United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment


ACCESSION #: 9809160155


ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE,
ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

JOSEPH A. WIDAY TELEPHONE
Plant Manager AREA CODE 716 546-2700
Ginna Nuclear Plant September 10, 1998

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk

Attn: Guy S. Vissing
Project Directorate I-1
Washington, D.C. 20555
 
Subject: 10 CFR Part 21 30 Day Report
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

Dear Mr. Vissing:

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), which requires "Written notification to the NRC ... on the identification of a defect or a failure to comply", the attached 10 CFR 21 report is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,

Joseph A. Widay

JSM

Attachment

xc: Mr. Guy S. Vissing (Mail Stop 14B2)
Project Directorate I-1
Division of Reactor Projects
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555


Regional Administrator, Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector

10 CFR 21 30 DAY WRITTEN REPORT

I. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:
NAME: Joseph A. Widay

Plant Manager Ginna Station

ADDRESS: Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation
89 East Avenue
Rochester, New York 14649
II. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The facility is the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant. The basic component is a Westinghouse DB-75 circuit breaker. This component was installed in a Class 1E Safety Related Bus. The breaker is the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker to Bus 16 (Safety Related Bus).
 
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:
The circuit breaker was manufactured by:
Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Nuclear Services Integrated Division
Box 78
Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0078
IV. NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY:
The DB-75 circuit breaker was retrofitted with an AMPTECTOR solid state trip unit per Westinghouse Instruction I.B. 33-850-6 more than ten years ago. Per the instruction bulletin the technician removed all tripper bar tabs from the tripper bar. Subsequently the instruction bulletin was revised to specifically leave the center tripper bar tab installed. There were no notifications to the plant to re-install the center tripper bar tabs on previously retrofitted breakers. The absence of the center tripper bar tab on the DB-75 circuit breaker for the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker allowed two tripper bar bushings to fall from their housing.
It is believed that, over time, the absence of the two bushings allowed flexing of the tripper bar. The tripper bar was found bent, such that it would not fully reset. The failure of the tripper bar to fully reset caused intermittent failure to close on the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker to Bus 16. With the identified deficiency in the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker it is possible that a single failure could render both safety trains incapable of performing their safety functions (buses 14 and 16). This deficiency constitutes a substantial safety hazard.
Between March 1985 and February 1988 the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker was installed with all tripper bar tabs removed. In February 1988 the DB-75 breaker, installed in the "A" Diesel Generator Supply breaker position on Bus 14, was retrofitted in the same manner as the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker to Bus 16. Between February 1988 and May 1996, Diesel Generator Supply breakers to both Bus 14 and Bus 16 were installed with all tripper bar tabs removed.
In May 1996 the Spare DB-75 breaker was installed in the "A" Diesel Generator Supply breaker position. This Spare breaker was modified correctly per the current revision of the Westinghouse instruction bulletin prior to installation. Although the potential for failure existed, the breakers were tested with regular surveillance tests to prove operability and the failure mechanism is of the nature that degrades over time. The missing tripper bar tab would not immediately bend the tripper bar upon removal of the tabs.
 
V. THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:
The information was obtained on July 27, 1998 after discussions with Westinghouse representatives. The missing tripper bar tabs were discovered March 25, 1998 during troubleshooting of a DB-75 breaker failure. The method of notification by the vendor was determined on July 27, 1998.
 
VI. IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:
There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers installed at Ginna in Buses 14 and 16. There is also one Spare breaker. The Bus 14 and 16 bus feeds and the two (2) bus tie breakers between Buses 14 and 16 were correctly modified per the revised instruction bulletin. The original Spare DB-75 breaker was also correctly modified prior to being installed into the "A" Diesel Generator Supply breaker position.
 
VII. THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE TAKEN; THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO COMPLETE THE ACTION:
All DB-75 breakers were inspected. Maintenance personnel installed center tripper bar tabs on the "B" Diesel Generator Supply breaker and Spare breaker (spare breaker was previously installed in the "A" Diesel Generator Supply breaker position from February 1988 to May 1996). Nuclear Engineering Services personnel performed a vendor document review. The review verified that all breakers are properly configured per applicable vendor documentation. The results of the review will be incorporated into maintenance procedures. All corrective actions are scheduled to be completed by December 31, 1998.
 
VIII. ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE GIVEN TO PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:
The tripper bar tab installation is verified by visual inspection, possible with the breaker in service. An industry notification was distributed at the time the tripper bar tab was discovered to be improperly modified.


*** END OF DOCUMENT ***


Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012