Escalated Enforcement Actions Issued to Reactor Licensees - D
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- D.C. Cook 1 & 2
- Davis-Besse
- Diablo Canyon 1 & 2
- Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc
- Dresden 2 & 3
- Duane Arnold
D.C. Cook 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00315; 050-00316
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-12-005 D.C. Cook |
ORDER | 06/28/2012 | On June 28, 2012, an Immediately Effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company to confirm commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session held on May 23, 2012. This action is based on a violation involving two D. C. Cook supervisory-level individuals who failed to ensure that an individual, who was offsite when selected for fitness-for-duty testing, was tested at the earliest reasonable and practical opportunity when both the donor and collectors were available. This was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 26, Sections 4(b) and 31(d)(2)(v) of the Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) program. Indiana Michigan Power Company has completed a number of corrective actions and agreed to implement additional corrective actions and enhancements. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the order, the NRC agreed to refrain from proposing a civil penalty and issuing a Notice of Violation for this matter. |
| EA-06-295 D.C. Cook |
ORDER | 04/04/2007 | On April 4, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) as part of a settlement agreement between I&M and the NRC regarding an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," issued by the NRC to I&M. In response to an NRC choice letter, I&M requested Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) to resolve the apparent violation. As part of the settlement agreement that resulted from the ADR session, I&M agreed to complete a number of actions, including the completion of the training of all non-supervisory plant workforce and long-tern contractors on the subject of a safety-conscious work environment (SCWE), the completion of a Nuclear Safety Culture (including SCWE) survey, the reinforcement of I&M's policy and expectation of its management relating to a SCWE as communicated by an executive level manager, and the implementation of a periodic assessment of I&M's compliance with its hours of work limitation program and evaluation of the results for trends. In exchange for I&M's actions, the NRC agreed to not pursue further enforcement action; however, the NRC will evaluate the implementation of the Confirmatory Order during future inspections. |
| EA-06-177 D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 60,000 |
10/06/2006 | On October 6, 2006, a Severity Level III Notice of Violation and Proposed Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued to the Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M). The violation resulted from changes the licensee made to its D. C. Cook Emergency Plan in April 2003. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q), a licensee may make changes to emergency plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). In April 2003, I&M made changes, without Commission approval, to the Fission Product Barrier Matrix Emergency Action Level (EAL) in the D. C. Cook Emergency Plan that decreased the effectiveness of the plan and resulted in use of a non-standard scheme of EALs. |
| EA-05-171 D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 60,000 |
11/23/2005 | On November 23, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of a Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000, was issued for a Severity Level III problem involving the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information, and meet reporting requirements regarding NRC-licensed operators at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant. Specifically, the licensee failed to: (1) provide complete and accurate information to the NRC concerning corrective actions associated with a previous Severity Level III violation (EA-04-109); (2) notify the NRC within 30 days of NRC-licensed operators experiencing a permanent disability or illness; and (3) provide complete and accurate information concerning the medical condition of individuals on new or renewal NRC reactor operator license applications. |
| EA-04-109 D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
09/29/2004 | On September 29, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving an application for renewal of a Senior Reactor Operator license that was not complete and accurate in all material respects. |
| EA-04-006 D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOV (White) |
03/12/2004 | On March 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to properly prepare a package of radioactive material for shipment. The violation cited the licensee's failure to prepare the radioactive material package for shipment so that the radiation level did not exceed 200 millirem per hour at any point on the external surface of the package. |
| EA-01-286 D.C. Cook, Units 1, 2 |
NOV (White) |
10/03/2002 | On October 3, 2002, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving a failed essential service water (ESW) strainer basket that resulted in a debris intrusion event. The violation cited that the installation instructions for the ESW strainer baskets, an activity affecting quality, were not appropriate. |
| EA-02-010 D.C. Cook, Unit 2 |
NOV (White) |
05/06/2002 | On May 6, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure to take corrective action to preclude a repetitive failure of the Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, a significant condition adverse to quality. |
