NRC Action Number(s) and
Facility Name |
Action Type
(Severity) &
Civil Penalty
(if any) |
Date
Issued |
Description |
EA-22-122
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 |
NOV
(White) |
05/08/2023 |
On May 8, 2023, the NRC issued a notice of violation associated with a white significance determination process finding to the Tennessee Valley Authority (licensee) at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (BFN1). The white finding, an issue of low-to-moderate safety significance, involved the licensee’s failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This failure resulted in the inoperability of the BFN1 high‑pressure coolant injection system. |
EA-16-064
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant |
NOVCP
(SL III) |
11/28/2016 |
On November 28, 2016, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of $140,000 to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a Severity Level III violation. The violation involved the failure to conduct compensatory fire watches as required by TVA corporate procedures and 10 CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection." Specifically, on multiple occasions in May 2015, hourly fire watches required as compensatory measures for fire protection equipment that was out of service in the Unit 3 Diesel Building and Unit 3 4kV Shutdown Board Room were not performed. |
EA-14-005
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant |
NOV
(White) |
04/30/2014 |
On April 30, 2014, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), as a result of the failure to maintain plant staffing levels in accordance with the radiological emergency plan at Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. This White finding, an issue with low to moderate significance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspections, involved the failure of the licensee's process for maintaining minimum emergency response shift staffing to adequately maintain staffing of the Shift Technical Advisor and Incident Commander to ensure initial accident response in all key functional areas.
Additionally, NRC identified two examples of a violation of 10 CFR 50.9 based on the licensee's failure to provide complete and accurate information associated with emergency response on-shift staffing requirements and a violation of 10 CFR 50.90 for the failure to submit an application requesting an amendment to their operating license concerning on-shift staffing levels. On May 1, 2014, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to TVA to formalize commitments made as a result of an ADR mediation session. The commitments were made by TVA as part of a settlement agreement between TVA and the NRC regarding the violation(s) of 50.9 and 50.90. TVA agreed to a number of corrective actions, including correcting the Conduct of Operations procedure to reflect adequate staffing levels and comprehensive fleet-wide and plant-specific corrective actions.
|
EA-13-118
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 |
NOV
(White) |
08/23/2013 |
On August 23, 2013, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) to Tennessee Valley Authority for a violation of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1, Procedures, associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure of Browns Ferry personnel to properly implement a procedure recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, dated February 1978. Specifically, on December 22, 2012, the licensee failed to properly implement the procedure for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of the Reactor Protection System, 2-OI-99, Reactor Protection System, step 5.1[3], when an operator incorrectly opened the RPS motor generator set tie to battery board 2 Breaker on the A RPS bus motor generator set while attempting to start the B RPS bus motor generator set. The failure to properly implement 2-OI-99 caused a Unit 2 reactor SCRAM and MSIV closure. |
EA-12-133
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
NOV
(White) |
08/13/2012 |
On August 13, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," associated with a White Significance Determination Process finding involving TVA’s failure to accomplish the requirements contained in procedure NPG-SPP-09.3 “Plant Modifications and Engineering Change Control,” which required that an evaluation of training needs be completed to support implementation of procedures developed in response to design changes. Specifically, on September 13, 2011, TVA issued several Safe Shutdown Instructions in support of Design Change Notice 69957, which installed a new three-hour fire barrier in the Intake Tunnel Structure, without performing an evaluation of training needs. As a result, the Safe Shutdown Instructions could not be satisfactorily performed by plant operators and staff. |
EA-12-071
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
ORDER |
05/18/2012 |
On May 18, 2012, an immediately effective Confirmatory Order was issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), confirming TVA’s commitment to submit a license amendment request to transition the three units at the Browns Ferry plant to the National Fire Protection Association Standard 805. TVA had originally planned to submit its application to transition Browns Ferry on March 4, 2012. However, TVA requested a delay to ensure it could submit a high-quality application. Based on TVA’s commitment to maintain acceptable compensatory measures, and a review of TVA’s status and planned key activities, including the intended NFPA 805 modifications, the NRC determined that TVA provided adequate justification for its commitment to submit a license application by March 29, 2013. The NRC has therefore extended TVA’s enforcement discretion until March 29, 2013. |
EA-11-252
Browns Ferry 1 |
NOV
(SL III) |
01/23/2012 |
