can do.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I am not asking a big
 effort, but I'm only saying there is a list, because
 ultimately after I read the SER, I go back to the
 application, and that has the tables with the columns. 
 And that really helps me understand and reflect on the
 comments.
 And it is just that I read it again and go
 through it again, and that is not the whole story. 
 There is some stuff coming out of the SER. Here is
 one thing and another one, and then I am left with
 questions about how many I missed. So anyway it is a
 minor comment, and it is not a major issue.
 MR. JULIAN: That concludes my comments on
 our inspection.
 MR. MEDOFF: Mr. Bonaca, would it be
 helpful if in the references if the documents at this
 point should be in ADAMS if were to put associate
 numbers by the reference so that you could enter ADAMS
 and pull the documents for review?
 It seems that the issue that I am getting
 from you is that you are a little bit uncomfortable,
 because sometimes you don't get to see the whole story
 issued by the RAI.
 MR. GRIMES: We did not intend to threaten
 the ACRS. This is Chris Grimes. 
 MR. MEDOFF: We will brainstorm some ideas
 with you separately.
 MR. AULUCK: And to bring this to the last
 item in our presentation, conclusions. The staff has
 completed its review of the Turkey Point License
 Renewal Application, and all the open items have been
 resolved.
 And the applicant has met the requirements
 for license renewal as required by 10 CFR 54.29. At
 this time, I will request the Committee's views on
 whether or not there is anything additional we need to
 do before preparing a recommendation to the
 Commission.
 And secondly, I would like your views and
 recommendations, and input, regarding what topics or
 subject matter you want us to focus on in next month's
 ACRS full committee meeting.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I first will go around
 the table and see if there are any questions or
 additional issues that the members would like to
 raise. Jack.
 DR. SIEBER: No, I have none. I thought
 that the staff and the licensee did a good job on
 this.
 MEMBER KRESS: Same here.
 DR. BARTON: I have got a question, and in
 reviewing the SER, it has to do with the section on
 containment. You guys don't have it in front of you,
 but 204 and 205, where we talk about the structures
 and monitoring systems program that the applicant has
 got to manage aging and concrete structures below
 ground and water level.
 The program will monitor degradation of
 water proofing membranes and water stops by evidence
 of ground water leakage, accessible to internal
 surfaces, et cetera, et cetera. 
 The bottom line is that the staff reviewed
 this information and found that excluding the water
 proofing membrane and water stops from the scope of
 license renewal is acceptable because degradation of
 the water stops will not affect the containment
 integrity.
 Now, have you guys noticed any leakage at
 your containment water stops?
 MR. SPICLER: My name is Bruce Spicler and
 I am the lead civil engineer for license renewal for
 Florida Power and Light. 
 I guess the key answer would be that we
 have done inspections in the independent ten and
 access gallery, and in fact during the NRC inspection,
 one of the inspectors went with us into the ten and
 access gallery.
 The areas where we have water stops that
 are cast in the concrete, we have not had any leaks. 
 We have a seal that is between the safety related
 containment structure and the non-safety related ten
 and access gallery structure which ensures that the
 two structures are independent from each other.
 We have experienced leaks in that seal,
 but that seal is unique to that location. It is not
 replicated in safety related structures. But the
 question I have is how can you say so now there is a
 leak, and there is some seepage of ground water, and
 you are seeing it in this membrane. 
 How can you say that this does not
 compromise containment integrity? What happens in an
 accident with your pressurized containment? Can you
 now drive activity into ground water, and that is my
 question.
 MR. SPICLER: Well, you are asking if we
 can maintain containment integrity, and one of the
 things that we explained in our response to the RAIs
 was that we are using the ten and access gallery as
 the early indicator for signs of degradation to the
 concrete below ground water.
 DR. BARTON: Right.
 MR. SPICLER: It is like a one foot thick
 wall, I believe my recollection is, where the
 containment, the safety related portion of containment
 is many feet.
 So our assertion is that if there was to
 be degradation, or in other words, we lose the
 waterproofing membrane, and then we have intrusion of
 ground water through the concrete, and past the water
 stops embedded in the concrete, it would show up there
 first before it would show up, say, inside
 containment.
 DR. BARTON: So during an accident there
 is no way that you could get accident generated water
 -- you see where I am going with this -- accident
 generated water back into ground water.
 MR. HALE: My name is Steve Hale, Florida
 Power and Light. The water stop is to prevent water
 from coming in at a construction joint, and internally
 we have a liner, which is tested fully as part of our
 integrated leak break test and that sort of thing.
 And so a water stop itself is not really
 related to pressure integrity. It is a circular seal
 that is put into a construction joint, where that
 construction joint is below ground water level.
 And so it is really a construction
 feature. Now, what we haw is a similar seal in this
 ten and access gallery. So we are using it as a
 monitor of the effectiveness of the water stop, and
 whether we are seeing any aging in that water stop,
 which is very similar to the one that we have for the
 containment base path.
 DR. BARTON: If you are telling me that
 there is no path for radioactive water to get to
 ground water through a leak in a seal, that's all I
 wanted to know.
 MR. HALE: Right. Exactly. The liner is
 the pressure package.
 DR. BARTON: That is the only question
 that I have got, and other than reviewing the SER, I
 don't have any other open items. If I could say
 something not technical. Am I allowed to say
 something not technical before this committee?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Anything that is proper.
 DR. BARTON: I was impressed with the
 tour, and I think from what we saw, and in a snapshot
 and being familiar with other plants and in looking at
 other plants, I think they have got a good safety
 culture here, and I think the condition of this plant
 in the environment it is in, as compared to other
 plants that I have seen outside turbines, et cetera,
 and less harsher environments, this plant has got
 better material conditions than I have seen in other
 stations.