| EA-99-329 D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
05/05/2000 | On May 5, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on discrimination against an employee for engaging in protected activities. |
| EA-98-113 D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
04/21/1998 | Transportation violations; no shipping papers or emergency contact number. |
| EA-96-020 D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
03/11/1996 | Both centrifugal charging pumps were rendered inoperable and action was not taken within the technical specification requirements. |
| EA-93-059 D.C. Cook 1 & 2 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 25,000 |
08/05/1993 | Withdrawal of Notice of Violation and proposed imposition of Civil Penalty on an action based on discrimination against a technician for engaging in protected activity. |
Davis-Besse - Docket No. 050-00346
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-21-155 Davis Besse |
NOV (White) | 03/01/2022 | On March 1, 2022, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation (Licensee) Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The white finding, an issue of low to moderate safety significance, involved the licensee’s failure to establish the required voltage specifications for emergency diesel generator (EDG) speed control switches as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control.” As a result, on May 27, 2021, the Division 1 EDG failed to reach required voltage and frequency during surveillance testing. |
| EA-18-008 Davis Besse |
NOV (White) | 04/13/2018 | On April 13, 2018, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) for a violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding. Contrary to the requirements, FENOC failed to assure that activities affecting quality were prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, FENOC failed to provide appropriate instructions to calibrate the turbine bearing oil sight glasses for the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pumps. This failure resulted in failure of the inboard turbine bearing on the number 1 AFW pump due to low bearing oil levels when the pump was tested in September 2017. Additionally, there are associated violations of Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Emergency Feedwater," which requires three trains of emergency feedwater available at power or restored to operable within 72 hours and plant shutdown if the 72 hour requirement cannot be met. |
| EA-16-022 Davis Besse |
ORDER | 09/01/2016 | On September 1, 2016, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute mediation session. The agreement resolves the apparent failure of a licensed operator who deliberately failed to comply with a condition of his license, and failed to provide Davis-Besse with information, that was complete and accurate in all material respects, for the submittal of required updates on the operator's medical condition. Davis-Besse agreed to a number of corrective actions, including: (1) a management discussion with each licensed operator in regard to this event, (2) revisions to operator requalification training materials to incorporate facts and lessons learned from this event, (3) management communications regarding expectations and requirements for complete and accurate medical reporting to operations personnel subject to those requirements, (4) training to address the provisions of 10 CFR 50.9, (5) revisions to existing fleet procedures governing licensed operator medical reports, (6) a presentation at the Nuclear Medical Resources Professionals User Group on the facts of this case, and (7) submission of an article to a widespread trade publication based on the facts and lessons learned from this event. In consideration of these commitments, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and will consider this Order as an escalated enforcement action for a period of one year from its effective date. |
| EA-14-094 Davis Besse |
ORDER | 06/30/2014 | On June 30, 2014, a Confirmatory Order was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), confirming FENOC's commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. FENOC had originally planned to submit its application on July 1, 2014. The NRC reviewed FENOC's justification for the delay, and accepted the proposed new submittal date of December 31, 2015. |
| EA-10-332 Davis Besse |
NOV (SL III) |
04/30/2010 | On April 30, 2010, a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a Severity Level III problem for the failure to implement: (1) 10 CFR 50.71 "Maintenance of records, making of reports" and (2) 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design control." In July 1999, the licensee submitted a license amendment request to eliminate as found testing criteria by using the past data for double O ring data and was approved by the NRC. However, the licensee staff did not update this fact in their updated final safety analysis report. The licensee also changed from the double O ring design to a flat gasket design which did not have the same reliable history as the double O ring and failed to translate this fact into the licensing basis at time of installation. |
| EA-09-283 Davis Besse |
NOV (White) |
02/25/2010 |
On February 25, 2010, a Notice of Violation was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. This finding involved a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) which requires, in part, that a holder of an operating license shall follow emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b). 10 CFR 50.47(b) requires, in part, that the licensee have a standard emergency classification and action level scheme in use. The Davis-Besse Emergency Plan requires, in part, that the Shift Manager shall verify the indication of an off-normal event and classify the situation. Specifically, on June 25, 2009, the Shift Manager failed to verify the indications of an off-normal event or reported sighting, assess the information available from valid indications or reports of an explosion, and classify the situation as an Alert in accordance with the Emergency Action Level Conditions during an actual event. |
