Item A-31: RHR Shutdown Requirements (former USI)
DESCRIPTION
The safe shutdown of a nuclear power plant following an accident not related to a LOCA has been typically interpreted as achieving a "hot-standby" condition (i.e., the reactor is shu
The safe shutdown of a nuclear power plant following an accident not related to a LOCA has been typically interpreted as achieving a "hot-standby" condition (i.e., the reactor is shu
This issue is documented in NUREG-0371[1]and addresses the adequacy of safety-related DC pow
The safety concern of this NUREG-0371[1]item deals with the consideration of alternatives to the basic design of nuclear po
This NUREG-0371[1]item involves the development of consistent and formalized acceptance criteria regarding the conversion t
By letter dated June 18, 1975, licensees of operating reactor facilities were sent a preliminary copy of a staff paper, "Guidance for Proposed License Amendments Relating to Refuelin
The Class 1E power sources provide the electric power for the plant systems that are essential to reactor shutdown, containment isolation, reactor core
CP applicants for which SERs were issued after July 1, 1974, were required by the NRC to qualify all safety-
Since the issuance of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 in February 1973, certain requirements of the appendix have been found to be conflicting, impractical
Several aspects of the MSLB analyses as currently provided by applicants and accepted by the NRC have been questioned.
Safety-related equipment inside the containment of a nuclear power plant is qualified for the most severe accident conditions under which it is expected to function.