On January 23, 2012, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” associated with a Severity Level III violation involving TVA’s failure to provide information to the Commission that was complete and accurate in all material respects, related to its NRC Generic Letter 89-10, “Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance” testing program. Specifically, in a letter dated January 6, 1997, TVA stated that “Closure of valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 is not required by plant procedures to operate the residual heat removal (RHR) system in the suppression pool cooling mode. Therefore, these valves have no ‘redundant’ safety function and will not be included in the GL 89-10 program.” In a letter dated May 5, 2004, TVA stated that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66, “are not in the GL 89-10 program, since the valves are normally in their safety position.” This information was inaccurate because the FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 valves do have a safety function to shut to operate the RHR system in the suppression pool cooling mode and should therefore have been included in Browns Ferry’s GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program. |
EA-11-018
Browns Ferry 1 |
NOV
(Red) |
05/09/2011 |
On May 9, 2011, the NRC issued a violation of Technical Specifications associated with a Red Significance Determination Process finding involving the failure to implement an IST program in accordance with the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants (OM Code), 1995 Edition, 1996 Addenda, Section ISTC 4.1. In a letter dated June 8, 2011, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) appealed the Final Significance Determination of this Red Finding. The NRC performed an independent review of this finding and in a letter dated August 16, 2011, concluded that TVA failed to establish adequate programs, as required by 10 CFR Part 50.55a(b)3(ii), to ensure that motor-operated valves continued to be capable of performing their design basis safety functions. The inadequacy of TVA programs resulted in the Unit 1 LPCI outboard injection valve, 1-FCV-74-66, being left in a significantly degraded condition and the Unit 1 LPCI/RHR Loop II unable to fulfill its safety function. The basis and outcome of the final risk significance determination evaluation on this Red finding remained unchanged. |
EA-09-307
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
NOV
(Yellow & White) |
04/19/2010 |
On April 19, 2010, a Notice of Violations was issued to Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) for violations associated with Yellow and White Significance Determination Findings as a result of inspections at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. The Yellow finding involved the licensee's failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G, fire protection of safe shutdown capability. There were multiple examples of the licensee not providing fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage and failing to ensure one train of systems or components was free of fire damage by approved methods. Compensatory measures are currently in place and long term corrective actions will be implemented. The White finding involved the licensee's failure to meet the requirements of a Technical Specification. This involved the inappropriate revision to a procedure which could have delayed proper operator response to a major disabling fire event. The procedure has been revised to prevent such an issue from occurring. |
EA-09-009; EA-09-203
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
ORDER |
12/22/2009 |
On December 22, 2009, a Confirmatory Order (effective immediately) was issued to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to confirm commitments made as a result of an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mediation session held on December 4, 2009. At issue were two apparent violations of the NRC's employee protection regulation (10CFR50.7) identified during two separate investigations conducted by the NRC Office of Investigations at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN). The NRC acknowledged that TVA, prior to the ADR session, had taken numerous actions which address the issues underlying the apparent violations. As part of the agreement, TVA agreed to take a number of additional actions. These actions include, implementing a process to review proposed adverse employment actions before they are taken to ensure compliance with 10CFR50.7 and to ensure the action could not negatively impact the Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE), issuing a fleet-wide written communication from TVA's executive management communicating TVA's policy and management expectations regarding the employee's right to raise concerns without fear of retaliation, performing two additional independent safety culture surveys before the end of calendar year 2013, and modifying contractor in-process training and new supervisor training to improve awareness of TVA's policy on SCWE. In recognition of these commitments, and the other actions already completed by TVA, the NRC agreed to refrain from issuing a civil penalty or Notice of Violation for these apparent violations. |
EA-04-063
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
05/12/2004 |
On May 12, 2004, a Notice of Violation was issued for a Severity Level III violation involving four examples of a failure to adhere to the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. All four examples were associated with the Long-Term Torus Integrity Program and involved failure to evaluate or incorporate numerous deficient welds into Deficiency Fix Requests sketches; failure to perform numerous repairs on the correct welds; omission of numerous welds requiring repair from Work Orders; and failure of Quality Control to independently verify the correct location of numerous weld repairs. |
EA-00-163
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
10/27/2000 |
On October 27, 2000, a Notice of Violation was issued for a severity Level III violation involving the failure to perform required evaluations for out-of-tolerance measuring and test equipment. |
EA-96-199
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
NOV
(SL III) |
08/01/1996 |
Violation of TS 3.5.F.1 inoperability of RCIC from inadequate design And inadequate post-modification testing. |
EA-95-252
Browns Ferry 1, 2 & 3 |
NOVCP
(SL III)
$ 80,000
W/drawal
of CP
|
02/20/1996 |
Discrimination. |