| EA-07-199 Davis Besse |
ORDER | 08/15/2007 | On August 15, 2007, a Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to formalize commitments made by FENOC following the NRC staff's issuance of a Demand for Information (DFI) on May 14, 2007. The DFI was issued in response to the information provided by FENOC relative to its re-analysis of the time line and root causes for the 2002 Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event following its receipt of a report prepared by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent). On June 13, 2007, FENOC provided its response to the DFI. On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided a supplemental response to the DFI which provided additional detail regarding the planned implementation of commitments established in its June 13, 2007, response to the DFI. |
| EA-07-123 Davis Besse |
DFI | 05/14/2007 | On May 14, 2007, a Demand for Information (DFI) was issued to FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) in response to information provided by FENOC in a report, dated December 15, 2006, prepared by its contractor, Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent), associated with the root causes and time line for the 2002 Davis Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. In particular, the DFI required FENOC to provide detailed and specific information relative to the timing of FENOC's review of the Exponent Report and the factors FENOC considered when determining whether the conclusions in the report should be communicated to the NRC. The DFI also required FENOC to provide information in order for the NRC to understand the depth and completeness of FENOC's evaluation of the assumptions, methods, and conclusions of the Exponent Report and to understand the differences between the Exponent Report and the technical and programmatic root cause reports previously developed by FENOC relative to the 2002 Davis-Besse event. In addition, the DFI required information in order for the NRC to understand FENOC's position regarding a second contractor report prepared for FENOC entitled, "Report of Reactor Pressure Vessel Wastage at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant," dated December 2006. Regarding the second report, the DFI required specific information relative to FENOC's endorsement of the report's conclusions and the implications of any new positions taken by FENOC compared to those previously communicated to the NRC in response to the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties, dated April 21, 2005. After reviewing FENOC's response to the DFI the NRC will determine whether further action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. |
| EA-04-224 Davis Besse |
ORDER | 07/15/2005 | On July 15, 2005, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to establish certain requirements as set forth in the Order including training related to employee protection for contractor personnel who are granted unescorted access at Davis-Besse and the other FENOC nuclear facilities. The Order was discussed during Alternative Dispute Resolution and, subject to satisfactory implementation of said requirements, the NRC will not pursue further enforcement action on this issue. |
| EA-04-231 Davis Besse |
NOV (White) |
05/05/2005 | On May 5, 2005, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the failure of the emergency planning zone (EPZ) sirens. The violation cited the licensee's failure to implement the means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. |
| EA-05-071 EA-05-068 EA-05-066 EA-05-067 EA-05-072 EA-03-025 EA-05-069 EA-05-070 Davis-Besse |
NOVCP (SLI, Red) $5,450,000 |
04/21/2005 | On April 21, 2005, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount of $5,450,000 was issued for multiple violations (some willful) related to the significant degradation of the reactor pressure vessel head identified in February and March 2002. The significant violations included, (1) operation with reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage (associated with a Red SDP finding, $5,000,000), (2) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level I, $110,000), (3) failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (Severity Level II, $110,000), (4) failure to implement procedures (Severity Level II, $110,000), (5) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level I, $120,000), (6) failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality (associated with a Red SDP finding), (7) failure to implement procedures (associated with a Red SDP finding), and (8) failure to provide complete and accurate information (Severity Level III). |
| EA-03-209 Davis-Besse |
NOV (SL III) |
05/07/2004 | On May 7, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the failure to provide the NRC with complete and accurate information in the licensee's response to NRC Generic Letter (GL) 98-04 regarding protective coating deficiencies and foreign material in containment. |
|
EA-03-214 |
