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Inspections of operating BWRs conducted up to April 1978 revealed cracks in the feedwater nozzles of 20 reactor vessels. Most of these BWRs contained 4 nozzles with diameters ranging from 10 in. to 12 in.
The technical report on ATWS for water-cooled reactors (WASH-1270)[1]discussed the probability of an ATWS event as well as an appropriate safety objectiv
As a result of the GE testing program for the MARK III pressure-suppression containment program, new containment loads associated with a postulated LOCA were identified in 1975 which had not been explicitly includ
During testing for an advanced BWR containment system design (MARK III), suppression pool hydrodynamic loads were identified which had not been considered in the original design of t
During the conduct of a large scale testing program for an advanced design BWR pressure suppression containment system (MARK III), new suppression pool hydrodynamic loads associated with a postulated LOCA were ide
Prior to 1978, operating experience with PWR steam generators was characterized by extensive corrosion and mechanically-induced degradation of the steam generator tubes, frequent pla
On May 7, 1975, the NRC was informed by VEPCO that an asymmetric loading on the reactor vessel supports resulting from a postulated reactor coolant pipe rupture at a specific location
The issue was raised after the occurrence of various incidents of water hammer that involved steam generator feedrings and piping, emergency core cooling systems, RHR systems, contai
