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NUREG 0933

Displaying 26 - 50 of 77

DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in NUREG-0471 [1] and addressed the establishment of surveillance test intervals and allowable equipment outage periods, using analytically-based TS criteria and methods. At the time the issue …
DESCRIPTION Following a plant transient or accident, provisions are required for long-term decay heat removal. Redundancy of components is required as necessary to assure that a failure in the RHR system will not impair the ability to maintain the plant …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background As identified in NUREG-0471, [1] Appendix K of 10 CFR 50 specifies the requirements for LWR ECCS analysis. These requirements call for specific conservatisms to be applied to certain models and correlations used in the …
DESCRIPTION This issue was documented in NUREG-0471 [1] and stemmed from an ACRS recommendation that the staff explore diverse means of obtaining ECCS capability for future plants. The ACRS also recommended the staff explore the issue in the context of …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue is identified in Appendix D of NUREG-0572 [1] and is one of the key observations made after the ACRS requested its members and consultants to make comprehensive reviews of all Licensee Event Reports (LERs) …
DESCRIPTION Background This issue was identified [1] after a review of LERs involving the failure or degraded performance of essential equipment that resulted from the failure of protective devices such as fuses and circuit breakers. The affected systems …
DESCRIPTION Background Flow-induced vibrations caused by vortex shedding resulting from rapid area change, buffeting due to random flow turbulence, fluid structures interaction instability, leakage excitation, steady operation of positive displacement …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This concern was identified by the ACRS as a result of their review [1] of LERs covering a period from 1976 through 1978 and, subsequently, a comprehensive review of the problem was completed which covered the LERs and …
DESCRIPTION Under the scope of the TMI Action Plan Item II.K.3 in NUREG-0660, [1] the NRC Bulletin and Orders Task Force conducted generic reviews of the loss-of-feedwater and small-break loss-of-coolant events on all operating reactors. These reviews …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In the event of a LOCA in which offsite power remains available, the reactor operator may choose to shut down the emergency diesel generators shortly after the LOCA. If, after the diesels are shut down, offsite power is …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue effects all PWR-type reactors (Westinghouse, CE, B&W). The issue as described, [1] , [2] , [3] concerns postulated accidents resulting from a steam line break which consequentially results in a steam generator …
DESCRIPTION Background This issue addressed the high rate of reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal failures that challenge the makeup capacity of the ECCS in PWRs. At the time this issue was identified [1] in 1980, RCP seal failures in BWRs occurred at a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised by the staff following a review [1] , [2] of operating events that indicated a significant number of ECCS spurious actuations, particularly, the four events that occurred at Davis-Besse during 1980. …
DESCRIPTION In a San Onofre Unit 1 Preliminary Notification issued in September 1980, it was reported that, during testing, the licensee had identified a problem with the design of the diesel generator sequencing circuitry. This problem occurred when a …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] when AEOD expressed concerns about the use inside containment of a particular polymer coating that could flake off and fail when subjected to DBA conditions. In addition to the concern for …
DESCRIPTION AEOD issued a memorandum [1] in which a potential safety issue involving combined primary and secondary system LOCAs was raised. The issue was discussed at Commission meetings on October 16, 1980 and on November 10, 1980. NRR informed AEOD of …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was initiated in response to an immediate action memorandum [1] issued by AEOD in September 1981 regarding desiccant contamination of instrument air lines. NRR responded to the AEOD memorandum by establishing a …
DESCRIPTION Concerns for inoperability of instrumentation due to extreme cold weather were raised [1] by AEOD after an event at Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) in which all four RWST instrumentation channels were lost when the level transmitters …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In January 1982, AEOD published a report (AEOD/C201 [1] ) on safety concerns associated with reactor vessel level instrumentation in BWRs. The report was forwared to NRR for further action. Safety Significance BWRs use …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Increasing attention has recently been focused on the integrity of RCP seals due to loss of cooling to the seals both in connection with PRA studies which are currently under review and from operating experience. [1] , …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Cracks were found in the normal make-up high pressure injection (MU/HPI) nozzles of several B&W plants following an inspection of the 8 B&W plants licensed to operate. These cracks appeared to be directly related to loose …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background PORVs and block valves were originally designed as non-safety components in the reactor pressure control system for use only when plants are in operation. The block valves were installed because of expected leakage from …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] when a number of concerns regarding DC power systems were raised during the review of the proposed resolution of Issue A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies." The main concerns …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On November 11, 1981, the DAILY REPORT-REGION I carried a "prompt report" from Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 indicating the licensee had been notified that the water tight integrity of the service water pump rooms in both …

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