ORDER | 03/08/004 | On March 8, 2004, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to confirm certain commitments, as set forth in the Order, that requires annual independent assessments for five years, in the areas of operations, engineering, corrective actions and safety culture and requires inspection of key reactor coolant system pressure boundary components during a mid-cycle outage to ensure effective assessment and sustained safe performance. The Order was issued in conjunction with the NRC's decision to approve the restart of the facility. |
| EA-03-172 Davis-Besse |
NOV (White) |
03/05/2004 | On March 5, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the potential inability of the high pressure injection (HPI) pumps to perform their safety function under certain accident scenarios due to potential pump degradation. The violation cited the licensee's failure to adequately implement design control measures for verifying the adequacy of the design of the HPI pumps to mitigate all postulated accidents. |
| EA-03-131 Davis-Besse |
NOV (Yellow) |
10/07/2003 | On October 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a Yellow SDP finding involving the inability of the emergency core cooling system sump to perform its safety function under certain accident scenarios due to potential clogging of the sump screen. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly identify and correct significant conditions adverse to quality involving the potential to clog the emergency core cooling and containment spray system sump with debris following a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). |
| EA-02-117 EA-02-257 Davis-Besse |
NOV (White) |
02/19/2003 | On February 19, 2003, a Notice of Violation was issued for violations associated with two White SDP findings associated with the radiological controls related to steam generator nozzle dam installation conducted on February 20, 2002. The violations cited the failure of the licensee to conduct an adequate evaluation of the radiological hazards in order to characterize the radiological work conditions and to take timely and suitable measurements to adequately monitor the occupational intake of the material by workers during and following steam generator nozzle dam installation. |
| EA-99-138 Davis-Besse |
NOV (SL III) |
08/06/1999 | Violations involving failure to maintain the design of a pressurizer spray valve and inadequate corrective action for the degraded condition. |
| EA-96-304 Davis-Besse |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 50,000 |
10/22/1996 | Failure to take actions to address hot shorts in circuits controlling as many as 41 MOV's and to take corrective action to address the use of combustibles for radiant energy shields. |
| EA-96-122 Davis-Besse |
NOV (SL III) |
06/13/1996 | Missing HPI system high point. |
Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 - Docket Nos. 050-00275; 050-00323
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-16-168 Diablo Canyon Power Plant |
NOV (White) |
12/28/2016 | On December 28, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee), for a violation involving the licensee's failure to develop adequate instructions for the installation of external limit switches on safety-related motor-operated valves as required by Technical Specification 5.4.1.a "Procedures," at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. Specifically, Procedure MP E-53.10R, "Augmented Stem Lubrication for Limitorque Operated Valves," Revision 4, used to perform maintenance on safety-related equipment, failed to provide instructions to establish and check the travel of external switches installed on motor-operated valves are within vendor established criteria. Consequently, the limit switch for valve RHR-2-8700B was installed, such that, it was operated repeatedly beyond overtravel tolerances resulting in its failure on May 16, 2016. Additionally, the licensee also violated Technical Specification 3.5.2 because train B of the emergency core cooling system was determined to be inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time of 14 days. |
| EA-14-010 Diablo Canyon Power Plant |
NOV (SL III) |
02/11/2015 | On February 11, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Pacific Gas and Electric Company for a Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Conditions of Licenses" involving the failure to apply and receive approval from the Commission for a proposed change that decreased the effectiveness of the approved emergency plan. In addition, a White Significance Determination finding was issued. This White finding, an issue with low to moderate significance to safety, will require additional NRC inspections. The finding involves a change to the emergency plan which decreased its effectiveness. Specifically, on November 4, 2005, without approval from the NRC, the licensee removed instructions in emergency plan implementing procedures for making protective action recommendations for members of the public on the ocean within the 10-mile emergency planning zone, decreasing the plan's effectiveness. |
| EA-12-075 Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
05/04/2012 | On May 4, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information," associated with a Severity Level III violation involving PG&E's failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects, related to its NRC Generic Letter 2003-01 response. Specifically, in a letter dated April 22, 2005, PG&E stated that: (1) test results confirmed that no unfiltered control room in-leakage existed; and (2) tracer gas in-leakage testing was performed in the alignment that results in the greatest consequence to the control room operator. This information was inaccurate because control room ventilation testing conducted prior to PG&E's response to Generic Letter 2003-01 indicated that the unfiltered in-leakage was greater than the value assumed in the design basis radiological analyses, and the system test was not performed in an alignment that resulted in the greatest consequence to the control room operator. |
