Safety Evaluation Regarding Combustible Gas Control in Containment at Indian Point Unit 2

March 23, 1999

MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers
Executive Director for Operations
/s/
FROM: John T. Larkins, Executive Director
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards

SUBJECT: SAFETY EVALUATION REGARDING COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTROL IN CONTAINMENT AT INDIAN POINT UNIT 2

During the 460th meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, March 10-13, 1999, the ACRS considered the staff's safety evaluation regarding combustible gas control in containment at Indian Point Unit 2. The safety evaluation documented the staff's acceptance of the use of passive autocatalytic recombiners (PARs) for combustible gas control inside the containment. The ACRS decided not to review the safety evaluation associated with Indian Point Unit 2.

The ACRS previously reviewed and commented on the qualification of PARs as part of its review of the AP600 design. The ACRS position on the adequacy of the present qualification requirements for PARs is presented in its March 22, 1999 letter to you on lessons learned from ACRS review of the AP600 design.

References:

• Memorandum dated February 22, 1999, from Carl H. Berlinger, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, to Singh S. Bajwa, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Subject: Indian Point 2 Proposed Technical Specification for Hydrogen Recombiners.
• Letter dated March 22, 1999, from D. A. Powers, ACRS Chairman, to William D. Travers, EDO, Subject: Lessons Learned from the ACRS Review of the AP600 Application.

cc: A. Vietti-Cook, SECY
J. Blaha, OEDO
J. Mitchell, OEDO
S. Collins, NRR
E. Adensam, NRR
G. Holahan, NRR