 And so I think my assessment is that they
 are doing a real good job of maintaining the station.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I agree with those
 comments that were said. And that this is a good
 application, and that is my judgment, and a very
 extensive review, and I appreciate the review
 performed by the staff. 
 I think it was thorough, and I was
 impressed by the inspections that took place over a
 period of two years. So we depend on inspections, and
 that's why I want to recognize you for this. With
 regard to next week's meeting, and I will give you my
 thoughts on that, and then go around the table for
 additional thoughts.
 But certainly we did not have an interim
 presentation to the full committee when we had the SER
 with open items because there were only four open
 items. 
 MR. AULUCK: We did have the full
 committee meeting.
 DR. BARTON: Yes, we did.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: We did?
 MR. AULUCK: Yes. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, you are absolutely
 right. I think that I still would like to have during
 the presentation some points regarding methods used
 for scoping and screening. And we are trying to
 monitor here from application to application how much
 we are depending on generic documents, and I don't
 know to what extent it was used.
 I know that a lot of previous experience
 was used in the application that you put together. 
 Clearly we need to hear about closure on open items.
 One thing that would be interesting to
 know for the committee is the bottom line on past
 measure components. You know, the active vessel. You
 know, 48 effective technical power years and the
 margin to that.
 And the other thing that I thought would
 be important is just a brief discussion of the
 Westinghouse topicals, because we will see those again
 for the next Westinghouse application.
 So although they were not used as a
 reference in this application, I think that we may
 want to briefly give us a summary, and if nothing
 else, that you have completed the review of those.
 MR. AULUCK: And we will have the whole
 afternoon for a presentation.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes. That's right. And
 I will go around the table to see if there are other
 issues that we should attach on.
 MEMBER KRESS: I agree with what you have. 
 I would not spend a lot of time on the Westinghouse
 because we can get those later. 
 But when we talk about the open items and
 how they were resolved, I would like to see for the
 Seismic II over I a little more explanation of the
 criteria that were used to decide the impact of the
 non-safety and safety, and how they decided what that
 impact would be, or whether there was any impact. So
 just some criteria or some statements on how they made
 their determination.
 DR. SIEBER: I have nothing to add.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: This will be a two hour
 meeting?
 MR. DUDLEY: And the date -- I would like
 to correct the date, and that is Thursday, April 11th.
 MR. AULUCK: It has been changed?
 MR. DURAISWAMY: I believe it is the 11th,
 but let's look at the date. We were thinking about
 doing it first thing in the morning, 8:30. Is that
 okay? It will be on Thursday morning.
 DR. BARTON: If Tom's comment had to do
 with the description of the Seismic II over I program
 here to the full committee; is that what you were
 talking about, what we heard this morning from Steve?
 MEMBER KRESS: Yes, but I would like to
 see specifically how they determined if it had no
 impact or if it had an impact, how they were citing
 that, the criteria.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: That covers pretty much
 the scope, and we will have an hour for the applicant
 and an hour for --
 MR. DURAISWAMY: You want two hours,
 Mario?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: We should take that. I
 think we will need two hours. I think you wanted to
 talk about station blackout stuff.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Yes, exactly. We should
 talk about the issues of station blackout. And there
 are these issues presented to us and should we have
 them on the agenda? 
 MR. DUDLEY: We should probably bring that
 forward to the full commission.
 MR. AULUCK: Do you want us to discuss
 public citizens comments?
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: I would like for you to
 discuss it, yes. Those are the issues, and regarding
 the concrete and the voids in it, and that would be
 again interesting to know for the committee what was
 done then in looking at other plants. I am sure that
 there was something in the stuff there to be
 addressed. Any other issues?
 MR. AULUCK: Regarding station backup, the
 issue was not raised at Turkey Point, and there was no
 RAI on it. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: It is an emerging issue,
 and I think it is important. I know that I came here
 with a question in my mind how do you close this issue
 here, because there is a document from the staff with
 specific guidance talking about that, and that is not
 a prescriptive approach, and the assumption that
 outside power is the preferred source. But I am
 saying that I think the committee should hear about
 that.
 MR. GRIMES: We will present the status of
 the station blackout issue and understand it, and we
 will specifically say that we have not attempted to
 apply that position on this plant.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Exactly.
 MR. GRIMES: Because the staff did not
 believe that the position was ripe enough. We are
 still having an ongoing debate about whether or not
 the current licensing basis does nor does not include
 off-site equipment, or whether or not the industry's
 view will prevail that the station blackout rule stops
 when you get AC power.
 And it does not go to the restoration
 period or the recovery. 
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Does that mean that this
 is not a closed issue yet?
 MR. GRIMES: It is not an open issue on
 this application. It is not a closed issue
 generically. We sent a letter to NEI and the Union of
 Concerned Scientists, and said that we are proposing
 to expand the scope of equipment and license renewal
 to include the equipment that is used to restore off-
 site power based on this interpretation of 50.63. 
 And that stimulated a dialogue that is
 going to end in a decision and we have not made that
 decision yet.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. Good. Thank you
 very much. I know that this is a proposed item, yes.
 MEMBER KRESS: I guess I would be
 interested in hearing a little more about from the
 staff about the question of the concrete compaction
 and why you feel like it is not a generic issue.
 And what you have done in the disposition
 is a generic issue. And with respect to the licensing
 renewal, it just says it is a generic issue.
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: Okay. I think you are
 going to have plenty to talk about in NRR. Any other
 comments from the members or any comments from them
 members of the public? 
 (No response.)
 CHAIRMAN BONACA: If not, then this
 meeting is adjourned.
 (Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the meeting was
 concluded.)