| EA-96-123 Diablo Canyon 1 & 2 |
NOV (SL III) |
06/07/1996 | Licensee granted unescorted access when there was derogatory information and a request to hold from contractor. |
Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. - Docket 50-423
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-14-092 Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. Millstone Power Station, Unit 3 |
NOV (White) |
08/20/2014 | On October 20, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, involving the failure to identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality for the Millstone 3 turbine-driven auxiliary feed water (TDAFW) pump. Specifically, in spite of the TDAFW pump experiencing three over speed trips from August 11, 2013 to February 3, 2014, Dominion did not identify that the pump was operating in an adverse configuration. The Adverse configuration was due to the installation of an inappropriate cam follower bearing within the turbine control valve linkage. This discrepant condition rendered the TDAFW pump inoperable for periods of time exceeding the limiting condition for operation specified in the Millstone 3 Technical Specification 3.7.1.2. |
Dresden 2 & 3 - Docket Nos. 050-00237; 050-00249
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-16-236 Dresden Nuclear Power Station |
NOV (White) |
02/27/2017 | On February 27, 2017, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3. Criterion III requires, in part, that design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a suitable testing program. Specifically, from June of 2002 until July of 2016, Exelon failed to verify the adequacy of the design of a high pressure coolant injection auxiliary oil pump required for the successful operation of the high pressure injection system and subject to the requirements of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50. |
| EA-15-115 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 |
NOV (White) |
09/16/2015 | On September 16, 2015 the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control". This violation involved the failure to review the suitability of application of the Automatic Depressurization System electromatic relief valve (ERV) actuators, which are essential to perform the safety-related reactor vessel depressurization and overpressure protection functions. This resulted in a failure of the 2C ERV, and an indeterminate period of inoperability and unavailability greater than allowed by Technical Specifications (TS) during the operating cycle. The 2C ERV inoperability during the operating cycle was identified after the failure of the valve during its first operational test in a mid-cycle outage. Additionally, because the licensee was not aware of the valve's inoperability between 2013 and 2015, the required TS actions were not followed. |
| EA-15-001 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 3 |
NOV (White) |
03/26/2015 | On March 26, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to Exelon Generation Company, LLC, for a violation, identified as a result of an inspection at its Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3, involving the failure to establish measures to ensure the suitability of materials, parts, equipment, and processes essential to the safety-related functions of structures, systems, and components as required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the application of the Automatic Depressurization System electromatic relief valve (ERV) actuators, which are essential to perform the safety-related reactor vessel depressurization and overpressure protection functions, remained suitable for operation. As a result, multiple failures of the 3E ERV occurred during testing prior to operating cycle D3C23, as well as an indeterminate period of inoperability and unavailability greater than allowed by the Unit 3 Technical Specifications during operating cycle D3C23. The 3E ERV inoperability during the operating cycle was identified after the failure of the valve during its first operational test following the Unit 3 shutdown for refueling. |
| EA 13-068 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 |
ORDER | 10/28/2013 | On October 28, 2013, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order (CO) to Exelon Generating Company, LLC. (Exelon) to formalize commitments made as a result of an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session held on September 18, 2013. The commitments were made as part of a settlement agreement between Exelon and the NRC regarding the apparent violation of 10 CFR 73.56, “Personnel access authorization requirements for nuclear power plants.” The agreement resolves the apparent violation which involved the failure of several Dresden Nuclear Power Station (Dresden) individuals to immediately inform a reviewing official of the questionable behavior of a now former Dresden senior reactor operator (SRO). This individual, along with another former Dresden SRO, planned and attempted to recruit another former employee to commit a violent off-site crime. As part of the ADR settlement agreement, Exelon has completed or intends to complete a number of corrective actions. These actions include fleet wide procedure revisions and training, fleet wide briefings, a presentation at an appropriate industry forum and submittal of an operating experience summary to an industry wide organization. In consideration of the corrective actions and commitments outlined in the CO, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a Notice of Violation and to preclude consideration of this CO as enforcement history for the Dresden Station. |
| EA-13-079 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 |
NOV (White) |
07/31/2013 | On July 31, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Dresden personnel to establish a written procedure to address the effect of an external flooding scenario on the plant. Specifically, prior to November 21, 2012, procedure DOA 0010-04, Floods, did not account for reactor vessel inventory make-up during an external flooding scenario up to and including the probable maximum flood event which could result in reactor vessel water level lowering below the top of active fuel. |
| EA-09-172 Dresden 3 |
NOV (White) |
10/26/2009 | On October 26, 2009, a Notice of Violation was issued to Exelon Generation Company, LLC for a violations associated with a White Significance Determination Finding as a result of inspections at the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 3. The White finding involved multiple violations including: (a) 10 CFR 50.54(j), in which non-licensed operators, during a maintenance activity, manipulated the control rod drive system hydraulic control unit insert riser isolation valves and the withdraw riser isolation valves, an action which affected the reactivity of the reactor in that the valve manipulations caused three control rods, D-7, E-7, and E-6 to move out of the core to positions 06, 18, and 16, respectively; (b) Technical Specification 3.1.1, in which the reactor was in Mode 4, the shutdown margin was not ≥ 0.38 ∆k/k and the licensee failed to initiate immediate actions to insert control rods; (c) Technical Specification 5.4.1, in which maintenance that affected the performance of the control rods, which are safety-related equipment, was performed in accordance with a written procedure that was not appropriate to the circumstances; (d) Technical Specification 5.4.1, in which the control room operators failed to implement a section of a procedure in that they did not aggressively investigate annunciators and alarms and did not accept the alarms as correct until demonstrated otherwise; and (e) Technical Specification 5.4.1, in which the licensee failed to implement its written procedure which addressed the inability to drive control rods. |
| EA-07-200 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOVCP SL III $65,000 |
11/27/2007 | On November 27, 2007, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Discretion for Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $65,000 was issued for a Severity Level III problem consisting of four violations involving the licensee's failure to comply with 10 CFR 74.19 between 1959 and 2007. In summary, the licensee failed to (a) keep complete records showing the inventory (including location and unique identity), transfer, and disposal of all special nuclear material (SNM) in its possession; (b) establish, maintain, and follow written MC&A procedures that were sufficient to enable the licensee to account for SNM in its possession; and (c) conduct a physical inventory of all SNM in its possession at intervals not to exceed 12 months. This resulted in the failure to account for two fuel pellets and a number of incore detectors containing SNM. |
| EA-03-102 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV SL III |
08/29/2003 | On a August 29, 2003, Notice of Violation was issued for a violation involving the failure by Exelon to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC regarding a request to renew a reactor operator license. |
| EA-02-265 Dresden 3 |
NOVCP SL III $60,000 |
06/23/2003 | On a June 23, 2003, a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was issued for the willful failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC Region III staff concerning the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system during a telephone conference call on September 27, 2001. A Notice of Violation was also issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding. |
| EA-02-264 Dresden 3 |
NOV (White) |
06/23/2003 | On a June 23, 2003, Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White SDP finding involving the operability of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system. The violation cited the licensee's failure to promptly correct a damaged HPCI system support resulting in the equipment being inoperable for greater than the allowed outage time. A Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $60,000 was also issued in conjunction with this case. |
| EA-99-313 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
09/06/2000 | On September 6, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation based on discrimination against a radiation protection technician for engaging in protected activities. |
| EA-96-532 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
05/21/1997 | Failure to adequately test control room emergency ventilation system. |
| EA-96-493 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
09/18/1998 | Problems are rooted in practices associated with the control of examination materials and the lack of personal integrity of the individuals involved. |
| EA-96-391 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOV (SL III) |
05/30/1997 | U-3 main steam line drain valve LLRT failures. Primary containment inoperable. |
| EA-96-115 Dresden 2 & 3 |
NOVCP (SL III) $ 50,000 |
06/13/1996 | Corner rooms structural steel in a condition outside FSAR caused by failure to account for modifications and errors in original design calculations. |
Duane Arnold - Docket No. 050-00331
| NRC Action Number(s) and Facility Name |
Action Type (Severity) & Civil Penalty (if any) |
Date Issued |
Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| EA-14-237 Duane Arnold |
NOV (White) |
04/16/2015 | On April 16, 2015, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC (licensee) for a violation identified at its Duane Arnold Energy Center involving the failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion IX, "Control of Special Processes" which required the licensee to maintain measures to assure that special processes are controlled and accomplished by qualified personnel using qualified procedures in accordance with applicable codes, standards, specifications, criteria, and other special requirements. Specifically, between November 5 and 10, 2012, the licensee did not adequately control the application of the torus coating, a special process, because the requirements associated with wet film thickness measurements and conditions for recoat application were not contained in design specifications and vendor documentation, nor were they included in qualified procedures. The licensee’s failure to establish adequate quality controls during the application of a torus coating resulted in an unqualified torus coating in excess of the emergency core cooling system suction strainer design debris loading margin. This finding did not present an immediate safety concern because the unqualified torus coating in excess of the design margin was removed during an outage before the reactor resumed operation. |
| EA-13-223 Duane Arnold |
NOV (White) |
02/11/2014 | On February 11, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of Technical Specification 3.5.3, "Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System", associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold personnel to perform an immediate operability determination in accordance with NextEra's procedures. Specifically, on June 21, 2013, Duane Arnold personnel failed to consider the degraded speed indication's impact on RCIC operability. As a result, the RCIC system was inoperable from June 21, 2013, to August 24, 2013. |
| EA-13-182 Duane Arnold |
NOV (White) |
12/18/2013 | On December 18, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to NextEra Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Duane Arnold personnel to prescribe a work instruction of a type appropriate to the circumstances for the re-assembly of the ‘A’ standby diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger. Specifically, on October 18, 2012, the licensee completed work order 40132858, which replaced the ‘A’ standby diesel generator lube oil heat exchanger tube bundle. The work order did not contain a specific and detailed sequence for re-assembly of the heat exchanger and connected piping system to achieve uniform and appropriate compression of the tube bundle-to-shell gasket. This contributed to the catastrophic failure of the tube bundle-to-shell gasket during a maintenance run of the engine on March 8, 2013, rendering the ‘A’ standby diesel generator unavailable. |
| EA-09-083 Duane Arnold |
NOV (White) |
06/06/2009 | On June 6, 2009 a Notice of Violation was issued to Florida Power and Light Energy Duane Arnold, LLC for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions." Specifically, the licensee initially identified and corrected a condition adverse to quality regarding overspeed trip alarms on the Train B emergency diesel generator (B EDG), a safety-related component covered under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, in February and March 2008. However, when spurious overspeed trip alarms began recurring in June 2008, the licensee did not perform any additional evaluation to identify the cause for the new condition adverse to quality and did not correct the recurring spurious overspeed trip alarms. This allowed the overspeed switch degradation to continue, resulting in the failure of the B EDG during the monthly surveillance test conducted in November 2008. |
| EA-07-017 Duane Arnold |
NOV (SL III) |
04/02/2007 | On April 2, 2007, a Notice of Violation was issued for a violation associated with a White Significance Determination Finding involving the failure of the licensee's 2006 full-scale exercise critique to identify a weakness associated with a Risk Significant Planning Standard which was also a Drill and Exercise Participation Performance Indicator. The NRC has determined that this failure is a performance deficiency and is also a violation of emergency preparedness planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) and associated risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.54(b)(4). |
| EA-06-047 Duane Arnold |
NOV (SL III) |
05/01/2006 | On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving failure to complete a pre-fuel-move checklist prior to relocating three irradiated fuel bundles in the spent fuel/cask pool Duane Arnold spent fuel/cask pool. Specifically, a designated fuel handling supervisor failed to complete the checklist, as required by a Duane Arnold fuel handling procedure, before moving the irradiated fuel bundles. |
| EA-04-053 Duane Arnold |
NOV (SL III) |
05/01/2006 | On May 1, 2006, a Notice of Violation and Exercise of Enforcement Discretion was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving a Refueling Floor Supervisor who deliberately directed an operator to relocate irradiated items in the cask pool without notifying health physics or ensuring that health physics personnel were present prior to relocating the irradiated items on July 23, 2003. Enforcement discretion in accordance with Section VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy was exercised to refrain from issuing a civil penalty for the violation because it involved special circumstances. |
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, December 17, 2024
Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, December 17, 2024